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Showing 201 to 220 of 228 Records
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1983 (12) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nership what is admittedly his separate property held in his individual capacity and unconnected with the family funds and that such a partnership can be entered into not only for commencing a new business, but also in respect of an existing joint family business and such a firm would be entitled to registration under s. 26A of the Indian IT. Act, 1922. In view of the facts found in this case that the contribution made by Natarajan and Kandaswami towards capital for the partnership proceeded from their earnings or from out of the amounts which belonged to them separately and exclusively, it has to be held in the light of the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court referred to earlier that the partnership, on the facts found in this case, would be perfectly valid in law. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... pleted after the petitioner disclosed all the relevant information about the valuation of the shares, and the WTO accepted the said valuation. It was urged that the mere fact that subsequently the WTO is of the opinion that the shares were not properly valued is not sufficient to reopen the assessment. The respondents have not filed any return in answer to the petition, but Shri Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, stated that the WTO initiated the proceedings on receipt of certain information that the shares were not properly valued. It is not permissible to exercise jurisdiction under s. 17 of the W.T. Act merely because the WTO changes his opinion about the method of valuation of shares. In my judgment, the proceedings commenced by the WTO under s. 17 of the Act were wholly misconceived and are required to be struck down. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Penalty, Reduction Or Waiver ... ... ... ... ..... t the Commissioner must disclose how his mind works in law and why it was decided not to waive the penalty but to reduce it and how the particular figure was arrived at. In my judgment, as the impugned order is entirely silent as to what reasons prompted the Commissioner to reduce the penalty instead of waiving it, it is necessary to set aside the order and remit the proceedings back to the Commissioner for fresh disposal. The Commissioner must consider all facets of the matter and exercise the powers under s. 273A of the I.T. Act, 1961, by a speaking order setting out the reasons, in case the entire penalty is not waived. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute and the order dated December 21, 1978, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-V, Bombay, is set aside and the proceedings are remitted back to the Commissioner for passing a fresh order in accordance with the observations made in the judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 25 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... interest in the properties into the separate interest of the partners. In Abdul Kareemia and Bros. v. CIT 1984 145 ITR 442, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has also taken a similar view. Having regard to the clear provisions of law governing the transfer of immovable properties, we do not think that any other view is possible. Mere entries in the account books of the partnership firm proprio vigore Will not convert partnership property into individual property of the partners or of third parties. Nor the agreement dated June 30, 1970, entered into by the partners treating the firm s property as individual property will have any such effect. Unless that agreement is followed by deed of conveyance known to law, the partners cannot claim the firm s property as their separate and individual property so long as the firm continues. In the result, we answer the second question in the affirmative and against the assessee. Consequently, the first question is also answered accordingly.
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1983 (12) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... rials on record such an opinion could not be formed objectively and that a probing or fishing proceeding was initiated mala fide and without application of mind. It was submitted that in view of the above findings of His Lordship, whether the principles laid down in the decisions cited by the petitioner before His Lordship were neither discussed nor considered by his Lordship did not really matter. Be that as it may, as at present advised, I find that the decision of G. N. Ray J. covers these two matters. The petitioner may, however, urge other points which have been raised by Mr. Bajoria before me, if so advised in subsequent proceedings that may be taken by the petitioner. Accordingly, no interference is called for by me and the rules are, therefore, discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. On the prayer of Mr. Bajoria, learned counsel for the petitioner, let the operation of this order be stayed for a period of three weeks from today.
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1983 (12) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Discretionary Order, Failure To File Return In Time, Penalty, Wealth Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... ances of the present case, the Commissioner has declined to waive the penalty under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act in his discretion, and in my judgment, it is not open to disturb such discretionary order in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. Writ jurisdiction is not meant to disturb each and every discretionary order passed by the authority empowered to do so under the statute. In my judgment, the grievance of the petitioner has no merit and deserves to be repelled. Shri Ganesh relied upon the decisions in Anjanappa v. CWT 1980 124 ITR 433 (Kar) and Shareef Ahmad v. CWT 1979 117 ITR 35 (All), but, in my judgment, these decisions have no bearing on the issue involved in the petition. The order passed by the Commissioner is purely a discretionary order and it is not possible to hold that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or irrationally. In my judgment, there is no merit in the petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the rule is discharged with costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 22 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Clubbing Of Income Of Spouse, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... had substantial interest. His salary cannot, therefore, be taxed in his hands ignoring the provisions of s. 64(1)(ii). The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in excluding the income of the assessee from his assessment and directing it to be assessed in the hands of his spouse. The question referred is not properly framed. The real question is whether the salary drawn by the assessee in the firm in which his wife is a partner and holds substantial interest, should be assessed in his hands or should be aggregated with the income of his spouse in her assessment. The question is, therefore, reframed as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in reversing the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s order and directing that the salary of the assessee from the firm of M/s Gopal films should be assessed in the hands of his spouse who is partner in the firm ? The question as reframed is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1983 (12) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... ose during the accounting year from July 1, 1967, to June 30, 1968, and, therefore, the above decisions may not be of any assistance to the assessee. Since we have held that the date of transfer July 19, 1967, falls within the previous year July 1, 1967, to June 30, 1968, specifically adopted by the assessee while submitting the return for the assessment year 1969-70, we have to hold that the Tribunal is in error in holding that the capital gains cannot be assessed during the year 1969-70. We, therefore, answer the questions raised in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. In this case, the Tribunal, as already stated, has not gone into the question as to whether the lands sold are agricultural lands as contended by the assessee or whether they are non-agricultural lands as contended by the Revenue. Therefore, the matter will stand remitted to the Tribunal for rendering a decision on the said question.
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1983 (12) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... he assessee chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. When that was challenged before the court on the round that the valuation given by the assessee having been accepted in 1976-77, it will be a more change of opinion on the part of the WTO and on the basis of that mere change of opinion s. 17 cannot be invoked, the court pointed out that it was not a mere change of opinion on the part of the WTO but cogent materials, viz., the valuation report obtained by the assessee and the sale also effected by him, coming to the notice of the WTO on the basis whereof he had within the meaning of s. 17(1) information and reason to believe that net wealth chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and, therefore, he was justified in invoking s. 17. The decision in that case clearly applies to the facts of this case. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1983 (12) TMI 19 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... to only the income voluntarily declared under s. 3(1). The expression is distinct and different from the declaration envisaged under s. 14(1). Section 14(1), as we have earlier stated, contains a complete code in itself providing certain benefits and immunities to persons against whom there has been search and seizure under s. 132 of the I.T. Act. That is also made further clear under s. 3(2)(ii) which excludes s. 3(1) in respect of such persons. Section 8 provides a benefit for persons falling under s. 3(1) and it expressly states that the amount of voluntarily disclosed income shall not be included in the total income of the declarant for any assessment year, whereas there has been no such prohibition in s. 14(1) of the Act. On the contrary, there has been specific provisions in s. 14(4) to (6) in regard to the aggregation of such income in the assessment. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not sufficient to outweigh the evidentiary value of the voluntary nature of the revised return filed before the ITO before he began hearing of the case. In our view, this is a finding of fact and this finding is clearly justified. It may be observed that neither the ITO nor the AAC had found that the case of the assessee that, in fact, the books of account had not been closed and audited prior to the filing of the original return on July 31, 1964, (June 29, 1965 ?) was not believable. The findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal have not been challenged. In this application, the question of law referred to us for opinion is as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1983 (12) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt held that though paid as salary, such payment was treated as profits and enjoyed the same invulnerability to exigibility that rule 24 of the Indian I.T. Rules confers on the agrarian portion. In our view, this decision of the Supreme Court does not in any manner assist in advancing the case of the Revenue. Besides, as the question relating to the applicability of s. 67(1)(b) of the Act has not been specifically made the subject-matter of these references, we are of the view that it is unnecessary on the facts and in the circumstances of this case having regard to the scope of the reference, to pursue this matter further. We hold the Tribunal was quite right in the conclusions arrived at by it and answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the Revenue. The assessees in T.Cs. Nos. 637 and 638 of 1978 will be entitled to get the costs of this reference from the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. There will be no order as to costs in T.Cs. Nos. 3 to 7 of 1980.
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1983 (12) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Practice, Provisional Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... by decision and, therefore, not disputed questions of law. In my judgment, the questions raised by the petitioners were disputed questions of law and, therefore, while passing the provisional assessment order, the Controller could not have ignored the claim of the petitioners and passed a provisional assessment order requiring the petitioners to pay duty of Rs. 30,13,660.69. Therefore, the provisional assessment order passed by respondent No. on September 21, 1979, is set aside and, consequently, also the demand notice issued by respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the said order. It is open to respondent No. 1 to pass a fresh provisional assessment order in accordance with the accounts submitted by the petitioners. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition, but this will not prevent respondent No. 1 from passing a fresh provisional assessment order. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity Liability ... ... ... ... ..... bility to pay gratuity without parting with the funds and, therefore, it was provided that there will be a general ban on the deduction of any liability to pay gratuity except a provision for contribution to an approved gratuity fund. Admittedly, the assessee has not made any provision for contribution to the approved gratuity fund in its accounts. Merely because there is a liability to pay contribution to that fund, it cannot be treated as an accrued liability and the liability should be taken to have accrued only when a provision is made in the accounts. In view of the admitted position in this case that neither an actual payment has been made nor a provision has been made towards the gratuity liability in the year in question, the deduction claimed has rightly been disallowed by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, we are in entire agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal and, therefore, no reference is called for in this case. The tax case petition is dismissed.
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1983 (12) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
CBDT, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... he powers or not. Shri Dastur made an attempt to urge that in view of the contents of the circular referred to hereinabove, the Board should be given a direction to issue the order authorising the ITO to reopen the assessment. It is impossible to accede to this submission. The question whether the circular is applicable to the facts of the present case or not cannot be determined by this court. It is for the Board to decide whether the contents of the circular apply to the facts of the case or not and I am not prepared to exercise my jurisdiction to limit the powers of the Central Board of Revenue. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the decision taken by the Central Board of Direct Taxes not to interfere with the matter and communicated to the petitioners by letter dated November 8, 1979, is set aside and the Central Board of Direct Taxes is directed to reconsider the matter afresh in the light of the observations made in the judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 13 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been done by the authorities of the Revenue, in the instant case, as shown below. On March 28, 1970, the dividend was declared. Venkatesam Chetty maintains cash system of accounts. The cheque was received by him on May 11, 1970. The two aspects have to be juxtaposed, one he received the cheque in May, 1970, and the other he maintains cash system of accounts. The two aspects were not borne in mind by the income-tax authorities when they reopened the assessment. We are of the view, on the facts of this case, may be, the dividend was declared on March 28, 1970. Having regard to the cash system adopted by the assessee and the fact that the cheque was received by him on May 11, 1970, we hold that the day when it was received is decisive of the issue raised, and not the date when the dividend was declared. The impugned orders of the income-tax authorities, for the aforesaid reasons, are unsustainable accordingly, they are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... area or cases or class of cases or persons or class of persons. If really the notification issued under s. 125A(1) will serve the Purpose, as contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue, there is no necessity for making a provision like s. 8AA authorising the Commissioner to issue a notification enabling the IAC to function concurrently, along with the WTO. Therefore, the legislative intention seems to be that the concurrent power under the W.T. Act has to be conferred on the IAC, by a separate notification issued under s. 8AA of the W.T. Act. We are also not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the Revenue that s. 8AA is intended to apply only to individuals, HUFs and companies who are not assessees under the I.T. Act but who happened to be assessees under the W.T. Act. In this view of the matter, we are not in a position to disagree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case. We, therefore, see no justification for directing a reference in these cases.
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1983 (12) TMI 11 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Industrial Company ... ... ... ... ..... rant section could be attributable to activities falling within the meaning of manufacture or processing of goods cannot, therefore, be entertained. As observed by the Kerala High Court in Casino Pvt. Ltd. s case 1973 91 ITR 289, a restaurant, by and large, is a trading concern and the object of the restaurant is not the manufacturing or processing of goods for the purpose of sale. It may not be out of context if we refer to the provisions of s. 80J of the Act in which a hotel is included along with industrial undertakings or ships for the purpose of relief under that section. It is an indication of the legislative intent that a hotel does not ordinarily fall within the ambit of the definition of industrial company . The assessee, therefore, has failed to establish that its income attributable to the manufacture or processing of goods is not less than 51 per cent. of the total income. In the result, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1983 (12) TMI 10 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... le as income from property under s. 9. The Supreme Court, on appeal held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that the Department having ill along proceeded on the basis that the income of the assessee was from two different sources, it should not have been allowed by the High Court to change its case. In that view of the matter, therefore, the fifth contention also must fail and is rejected. No other contentions have been urged. The result is that we answer the questions referred in both these references as under I.T.R. No. 214 of 1978 Question No. 1 In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Commissioner shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee. I.T.R. No. 68 of 1977 The question is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There should be no order as to costs in this reference.
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1983 (12) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... ision also is not of any help to the assessee. It is seen that the view taken in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sadasivan 1978 42 STC 201, holding that even after the process of dyeing and colouring of cotton yarn, it continues to remain as cotton yarn has been accepted and followed by the Gujarat High Court in Nerol Abendaly v. Union of India 1979 ELT (J.) 181, and of the Bombay High Court in Shreemowas Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1981 ELT 867 and of the Delhi High Court in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India 1981 ELT 887. In view of the fact that the order of the Tribunal holding that the process employed by the assessee such as warping, sizing and bleaching amount to manufacture of textiles without giving any reason for coming to such a conclusion is not legally tenable, we have to, therefore, answer both the questions in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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