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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 644 Records
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2005 (1) TMI 733 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ellant. Perused the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 28.1.2002. In the above, there is no substantial question of law involved, hence the Appeal stands dismissed.
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2005 (1) TMI 732 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... r considering eligibility to SSI exemption in respect of the goods cleared for home consumption. 3. The contention of the Revenue is that these corrugated boxes are not used in or in relation to the manufacture of shoe, which were exported. Therefore, the clearances of these corrugated boxes are to be included in the total clearance of the goods cleared by unit for claiming the small scale exemption notification. We find that this issue is now settled by the order CCE Kanpur Vs M/s. International Corrugators vide Final Order No. A/1500/04/NB(SM) dated 14.10.2004 whereby the similar contention of the Revenue was rejected by the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that there was no material produced by the Revenue that the cartons are not actually exported out of the country along with shoe. The exported goods are not taken into account while eligibility of small scale exemption. In view of the above decision of the Tribunal, we find no merit in the appeals. The appeals are dismissed.
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2005 (1) TMI 731 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... order of the CIT(A), rejecting the grounds of the Revenue in this appeal. 12. Consequently, Revenue's appeal, ITA No. 1592/Mum/2004 concerning Smt. Jyothi Prakash Chhabria, is hereby dismissed. ITA Nos 1593 and 1601 to 1603/Mum/2004 13. As already noted above, facts involved in these appeals concerning the other four assessees, viz. Smt. Jassibai Amarlal Chhabria, Smt. Sonia R Chhabria, Shri Sewaram S.Bajaj and Shri Ashok T. Ahuja HUF, are identical to those considered hereinabove, in the context of Revenue's appeal ITA No. 1592/Mum/2004 concerning Smt. Jyoti Prakash Chhabria, and as such, the outcome in that appeal would hold good in these other appeals as well. Therefore, for the detailed reasons discussed in the content of the appeal concerning Smt. Jyothi Prakash Chhabria in the foregoing paras, I dismiss these four appeals of the Department as well, confirming the impugned orders of the CIT(A) 14. In the result, all the five appeals of the Revenue are dismissed.
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2005 (1) TMI 730 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait- jacket formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable to the High Court. The only reason indicated by the High Court is that the accused belonged to rural areas. The same can by no stretch of imagination be considered either adequate or special. The requirement in law is cumulative. Considering the legal position as indicated above the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The respondents are directed to surrender to custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
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2005 (1) TMI 729 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... er, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2005 (1) TMI 728 - MADRAS HIGH COURT (MADURAI BENCH)
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... ... ..... al Court held that the parties should be impleaded. The impleadment of the third parties was upheld because fraudulent and forgery were alleged to have been committed. 12. In the present case the purchases by the petitioners are clearly hit by lis pendens. They are not entitled to be impleaded, since any right that they may have cannot be larger than the right of their vendors, assuming that they are bona fide purchasers. The Order passed in E. A. No. 98 of 2000 is to the effect that brother of one of the petitioners had purchased the very same property by fraud at a Court auction. It is claimed that this Order is subject matter of a pending C. R. P. But the fact remains that as on date, the Order passed in the E. A. would indicate that the petitioners cannot even claim any equity. There is no justification to interfere in the Order passed by the Court below. In the result, this revision is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C. M. P. and V. C. M. P. are closed.
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2005 (1) TMI 727 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ainant should not suffer any loss and in order that interest of justice be secured, the complainant - respondent shall take all steps to reopen the case as against accused 1 to 9 as well. Since the trial Court has already split up the matter against accused 1 to 9 who are also said to be responsible as alleged in the complaint, I deem it appropriate even at this juncture, to direct the trial Court to reopen and hear the matter against all the accused except accused 10. 16. In the result, the impugned order of splitting the case against accused 1 to 9 is set aside. The petition is disposed of with a direction to the complainant to take steps to proceed against accused 1 to 9 as well in addition to accused 11 and 12. The petitioners herein are at liberty to take all the best defense available to them to prove their innocence in the conduct of business of the company. Thereafter, the trial Court shall pass orders according to law, keeping in view of the observations made above.
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2005 (1) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of the public interest litigation - delay in filing - lease-cum-sale agreement - Challenged the Validity of building licence issued for construction of multi-storeyed/multi-apartments and direction to demolish the building already constructed on the site - permission granted by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation to the appellant for raising the construction up to third floor - violation of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules - HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the construction already started by the appellant in 1987 and building had come up to three floors. Thereafter it was stopped in 1988 and in March, 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The Writ Petition was filed in November, 1991 meanwhile almost construction was complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in the present case and learned single judge rightly held it. It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi storey buildings have come up in this area. Learned counsel has produced photographs to show that buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around this area.
However, we are satisfied that there is no prohibition under the provisions of the Act and Rules putting the ceiling on construction of the multi storey building. We are also satisfied that the delay is also fatal in the present case.
The sale purchase agreement has its own terms and conditions and the condition as reproduced above, only says that the building to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not used as a shop or a building or warehouse or used for manufactory operations by mechanical power. Therefore, in this final agreement which has come to be executed and which has been registered the condition is that the building has to be used for human habitation and there is no prohibition contained therein that it cannot raise multi-storeyed building.
Once the final agreement is executed then the lessee- purchaser becomes absolute owner of the schedule property and he has to abide by the conditions of the final agreement for sale and other provisions bearing on the subject. The final agreement only contains the condition that the lessee -purchaser should use the schedule property for human dwelling purpose and it will not be used in apartment of that building for purpose of shop or for warehouse or for manufacturing process, therefore, the view taken in Pee Kay Constructions case cannot be said to be a good law.
We regret to say that this interpretation does not bear out in the face of the language used in the Clause 2 of the final agreement which says that the building to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not for shop or warehouse or manufacturing purposes but that does not make out a case for prohibition of raising of the multi-storeyed building. Once the Municipal Corporation has permuted to raise construction more than three floor then this condition for construction will hold good and they are not contrary to any of the provisions of the Act. Section 505 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 only says that the Corporation shall exercise power in conformity with the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. Therefore, the Corporation at the time of granting permission has to keep in mind the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. But we have not been able to find any provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act or Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 where any ceiling has been applied on the construction of the multi-storeyed building. Therefore; we do not find that the Municipal Corporation has committed any illegality in granting permission to the appellant for raising construction up to third floor.
Thus, we are of opinion that permission granted by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation to the appellant for raising the construction up to third floor is not in violation of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
Hence, we set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and allow the appeal. The facts of C.A. are identical. Therefore, this appeal is also allowed for the reasons mentioned aforesaid. C.A, has been filed by persons who have already purchased the flats and they are living in the said flats of the multi-storeyed buildings. Therefore, third party interest has already been created. As such this appeal is also allowed for the reasons mentioned above. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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2005 (1) TMI 725 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... the connected papers. We do not found any merit in the same. The review petitions are dismissed.
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2005 (1) TMI 724 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... 2000 (93) ECR 226 (T). 6. We have carefully considered the submissions and on perusal of the citations before us, we find that the order passed by the Commissioner is just, legal and proper. There is no infirmity in the same. Furthermore, we find that the Tribunal, on the same set of allegations, has already set aside the order of the Commissioner in the case of Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. and Anr. (supra) by following the earlier judgments of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. (supra). The Tribunal also has upheld the utilization of modvat credit in respect of the same goods in the case of Vasavadatta Cement v. CCE, Belgaum (supra) by following the earlier ruling of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. We find all the citations squarely apply to the facts of the case. There is no merit in the Revenue appeals and the same are rejected. (Operative portion of this Order was pronounced in open court on conclusion of hearing).
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2005 (1) TMI 723 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (Supra) has already held, which is against the judgment of Pradeep Kumar's case. 7. The trial judge did not apply the law of the apex court though cited at page 3 of his judgment and the Division Bench of this Court and took the shelter of judgment of Pradeep Kumar's case to dismiss the application. The revision is therefore allowed. The order dated 26.7.2004 is set aside. The interim order dated 19.8.2004 is vacated. The matter is remanded back for reconsidering the matter afresh in the light of law laid down by the apex court and properly appreciate the prosecution evidence in the light of observations made in the body of the judgment and pass fresh order. 8. The Registry of this Court shall send a copy of this judgment to the District & Sessions Judge, Fatehpur within a week, for future guidance to the officer concerned and to direct him to properly appreciate the law laid down by the superior courts and follow the principles of law in true letter and spirit.
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2005 (1) TMI 722 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed therein. I have already considered the scope of Section 19(9) of the Act which merely treats a counter claim as a counter suit for the limited purpose of enabling the Tribunal to pass orders on the same application by following the procedure as required for disposal of the Banks' application. Fee payable on an application is a substantive provision. The Legislature has by express words given effect to a counter claim as a counter suit only for a limited purpose as provided for in Section 19(9); but did not make any reference to Section 19(2) of the Act nor is there anything expressly or impliedly to hold that the provision for payment of fee to O.A. would equally apply to a case of counter claim. No fee is payable on a counter claim raised after 17.1.2002 by which date the Act was amended till 21.1.2003 when the rules were amended providing for payment of court fee. o p /o p Hence the order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The Writ Petitions are allowed. o p /o p
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2005 (1) TMI 721 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... panies Act and take suitable action against the company. However, no case of oppression to the petitioner is made out by merely some wrongful actions taken by respondent-company as mentioned above. 37. In view of the above discussions, the petition is disposed of with the following directions that in order to end the dispute, the petitioner should be given liberty to sell his shares and go out of the company on return of his investment in shares, as she feels oppressed by the majority share- holders. In case, the petitioner is willing to part with her shares, the shares will be bought by the respondent at the fair price to be fixed by a valuer to be appointed by this Board. The valuation will be based on the balance sheet of the respondent-company as on 31-3-2001. In case the petitioner desires to go out of the company, then on an application made by her, a suitable valuer will be appointed by this Board in consultation with both the parties. 38. There are no orders to cost.
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2005 (1) TMI 720 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the judgment of the High Court dismissing second appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (’the CPC’) -section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (’the Act’) - benefit of the appellant was fenced off by barbed wire - award made u/s 11 of the Act and possession of the acquired land taken, the land would vest absolutely in the Government "free from all encumbrances" - HELD THAT:- In the first place, it is difficult for us to read the judgment in Tarsem Singh case [2001 (9) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT] as taking a view contrary to and differing from the law laid down by a larger Bench in Collector of Bombay [1955 (2) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT]). Secondly, we notice that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) is not in respect of an easementary right arising out of necessity. There does not seem to be any discussion on the said aspect of the matter in this judgment. The view taken in Collector of Bombay (supra), therefore, appears to hold the field, particularly where the nature of easementary right claimed is not capable of being evaluated in terms of compensation and arises out of sheer necessity.
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the distinction drawn by the High Court about non extinguishment of the right of easement arising out of necessity appears to be justified both on principle and precedent. In any event, we do not think that the present is a fit case where it is necessary for us to go deeper into this larger issue of law for we are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court under appeal is not one which is required to be interfered with in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Thus, we are of the view that the appeal has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. The appeal is hereby dismissed. No costs.
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2005 (1) TMI 719 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the House of Lords was reiterated being - "If a buyer orders goods of a certain description, and the seller delivers goods of a different description, it is open to the buyer to reject them. But if he does not reject them but keeps the goods, even if he does so in ignorance of the fact that they are of a description different from that provided for by the contract he is debarred from rejecting the goods thereafter, and can only fall back upon a claim for damages, as upon a breach of warranty." 29. The long gap after which goods were ostensibly rejected on the premise that they were defective/sub-standard is clearly fatal to the projected defense in the context of statutory law being Section 41 and 42 of the Sale of Goods Act. 30. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances, no friable issue arises. IA No. 5607/2004 is dismissed. CS(OS) 953/2003 In view of dismissal of IA No. 5607/2004, the suit is decreed as prayed for. Plaintiff would be entitled to costs.
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2005 (1) TMI 718 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lekar, JJ. ORDER Appeal admitted.
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2005 (1) TMI 717 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in his possession can be deemed to be his income. It cannot be said in the case of stolen property that the thief is the owner thereof and, therefore, provisions of Section 69A of the Act would not be applicable. The aforesaid case is of no assistance in the present case. The articles have been found in the possession of the applicant and he had not been able to prove that it belonged to some other person. It is not the case of stolen property. 9. In the case of Anil Kumar Roy Chowdhury (supra) the apex Court has held that the person who asserts that certain property is joint family property has to prove that it is so. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the present case. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no legal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. We, accordingly, answer all the questions referred to us in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (1) TMI 716 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Under these circumstances, the above appeal is admitted only on the following substantial question of law. Whether on the facts and the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was right in holding that neither the underwriting commission nor even the selling commission/ concession paid to the Lead Managers/Managers Merill Lynch International Ltd. UK and other Managers by M/s. Raymonds Ltd. would amount to fees for technical services within the meaning of the DTAA with UK ? 3. The learned counsel for the respondent waives service.
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2005 (1) TMI 715 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the appeal and to decide the appeal on merits. 8. We have carefully perused the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. Nos. 52937-52938/2003, dated 21-2-2004. The learned Single Judge, in his order observes, that the discretionary orders passed by the Tribunals and the quasi-judicial authorities will not be interfered by a Writ Court unless those order are either arbitrary or capricious. Further, the learned Single Judge has also taken into consideration the reasons assigned by the Appellate Tribunal for rejecting the application filed by the appellant firm for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has not committed any error whatsoever, which would call for our interference in these appeals. Therefore, concurring with the reasoning and the findings of the learned Single Judge, we reject the appeals filed by the appellant firm. Ordered accordingly.
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2005 (1) TMI 714 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... to how he has concluded that the items listed by him in annexures have arisen on account of mechanical working of metal. In order to fasten a huge duty liability on the appellants, it is very necessary that the revenue produces clinching evidence to show that the scrap has arisen out of mechanical working of metal. Merely coming to a conclusion by going through the Annexures and showing that one is satisfied that the items are scrap or have arisen during the course of mechanical working of metal is not sufficient. In our view, Revenue has not discharged its onus in order to confirm duty and impose penalty. It is also seen that Central Excise Officers have been posted in the appellants unit. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to sustain that the appellants had been indulging in clandestine activity for a long time. Hence there are no grounds for invoking a longer period. Under these circumstances the OIO has no merit. We allow the appeal with consequential relief.
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