|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 280 Records
-
1984 (2) TMI 60 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Hybrid System, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... imself was of the view that the deduction could not be allowed because it was premature inasmuch as the matter was still under contest and he passed the order in February, 1969. In fact, the ITO was of the view that the claim to deduction was premature. According to the judicial Member, it was belated. These two totally opposing views on the same question reveal the difficulties involved by adopting a purely mercantile accountancy method to a disputed amount. Of course, if the matter is settled, it can be claimed in the relevant assessment year in which the liability arose, but if it is not settled, it can only be raised later. Thus, both on account of the hybrid accountancy method adopted by the assessee and on the ground that the determination of the liability was not earlier than 1964, we are of the view that the question referred to us has to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 59 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... tice left undetermined as to who were the persons who were sought to be assessed. It is on the record that, in the present reference, the assessee sought to raise a specific question, viz., whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the reassessment proceedings were validly initiated under s. 147(a) of the Act. This question was not allowed to be raised. Therefore, in our view, it is not open to the assessee to urge this contention under question No. 2. In any event, it has been held in C.R. No. 4735(W) of 1965 (Cal) that there was no lack of jurisdiction in the initiation of the proceedings. We note that the Tribunal directed the Revenue to adjust the tax already paid under the earlier assessments made on the firm in computing the tax payable by the association of persons. For the above reasons, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative, both in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Bar Of Suits In Civil Court Regarding I.T., Suits In Civil Courts ... ... ... ... ..... unction to stay the proceeding initiated against him under the I.T. Act. This application was declined by Shri A.S. Garg by his order of July 26, 1982, holding that the Income-tax Authorities were competent to proceed in the matter according to law. In this background it becomes all the more curious how the, order now under challenge came to be passed. Legal issues apart, it has now been pointed out by Mr. Ashok Bhan, counsel for the Union of India, that the matter of Shri Kashmir Singh Bhullar is now no longer before Sukhdev Chand as he has since been transferred and it is now being dealt with by some other officer. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order was contrary to law and wholly unwarranted. The civil court clearly bad no jurisdiction in the matter. This revision petition is consequently accepted and the suit of the plaintiff is accordingly ordered to be dismissed with costs. This petitioner shall also be entitled to costs of this petition.
-
1984 (2) TMI 57 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... he transferee-firm, no action arose for seeking reference on questions Nos. (i) and (ii). It is only on question No. (iii) that some stress could have been laid as to whether income accrued to the assessee or not as a matter of law, but not as matter of fact. The Tribunal while rejecting the application of the Revenue under s. 256(1) of the Act, took the view that the finding recorded by it was a pure finding of fact and did not involve the interpretation of any legal principles. No such principles have been pointed out before us from which it could be said that the Tribunal was wrong in law in holding that the total profit of Rs. 1, 18,560 was not assessable in the assessment year 1969-70. The Tribunal as a fact has found that since the said income accrued to the assessee in that assessment year, the question as such did not arise being a question of fact. In this view of the matter, the prayer made herein by the Revenue has to be declined but without any order as to costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... olves upon his legal representatives will apply to goodwill as well as to other assets. The principle laid down in the above case, in my view, applies to a case where a partner transfers his interest or share in the firm to a third party. Upon transfer, the share or interest in the property of the firm of the transferring partner including the goodwill becomes the share or interest of the transferee. In the instant case, Nani Gopal Mondal by the deed of gift transferred his share or interest in the firm which included his share of goodwill also. Hence, for the purpose of payment of gift-tax, the value of one-third share of the assessee in the goodwill shall also be taken into account. It should be noted that no dispute has been raised regarding the value of the goodwill. In the above view of the matter, I answer the question referred to this court for its opinion in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs. S. C. SEN J.-I agree.
-
1984 (2) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Circular Conferring Benefit On Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... ll as of the Tribunal does not appear to have been drawn to this circular. We have no doubt that had the circular been pointed out to the CIT or to the Tribunal, the directions contained in the circular would have been carried out. In view of this circular, it would be academic to answer the question of law raised before us. We, therefore, decline to answer the question and send the matter back to the Tribunal so that the Tribunal may examine the matter in the light of the circular and in the light of our observations and may give such suitable directions as the Tribunal may deem fit. In taking the course that we have taken in this matter, we are supported by a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Ahmedabad Kaiser-E-Hind Mills Co. Ltd. 1981 128 ITR 486, where, in the light of the same circular in a somewhat similar situation, the Gujarat High Court declined to answer the question and referred the matter to the Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Effect Of Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... evy the penalty, as admittedly the amount of income in respect of which particulars were alleged to have been concealed did not exceed Rs. 25,000. The reference made to the IAC was, therefore, bad in law. The jurisdiction of the IAC in this regard is founded on a valid order of reference under, s. 274. As in the present case, the order of making reference was itself invalid, the IAC had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter of levying penalty. In view of what we have said earlier, question No. 1 must be answered in the affirmative. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is based on an alternative submission of the assessee, and that alternative submission, is based on the premise that the question of jurisdiction had to be considered under s. 274(2) as it stood prior to April 1971. In view of what we have held earlier, that question does not arise at all and, hence, we decline to answer that question. The Commissioner to pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
-
1984 (2) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
The Constitution ... ... ... ... ..... t through the set. This is clear on a reference to sub-clause (5) of S. 6 of the Act which entitles a holder to the refund of the tax when the set is not in actual use. In the result, I must hold that since the Act affects the freedom of intercourse through the media of television guaranteed under art. 301 of the Constitution and since the State s power of taxation is derived from art. 245 and the said power is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution including those of Chapter XIII, the Act must be declared to be ultra vires and void. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for me to enter into the other points urged in support or in challenge in this rule nor is it necessary to refer to the other decisions which have been cited. The, rule is, accordingly, made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. If any holder of a television set has paid any tax under the Act, the authorities concerned are directed to refund the same as expeditiously as possible.
-
1984 (2) TMI 52 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Effect Of Retrospective Amendment Of S. 271(1)(a), Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... etermined by the ITO, on the basis that the assessee had failed to file the return of its total income within the time specified in s. 139(1) without reasonable cause appears to be justified. As penalty was imposable upon the assessee, the provisions of s. 271 (1)(a)(i) shall have to be read along with the provisions of s. 271(2) and the quantum of penalty has to be worked out on the assessed income, after treating the assessee-firm as an unregistered firm for the purpose of quantification of the amount of penalty imposable upon it. As the same amount of penalty would be imposable upon the assessee as was imposed by the ITO in view of the amended provisions of s. 271(1)(a)(i) read with s. 271(2), we are of the view that the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal cancelling the penalty imposed upon the assessee cannot be maintained, in view of the retrospective amendment of the provisions of s. 271(1)(a)(i) of the I.T. Act, 1961. We answer the reference accordingly.
-
1984 (2) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ly, staff members of the Tata Group of Mills. On the basis of this finding of fact, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the transaction was not an adventure in the nature of trade but was an investment which had been subsequently sold. In this connection, the Tribunal also noted that though in the objects clause of the company s memorandum and of articles of association, it is mentioned as one of its objects that the company can buy and sell lands, in fact, this was the only transaction of purchase of land. The finding given by the Tribunal is based on the above facts as found by it. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was no evidence in support of the Tribunal s finding. Since this is a solitary transaction of purchase of land, the burden would be on the Department to show that this was an adventure in the nature of trade. In our view, the finding of the Tribunal cannot be said to be without evidence or perverse. Accordingly, the rule is discharged with costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Additional Tax, Closely Held Company ... ... ... ... ..... 1961, pursuant to the decision of the Commissioner. In view of our findings, no such tax under s. 104 was payable by the petitioners for the relevant assessment year. The order of the Commissioner under s. 263 of the I.T. Act, 1961, being exhibit F to the petition, has already been set aside by the Tribunal and, hence, no relief needs to be given in respect of the order exhibit F . Accordingly, the order of the ITO (exhibit D ) and the order of the Commissioner under s. 264 of the I.T. Act, 1961, being exhibit G to the petition, are set aside and the respondents are directed to refund to the petitioner forthwith the said sum of Rs. 4,64,998 paid by the petitioner as tax under s. 104 of the I.T. Act, 1961. The rule is made absolute, accordingly. The respondents will pay to the petitioners costs of the reference. For the reasons which are set out above, we find that there is no merit in the Income-tax Application No. 64 of 1983. The rule is, accordingly, discharged with costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 49 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Minimum Penalty Imposable, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... 271 (1). In the present case, the ITO during the course of assessment proceedings felt satisfied that there was concealment of income and that inaccurate particulars were furnished by the assessee. After arriving at the aforesaid satisfaction, while passing the assessment order on April 14, 1967, the ITO directed that notice under s. 271(1)(c) read with s. 274 be issued to the assessee. He, thereafter, referred the proceedings to the IAC who also issued a notice to the assessee under s. 274(1) to show cause why penalty should not be imposed upon him. Thus, in our view, the proceedings were properly initiated by the ITO and then referred to the IAC because the minimum penalty imposable would have exceeded Rs. 1,000. We, therefore, hold that the penalty proceedings were properly initiated in the present case. The question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
-
1984 (2) TMI 48 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... day, I will quote Dryden As long as words different sense will bear, And each may be his own interpreter, Our airy faith will no foundation find The words a weathercock for every wind. (Dryden The Hind and the Panther II 462. Quoted in Statutory Interpretation in Australia by D. C. Pearce (2nd edn., 1981) at p. 179). For these reasons, I agree with Chadha and Goel JJ. that the first question must be answered in favour of the Revenue. As against Caxton, D Costa should be preferred as an accurate statement of the law. On the second question, I am with Chadha J. In my opinion, we should not follow the M.P. view propounded in Indian Pharmaceuticals. I think D Costa and Achal Jain were correctly decided. The second question, I would answer in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the first question is answered in the affirmative. The second question is answered in the negative. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 47 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Notice, Penalty, Wealth Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... xistence of an alternate remedy has of course to be taken into consideration in the exercise of the discretion which vests in the court under article 226 of the Constitution, but where the impugned order is patently contrary to law in that it proceeds to decide the matter on the basis of a law not applicable and ignores that which really applies, interests of justice clearly impel interference. In the circumstances as exist in the present case, the fact that a further appeal lay and the petitioner did not avail of this remedy should not be taken to bar the relief claimed particularly when the petitioner had approached the Commissioner of Wealth-tax in the matter under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax of March 24, 1977 (annexure P-3) with regard to the assessment year 1968-69 is hereby set aside and the case is remitted to him for decision afresh according to law. This writ petition is, accordingly, hereby accepted.
-
1984 (2) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... operations cannot be treated as an expenditure which is referred to in s. 40(c) of the said Act. If the payments represent a fair market value for the services rendered, then there is no limitation on the total amount payable during any period. This decision of the Karnataka High Court has been approved and relied on by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT v. Avon Cycles (P.) Ltd. 1980 126 ITR 448. In view of these decisions, the Tribunal was right in its view that the question as to whether the amount of guarantee commission fell within the provisions of s. 40(c) or s. 40A(5) of the said Act and the computation of the disallowance was a highly debatable question. Such disallowance could not be made by way of rectification under s. 154 of the said Act. As, in our view, the Tribunal was obviously right in its conclusion, no purpose will be served in directing the Tribunal to refer the question as sought by the petitioner. Rule is discharged with costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ribunal. A reading of the proviso to s. 36(1)(ii) of the I.T. Act makes it clear that in order to decide this contention of the Department, it would have to be investigated as to whether the establishment of the assessee was one to which the Payment of Bonus Act was applicable., In the event of it being held that the proviso applied only to the payment of profit bonus, it would have further to be ascertained as to whether the additional bonus paid by the assessee as aforesaid was in the nature of profit bonus or not. These questions have not been investigated at all or dealt with by the Tribunal, because no contention, as is now sought to be raised by the Department, was advanced before the Tribunal. As this question was neither raised before the Tribunal nor dealt with by it, it is clearly not a question which arises from the order of the Tribunal, and no such question can be directed to be referred. In the result, the application fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is that the Tribunal accepted the statement made on behalf of the assessee that according to the practice of the assessee, if in any year any debt became actually bad, then it was debited straightaway in the profit and loss account and the aforesaid reserve account was not touched at all. This finding of fact would show that the amount of Rs. 16,854 was really in the nature of a reserve and not an amount kept by way of It provision to meet any particular liability. It is now well settled that an amount set aside out of the profits and other surpluses not designed to meet a liability, contingency, commitment or diminution in value of assets known to exist at the date of the balance-sheet is a reserve. (See Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1981 132 ITR 559 (SC) and Parke Davis (India) Ltd. v. CIT 1981 130 ITR 813 (Bom)). In the result, question No. 3 must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Department to pay to the assessee costs of the reference.
-
1984 (2) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Import Entitlements, Income, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... the excess should be treated as a reserve . Therefore, it would be includible in the capital computation. In the present case, the amounts shown as reserve for tax contingencies are, in any event, an excess provision made for taxation. Therefore, these amounts should be treated as a reserve for the purpose of capital computation under the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. In the result, if the said amounts are looked upon as provision for taxation, it is a provision which is in excess of the needs of the assessee. Otherwise, it is a reserve against which there is no existing liability. In either case, the result would be that these amounts will have to be included in the computation of capital of the company under the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are, therefore, answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (2) TMI 42 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Development Rebate Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... (Guj) and Addl. CIT v. Shri Subhlaxmi Mills Ltd. 1975 100 ITR 188 (Guj), which flowed from the misapplication of the Supreme Court s case of Indian Overseas Bank Ltd. 1970 77 ITR 512, as also Barar Lion Buttons (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1973 87 ITR 44 (P and H) and Leader Engineering Works v. CIT 1980 124 ITR 44 (P and H) (the latter two decisions are of this court), on the same premises holding that for getting such a benefit, a separate rebate reserve has to be created by the assessee, cannot stand on the anvil of the clarificatory circular order of January 30, 1976. Undoubtedly, such circulars are binding on the Revenue as held by the Supreme Court in Navnit Lal C.Javeri v. K. K. Sen, AAC of I.T. 1965 56 ITR 198. It cannot get out of it and the decision in this case must necessarily go against it. For the aforesaid view, the question posed at the outset is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, with costs. RAJENDRA NATH MITTAL J.-I agree.
-
1984 (2) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Voluntary Disclosure Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... s the same amount which was disclosed under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme on March 30, 1966. When this explanation was rejected on the footing that the wife had never any source of income, an inference of fact was drawn that this was the husband s money which was disclosed by the wife. It would, therefore, follow that the finding that the amount was in existence in March, 1966, followed from the explanation given by the assessee and that given by his wife. It is a conclusion of fact. We, accordingly, answer this reference. We have already observed that the answer to question No. 1 is in the negative by holding that as the Delhi High Court judgment has been overruled, the amount was taxable in the hands of the assessee. However, it had to be taxed in the correct assessment year. The answer to the second question is in the affirmative on the footing that the amount could be taxed in 1966-67, notwithstanding the language of s. 68 of the I.T. Act. We make no order as to costs.
....
|
