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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 432 Records
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1996 (3) TMI 556 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , the turn-over will go below ₹ 2 crores. But the order of the Tribunal does not show any reference to this argument based upon ₹ 93 lakhs. If the counsel for the appellant says that he had argued this point and the Tribunal has not considered it, the proper course for him is to approach the Tribunal according to law, and it is for the Tribunal to go into the correctness of the said argument. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 555 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ipoornan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 554 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The Chief of Army Staff receives a report which reveals that an Army Officer has treacherously communicated intelligence to the enemy an Offence punishable under Section 34 of the Act. He however finds that to successfully prosecute the officer it will be necessary to examine some witnesses, ensuring presence of whom will not be feasible and exhibit some documents, disclosure of which will not be advisable in the interest of the security of the State. In such an eventuality he may legitimately invoke the Rule to dispense with the trial on the grounds that it would be impracticable and/or inexpedient. But to dispense with a trial on a satisfaction de hors the misconduct - like the bar of limitation in the present case will be wholly alien to Rule 14(2). 13. For the foregoing discussion we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore that of the learned Single Judge. The appeal is thus allowed with costs which is assessed at ₹ 10,000.
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1996 (3) TMI 553 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he sale deed. Since time is not the essence of the contract, the respondent had offered the payment of the amount before the expiry of the date of reconveyance but the appellant had refused to reconvey the same. The cause of action arose an expiry of eight years from the date of execution of later sale deed i.e. July 20, 1973. The appellant by conduct refused to execute the sale deed on July 19 1976 the suit was filed on July 20, 1976. The suit was filed within limitation from the date of refusal, i.e., July 19, 1976, i.e., next day. It is not a case of appreciation of evidence by the High Court in Second Appeal but one of drawing proper inference from proved facts which the first appellate court has failed in law to draw proper inference from proved facts and non application of law in the proper perspective. We, therefore, hold that the suit was filed within limitation. We do not find any illegality warranting our interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 552 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... egitimate expectation that he would be allowed to continue with contract inasmuch as indicated hereinbefore such a contingency is clearly stated in the decision of the Patna HighCourt in Pancham Singh (supra) and the other decisions referred to in Marine Engineer v. Siddeswar Halder reported in 1991 (1) Cal LJ 467, paragraphs 20 to 25 and an unreported decision of Babulal Jain, J. in Niranjan Papalia v. Hindusthan Steel Works Construction Ltd. in Matter No. 3743 of 1994 disposed of on 8th Sept. 1993. 149. In view of the foregoing reasons this writ application is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. The impugned orders dated 8-10-1995 and 10-10-1995 are quashed. Let a writ of mandamus issue accordingly. However, it goes without saying that it would be open to the respondent to pass an appropriate order after giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1996 (3) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not in existence or had no authority to administer the oath or that the signature and the endorsement on the document purported to have been made by the alleged authority were fake. If the copies of the affidavit are not faithful and do not include these endorsements, a valuable right of the respondent is taken away and considering the purpose which the copy of the endorsement would serve, it cannot be said that this portion would not be integral part of the affidavit. Since these details form an integral part of the affidavit, furnishing a copy without that portion would not be furnishing a complete copy, and in that event, merely because the returned candidate made an endorsement that it was a true copy, it cannot be regarded as a true copy. Considering the purpose that is to be served, I do not think that the lapse can be regarded as inconsequential. (emphasis supplied) 22. With respect, I would adopt the said observations as my own. The appeals deserve to be dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 550 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT, HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... that the arbitrator himself awarded interest and therefore by confirming the award no further direction need be given for payment of interest. But as already noticed, the award puts an outer limit for the payment of interest and that outer limit is the date of passing of the decree. Beyond that date, the Court should have provided for interest. We, therefore, allow the cross-objections filed by the respondent and direct payment of interest at 15 per annum from the date of decree till the date of payment. 24. In the result, the appeal and the C.R.P. filed by the Government of A.P. and the cross-objections filed by the contractor are partly allowed and the award and decree shall stand modified by directing the appellants-petitioners to pay a sum of ₹ 9,12,394/- with interest thereon from the date of award till the date of decree at 18 per annum (as awarded by the arbitrators) and 15 per annum from the date of decree till the date of payment. We make no order as to costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 549 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has come on record it cannot be ruled out that sample could not be tampered or the case property Exs. P. 1 and P. 2 were the same. Likelihood of the sample being tampered so long it remained in the custody of Ashok Kumar cannot also be ruled out. 6. For the reasons stated above, I am of the considered view that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. The same are liable to be set aside. Order accordingly. 7. But before parting, I want to put on record my appreciation for the hard work done by Mr. Mukesh Kalia. He was appointed as amices Curiae in this case. He not only assailed the judgment on legal grounds but did a good job in pointing out various lacunae and material contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He cited number of decisions on each of the points raised by him. I have not quoted all the authorities because I found that on the facts of this case, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. 8. Order accordingly.
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1996 (3) TMI 548 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of an unlicensed fire arm, which answers the description of an arm under the Arms Act, without any licence, in a Notified Area attracts punishment under Section 5 of TADA and an accused shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. In view of the established facts on the record, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Sanju Dutt's case (supra), fully applies to the case of the appellant since the appellant was having conscious possession of the weapon which answers the description of an arm under the Arms Act in a notified area. The conviction of the appellant recorded under Section 5 of TADA by the learned Designated Court in the established facts and circumstances of the case is well merited. 9. There is no. merit in this appeal which fails and is hereby dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 547 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... does not appear from the impugned order of the High Court. We cannot permit that to be done in these special leave petitions against the impugned order. Moreover, the High Court itself has observed that the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy available of a statutory appeal. Special leave petitions are dismissed accordingly.
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1996 (3) TMI 546 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rt in Gulab Ajwani & Ors. vs. Saraswati Bai (1977) 3 SCC 581 had laid the law. But the question is not resolved with the above finding alone. As stated earlier, the Financial Commissioner (Taxation) as a delegate of the Central Government has been invested with the power under Section 33 to revise any orders. All the authorities have half that after his brother Jawhar Singh had been granted assignment granted to them, the respondent in collusion with lower level revenue officials hat played fraud and obtained another assignment. The Commissioner under Section 33, therefore, has power to correct the same in his revisional jurisdiction though it was brought to his notice by way of revision by the respondent himself treating it to be a suo review. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not justified in quashing the orders. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the Division bench is set aside and that of the single judge and the authorities upheld. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 545 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... al, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 544 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his possession must be restored. In view of the aforesaid, the order passed by the appeal court dated 14th January, 1994 is set aside and we remand the case back to the appeal court. The appeal court will direct an enquiry as to whether Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar was the person who was actually evicted from possession on the strength of the order passed on 30.8.1993 and, if so, restore Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar back into the possession of the disputed premises. Before passing any order the court must satisfy itself as to the true identity and the wish of the appellant, Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar. If necessary, the Court will direct Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar to be personally present in the Court. The appeal court will be at liberty to pass such order in the interest of justice as it thinks fit after ascertaining the facts and in accordance with law. The respondents, who were the writ petitioners in this case, will pay costs assessed at ₹ 1,000/- to the appellant.
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1996 (3) TMI 543 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d fault with the appellant for taking a stand as they took before the High Court, namely, that the Government have no authority to give directions to the Electricity Board to appoint/absorb the first respondent as Electrician in the Board. The further question whether the direction in the facts and circumstances of this case will fall within the scope of Section 78-A is a debatable question and, therefore, the appellant cannot be condemned for taking such a stand before the High Court. This Court has time and again observed that making stringent observations/strictures must be avoided by the courts as far as possible and only in exceptional circumstances such observations can be made. We do not think the case on hand presents any exceptional circumstance. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the observations extracted at the beginning from the judgment of the High Court appealed against and dispose of the appeal accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 542 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... en, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 541 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ners died pending second appeal. Therefore, there cannot be any inconsistent decree as against the dead persons and against whom the decree dismissing the suit had become final and other contesting respondents whose rights are to be adjudicated in the second appeal. It would, therefore, be clear that the High Court has not committed any error of law. Since the appeal has already got abated as against the deceased respondents, the Court cannot proceed further on merits. Equally, the same situation is confirmed in this appeal also. Since respondent Nos. 8 and 14(i) had already died and their rights have become final; since their legal representatives have not been brought on record and the appeal stands abated as against them, it would be inconsistent if we go into the merits of the matter as against the contesting respondents in this appeal. Under these circumstances, this appeal also stands abated as against all the respondents. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 540 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... led to the commission as is provided in the vaimpu and is not entitled to anything more. In view of the specific language used in clause 8(c) of the vaimpu, the amount of auction discount has to be distributed among all the subscribers in proportion to their ticket share. We are further of the view that the forfeited discount of nonprized subscribers will have to be distributed among the subscribers who have remitted their subscriptions regularly. It is true that there is no specific provision in the vaimpu but since under the Act and the vaimpu the entitlement of the foreman has been indicated and the foreman cannot take anything more than what is provided for and therefore the amount has to be distributed among the regular subscribers. In our considered opinion, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court rightly answered the question and we do not find any legal infirmity in the same. This appeal is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1996 (3) TMI 539 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 538 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... and the Commissioner (Appeals) has not made any reference to these grounds in his order. He may consider them now. The appeals of the assessee are partly allowed. 25. Now we take up the appeals of the Revenue. The common ground taken in these appeals is that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in not considering the notional interest received on the interest-free deposit of ₹ 22,50,000 by the assessee from the lessee, Lohia Machines Ltd. for the purpose of determining the annual value of the flats under section 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 26. We have already considered these grounds along with the ground taken by the assessee on this issue while considering the assessee's appeals hereinbefore. For the reasons recorded therein, we have to dismiss the appeals of the Revenue. 27. In the result, the appeals of the assessee (Income-tax Appeal Nos. 9625 to 9627/Bom/89) are partly allowed and those of the Revenue (Income-tax Appeal Nos. 113 to 115/Bom/90) are dismissed.
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1996 (3) TMI 537 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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