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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 34 of 34 Records
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1954 (9) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in section 6 from adding one more head to the heads included in that section and providing that dividends should be a separate head of income. Therefore, in our opinion, really the question ultimately turns on this. Is the assessee, on the facts of this case, entitled to include the income from dividends as his business income? The answer to that question depends upon whether the dividend income was earned in the course of the business or arose out of the business. On the facts of this case the answer to that question can only be in the affirmative. If that is the answer, then the taxing department cannot succeed in compelling the assessee to show this income under section 12 which section can only come into operation provided the income earned by the assessee does not legitimately fall under any other head under section 6. The answer, therefore, to the question submitted to us will be in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1954 (9) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ether the Tribunal is right in the view it is taking because in our view if notice is served upon the principal for assessment under Section 42 it would be open to him to challenge the assessment on the ground that his agent has already been assessed and therefore he is not liable. If that contention is not accepted by the Income-tax Officer, it would be open to him to appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and ultimately to the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore that would be the prop occasion when the Tribunal should express an opinion as to the liability of the principal to be assessed when the agent has already been assessee. Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right when in its order stated that this question at this stage was irrelevant. The result, therefore, is that we will answer the first question in the affirmative, second in the affirmative, and third also in the affirmative. Question (4) is unnecessary. The word "defendant" to be struck out.
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1954 (9) TMI 24 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of an arrangement made with the Inland Revenue Authorities in the United Kingdom that for the purpose of British income-tax it should be thus assessed. Their Lordships can see no justification in law for this contention. It is no doubt true from the point of view of accountancy that there is no other way of finding the company's ultimate profit and equally it may be a convenient arrangement if the taxing authority chooses to adopt it. But it is impossible to find support for it in the terms of the Ordinance. The question under the Ordinance is, what is the income of the company in the particular year of assessment, and it must be answered by applying its relevant provisions as best they can be applied, not by introducing some new and supposedly more convenient method of ascertainment. I therefore, agree with my learned brother that the answer to the question referred for the opinion of this Court has to be given in the affirmative. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1954 (9) TMI 23 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he other hand, there might be facts on which the direction would have to be given the other way. But between those two extremes there is a very large tract of country in which the matter becomes a question of degree ; and where it becomes a question of degree, it is then undoubtedly, in my opinion, a question of fact ; and if the Commissioners come to a conclusion of fact without having applied any wrong principle, then their decision is final upon the matter. " In the present case we are not satisfied that the finding of fact reached by the Tribunal is based upon no material or that a wrong legal principle has been applied. It follows that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the conclusion reached by the Appellate Tribunal and the question referred to the High Court must he answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (9) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can be a waiver of the condition precedent, compliance with which alone can confer jurisdiction upon an authority or a tribunal. It is well settled that no consent can confer jurisdiction upon a Court if the Court has no jurisdiction, and if we take the view that the Income-tax Officer can have jurisdiction only provided he complies with the conditions laid down in section 34, then no consent by the assessee or no waiver on his part can confer jurisdiction upon the Income-tax Officer. Therefore, while agreeing with the Calcutta High Court that the notice provided for in section 34 is a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction, with respect we are unable to accept the view that a defect in a notice given under section 34 or a failure to give notice under section 34 can be waived by the assessee. The answers therefore we must give to the questions raised are (1) In the negative. (2) In the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (9) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e deemed to have come into force on the 1st of April, 1946. The Department has proceeded to assess the assessee on the assumption for which there is no warrant. It was attempted to give retrospective effect to an Act when the Central Legislature itself did not do so and therefore, in our opinion, the assessee is not liable to pay tax on the income of Rs. 9,26,532 because the fourth proviso to Section 10(2) (vii) under which this income is sought to be taxed was not in force in respect of the assessment year 1946-47 and in respect of the total income of the assessee for the year 1945-46. Mr. Palkhiwalla wanted to argue that apart from this aspect of the matter he was entitled to exemption on other grounds as well. But as this point that has been raised goes to the root of the matter, we did not think it necessary to hear Mr. Palkhiwala on his other contentions. We, therefore, answer the question raised in the negative. No order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (9) TMI 20 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... may not form part of the sale price according to the terms of the contract between the parties. The same considerations apply equally to all the three kinds of cost contemplated in the definition. In other words, if the parties to the sale transaction agree that the cost of freight, or of delivery or of instal- lation should be paid for separately, that cost should not form part of sale price . If, on the other hand, the parties agree that the sale price should be all-inclusive, i.e., that the purchaser must bear all the costs up to the stage of installation of the goods purchased and on the responsibility of the seller, the legislature intended to include all those charges in the sale price . The question must therefore be answered in the negative. 17.. As the assessee has substantially failed in the reference, except for the small amount relating to trade discount, he must pay the costs of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (9) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . There is the further fact that the deed of partnership makes it clear that the new partner, Ramalingam Chettiar, had no right to, or interest in, any of the properties belonging to the firm, and that he was only concerned with the profits and the losses. If there was a transfer, it was by the partners of the plaintiff firm to themselves. Such a transfer would not obviously be a sale within the meaning of the definition in the Act. In this view, it is not necessary for us to consider the applicability of rule 5(1)(h) of the Turnover Rules under which all amounts realised by the sale by a dealer of his business as a whole is exempted from sales tax . We agree with the learned District judge that there was no transaction which amounted to a sale and the sales tax authorities were wrong in including a sum of Rs. 1,02,911-6-0 in the turnover of the plaintiff firm. The second appeal is dismissed. In the result, the plaintiff s suit is decreed as prayed for with costs throughout.
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1954 (9) TMI 18 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Sales Tax Department , and the word by was replaced by the words at the instance of . There is no affidavit in support of this statement. We must therefore take it that the state- ment made on affidavit by the applicant is correct. If the Commissioner had to be moved by some other authority or by a party for interference in revision, such an application should have been made within 30 days of the order impugned. 8.. It would thus appear that recourse to the provisions of sub- sections (4) and (5) of section II of the Act was not justified in the circumstances of the case, and the manner of it is also not in accordance with the rules framed under the Act. We would therefore quash the orders impugned in this case and direct the respondents not to proceed with the fresh assessment as proposed by them. The applicant is entitled to his costs in this Court. Hearing fee Rs. 100. The amount of security deposited by the applicant shall also be refunded to him. Application allowed.
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1954 (9) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision in Public Prosecutor v. Kuncham Venkateswarulu(1). That is a case of a prosecution under section 13 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and not under section 15(a) of the Act. In Crl. App. No. 484 of 1953 , I have considered the decision given in Public Prosecutor v. Kuncham Venkateswarulu(1), and held that that decision applies only to offences under section 13 of the Act and not for offences under section 15. Section 15 is in general terms and it applies to any person who has to submit a return but does not do so. That is not restricted to only a registered dealer. The two grounds on which the learned Magistrate has acquitted the accused are unsustainable. His acquittal is therefore set aside. The accused is convicted for not submitting the return and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50, in default to two weeks rigorous imprisonment. Acquittal set aside. (1) 1952 3 S.T.C. 216 1952 M.W.N. Crl. 162. Since reported as The Public Prosecutor v. D. Ramaswami 1955 6 S.T.C. 43.
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1954 (9) TMI 16 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... able oil like ground-nut, sesame, till, etc., is completely harmless and edible. This has been proved in the Laboratory by test on rats while especially in America, where the major oil is refined cotton-seed oil, it has been eaten without ill effects for over 30 years. It is also being consumed after refining in various parts of India. It can be used as food material as such or after hydro- genation to vanaspati. Refined cotton-seed oil of good quality is hence an edible oil just like any other edible vegetable oil. The report taken as a whole would show that cotton-seed oil at any rate for the present has not become edible in the hands of the dealer. In the result, we direct a writ of mandamus to be issued to the Sales Tax Authorities quashing the order to collect tax on the purchase turnover of shelled ground-nut or kernel. The writ application is allowed to the extent mentioned above. In the circumstances of the case, no order is made as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1954 (9) TMI 15 - SAURASHTRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ctments than one and therefore admits of that interpretation. The Sales Tax Ordinance imposes a pecuniary burden on the subjects and is a taxing Statute and must therefore be strictly construed and in case of reasonable doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject must be adopted. See Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., pp. 291-292. The Concise Oxford Dictionary expresses the meaning of the word match as under Match Short piece of wood, wax taper and c., tipped with com- position that bursts into flame when rubbed on rough or specially pre- pared surface. It appears therefore that the Bengal Light Matches are understood in common parlance not as fireworks but as matches and cannot therefore be included in item 5 in the Schedule to the Saurashtra Ordi- nance. In the result the answer to both the questions is in the negative. In view of the nature of the question involved we make no order as to costs. SHAH, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (9) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... s that the appeal is dismissed, though we have reached the same result as the learned Judge by a different line of reasoning, having regard to the fresh points raised by the respondents in this appeal. One further observation remains to be made and that is regarding the sum of Rs. 2 frac12 lakhs which has been deposited in court at the time of the filing of the appeal by a prospective buyer one Mr. Govindarajulu Naidu. When the appellants applied for a stay of delivery of the properties to the Bombay buyers, they showed their bona fides by producing a prospective buyer, one Mr. Govindarajulu Naidu, who stated that he was willing to purchase the identical assets purchased by the Bombay firm for an increased price. For that purpose the prospective buyer deposited in court a sum of Rs. 2 frac12 lakhs. In view of our decision dismissing the appeal, it follows that the sum deposited into court should be refunded to the person making the deposit. There will be no order as to costs.
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1954 (9) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Order made in any Court to be enforced by other Courts and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... ot contemplate the mere making of an application under section 235 with the allegations contained in it, but contemplate making out a prima facie case which had to be done by admissible evidence. As to whether the application and the supporting materials in the present case contained any or sufficient admissible evidence I express no opinion, because we were not invited to consider those materials, because in view of the order of S.R. Das Gupta J., the question does not arise and because no appeal lies from the order of Bachawat J. For those very reasons I do not also express any opinion on the question as to whether the procedure applicable where an order under section 45H is asked for on the basis of the application and the supporting materials is the procedure of an ex parte application such as is provided for in rules 196 and 200 of the rules framed by this court under the Companies Act or whether the respondents to the application should be heard before an order is made.
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