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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 63 Records
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1966 (8) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... outset and refused to take part in the proceedings. Though the notification under s. 4 was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on February 14, 1957, Award No. I was made on December 11, 1959 and Award No. 2, on June 27, 1960. The appellants say that they came to know that the awards were made only on September 15, 1960, and they filed the petition on October 26, 1960. It 'cannot, therefore, be said that there was such an inordinate delay as to preclude the appellants from invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the other two questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. In the result, the appellants will be entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from giving effect to the said two awards. The order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed with costs here and in the court below. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntended that because the plaintiff Bijendra Narain was receiving income of the lands of his share no decree for accounts could be made. The High Court rejected the contention that no account would be directed in favour of the plaintiff on that account. They pointed out that the mere fact that the plaintiff was in possession of some portion of properties of the joint family since 1941 cannot possibly absolve the defendants, who were in charge of the management of the properties, from rendering accounts of their dealings with the joint family estate. The plaintiff was since September 1941 severed from the joint family in estate and also in mess and residence, and he was entitled to claim an account from the defendants from September 1941, but not for past dealings. The fact that the plaintiff is in possession of some of the properties will, of course, have to be taken into account in finally adjusting the account. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 33 and 34 the older establishments are treated as equally as possible, except where the pendency of cases has necessitated different rules to make the Act applicable to them. Uniformity in each class has been achieved and there is no discrimination. As the power to frame a new bonus formula cannot be gainsaid, the power to classify cannot also be denied. The Act further confers power to exempt and remove doubts and difficulties (which provisions are unfortunately criticized) and they can be invoked where in spite of so much care there is hardship in a special case. In our judgment the Bonus Act is validly enacted and this appeal must fail. We would dismiss the appeal and the writ petitions with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Industrial Tribunal set aside. The writ petitions are allowed in part and ss. 33, 34(2) and 37 are declared ultra vires. There will be no order as to costs in all these proceedings.
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1966 (8) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pears that he was represented by two eminent advocates-Sri V. T. Rangaswami Iyenger and Sri R. Krishnamoorthy Iyer-in the trial court who knew both these languages and who would not have allowed the interest of the appellant to be jeopardised even to the smallest extent. In our opinion, the irregularity has not resulted in any injustice and the provisions of s. 537, Criminal Procedure Code are applicable to ,cure the defect. Lastly, it was submitted that the 6 items of allged cheatinwere combined together in one charge and the conviction of the appellant is therefore illegal. There is no merit in this argument because the lower courts have found that all the six items of cheating were part and parcel of one transaction and the trial of the appellant on a single charge was therefore permissible under s. 239, Criminal Procedure Code. For the reasons expressed we hold that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed, and this. appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... into an item of information in his possession only if, and only when, its existence is realised and its implication are recognised. We consider the awareness of the Income-tax Officer, for the first time, after the assessment order of the 19th November, 1957, that the bonus shares were issued not out of premiums received in cash and the consequent result in the light of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1957, as information within the meaning of that expression as used in section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922. It follows that we should answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so, but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (3) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (8) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent was entitled to pendente lite interest?
Held that:- In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled to pendente lite interest. The arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could award pendente lite interest just as a Court could do so under s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though, in terms, s. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The contention that in an arbitration in a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite interest must be rejected. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 60 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dissolved as alleged, then the assessment order should not have been passed against Suganchand alone but against the firm itself. The question whether firm was or was not dissolved as alleged by the petitioners before us is, however, a question of fact, and it is not within our province to go into it. And in any case that is a question which seems to us to go to the root of the assessment in the case. In this state of circumstances learned counsel for both parties agree that the assessment order dated 28th February, 1961, be quashed and the case sent back to the Sales Tax Officer concerned with a direction that he shall examine the case set up by the petitioner that the assessee-firm was dissolved on 15th April, 1958, after recording such evidence as may be necessary and then pass a fresh order in accordance with law. We order accordingly. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case we leave both the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Ordered accordingly.
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1966 (8) TMI 59 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... overnment or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on the grounds like limitation the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. The above Supreme Court case also tends to enunciate that where facts are disputed as in the present case about the exact amount alleged to have been unlawfully recovered from the petitioners as State sales tax and Central sales tax a writ of mandamus for refund of taxes should not be allowed. The writ petition fails on this short ground and is hereby dismissed. The parties, however, are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ill depend upon the nature of contract. For instance, when the contract is to purchase goods-oil in barrels-an implied contract to purchase the packing material can readily be inferred. In such cases cost of packing materials cannot be termed as cost of delivery or services. (The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, by R.V. Patel, Second Edition, page 131). 8.. Against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissionerexhibit P-3-the appellant had a remedy by way of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 39 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, and then by way of revision to this Court under section 41 of the said enactment. The appellant has not chosen to resort to those remedies and on that ground also the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should be considered as unsustainable. 9.. In the light of what is stated above the appeal must fail and has to be dismissed. We do so but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 57 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as to how the provisions of the Indian Iron and Steel Control Order were carried out or complied with. I cannot help observing that these documents were deliberately suppressed from the Court and the affidavits used, instead of helping the Court to ascertain the truth of the facts, were merely affirmed to put before the Court the view of the petitioner on the question of law involved. In my opinion, the learned trial Judge fell into an error in deciding the case in the way he did and the appeal must be allowed and the rule be discharged. With regard to the question of costs I see no reason why the first respondent who has not helped the Court at all in ascertaining the facts should not be made to bear the costs throughout. The order for costs made by the learned judge is therefore set aside and the first respondent is directed to pay the costs of the appellant both of the trial court and of the hearing before us. Certified for two counsel. MASUD, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used. On the facts now disclosed and on a review of the case law on the subject, I am of opinion that when the arecanuts are plucked, dried and dehusked they do not undergo physical or any other process making the article thereby alter its character as agricultural produce. The process of dehusking is the minimum process absolutely necessary for making the produce marketable and fit for consumption. The petitioner is, therefore, not liable to tax in respect of the proceeds of sale of arecanuts grown on his land, in the circumstances mentioned above. In this view, it is not necessary to consider whether explanation (1) to section 2(r) of the Act offends Article 14, Article 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31 of the Constitution. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. Petition allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 55 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were a firm who were reassessed for escaped turnover, it was stated, without proper notice being served. The partners of the firm were also prosecuted. In the prosecution, the contention of the accused was that the reassessment is illegal inasmuch as no notice was served on them and non-service of notice absolves them of the liability to be reassessed. The question was where the reassessment has been made and is final, could a contention that the assessment is bad be raised in a criminal prosecution on the basis that the assessment is valid. The Bench has answered the question in the affirmative, that is to say, that non-service of notice could none the less be pleaded as a defence as it affects the assessment order because of non-compliance with the fundamental provisions of the statute. In this view, the prosecution fails inasmuch as the Court has held that no notice has in fact been served upon the assessee. The criminal appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 54 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion of sales tax on bullion turnover for a particular year is only up to the value of the turnover stated in the certificate granted to the assessee in Form V at the commencement of the year. In the present case, the assessee obtained an exemption certificate for 1958-59 in accordance with rules 11 and 13. That being so, he was not liable to pay sales tax on the excess turnover of Rs. 61,000 for the year. On that amount the assessee was liable to pay only a fee at the rate of four annas per cent. 5.. For these reasons, our answer to the question referred is that an exemption certificate issued for a particular year under rule 11(c) of the Rules is valid not only for the quantum of turnover mentioned therein but also for any actual excess turnover in that year and on the excess turnover the assessee is liable to pay only a fee at the rate of four annas per cent. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (8) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision to the facts of the case the crucial date is 15th March, 1957, when the law in force was the Madras General Sales Tax Act. As already stated, section 12-A of that Act did not make it incumbent on an assessee to pay the tax before his appeal could be entertained. That onerous condition was imposed only by the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. As per the decision of the Supreme Court, that Act has no application on the crucial date. I, therefore, hold that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, acted beyond its jurisdiction in calling upon the petitioner (assessee) to pay the tax before his appeals could be entertained. The writ petitions are, therefore, allowed, and the writs will issue as prayed for. Since the contention on which the petitioner now succeeds is one which was not raised in the petition but raised only now, I do not think it just to grant him costs. I, therefore, make no order as to costs in both these writ petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce to the actual accounts of the dealer-whether they are capable of being produced or not-would establish that the return submitted was untrue. These questions have got to be investigated after the accused appears in court. But they cannot be ruled out on a preliminary finding that section 16 and rule 26(16) automatically bar a prosecution under section 45(2)(a), if the discovery of the data which led to the criminal prosecution, happens to be subsequent to the expiry of the five year period. I may add that in this case the discovery of the additional data was on 1st June, 1963, while the five year period for the assessment of 1957-58 ended on 31st March, 1963. I am of opinion that the acquittal of the accused on the preliminary ground in this case is unjustified in the circumstances stated above. The appeals are allowed and the acquittals are set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to restore the cases to his file and deal with them according to law. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncorrect returns in relation to the procedure for assessment with the provision for assessment of escaped turnover and came to the conclusion that in view of the difference in the phraseology employed by the relative sections, it was reasonable to conclude that the power under sub-section (4) of section 14 was limited to assessment of turnover which was definitely established. With respect we find ourselves in agreement with that view. We also derive support for our view from the legislative history of the sales tax provisions in this State. We hold that section 16(1) of the 1959 Act does not include the power to assess by best judgment. Inasmuch as the Assessing Authority proceeded in these cases on the basis that it had power to assess by best judgment, its orders are quashed. The writ appeals are allowed with costs, one set counsel s fees Rs. 250. The Assessing Authority will be at liberty to proceed further under section 16 in the light of this judgment. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 49 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Directors - Right of person other than retiring director to stand for directorship and Manging agent
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1966 (8) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... 10 of the Income-tax Act. In this view of the matter, we hold that the assessee is not entitled to set off against its other income the loss of Rs. 11,875 suffered by it in its joint venture with two other limited companies. We accordingly answer the first question in the negative. Having regard to this answer, question No. 2 does not arise for determination and we do not propose to express any opinion thereon. We need only record that the assessee s counsel s statement before the Tribunal that in the assessment of Binani Brothers Private Ltd., and Binani Commercial Company Private Limited, the losses from this joint venture have been allowed as a set-off and which was mentioned by the Tribunal, was a wrong statement by the learned counsel and the original records of assessment of Binani Brothers Private Limited, Calcutta, were produced before the court to show that the statement was wrong. That fact may be recorded. There will be no order as to costs. Laik, J. mdash I agree.
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1966 (8) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... of the sponsors of the scheme, Gopal Ganesh Ketkar and Achyut Dattatraya Phatak, figure as delinquent directors in those proceedings. The managing director of the company against whom also misfeasance proceedings are taken is the father of Achyut Dattatraya Phatak. It seems to us clear that if the creditors and shareholders were apprised that misfeasance proceedings were taken against the directors of the company, they would not have approved the scheme under which the affairs of the company are once again relegated into the hands of the selfsame directors. For these reasons, we are of the view that the learned District Judge was in error in giving his sanction to the scheme. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that winding up proceedings will continue. The respondents will pay to the liquidators the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the District Court. Receiver will stand discharged. Rule in Civil Application No. 2793 of 1965 stands discharged with costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act ... ... ... ... ..... ions of the Madras High Court in S. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. CIT reported in 1964 51 ITR 757 and B. Abdul Quadir v. CIT reported in 1964 52 ITR 364, We do not understand these decisions as laying down a principle that whenever an estimate had been made of income for any particular year the amount added by that estimate as income from the business disclosed and additions to income from undisclosed sources because of unexplained credits must be taken to be available with the assessee for being credited in a subsequent year of account. And that in all such cases it is for the department to establish that that amount was not available with the assessee. If these decisions imply the casting of any such burden on the department, with great respect we are unable to agree with that view. In the light of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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