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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 224 Records
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1984 (4) TMI 301 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ld also go against the respondents. Apart from this, the decision of the Tribunal in M/s. Kanwar Sewing Machine Co. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1983 E.L.T. 804), holds that domestic sewing machine would for the purpose of Heading 84.41 embrace within its scope such sewing machine as are used in houses or by tailors or dress makers etc. While Shri Narasimhan, learned Advocate for the respondents tried to distinguish this decision by explaining that it was based on C.C.C.N, notes in which there was distinction between domestic sewing machine and industrial sewing machine and no such distinction existed in the notes about the knitting machines, we think that the distinction pointed out is merely academic. It does not affect the domestic nature of the respondents machine. 25. In view of the foregoing, we set aside the order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) and restore that of the Assistant Collector of Customs (Refund), Bombay. The appeals are thus allowed.
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1984 (4) TMI 300 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . The F.C.I., has produced a certificate that the goods have already been used as manure/fertilizer and not otherwise for the purpose of agriculture. 6. The Exemption certificate provides that the Appellants are entitled to the relief. Hence, the appellants are entitled to the refund and there can be no doubt about it. But before parting with the case, we have necessarily to record the cavalier fashion in which the matter has been dealt with by the authorities. This litigation could have been avoided if the authorities below had only taken care to scrutinise the documents. Needless to say that the claim was lodged on 12-11-1973 and the relief has to be granted to the appellants nearly eleven years thereafter. The appellants have been driven from pillar to post even though they are legitimately entitled to the refund. The appeal is allowed and the Department will grant the refund in terms of ad hoc Exemption Order within 6 weeks of the date of communication of the order.
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1984 (4) TMI 299 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... hat, therefore, it could not be said to be imported in “a form indicative of their was for manurial purpose” as laid down in the said item No. 35. It was not the case of the Department that rock phosphate, if imported in pebble form and later mechanically converted into powder form, changed character of the rock phosphate or that it becomes a new substance or a new chemical. The Court held that rock phosphate, even if imported in pebbles, would not lease to be rock phosphate and item No. 35 would be attracted provided it was used for manurial purposes. Although there is a reference to the manufacture of fertilizers, the decision itself was on the basis that the Departments contention that the pebble form was not indicative of the imported rock phosphate being used for manurial purposes was not correct. In the circumstances we do not think that this decision has application to the facts of the present case. 22. In the result, the appeal fails and is rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 298 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sin and asking the party to file classification lists, price lists, etc. It is, therefore, evident that the assessments during the period 15-11-1969 to 23-5-1970 in respect of Alresat 201C (Hindresat 2001) were provisional and had not been finalised. Since the assessments had not been finalised and the chain of events shows that reasonable and adequate opportunity had been given to the appellants to put forth their case regarding the assessment of this particular product, it cannot be said that the proceedings leading to the demand contained in the adjudication order dated 1-3-1975 in respect of this product were vitiated by non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. We, therefore, uphold the assessment of this product as maleic resin and the appellants shall be liable to pay the duty levable thereon at the rate applicable to maleic resins for the period 15-11-1969 to 25-5-1970. 28. The appeal is disposed of in the light of the above findings and directions.
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1984 (4) TMI 297 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... squo;s argument that the Department had over a period of time accepted the classification under Item 68 and was not entitled to change it without cogent reason, we find that the amendment of the Tariff Item which specifically brought in tyre flaps was certainly a cogent reason for changing the practice. It is true that the Department should have woken up to this position earlier, but the fact that they did not do so does not mean that the appellants could continue indefinitely to enjoy a benefit which was patently contrary to the wording of the Tariff Item. As Shri Tayal pointed out, there can be no estoppel against a statute. We also find that the lower authorities had been fair in not seeking to go back more than six months beyond the date of the show cause notice. This objection, therefore, has no force. 23. In the result, we find that the orders of the lower authorities were correct. We accordingly confirm the Appellate Collector’s order and reject the appeal.
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1984 (4) TMI 296 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... - “Discount allowed in the Trade (by whatever name such discount is described) should be allowed to be deducted from the sale price having regard to the nature of the goods, if established under agreements or under terms of sale or by established practice, the allowance and the nature of the discount being known at or prior to the removal of the goods.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, the Supreme Court has laid lot of stress on the fact that trade discount to be treated as such must stand the test of established practice of the Trade and commerce. We find ourselves unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that after-sales service charges could be treated as a discount, in the light of the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court. For all these reasons, we are unable to agree with the contentions put forth by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 5. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1984 (4) TMI 295 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ng as they are covered by the D.G.T.D. Certificate and the end-use affidavit certifying their use in a particular machine, they have to be considered as components for initial manufacturing or setting up of that machine. He further contended that in their case, Winding Temperature Indicators and Oil Temperature Indicators were used only in the manufacture of Transformers and are covered by the necessary documentary evidence. 3. The Departmental Representative, after examining the D.G.T.D. Certificate and End Use affidavit etc. agrees that the goods to the extent which are covered by the D.G.T.D. certificate would be eligible for concessional assessment under the said notification. 4. It was noted that although the number of such Indicators imported was eight in all, the D.G.T.D. Certificate covers only six Indicators of different models. The appeal is, therefore, admitted to the extent they are covered by the D.G.T.D. Certificate. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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1984 (4) TMI 294 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ion notification. In the light of all these facts, and the judicial decisions referred to by Shri Mehta, we find that there is considerable weight in his contention that penal action should not have been taken in this case and that at most a warning could have been given. As already observed, even the Additional Collector recorded that a lenient view was being taken, but went on to impose a fine of ₹ 1,00,000/- which in the circumstances cannot be considered at all lenient. 12. In the result, we hold that the Additional Collector was right in treating the goods as a canalised item in terms of Appendix 8 of the ITC Policy for 1982-83. He was however not justified in confiscating the goods subject to a fine of ₹ 1,00,000/-. We accordingly set aside the confiscation of the goods. The fine of ₹ 1,00,000/- which we were informed had been paid by the appellant should be refunded to them. The Additional Collector’s order is modified to this extent only.
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1984 (4) TMI 293 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... l duly paid. This arises from the inherent nature of a rebate and the terms of the notification and the relevant rules. However, these considerations would not stand in the way of an exporter being entitled to a rebate of the entire amount of the duty paid by him, if the value of his exports was sufficiently high. We do not find any justification in the notification for making an apportionment in the manner done by the Collector. We therefore hold that the Collector was wrong in making such an apportionment, and that he should have allowed the appeal before him to the extent of allowing the rebate upto the total quantum of duty paid during the two months in question. 24. In the view that we have taken the appeal of the Department fails and is hereby rejected. The appeal of the manufacturers succeeds to the extent that rebate should be permitted to the extent of the duty paid by them during the two months in question, namely, ₹ 20,568.86, and is otherwise rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 challenged - Held that:- Neither of the contentions has any force. As regards the attack under Art. 14, sufficient material has been placed in the counter-affidavit of Shri K.S. Venkataramani, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance (filed in W.P Nos. 918-953 of 1977) showing how the classification made between the two categories in the context of making a declaration under S. 16 in relation to gold owned, possessed, held or controlled by them is based on intelligible differentia having a nexus to the object of the Act. The submitted material in the counter-affidavit not merely furnishes the intelligible differentia for the classification made but also shows that the classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act and the reasons for denying the exemption limits to licensed dealers or refiners are also valid and referable to the object of the Act.
As regards the second ground of challenge it is difficult to appreciate how the provision could be regarded as unnecessary or one which casts an unreasonable burden on the licensed dealer or refiner. In fact the reasons for introducing the provision as indicated above justify its enactment if the objects of the Act are to be achieved.
Under S. 16(7) it is provided that the licensed dealer or refiner shall make a declaration “in accordance with the provisions of this section” which means he has to do so within 30 days of his acquiring the owenership, possession, custody or control of such gold. With such time-limit being provided the burden cast cannot be said to be unreasonable, especially when the provision is found to be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Act. Having regard to the above discussion, the challenge to the constitutionality of S.16(7) must fail.
A remedy by way of an appeal to correct any erroneous order that may be passed under Sec. 52 has been provided for. In this view of the matter it is difficult to accept the contention that Section 52 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power or for that reason the said provision is unconstitutional. The challenge to that section therefore, has to be rejected.
The power to extend the initial period or the extended period must be exercised subject to the observance of the aforesaid two safeguards. In view of the above discussion it is clear that the challenge to Section 79 and the second proviso thereto has to fail.
The purpose served by sub-rule (2)(a) of Rule 3 is entirely different from the purpose served by one or more of the steps that are required to be taken by a dealer under sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 and therefore, it cannot be said that because of the provision contained in sub-rule (2)(a) the steps contemplated under sub-rule (1) are unreasonable. The validity of the amended Section 100 read with Rule 3(1) must therefore be upheld.
We find some substance in the grievance made by the petitioners and when these aspects of the amended Forms were put to the Counsel for the Respondents, he fairly conceded that either the new Forms will have to be suitably revised or the old Forms could again be revived. We, therefore, direct the Administrator to look into these grievances and remedy the same by taking appropriate action and hope that in the meanwhile no action penal or otherwise would be taken against licensed dealers for failure to maintain accounts in the amended Forms G.S. 11 and G.S. 12.
The challenge to S. 27(7)(b) of the Act, in furtherance whereof the facility of effecting peripatetic sales of gold ornaments through travelling salesman in various parts of the country was withdrawn, must also fail. Section 27 (7) (b), which confines a licensed dealer to carry on business as such dealer to the premises specified in his licence, being regulatory in character does not violate any of his rights under the Constitution. W.P. dismissed.
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1984 (4) TMI 291 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... Excise and Customs) Act, 1958 respectively. 10. When the High Court of Bombay had already interpreted the two expressions and in the absence of any judgment to the contrary by the Supreme Court the question of referring to the High Court for interpretation of the same expressions does not arise. On this ground we refuse to refer the questions set out in the application to the High Court. 11. If the Bench which decided the appeal did not follow the decisions of the High Court of Bombay, the remedy of the applicants is not by way of a reference application. In considering the reference application the Bench does not sit in judgment over the Order-in-Appeal No. 21 of 1983. It also has no power to review the orders so passed. The applicants in our opinion have chosen a wrong remedy. 12. After careful consideration of all the aspects and for the reasons stated earlier we refuse to refer the questions set out in the application and reject this Reference Application.
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1984 (4) TMI 290 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s/panels. On seeing the sample and after a careful consideration of the matter, we find that these units/panels are a composite article in which all the three principal materials, namely, glass, aluminium tubing and the dessicant, are not only present in significant quantities but also all the three functionally play an active part. In the scheme of the Central Excise Tariff, the classification of such a composite article cannot be decided on the basis of only one of the active materials. In the absence of a specific entry covering such composite articles in the Tariff, we hold that they are correctly classifiable under the residuary Item 68. 8. To sum up, we order that the two products of the appellants mentioned at sub-items (i) and (ii) of paragraph 3 above shall be classified under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. Any consequential relief accruing to the appellants shall be given to them. The appeal is allowed in these terms and the cross-objection is rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 289 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d is in fact used in patented preparation for this very property as it enables proper penetration of the active therapeutic components into otherwise impenetrable tissues and areas. That it is used as a drug for healing or to aid healing may be true and we think is quite true. But unfortunately, we are on the matter of assessment and our only objective is to see, what, of the many headings, is the most suitable heading. Item 68 is not a heading as it has no description or nomenclature. It covers only goods that cannot be covered by the preceding 140 or so heading. Unless the product has been rejected by all, Item 68 cannot accept it. 9. Can we say that SLS has no heading into which it fits ? Cannot, Item 15AA fits it well and perfectly, because this heading is designed for just such surface active preparations. All the arguments advanced on behalf of M/s. Anand Synthochem Pvt. Limited will avail it nothing in view of this fundamental fact. 10. We reject the appeal.
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1984 (4) TMI 288 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... o-polymerization product”. 42. However earlier in the same paragraph he says- “it is amply clear that the product in dispute is a co-polymer of acrylonitrile and other monomers. The molecular weight of polyacrylonitrile is also about 80000. The product is obtained as co-polymerization product”. 43. The Assistant Collector has completely contradicted himself; nor does Explanation II exclude this product from the scope of the description of polymerization and co-polymerization product. 44. We agree with M/s I.P.C.L.’s argument that the Appellate Collector was in complete error when he divided the subject Item 15A(1) into a first part and a second part. We see no logic or need for such a division, but for reasons we have detailed in our discussions above, that order is not very important now. 45. We accordingly reject the appeal and direct that M/s. I.P.C.L. should pay the duty on the polyacrylonitrile powder under 15A(1) as demanded.
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1984 (4) TMI 287 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e Saccharine 550, after treatment remained Saccharine. On this ground Shri. Roy wanted the show cause notice to be discharged. For the Department, Shri V. Lakshmi Kumaran stated that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Spinnerettes was against the Department. Though it was a Single Bench decision, he cannot say whether the Department had contested it. He also brought to the notice of the Bench that under Notification No. 118/75, dated 30-4-1975 goods falling under Tariff Item 68 and used in the factory of production are exempt from duty. 5. Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances and the various decisions cited by the respondents, we agree with their contentions and confirm the order of the Appellate Collector. We hold that re-shelling of roller shafts carried out by the respondents does not amount to manufacture for purposes of liability to duty under Tariff Item 68. We accordingly discharge the show cause notice and reject this appeal.
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1984 (4) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d permitted by Rule 10. We have already said so and that Rule 10 had no application to the case. 19. The question of Bhor’s eligibility to the Rule 56-A concession has been raised before us, the Sr. DR contending that Bhor is not eligible to it at this stage with retrospective effect and Shri Patel contending that to deny the benefit would be grossly unjust It does not appear that this point was raised before the lower authorities and we do not have before us a finding thereon. As such, we refrain from expressing any view on the question. Bhor may, if they so wish, raise this question before the lower authorities. 20. In the result, the Appellate Collector’s order is confirmed subject to the modification that duty in respect of clearances prior to the issue of the show cause notice shall be restricted to the period permissible in terms of Rule 10 read with Rule 173-J viz. 12 months. The appeal is allowed to this limited extent and is otherwise rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 285 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... on of M/s. Paper Tech. Consultants, Bombay dated 21-7-1980 who in respect of this machinery has certified that this machine was expected to produce 4500-5000 tonnes per annum. Further, when there is a doubt in interpreting a fiscal statute, benefit of the doubt should be given to the assessee. The Appellate Collector has pointed out that the DGTD has not referred to “installed capacity” in his letter dated 15-5-1979. But a perusal of the prior correspondence clearly indicates that the opinion of the DGTD was sought for only in respect of the installed capacity and that he has issued the communication in regard to it. Of course, on some days the production was above 20 M.T., but on that basis one cannot approve that the installed capacity was more than 5000 tonnes since we find from the show cause notice that on several days, the production ranged between 16-17 M.T. Hence, we are of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and the appeals are allowed.
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1984 (4) TMI 284 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... entral Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Gold Control Act, 1968. The period of limitation as provided in the three Acts for preferring of appeals, is applicable. All the six appeals are under the Customs Act and as such, all the six appeals should have been filed within the period prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962. However, we hold that the appellant was bonafidely preparing the writ petition for filing in the High Court and the time taken in the preparation of writ petitions and time taken in the High Court is sufficient cause for late submission of the appeals. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for the late submission of the appeals and as such, considering the facts and circumstances of these matters, we condone the delay in the filing of the six appeals. We are condoning this delay in view of the observation and wishes of the Hon’ble High Court and further observe that this order shall not be a precedent in other cases.
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1984 (4) TMI 283 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e the texturising surcharge even though admittedly they were not the spinners of the base yarn. The appellants’ reliance on Sulekh Ram’s case is correct. In the context of the peculiar scheme of Tariff Item 18 and the exemption notification, plain yarn available in the market had to be regarded as having paid the base duty on its removal from the spinning mill. If the Department had evidence that this was not so in any particular case, the Department should have to initiate proceedings against the concerned spinning mill for unauthorised removal of the base yarn and demand the base stage duty from that mill. The customers who purchased the base yarn from the market or the processors who simply texturised such yarn could not be called upon to prove the duty paid character of the base yarn and to pay the base stage duty if they could not give such proof. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned demand and allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (4) TMI 282 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the assessee shall pay the same (duty) on demand being raised by the Range Supdt. for subsequent period and the same shall be deemed to have been confirmed by the issue of this order”. In other words, by this order, the Assistant Collector confirmed the demands which were yet to be raised as on the date of passing his order. We do not have to say anything more to show how the Assistant Collector’s order suffered from irregularities and illegalities. The Appellate Collector’s order also suffers from the same defects. We are surprised over the facile manner in which the lower authorities have gone about their quasi-judicial functions. 7. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal allowed. Consequential benefit shall be granted to the appellants within 3 months from the date of communication of this order. In the view of the matter which we have taken, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the other contentions of the appellants.
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