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Showing 21 to 40 of 473 Records
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1996 (7) TMI 582 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der put on notice about the interim order, then it is deemed that the respondents also put on notice about the same especially in the absence of the plea that the respondents have not been communicated about the interim orders by the Government Pleader. But, however, on the date of removal of the obstruction, as contended by the Government Pleader, the interim order was not in force. But on this technical ground the respondents cannot be said to have committed the disobedience of the order of this Court. But, however when the question of wilful or intentional disobedience comes in, I am of the view that the explanation submitted by the second respondent can be accepted. More over the second respondent has stated in his counter affidavit that he had instructed his authorities to restore possession to the petitioner. Taking into consideration of this aspect also, I find that the respondents have not committed any wilful contempt of court. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (7) TMI 581 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as regards revision of rates of tariff was not arbitrable. Similarly, a suit for damages for disconnection was filed and the question arose whether it was arbitrable. In Mysore Manufacturers & Traders v. State of Kamataka AIR1982Kant54 , the learned Single Judge of the High court had held that the dispute was not arbitrable and, therefore, the reference of the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration Act was not available. This Court in Bassi's case (supra) had held that the dispute for the arbitration for the damages caused due to disconnection was not arbitrable under either of the two Acts. In that view, the High Court and courts below were clearly in error in holding that the matter was to be referred to arbitration and arbitrator had to decide the dispute as to arbitrability or on merits. 15. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances without costs. The decrees of all courts stand set aside and suit stands decreed as prayed for. No costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 580 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ner stated hereinabove, shall be reinstated in service forthwith. We are also satisfied, on an overall view of the matter, that the 1st respondent Corporation - an instrumentality of the State - has unnecessarily delayed the final disposal of the entire proceedings. If one expected a "fair and impartial" deal from the 1st respondent, he would feel disappointed. We are constrained to say so, on the facts of this case. So, we further direct that such of those persons reinstated after identification, as indicated above, shall also be paid back wages calculated at 70 of the "normal earnings", from the date of the expiry of the period specified in C.A. No. 1.55/90, i.e. , 17.4.1990, till they are reinstated. It is ordered accordingly. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Tribunal appealed against and allow this appeal in the manner indicated hereinabove with costs - costs quantified at ₹ 25,000 payable to appellant by the 1st respondent Corporation.
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1996 (7) TMI 579 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rned Single Judge of the High court cannot be sustained and the same are hereby set aside. This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law after taking into consideration the objections to be filed by the appellant herein seeking the setting aside of the award. Since, the matter has been pending for a sufficient long time, we consider it appropriate to grant 30 days time to the appellant to file its objections to the award before the trial court and direct the trial court to dispose of the matter after granting an opportunity of hearing to both sides expeditiously and as far as possible within a period of six months from the date of communication of a copy of this order. The appellant shall file the objections to the award in the trial court within 30 days from today, without waiting for any formal notice from the trial court in that behalf. 20. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 578 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... issuing the sale certificate. The period of one year limitation, now prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1973, in substitution of the three years period prescribed under Article 180 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, is reflective of the legislative policy of finalising proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction-purchaser to ask delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute, rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a suit for possession in a regular way. Thus for the aforesaid reasons, we have no hesitation to allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, restoring that of the First Court, which we hereby do, relegating the first respondent to the remedy of a suit, should he be so advised, but without any order as to costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 577 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lleged contemnor to be in contempt. Having regard to the gravity of the contumacious statements, the recklessness with which they are made, the intemperateness of their language, the mode of their publication in a writ petition in this Court and the alleged contemnors influential position in society, I do not think that punishment only in the nature of a fine would be adequate. A contemnor such as the present must also undergo imprisonment. Accordingly, the alleged contemnor is convicted for contempt and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine in the sum of ₹ 2,000 (Rupees two thousand). In default of such payment within three months, the alleged contemnor shall undergo further simple imprisonment for period of one month. In view of the conviction and sentence, the Court Marshal of the Court is directed to take the Contemnor into custody and confine him to Tihar Jail for his undergoing the sentence as imposed in the case.
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1996 (7) TMI 576 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o.(Supra) and it was held that definition of expression 'business' in Madras General Sales Tax Act after amendment and amended definition of business in Madhya Pradesh Act is more or less similar. We express our respectful disagreement with the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court. We may note that the said decision does not refer to the fact that in Burmah Shell Oil Co.'s case, considering the case of similar definition of 'business' in Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court affirmed the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in 27 Stc 42 which squarely dealt with the question as to whether Transport Corporation was a dealer or not. The decision of Bombay High Court in Controller of Stores, Central Railways Vs.Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, 99 Stc 222 would not be applicable as it deals with the case of Railways. (16) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer both the questions in affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (7) TMI 575 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ty attracting an obligation to pay an amount of tax absolutely disproportionate with the value of the property and means of the owner. In all such cases under the present law, the assessee must deposit the tax before he may deserve a hearing from the Appellate Authority. This provision too deserves to be suitably amended so as to confer a discretionary power on the Appellate Authority allowing dispensation of the deposit of the amount of tax wholly or partially in very deserving cases depending on the facts of individual case and for reasons to be recorded. Provision may be made for payment of interest so as to adequately compensate the Corporation for the delayed recovery in the event of appeal being dismissed or interim order being vacated. Such a provision would serve the ends of justice giving relief to the assessee/appellants in deserving cases and reduce the filing of writ petitions in superior Courts. 37. Let a copy of this order be placed on the record of CWP 479/96.
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1996 (7) TMI 574 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ken into consideration and, therefore, the deduction allowed or allowable under section 35CCA should also be allowed as a deduction while computing the distributable income of the assessee for the purposes of section 104. 24. With regard to shipping and clearing refund of ₹ 4,35,160, though it is initially assessed as part of the income by the Assessing Officer, in appeal against the said addition, the first appellate authority had deleted the said addition. Thus, the deletion of ₹ 4,35,160 formed part of the assessment which is ultimately made against the assessee. As already stated, the assessed income should be duly taken into consideration while computing the distributable income under section 104. Since the said amount is no longer available as part of the distributable income, the question of contravention of section 104 with regard to the said amount does not arise. 25. In the result, since the department fails in all the three appeals, they are dismissed.
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1996 (7) TMI 573 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , in our view, rightly arrived at the conclusion that there was inter se no conflict between the two. There may be certain areas such as provision for civil amenities in which there is identity of purpose but these are ancillary and incidental to the main purpose of the respective two statutes. The suggestion drawn from the Assembly debates, to which our attention has been drawn, while passing the 1961 Act, suggestive of the fact that the industrial estates or industrial areas on ripening were meant to be kept under the purview of the 1961 Act until some civic administration in the form of a Panchayat or Municipality could take over is not supported by any statutory provision available in the respective two Acts. As said before the topics of legislation being different, there was no question of their rubbing against each other because being enacted under two different legislative fields. We therefore find no merit in these petitions. They are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 572 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (7) TMI 571 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had been made more no assumptions than on concrete evidence which was required to be adduced. Nowhere was the finding recorded by that Court that damages were altogether not due or that the appellant Company was not liable; the period involved therein being from 1-3-1979 to 28-2-1992. Much time has elapsed thereafter. The respondent Company continues to be in possession of the premises in question. It would in any case be liable to pay for the use and occupation thereof and that liability was only required to be given a legal, character, depending upon the quality of occupation. The High Court, in our view, committed no wrong in putting the negated claim of damages on the scale of justice as a balancer, before granting relief, in setting aside the orders of eviction and effecting a remand, for fresh disposal in accordance with law. For the foregoing reasons, we find no case is made out for our interference. As a result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, with costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 570 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... adesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957, payment of tax is not one of the conditions prescribed in those Rules. Therefore, in our view, the defence taken by the respondent is untenable. (3) WE may also point out here that in M/s. Dabur India Ltd. v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 1814. The Supreme Court observed that Government should not take extra -legal steps or manoeuvre to coerce citizens to make payment which they are not legally obliged to make. Relying on the observation of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as the petitioner is exempted from payment of tax, non -issuance of the way bills is illegal. We do not consider it necessary to go into the exemption of tax. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, even if any tax is due from the petitioner, denial of the way bills is not the proper way to recover the tax. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 569 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... m the scheme of the Act it is clear that the Central Government is vested with discretion to determine the policy regarding the grant or renewal of leases. On matters affecting policy and those that require technical expertise, we have shown deference to, and followed the recommendations of, the Committee which is more qualified to address these issues. o p /o p We are. therefore, of the view that the Central Government was justified in issuing its order dated August 17 ,1995. o p /o p For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court and the Committee were justified in the view they took. Consequently the appeals filed by TISCCO stand dismissed. IDCOL has filed the appeals on much the same grounds as TLSCO while additionally claiming that the Committee should have heard its claim too while hearing the other parties. Since we have heard them at length, the grievance does not. survive. Hence IDCOL's appeals must also fail. Cost, cost in the cause. o p /o p
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1996 (7) TMI 568 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er cutting the long fibre into short fibre resulted into a new and different article of commerce and whether it amounted to manufacture or not. This was negatived by their Lordships. This case does not help the petitioner. The case of Pio Food Crackers (supra) is also of no help in the present case. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, 1964 MPLJ 705 (SC) AIR 1964 SC 1006 is a case under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act (Act No. 30 of 1950) in which the sales-tax was imposed on tobacco imported in Madhya Bharat, whereas no tax was imposed for the tobacco produced in the State. This was found to be invalid under Article 301 of the Constitution. But as already held above that 'fee' is not an 'excise duty', it is a fee for parting away the privilege of the State for manufacture of liquor. Therefore, this case also stand distinguished. 14. As a result of above discussion, we do not find any merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 567 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... f the case and in law, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in holding that the sums of ₹ 32,759 and ₹ 7,349 representing the price attributable to the Furniture and Fixture and office equipment should be treated as capital receipt in the hands of assessee and further erred in holding that the Assessing Officer should work out profit under section 41(2) and/or capital gains in relation to this amounts with reference to the actual cost/written down value as per the assessment records." As already observed above, the Commissioner (Appeals) has directed the Assessing Officer to work out profit under section 41(2) of the Act and/or capital gains with reference to actual cost/written down value of the furniture and fixtures as per the assessment records. The direction issued by the Commissioner (Appeals) is in tune with the legal provisions. We find no infirmity in the direction issued by the Commissioner (Appeals). 22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (7) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... year 1992 was about ₹ 400/- per sq. years, inclusive of the land cost. This figure too was arrived at, one knows not from where without determining the age of the building, the quality of construction and citing appropriate instances. The approach of the authorities, to say the least, was highly vain, casual and unsatisfactory and dehors any constructive material on the basis of which one could have said that the decision arrived at by the first respondent was fair and reasonable. We cannot approve of such an assumptive posture of the respondent in treating the appellant as an evader. We must, therefore, upset the impugned order of the first respondent and the proceedings for the supposed deficient payment of stamp duty, but confining the end result to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, when the valuation fixed is at least not below the minimum prescribed under Section 341 of the Stamp Rules. For the fore-going reasons, this appeal is allowed with costs.
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1996 (7) TMI 565 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sition of the asset was not available with the Assessing Officer during the relevant assessment year 1992-93. The information is disclosed in the return submitted for the assessment year 1995-96. It may be that the petitioner was not bound to disclose this information in the return for the assessment year 1992-93, but nevertheless if the information is now made available to the Assessing Officer and if on that basis, he bona fide believes that there is escapement of income, the notice issued by him under section 148 cannot be regarded as invalid. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that no interference is warranted at this stage under article 226. 7. In the result, the petition is dismissed. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgment are only tentative observations and all the contentions of the parties are kept open. At the oral request of Mr. Bhujle, the interim relief is continued for a period of four weeks from today.
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1996 (7) TMI 564 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on 135(2) of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909 which is similar to Section 253(a) of the Act in the following term "The provisions contained in section 135 of the Indore Municipal Act will be applicable to things done under the Act. It is manifest that in the present case the order of dismissal passed by Shri Ghatpande was beyond his jurisdiction and is therefore not an act done under the Act." The dismissal order in the present case could only be passed by following the procedure laid down under rule 35 of the Rules. The Municipal Board had no jurisdiction or authority to dismiss the appellant without following the mandatory procedure. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not justified in reaching the conclusion that the order dismissing the appellant was within the provisions of the Act. We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and decreed the suit of the appellant with costs. We quantify the costs as ₹ 20,000/-.
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1996 (7) TMI 563 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ich S.L.P. (Criminal) No.2336 of 1990, as earlier noticed stands dismissed by this court on 15.2.1991. The evidence on the record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Act was made by the appellant. May be the appellant was in agreement with his elder brother regarding 'demand' of 'dowry' but convictions cannot be based on such assumptions without the offence being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The courts below appear to have allowed emotions and sentiments, rather than legally admissible and trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment. The evidence on the record does not establish the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. This appeal, thus,succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.
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