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Showing 221 to 240 of 286 Records
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1991 (9) TMI 66 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Firm Registration ... ... ... ... ..... were considering the provisions of sections 23(4) and 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, whereunder there was no provision similar to the one contained in sub-section (7) of section 184 of the Act. Under the 1922 Act, a firm was required to get itself registered every year by filing an application whereas this is not so now under the Act where registration once granted continues automatically, provided the assessee furnishes the requisite declaration in Form No. 12 within time. For this reason, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Income-tax Officer to the extent it treats the petitioner firm as an unregistered firm for the relevant assessment year is quashed, as also the, order of the Commissioner. It shall, however, be open to the Incometax Officer to proceed in the matter in accordance With law. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 65 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority ... ... ... ... ..... ion which is available to him and that is either to buy the property or to issue a "No objection certificate". The right to buy the property has to be exercised within a stipulated period which is within two months from the end of the month within which a statement under section 269UC has been filed. In the present case, the statement was filed on January 31, 1990. Two months would expire by March 31, 1990. Thereafter, the Government lost its right to purchase the said property. Following the ratio of this court's decision in Tanvi Trading and Credits' case 1991 188 ITR 623, we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order passed by the appropriate authority and further issue a writ of mandamus directing the appropriate authority to issue to the petitioners and to respondent No. 4, within four weeks from today, a "no objection certificate" in terms of section 269 UL (3). The petition stands disposed of. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... el appearing on behalf of the respondent. I have carefully perused the averments in the complaint. They show that these two petitioners who were partners of the first accused/firm, had conspired along with the other accused, with a view to wilfully evade tax, defraud the exchequer of its legitimate revenue and deceive the concerned Income-tax Officer, in which process they had fabricated false evidence in the form of books of account containing false entries. These allegations are sufficient prima facie to permit the trial to be proceeded with against these two petitioners as well. The prosecution must be furnished an opportunity to let in evidence on the allegations made in the complaint. It will always be open to the petitioners to canvass this question before the trial Magistrate, after evidence is brought on record. No ground has been made out to quash the pending prosecution, in so far as it relates to the petitioners, at this stage. This petition shall stand dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 63 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Self-Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... court held that the question whether the facts of a given case will constitute good and sufficient reason for not imposing a penalty is a question of fact. On going through the appellate order in question, we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not base its findings on irrelevant considerations. Extraneous considerations have not been taken into account by the Tribunal. The Tribunal entered its findings on appreciation of the entire facts. The argument that the Tribunal referred to the loan to the sister concern as on April 1, 1983, did not appeal to us. The questions whether available funds have been siphoned off and whether, if the funds were not diverted, the assessee would have been able to discharge the liability under the Income-tax Act, have been considered by the Tribunal and finding has been arrived at on appreciation of facts. The finding is one of fact and we find that no referable questions arise out of that finding. The original petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... tion of rubber latex which was construed as agricultural income is not applicable in the instant case. The petitioner-assessee has not received any amount towards the realisation of rubber latex. Since the amounts covered as sale consideration of the trees sold under the agreement are construed as a capital receipt, the inclusion of the portion towards agricultural income during the accounting period of the assessee cannot stand. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders of the assessing authorities are liable to be quashed and accordingly they are quashed. It is for the assessing authorities, if they possess enough material to substantiate that either the assessee or the agreement-holder during the accounting year, de hors the consideration specified in the agreement, derived income as a result of slaughter tapping, to decide what course of action to be taken, if they are so advised. The writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 2,000 (rupees two thousand only).
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1991 (9) TMI 61 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accounting, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... the accounts on mercantile basis, they were bound to file the returns on accrual basis regarding the rental income due as per the lease deed. They did so for the previous year 1974-75. That was proper. The Income-tax Officer was justified in effecting the assessments under section 143(3) read with section 143(2)(a) on the basis of the original returns. The subsequent returns filed on receipt basis has no basis or relevance. The Tribunal was in error in cancelling the assessments made under section 143(3) read with section 143(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of the original returns filed and in directing the Income-tax Officer to make fresh assessments on the basis of the revised returns filed by the assessee. We answer the question referred to this court in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment tinder the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1991 (9) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... f funds is false. This is a vital aspect that should be borne in mind in evaluating as to how far the order of penalty passed by the Tribunal was justified on the facts of this case. We have no doubt that the Tribunal was justified in sustaining the penalty in the sum of Rs. 37,000 in the light of the independent material available and adverted to by it during the penalty proceedings. We, therefore, answer the question referred to this court by holding that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee concealed the particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars of his income. The order passed under section 132(5) of the Act was not the basis or foundation for sustaining the penalty in the sum of Rs. 37,000. We answer the question in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1991 (9) TMI 59 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... eror in exchange for the capital asset transferred by him. The consideration for the transfer is the thing received by the transferor in exchange for the asset transferred and it is not right to say that the asset transferred and parted with is itself the consideration for the transfer. The main part of section 12B(2) provides that the amount of a capital gain shall be computed after making certain deductions from the full value of the consideration for which the sale, exchange or transfer of the capital asset is made . In the case of a sale, the full value of the consideration is the full sale price actually paid. The Legislature had to use the words full value of the consideration because it was dealing not merely with sale but with other types of transfer, such as exchange, where the consideration would be other than money. We, therefore, are of the view that there is no need to have these questions referred to this court. The original petitions, therefore, are dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... to show that the failure to file the return in time was without reasonable cause . It was held that it is only when the assessee shows cause that an opinion can be formed regarding its reasonableness or otherwise. Liability for payment of penalty, it was further observed, arises immediately upon the failure of the assessee to furnish the return within the time prescribed and, consequently, the burden of proof to show that he had reasonable cause for not filing it within time, would be upon the assessee and not on the Revenue. It would follow, therefore, that it was for the assessee to show reasonable cause for late filing of the return and not for the Revenue to prove the lack of it. Respectfully agreeing with the view expressed in Haryana Iron and Steel Rolling Mills case 1987 164 ITR 779 (P and H), we dispose of the reference by answering the matter referred in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 57 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Transfer To Minor Children ... ... ... ... ..... case of deferred benefit for a minor child. This contention of the assessee was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal by following the decision of the Bombay High Court in 1977 109 ITR 602 (Yogindraprasad N. Mafatlal v. CIT). The question is now settled by a decision of this court also which is CIT v. M. D. Veeranarasimhaiah 1988 174 ITR 435. It was held by this court that since the income had to be accumulated and the minor children had no right to receive that income, nothing had accrued to the minor children and consequently the said income could not be included in their father s income. It was a case of a deferred benefit, not being for a minor child. Accordingly, it was held that section 64(1)(vii) was not applicable. The aforesaid decision directly covers the point. Consequently, the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal has to be affirmed. The question referred to us is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. References are answered accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 56 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... plaint, it has been specifically described that Shri Jagmohan Singh was the chairman of the company and the return had been filed by him for himself and on behalf of the company though specific allegations of the petitioner being in charge of the business and being responsible to the company for its business were not added. In the petition filed, the petitioner has not urged that there was some other person acting for the company and looking after its business affairs. In the course of arguments, learned counsel has urged that the question of his responsibility to the company may be left open so that he may show it to the trial Magistrate that, in fact, the petitioner was not in charge of and responsible to the company for its business. This question is left open. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no force in the criminal revisions which are hereby dismissed. The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the trial Magistrate on October 10, 1991.
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1991 (9) TMI 55 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... 96. The Tribunal s finding is to the following effect On September 18, 1976, the Income-tax Officer issued notice under section 148 on the basis of the Revenue audit note. These findings are essentially conclusions from the factual position. No material has been placed before us to show that the factual position as indicated by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) or the Tribunal is contrary to the actual fact situation. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the reassessment under section 147(b) was unauthorised, and mechanically relying on the audit objection, the Income-tax Officer cannot reopen an assessment. In view of these conclusions of ours, the second question is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We decline to answer the first question because the same will be an academic, exercise. The reference is accordingly disposed of. No costs. S. K. MOHANTY J.-I agree.
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1991 (9) TMI 54 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Firm, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... raph 9, it is stated that it was Jaswant Rai who had been appearing on different occasions in the assessment proceedings and penalty proceedings. With respect to the other partners, except for describing that they were partners of the firm, no allegations are made that they were in charge of, or responsible to, the firm for the conduct of its business. In a similar situation, in Puran Devi v. Z. S. Klar, ITO 1988 169 ITR 608 (P and H), I. S. Tiwana J. quashed the proceedings against the partners against whom no such plea had been taken. I subscribe to the same view. There being no allegation against the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 and respondents Nos. 2 and 4, the impugned complaint qua them cannot proceed and the complaint and order of the Additional Sessions judge, annexure P-9, qua them are hereby quashed. The prosecution shall, however, continue against Jaswant Rai Mittal and Co. and its partner, Jaswant Rai. The criminal miscellaneous petition stands disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Company, False Statement In Verification, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... bills numbering 263 were fraudulently made use of for the relevant assessment year. This is not a case where there are no prima facie allegations sufficient to put the petitioner on trial. The complaint also shows that the petitioner, along with others, was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The petitioner will be at liberty to urge the contentions placed before me after evidence is adduced before the trial Magistrate. The difference between the nominee-director and any other director will again be a matter of evidence. So far as section 30A of the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964, is concerned, the words used therein nothing done or omitted to be done in good faith in the discharge of his duties as director will again postulate the need to appreciate the evidence before arriving at a conclusion. I am satisfied that no ground has been made at this stage to quash the pending prosecution. In that view, this petition shall stand dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 52 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income, Mutual Concern ... ... ... ... ..... rinciple of mutuality In respect of transactions held by it with its members is not lost. The Principle of establishing complete identity between the contributors and the participators will apply only in respect of contributions made by the members. Accordingly, I hold that the law laid down in Ranchi Club s case 1987 168 ITR 120 (Patna) is not correct and is, therefore, overruled. In view of the discussions made above, I answer all the three questions referred to this court in the affirmative and against the Department. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. S. B. SANYAL J.-I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother, Bharuka J. The judgment lucidly deals with the difficult questions referred to us for decision. AFTAB ALAM J.-I agree.
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1991 (9) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... f the answer to this question is in the negative, the assessee would not be entitled to claim exemption as provided under clause (xxxii) of section 5(1) of the Act. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the firms in which the assessee was a partner did not have or own any undertaking which was engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods. The making or preparation of cement concrete or other such articles was not an activity in which the firms in which the assessee was a partner were engaged, but such activity was an integral part of the activity of construction of buildings in which the firms were engaged. In our opinion, therefore, the assessee did not qualify for the exemption as provided under clause (xxxii) of section 5(1) of the Act. In the result, we answer the question which has been referred to us for our opinion in each of these references in the negative and against the assessee. References shall stand disposed of, accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Collaboration Agreement, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Technical Know-how ... ... ... ... ..... ing the valuation given by the assessee as in the case of patent rights, then there cannot be any objection. But, in the order, it is seen that except for the patent rights, there was no admitted valuation for other components. Therefore, we feel that a fresh consideration is required by the Tribunal regarding the exclusion and valuation of the seven items mentioned in question No. 1 referred to us. The answer to the second question referred will depend upon reconsideration of the appeal. In the circumstances, we refuse to answer the question referred to us and direct the Appellate Tribunal to take the appeal for the assessment year 1971-72, viz., I.T.A. No. 303/Coch. of 1974-75, on file and dispose of the same afresh considering the question of exclusion of the know-how mentioned in question No. 1 and valuation thereof. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1991 (9) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e scope of article 227. The question whether the High Court, under article 227, can act even on the information received from any person say for instance such information is got from the proceedings in the High Court which may not be maintainable is no more res integra in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan, AIR 1971 SC 315 and Shaikh Md. Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab, AIR 1970 SC 61). A reference to the ruling of this court in State of Kerala v. M. J. Louis 1989 2 KLT (SN) 19, is also relevant in the context. If that be the position, the dissenting note, notwithstanding the fact that the Revenue has not filed any separate proceeding in this court to have the same quashed, in our view, can be set aside by issuing appropriate orders or directions in the exercise of jurisdiction under article 227. We, accordingly, set aside the dissenting note of the Accountant Member. The original petitions are disposed of as above.
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1991 (9) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business, Business Loss, Question Of Law, Set Off Against Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... pportunity afforded to him to furnish proper evidence. These are all findings of fact and it is based on such findings that the ultimate question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to claim set off of business loss will actually arise. For answering the question, the basic fact or vital facts to substantiate the plea made should have been established by the assessee. He failed to do so. The resultant conclusion that the assessee did not carry on any business during the previous year ended on March 31, 1974, and so he is not entitled to the benefit of set off of business loss was arrived at due to the failure of the assessee to substantiate his plea by producing proper materials before the authorities. We are of the view that no referable question of law arises either as formulated in the application filed under section 256(1) of the Act or as now attempted to be formulated in paragraph 20 of the original petition. The original petition is without merit. It is dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... lding are contiguous and situate in the same compound and with common boundaries and have unity of structure, there is no reason why they should not together be regarded as constituting one house. We are of the view that the approach and test laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid decision in Shiv Narain Chaudhari's case 1977 108 ITR 104, is a correct one and in the light of the said decision, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act in respect of the value of the whole building and not merely in respect of the proportionate value of one of the shop rooms in the building. We answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. All the references are answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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