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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 266 Records
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1994 (1) TMI 298 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cheque under the Act on the date which is written on the said cheque and the six month period has to be reckoned for the purposes of section 138(a) from the said date. One of the main ingredients of the offence under section 138 of the Act is the return of the cheque by the bank unpaid. Till the time the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, no offence under section 138 is made out. A post-dated cheque cannot be presented before the bank, and as such the question of its return would not arise. It is only when the post-dated cheque becomes a "cheque" with effect from the date shown on the face of the said cheque, the provisions of section 138 come into play." 10. Hence submission No. (iii) also fails. 11. With regard to the fourth submission, it is a matter which relates to evidence and so it can be considered only during trial. 12. Since none of the submissions made by Mr. K. V. Sridharan finds acceptance with me, the petition fails and shall stand dismissed.
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1994 (1) TMI 297 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e till the date written on it. With effect from the date shown on the face of the sale cheque it becomes a "cheque" under the Act and the provisions of section 138(a) would squarely be attracted. In the present case, the post-dated cheques were drawn on March 12, 1990, but they became 'cheques' only on April 22, 1990, and April 28, 1990, the dates shown therein. The period of six months, therefore, has to be reckoned from the date mentioned on the face of the cheques. As the apex court has pointed out, section 138 has to be construed with reference to context. If the object of bringing section 138 of the Act on the statute has to be fulfilled, then the only interpretation which can be give to clause (a) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act is that a post-dated cheque shall be deemed to have been drawn on the date it bears. 5. In the result, the criminal original petition stands dismissed. Registry is to send the records expeditiously to the trial court.
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1994 (1) TMI 296 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant was unable to point out that there was such urgency in the present case that the employee could not have been accommodated till the end of the current academic year. We, therefore, while setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal, direct that the appellant should not effect the transfer till the end of the current academic year. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 295 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e court winding up the company and the official liquidator becomes the custodian thereof. His act is that of the company and, therefore, in the present case also he acts on behalf of the lessee-bank. It cannot be denied that the monthly tenancy rights or leasehold rights of a company are valuable assets and if the bank had not been subjected to winding up proceedings, the bank, under the lease would have been free to assign. As discussed above, I see no legal impediment in the assignment qua the leasehold rights in the premises. Moreover, this court has sanctioned the assignment of course, without prejudice to the petitioner's contentions in the present petition, which contentions are rejected as discussed above. In view of this position, I see no substance in the last contention. 12. In the result, the company petition is dismissed with costs. 13. At Mr. Doctor's request status quo with regard to the premises in question to be maintained for a period of three weeks.
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1994 (1) TMI 294 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Mohan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1994 (1) TMI 293 - CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... would otherwise be the case. I do not think that it is possible to spell out of the legislation any overriding purpose which assists in the construction of paragraph 3. Construed in the context of Chapter 1 of Part III of the Act of 1971 and Schedule 17, the purpose of paragraph 3 is to enable an allowance which would have been available if the equipment lessee had incurred the relevant capital expenditure to be made available for the benefit of the person who incurred the expenditure. For the reasons I have given I think that this appeal succeeds to the extent of the expenditure on the provision of central heating in council houses but fails as regard the miscellaneous items. Orders accordingly. Taxpayer companies to pay three quarters of Crown's costs. Application by taxpayer companies for certificate to appeal direct to House of Lords refused. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue; Denton Hall . Graham Aaronson Q. C. and Paul Morgan Q. C. for the taxpayer Companies.
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1994 (1) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.... That in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory. Likewise in State of Kerala and Ors. v. Allasserry Mohammed and Ors. , Hon Untwalia, J. speaking for the Supreme Court and while holding that Rule 22 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules is only directory, held that 'If the object is not frustrated and is squarely and justifiably achieved without any shadow of doubt, then it will endanger public health to acquit offenders on technical grounds which have no substance. 19. Therefore we are of the view that Rule 7(3) is only directory and not mandatory. No interference is called for in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1994 (1) TMI 291 - ITAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... I enumerated above and hold that there is a mistake rectifiable under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act in the order dated 30-4-1991 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. 18. In view of my conclusion that there are mistakes in the order passed by the Tribunal, it is not necessary for me to go into all the mistakes pointed out in the miscellaneous petition. Suffice it to say that if there is even one mistake, that is a mistake apparent from the record and the order of the Tribunal needs to be rectified to that extent provided for the purpose of this reference that was one of the mistakes pointed out in the miscellaneous petition. Since these mistakes are pointed out in miscellaneous petition and since I am of the opinion that they are mistakes apparent from the order of the Tribunal, I have come to the above conclusion without referring to the other points. 19. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for deciding the appeal according to the opinion of the majority.
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1994 (1) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t be held that the impugned order 1 (1962) 1 SCR 422 AIR 1961 SC 1381 (1961) 2 LLJ 419 was passed after fulfilling the requirement of Rule 3(1) of the Rules in view of the presumption as to the regularity of official acts which would be applicable and the absence of a recital in the order about the Governor being satisfied that it was either necessary or desirable to place Respondent I under suspension is of no consequence. The tribunal was, therefore, in error in invalidating the impugned order of suspension only on the ground that it did not contain a recital to the effect that Governor of Haryana was satisfied that it is either necessary or desirable to place Respondent I under suspension. The learned counsel for Respondent 1 has not shown any other infirmity in the order of suspension. 12.The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order dated October 12, 1992 passed by the tribunal in OA No. 1573/CH/91 is set aside and the said petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 289 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... however, preclude application of the principle in the cases pending adjudication. Any question on this point subsisting for decision on or after 1-6-1988 should be governed by the present declaration. 19. It is quite clear now that the revision order passed on the view taken of the legal effect of merger on the same way now as clause (c) of the Explanation declares, shall be free from any debate and the law as clarified should apply. That is why it has been said that the Explanation shall apply after 1-6-1988 as though it had been on the statute from the very inception. The words 'shall be deemed always to have extended' leave no doubt that clause (c) of the Explanation has retrospective effect and any order of revision coming in for judicial scrutiny shall have to be adjudged in the light thrown by the Explanation. 20. In the result, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 21. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 288 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of rubber tubes in the wheels of heavy automobiles there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that the rubber flap has to be treated as an accessory of motor vehicle. Although there is no direct evidence about the sale of the rubber flap in automobile market yet in view of its exclusive use it can be presumed that it is an item which is sold in the automobile market. In State of Orissa v. Dunlop (Supra), it has specifically been mentioned that flap is commercially a distinct identifiable commodity available for sale in the automobile market. In view of this also one of the tests laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mehra Brothers (Supra) brings the rubber flap in the category of automobile accessories. 11. For the reasons discussed above, I find that the Tribunal has rightly upheld the taxability of the turnover of rubber flap under the category of an accessory of a motor vehicle. These revisions thus have no force and are hereby dismissed with costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nowledge. That apart as held by the Board of Revenue, the order passed by the Tehsildar without confirmation by the Board is non est. A non est order is a void order and it confers no title and its validity can be questioned or invalidity be set up in any proceeding or at any stage. (13.) SO, we hold that the High Court is not right or justified in opining that the exercise of the power under Section 38 B is not warranted. It committed illegality in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue. The order of the High Court is set aside. The order of the Board of Revenue is restored. Consequently we hold that the Government, being the owner, need not acquire its own land and need not pay compensation to an illegal or wrongful occupant of the Government land. The direction or mandamus to acquire the land and to pay the compensation to the respondent is set aside. (14.) THE appeals are accordingly allowed. But in the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g the grant of sublease are clearly illegal. 24. We hereby set aside the order of the Division Bench dated October 5, 1993 and the orders of the learned Single Judge dated July 20, 1993 (except that part relating to appointment of Special Officer), August 4, 1993, August 6, 1993, August 11, 1993, August 16, 1993 and August 20, 1993 as well. 25. The parties are relegated to the position as on September 15, 1988. Somani Builders are hereby directed to deliver vacant possession to the Special Officer within one month from today. The learned Single Judge is directed to dispose of the application for contempt in its proper perspective confining himself to contempt jurisdiction. The Special Officer shall continue to be in possession till the disposal of contempt proceedings. This direction becomes necessary in view of the scramble for possession. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the civil appeal is allowed with costs which shall be home equally by Respondents 1 and 2 in this appeal.
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1994 (1) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... embers who had appeared in Courts notwithstanding strike calls given by any Bar Council or Bar Association. Besides, members of the legal profession should be alive to the possibility of Judges of different Courts refusing adjournments merely on the grounds of there being a strike call and insisting on proceeding with cases. (3.) THE matter will stand adjourned by six months to oversee the working of this interim order. It is hoped that it will work out satisfactorily. Liberty to mention in the event of any difficulty. We are grateful to Mr. Shourie for highlighting the issue. We are grateful to the learned Attorney General and all the other learned Counsels appearing before us for their positive contribution and broad out -look to solving the vexed problem of strikes. We do hope that we will not have an occasion to recall this matter on the ground that there has been any contravention of any of the above clauses. On this optimistic note we adjourn the matter for six months.
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1994 (1) TMI 284 - CEGAT-DELHI
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... ... ..... s that the aspect of use of other ingredients in the manufacture of copper (Brass) sheet and circles is a technological necessity and such use does not preclude the appellants from seeking the benefit of the notification in question. The notification has to be interpretted in such a manner as not to make otiose and deterrent. In the present case, the appellants had been enjoying the benefit from 1982 onwards. The Asstt. Collector had already passed order-in-original in their favour by his order dated 7-7-1982. The deptt. had not appealed against this order. Therefore, to reagitate the issue, the Revenue should point out any change in the state of affairs to deny the benefit. In this particular case, no such ground has been made out to debar from the view taken by the Deptt. in the adjudication and also from the clarification issued by the Board. In the circumstances, the appellant’s contentions are required to be accepted by allowing these appeals. Ordered accordingly.
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1994 (1) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a right of audience at the appellate stage. That is what this Court observed in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta’. We, therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi’ wherein observation is made in regard to the right of hearing. But that was not a case of a departmental inquiry, it was one emanating from Article 324 of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, those observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case. 4. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back to the High Court for disposal of the writ petition on the other grounds and contentions raised therein. Since the matter is fairly old, the High Court may expedite the same. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ehalf of defendants 1 to 3 is concerned, need not detain us, inasmuch as we have already held that the suit filed by the plaintiff, as such, is liable to be stayed in view of the applications for stay filed by the lenders i.e. defendant 4 and defendants 5 to 11 and, therefore, we leave this question open. 59. The result is that the appeals filed on behalf of defendant 4 and defendants 5 to 11 are accepted; the impugned order of the High Court dated June 17, 1993 and of the trial court dated June 23, 1992 are set aside and the suit is directed to be stayed as contemplated by Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act. The orders of the trial court on the application for stay filed on behalf of defendants 1 to 3 are also set aside but in view of our orders on the application filed on behalf of the lenders, no separate orders are being passed on the application for stay filed on behalf of defendants 1 to 3. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of the present proceedings.
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1994 (1) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onus that was being paid by the respondent-Company to the appellants was customary bonus payable at the rate of 10.5 per cent of the salary or wages could be justifiably drawn by the Tribunal having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and the High Court was in error in setting aside the award and holding that the bonus that was paid was not in the nature of customary bonus. 25. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated November 17, 1986 in Appeal No. 103 of 1983 as well as that of teamed Single Judge dated September 21, 1982 in Matter No. 754 of 1982 are set aside and the award dated April 16, 1982 made by the Eighth Industrial Tribunal holding that for the years 1974 to 1977 the appellants were entitled to payment of customary bonus at the rate of 10.5 per cent of the annual salary or wages earned by each workman concerned in each such year is restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rendered the advice for release of Vijay Kumar and other detenus" "a fortiori" it does not follow the Advisory Board will do the same thing. Even then it is function of the Advisory Board and not a ground for intereference as pre detention stage. 9. The High court has completely mis-understood the scope of liberalisation of policy in relation to import of gold and the conditions under which such import could be made. What is nexus between the policy and the Preventive Detention? Therefore not one of these three grounds on which the High Court choose to interfere at the pre-detention stage could be held to be tenable. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent before as could urge that this case of misuse of power for a wrong purpose. We find this argument has no substance. Nor again is there any delay in passing the order, as we see in the facts and circumstance of this case. Accordingly the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Criminal Appeal is allowed.
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1994 (1) TMI 279 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to issue directions in regard to the matter in dispute. The respondents urged, on the basis of Patel Veneers (P) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1988 72 FJR 471, that Section 19-A provides adequate alternative remedy and this petition should not be entertained until the petitioner exhausts that remedy. I will assume that Section 19-A does provide such a remedy. But, I do not consider it fair to drive the parties to seek the direction of the Central Government, after keeping this petition pending in this Court, for five years. 15. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, I allow this petition and make the following order (i) Order No. KR/10933/Enf.VI(2)/89/5821, dated February 28, 1989, made by respondent No. 2 is quashed. (ii) The respondents shall proceed to act on the basis that Evans Food Corporation and Super Traders are separate establishments for the purpose of Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 16. No costs.
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