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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 524 Records
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2002 (8) TMI 873 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ingh v. State (NCT) of Delhi 2002 (61) DRJ 670 (SC). In the later decision, the Supreme Court observed that imposition of a condition to deposit a sum of Rs. fifteen lakhs in the form of FDR was unreasonable since as per Sub-section (2) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. conditions which can be imposed should not be unreasonable. A condition, which would be difficult to comply with would amount to imposition of an unreasonable condition and would tantamount to refusal; of invoking the discretion under Sub-section (1) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. In Sandeep Jain v. State of Delhi condition of deposit of amount of Rs. two lakhs apart from furnishing a bond of ₹ 50,000/- with two solvent sureties, while granting bail was held by the Supreme Court to be unreasonable one. 21. Having answered the reference it will be now for the learned Single Judge to dispose of the petition in accordance with the law aforementioned. 22. Parties to appear before the learned Single Judge on 19th August, 2002.
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2002 (8) TMI 872 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... y condoned. Heard counsel. The appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 871 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... etition with liberty to file a statutory appeal under the Central Excise Act. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn.
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2002 (8) TMI 870 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . In view of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, referred to above, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertained adjudicating such questions is clearly barred. We may add that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case grant of impugned lease might be termed as illegal but it cannot be said to be nullity. It follows that the High Court erred in upholding the order of the First Appellate Court that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the said questions in the suit. The impugned judgment and decree of the High Court confirming the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are, therefore, set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are restored. We, however, hasten to add that this judgment does not preclude he respondents-plaintiffs from seeking redressal from appropriate authority under the said Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case. We make no order as to costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 869 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... as these proceedings arc concerned. Since we had already directed in para 6 of this order that the shares of the petitioners should be purchased at par either by the Company or the respondents, the investment made by the petitioner for these shares should be paid by the purchaser of these shares at par. As far as the claim of the respondent that he had repaid the loan taken by the petitioner is concerned, he may initiate appropriate proceedings if so advised in this matter. In case the Company purchases the shares, it is authorized to reduce the share capital of the Company to the extent of face value of the shares. The consideration for the shares should be paid on or before 31-12-2002. In case the shares certificates had been delivered to the petitioner, he will hand over the same along with the blank transfer forms to the purchaser of these shares at the time of receiving the consideration. 8. With the above direction, we dispose of this petition with no order as to cost.
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2002 (8) TMI 868 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the confiscation of the goods found excess in the factory is also upheld. However, taking into facts and circumstances of the case, the redemption fine is reduced to ₹ 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only). 11. The penalty on the Firm which was imposed under Section 11AC is reduced to ₹ 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only), in view of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Escorts JCB Ltd. v. C.C.E., New Delhi (supra). In respect of the personal penalty imposed on the Managing Director of the Unit, I find merit in the arguments of the appellant as there is no finding by the adjudicating authority regarding his action in the evasion of duty. The adjudicating authority only held that Managing Director being responsible person is liable to penalty under Rule 209A of the Central Excise Rules without discussing his role, hence the personal penalty on Shri Manoj M. Somani, Managing Director is set aside. The appeals are disposed of as indicated above.
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2002 (8) TMI 867 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ors. (1997) 141 CTR (SC) 67 (1997) 226 ITR 625(SC), it is not necessary to state the facts. In the said decision it has been held that for the purpose of s. 22 of the Act, the requirement of registration of sale deed is not warranted. It is observed that having regard to the ground realities and the object of the Act, namely, to tax the income, "owner" is a person who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. In other words, what has been held is that if the purchaser has been put in possession of the property on his paying the full consideration, he can be treated as "owner" for the purpose of s. 22 of the Act, even though no registered document as required under s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, has been executed in his favour. In view of the said authoritative pronouncement, question referred is answered in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (8) TMI 866 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. All grounds that may be urged in support of the revision petition may be urged in the appeal, but not vice versa. The dismissal of an appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal puts a seal of finality on the judgment of the trial court. In such a case it may not be proper exercise of discretion to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. Exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such a case may give rise to an incongruous situation where an accused tried and acquitted of an offence, and the order of acquittal upheld in appeal by its dismissal, may have to face a second trial for the same offence of which he was acquitted. For these reasons we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.
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2002 (8) TMI 865 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he procures extra business for the Corporation would be exempt. For this, the procedure as indicated by the respondent authorities can be taken note of. In the alternative, this has to be established as a fact that some amount out of the incentive bonus has actually been spent on account of discharge of duties or to procure extra business for the Corporation. 17. The questions posed at Sl. No. (i) and ( ii) are answered accordingly. 18. This appeal is accordingly allowed. For determining the limited issue as to what was the amount of incentive bonus and out of this amount how much was actually spent by the concerned officer for procuring extra business, the matter is sent back to the Income Tax Officer, who would go into the above aspect of the matter and it is only after the proof of factual foundation referred to above, the assessee would be eligible to seek benefit of exemption and also of the circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (8) TMI 864 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ew petition and the connected papers. We do not find any merit therein. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 863 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... consequential relief." 4. Similarly, I find that the Tribunal in the case of Deccan Alloys Ltd. v. CCE, Chennai reported in 2001 (46) RLT 327 (CEGAT-Che.) has held that the job workers cannot be denied the modvat credit provided duty on the final product is paid by the Principal manufacturer. In the instant case, the appellants have produced on record the declaration given by the Principal manufacturer, M/s Kejriwal Iron and Steel Works to their jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner under the provisions of Rule 57F(3) which reveals that their final product is liable to duty. As such there is no doubt that the duty is being paid by M/s Kejriwal Iron and Steel Works on their final product in which C.I. Articles manufactured by the appellants on job-work basis is being used. As such, the chain of modvat credit is not broken. 5. In view of the foregoing discussions, I set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants. (Pronounced)
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2002 (8) TMI 862 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ein it was held that notice of demand claiming interest can be issued only when there is order in the assessment order levying interest. 2. In view of the fact that both the said decisions have since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd. (2000) 164 CTR (SC) 200 (2001) 247 ITR 209(SC), no substantial question of law survives for our consideration. Admittedly in the present case there was no order for charging of interest under s. 234B of the Act in the assessment order. It may also be noted that a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Smt. Tej Kumari & Ors. vs. CIT (2000) 164 CTR (Pat)(FB) 201 (2001) 247 ITR 210(Pat)(FB), relying on decisions of the apex Court in Ranchi Club (supra) has reiterated the aforesaid view expressed in Uday Mistanna Bhandar case (supra). It has been held that in the absence of any specific order of the assessing authority, interest could not be charged and recovered from the assessee. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 861 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ard Counsel Delay Condoned The appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (8) TMI 860 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... oned. Appeals are admitted. Tag with C.A. Nos. 1822-1823/2002. No stay.
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2002 (8) TMI 859 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g the pendency of the appeal. Having regard to the facts of the case and the interest of justice, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay, if any, in filing of the application for substitution and could have compensated the respondents by award of cost. This we consider appropriate, having regard to the interest of justice. The parties have litigated since the year 1974 and it is only fair that there should be adjudication on merit. We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal would abate as a whole in the absence of legal representatives of appellants 1(d) and 1(e). In the result this appeal is allowed and the application filed for substitution of legal representatives of appellants 1(d), Dharohar Devi and 1(e), Deojhari Devi is allowed. The abatement, if any, is set aside. The appellants shall pay to the respondents a sum of ₹ 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) by way of cost.
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2002 (8) TMI 858 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... he Act. The learned counsel for the assessee brought to our notice that the return of income was filed in time, therefore, the question of levying any interest under section 234A does not arise. Under the circumstances, the Assessing Officer is directed to varify whether the return was filed in time or not and charge interest only if the return was not filed in time. So far as the charging of interest under section 234B is concerned, the issue remains only of academic interest in view of our specific findings in ground No. 3 (supra). The interest is leviable even if the income is determined under section 115JA of the Act as has been held by the Tribunal in their order dated 8-6-2001 in ITA No. 8833/Bom./1992 in the case of Dy. CIT v. Vickers Systems International Ltd. for assessment year 1989-90. Accordingly, while ground No. 4 of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purpose, ground No. 5 is dismissed. 14. In the result, appeal of the assessee is partly allowed
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2002 (8) TMI 857 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... State in express terms said that he, which would also mean his client which is the State, did not have any objection to the grant of bail. Therefore, in our opinion this is a vital fact notice of which the detaining authority ought to have taken. We do not say that merely because a concession was made by a counsel for the State in a bail application that would be binding on the detaining authority but it is necessary that such opinion expressed by a counsel for the State ought to have been taken note of and since this is a vital fact, non-consideration of this fact in our opinion vitiates the order of detention. We are of the opinion that the reasoning of the High Court in rejecting the contention of the appellant in regard to the above is not correct, therefore, we are of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the detention order impugned is liable to be quashed. For the reasons stated above, this appeal stands allowed and the order of detention is quashed.
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2002 (8) TMI 856 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... probably he was not served. We, therefore, directed the Registry to serve notice on the assessee by registered post with acknowledgement due. He was, accordingly, served on 12-7-2002. However, when the matter is called out today, there is no representation on the part of the assessee. This is besides the point that even the Vakalat and typedsets have not been filed by him. Probably, this is because, the matter is fully covered against the assessee as per the statement made by the learned senior standing counsel for the department who relies on the decision in the case of Venkatesh (Minor) v. CIT 2000 243 ITR 367 1 (Mad.) which is a case in respect of the assessee of the same group. This is not contested by the assessee as nobody is present on behalf of the assessee. We, therefore, proceed ex parte against the assessee and hold in favour of the revenue. The question is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee relying on the aforementioned judgment. No costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 855 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e attracted in such a situation. Note 5 to Chapter 30 is para meteria to Note 6 to Chapter 34. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order and, therefore, reject the Appeal filed by the Revenue. 7. Ld. Counsel, therefore, submits that the facts of this case are identical to that decided by the Tribunal in the case of Panchsheel Soap Factory. He, therefore, submits that the ratio of that decision squarely covered the case of the appellant and prays that the appeal of Revenue may be rejected. 8. We have heard the rival submissions. We have also perused the Chapter Note relied upon by both the sides as also the case law cited by the respondent. We note that the facts in the present case are similar to those leading to the decision in the case of Panchsheel Soap Factory. Following the ratio of this decision we hold that there is no need to interfere with the impugned order. The impugned, order is, therefore, upheld and the appeal filed by Revenue is rejected.
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2002 (8) TMI 854 - CEGAT DELHI
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... ... ..... al of the deemed Modvat credit on the ground of absence of declaration by the input-manufacturers in terms of para-4 of the Notification will be repugnant to the substantive provision of para-2 of the Notification. The declaration-related condition in para-4 is virtually of no significance in the light of the Central Government's declaration contained in para-2 of the Notification. I am, therefore, inclined to accept ld. Counsel's argument that, in view of the Government's declaration, it is not open to the departmental authorities to deny the deemed Modvat credit on the ground of absence of input-manufacturers' declaration in terms of para-4." 6. In view of the above, I find that the substantive requirement of Notification No. 58/97-CE have been complied with in the present case and the appellants are entitled to take the deemed Modvat credit on the strength of the aforesaid invoices. The appeal is allowed. Dictated and pronounced in Court on 23.8.2002.
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