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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 375 Records
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1995 (3) TMI 135 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
Assessing Officer, Assessment Order, Legal Representative, Tribunal's Order ... ... ... ... ..... ot be approved as his order cancelling the assessment order itself is vacated by us while deciding the ground Nos. 1 and 2. However, it is observed that the CIT(A) has deleted these additions also on the ground that no additions were called for as held in the case of Sri Sukumar Dutta. According to him, no addition is called for under section 69B when the assessment year is not the first year of business and no addition was warranted on account of estimated sale of gold dust. On perusal of ITAT s order in the case of Sri Sukumar Dutta we find that the Tribunal has deleted both the similar additions by giving elaborate reasons. Since the facts are identical and since these additions were deleted by the CIT(A) for the same reasons as given in he case of Sri Sukumar Dutta follows the decision of the Tribunal and uphold the order of the CIT(A) on this count and for this reason ground Nos. 3 and 4 fail and are rejected. 18. In the result, the departmental appeal is partly allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 134 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
Business Income, Capital Gains Tax, Capital Receipt, Cost Of Acquisition, Sale Proceeds ... ... ... ... ..... y. There is, however, nothing to show that for obtaining the export licence the assessee has to pay anything more than the service charges to the licencing authority. The council charges are paid to A.E.P.C. which enters the scene only after the export licence is issued by the licencing authority. The function of the A.E.P.C. is merely to allocate the export entitlement and for this purpose it charges council charges which has nothing to do with the export licence. From the papers produced in the paper book it would appear, therefore, that there is no cost of acquisition, as such, for the export licence. The judgment of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the assessee, though it relates to route permits is equally applicable to the case of export licence. Since there is no cost of acquisition for the export licence there is no liability to capital gains tax also. We hold accordingly. 14. to 18. These paras are not reproduced here as they involved minor issues .
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1995 (3) TMI 133 - ITAT CALCUTTA-A
Assessing Officer, Assessment Order, Business Income, Carrying On Business, Fixed Deposit, Interest Income, Other Sources
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1995 (3) TMI 132 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
Residential House Property ... ... ... ... ..... was allotted the flat on 1-1-1980 which he occupied on the same date. Joining the society and paying the amounts cannot really amount to purchase of a house even under the modified terms as above. On the contrary, allotment of the flat would certainly give the assessee certain specific obligations and rights. The manner in which the amounts are paid and the period over which they are paid may not also be of much relevance. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, therefore, I would hold that the assessee has purchased a house as required under section 54 and looking at the manner in which the project was started, the house constructed, allotment made and the co-operative society continued, the assessee must be deemed to have satisfied the conditions of section 54 for exemption. This is so, even though it is not possible to strictly point out any particular day or point of time at which the purchase was made. The assessee is entitled to the relief. 8. The appeal is allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 131 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
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... ... ..... assessee is required to deduct tax as per estimate. The amount so deducted must be paid to the exchequer within the time stipulated in the Act. From the facts gathered, we find that the assessee made honest estimate. No mala fide was attributed to the assessee in regard to the estimate. The assessee also filed annual return under s. 206 of the Act. He also made the payment to the exchequer within the stipulated time. Therefore, we find that the assessee discharged his duties as cast upon him as per the provisions of law. Admittedly the employees are assessed separately and shortfall, if there be any, was said to have been considered in the assessment of the employees. Having regard to the facts and considering carefully the precedents available over the point, we are of the opinion that the AO had no jurisdiction under s. 201 of the Act, to demand further tax from the assessee in respect of the tax short deducted. 11. In the result, the appeals of the assessee stand allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 130 - ITAT BOMBAY
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... opined that since the Tribunal had held that no interest was chargeable under section 216 because the ITO had failed to record a finding that there had been under-estimate of advance tax by the assessee, no question of law arose for reference to the High Court . It would be clear that the ratio of the Gujarat High Court decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of assessee s case. 8. Taking all these factors into account, we are of the opinion that the A. O. was justified in charging interest under section 216. We may further mention that the facts and circumstances on the basis of which the Tribunal had given its decision last year were different than what we have found for this year and hence while last year the assessee had been allowed relief, we are upholding the levy of interest under section 216 of the Act this year. 9. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the revenue is allowed. The order of the ld. CIT(A) is cancelled and the order of the A.O. is restored
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1995 (3) TMI 129 - ITAT BOMBAY
A Partner, Partnership Firm ... ... ... ... ..... Murlidhar Bhagwan Das 1964 52 ITR 335 (SC) and in the case of First ITO v. Short Bros. (P.) Ltd. 1966 60 ITR 83 (SC) as is done by us hereinbefore. Therefore, we are not in a position to accept the proposition advanced by the ld. counsel of the assessee. The proviso inserted by way of amendment clearly mentions that the deduction shall not be allowed in the computation of the income of any partner and if read in the context of notes and clauses for the purpose of bringing the amendment, it is quite clear to us that no such deduction is intended by the Legislature qua the share of profit derived by a partner of a registered firm. By inserting the proviso the Legislature has excluded the share of profits from the registered firm for the purpose of computing the profits to find out the quantum deduction up to 20 per cent stated in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 32AB. We, therefore, uphold the appellate order. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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1995 (3) TMI 128 - ITAT BOMBAY
Assessing Officer, Capital Loss, Dealer In Shares, S. 10, Speculation Business ... ... ... ... ..... power of exercising the control over the company. In view of these distinguishing features, the ratio of the decision of the Calcutta High Court cannot apply to the facts of the present case. Hence, the issue is decided in favour of the assessee. 6. The second issue relates to the disallowance of Rs. 3500 out of the professional fees paid by the assessee-company to the C.A. for handling the various tax matters. The Assessing Officer has restricted the deduction under section 80VV to the sum of Rs. 5,000. It has been observed by the CIT (Appeals) that the appellant had not been able to explain as to how the action of the Assessing Officer was wrong. Considering the facts of the case, the disallowance of Rs. 3,500 made by the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the CIT (Appeals). After hearing both the parties, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT (Appeals) and, therefore, this issue stands decided against the assessee. 7. In the result, appeal is partly allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 127 - ITAT BOMBAY
Income Tax Rules, Words And Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... consumable store or a raw material depending upon the business of the ultimate user. The mere fact that the gas cylinders are ultimately sold for a profit cannot be a ground for denying the depreciation to which the assessee is entitled. We, therefore, accept the assessee s contention and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the depreciation on the gas cylinders used in the assessee s business of leasing. 8. The next ground relates to the assessee s claim for deduction under section 80M. We have heard the parties and perused the details. The assessee has earned the dividend income of Rs. 17,762 gross and the net dividend income is Rs. 14,209 (after deducting Rs. 3,553 as expenses). Therefore, the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 80M on the net at 60 per cent of Rs. 14,209. We, therefore, direct the Assessing Officer to allow deduction under section 80M as worked out by the assessee at 60 per cent of the net dividend income. 9. In the result, appeal is allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 126 - ITAT BOMBAY
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... sent case. 8. The matter can be considered from another angle also. The Legislature itself has treated the hotel business differently from the industrial undertaking. The various sections, such as section 80HH, section 80-I, section 80-IA and section 80J refers to hotel business as well as industrial undertaking. This shows that industrial undertaking did not include hotel business. If the hotel business could be included within the meaning of industrial undertaking, then there was no need of including the hotel business separately in these sections. Since, we are not concerned in the present appeal with the hotel business, the authorities relied upon by the revenue cannot be pressed into service in deciding the issue before us. 9. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the activity carried on by the assessee amounts to manufacturing activity and the assessee is entitled to investment allowance under section 32A. 10. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 125 - ITAT BANGALORE
Approved Gratuity Fund, Assessing Officer, Gratuity Liability, Provision For Gratuity, Supreme Court
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1995 (3) TMI 124 - ITAT BANGALORE
Accounting Year, Deemed Income ... ... ... ... ..... fication or even any Standing Order, award, contract of services or otherwise. It is clear therefrom that the concept of due date here is to be taken in a rather very flexible sense. Inasmuch as the assessee is very much under impunity to make payment of the amount under consideration within 20th of the following month, we are of the view that the purpose of clause (va) of section 36(1) will be substantially complied with if the payment be made within such period of 20th of the following month. In the instant case, inasmuch as the assessee has actually made the payment within such date, we hold that the assessee should get the benefit of deduction of the amount under clause (va) of section 36(1). In that view, we reverse the actions of the lower authorities and direct that the entire amount of Rs. 1,49,061 being deductible under section 36(1)(va) be deleted from the addition as made in the assessment. 4. to 8 These paras are not reproduced here as they involved minor issues .
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1995 (3) TMI 123 - ITAT BANGALORE
Advance Tax, Appellate Authority, Assessment Order, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... bed by the provisions of sub-section (4) of sec. 249 in any way. Finally therefore, we are of the opinion that whether the assessee paid his self-assessment tax for any particular assessment year or not, shall have no relevance to the question of admissibility of the appeal against imposition of penalty u/s 271D on the assessee simply because of the fact that this penalty cannot be related to any particular assessment year or return of income in respect of any such year. Ultimately therefore, we hold that the CIT(A) was wrong in not entertaining the appeal of the assessee simply on the ground of applicability of the provisions of sec. 249(4). As we hold, the said provisions do not apply in the instant case. We, therefore, set aside the order of the CIT(A) and direct him to admit the appeal filed by the assessee before him and thereafter to decide the same on merits. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee before us is partially allowed to the above-mentioned extent
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1995 (3) TMI 122 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
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... ... ..... during the year the assessee was also not obliged to file estimate of advance tax under s. 212. The learned counsel has therefore pleaded that penalty levied on given facts is not valid and the same deserves to be cancelled. 18. The learned Departmental Representative on the other hand relied upon the orders of the lower authorities. 19. On due consideration of the facts given we find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the assessee and we see no justification in levy of penalty under s. 273(1)(b). It is evident from the facts given that the assessee had not been previously assessed and as such the assessee was not under an obligation to file a statement of advance tax under s 273(1)(b). The position being so penalty under s. 273(1)(b) is not leviable. We accordingly vacate the order of the first appellate authority and direct the AO to cancel the penalty levied being invalid and unlawful. 20. In the result all the appeals of the assessee stand allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the multifold yarn or doubled yarn prepared by the appellants out of duty paid cotton yarn and nylon filament yarn attracts duty under Item 18A/18E of the Central Excise Tariff?
Held that:- Every change does not necessarily fall within the expression `manufacture' unless it is shown that the process has brought into existence and a new product having a distinct identity in the commercial world. In the absence of any evidence in that behalf which the Revenue ought to have laid, we find it difficult to come to the conclusion that excisable goods came into existence by the treatment of cotton and nylon yarn into a multifold yarn.
We allow these appeals, set aside the order of the excise authorities as well as the Tribunal and hold that the item multifold yarn for want of evidence, in regard to which we had made a mention has not been shown to be liable to excise duty under the relevant Tariff Entry. It will be for the excise authorities to decide after notice to the appellants whether the excise duty already paid is liable to be refunded in view of Section 11B of the Act.
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1995 (3) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
Staple Fibre ... ... ... ... ..... fford opportunity to get the consignment tested afresh. The learned counsel submitted that the Department did not afford any opportunity to cross-examine the tester. 3. None of the submissions have any merit. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not claim fresh testing. No material has been placed to show that it applied for cross-examining the tester. On merits the finding recorded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any error of law. It is true that the two test houses gave report in favour of the appellant but that was not conclusive and in any case the Tribunal has based its finding not only on the report of the test house but also on the material furnished by the appellant and above all the certificate given by the manufacturers which has been extracted above. The exemption under Notification is to viscose and not the family of viscose. The finding of the Tribunal is well founded. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal to Supreme Court - Copper wire rods ... ... ... ... ..... he subsequent instructions issued by the department. The answers to the other questions may also depend upon the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal. In the instant case we think it was desirable for the Tribunal to record the finding of fact to answer the questions arising for determination in relation to the liability to pay excise duty. Both the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the revenue also stated that it would help to come to a definite and positive conclusion if the Tribunal records its findings of facts in relation to the commodity in question. We, therefore, think it appropriate that the entire matter should go back to the Tribunal. 2. For the above reasons we set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and remit the appeals to the Tribunal for decision afresh on all the matters arising in the appeals including questions which may have relevance having regard to the changed situation. The appeals are allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 118 - SC ORDER
Exemption - Effect of withdrawal ... ... ... ... ..... aw was settled by this Court in two decisions in Collector of Central Excise v. Kalinga Paints and Chemicals Industries - 1989 (44) E.L.T. 598 and Collector of Central Excise v. Newman Press - 1990 (48) E.L.T. 626. 3. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Division Bench and that of the learned Single Judge are set aside and the order passed by the Collector is restored. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Tungsten wire imported by the respondent can be classified as 'electrical resistance wires' for the purpose of payment of customs duty under Item 73(23) in Section XVI of the First Schedule of the Indian Customs Tariff which was prevalent during the period 1972 to 1975 when the said imports were made?
Held that:- The expression `electrical resistance wires' in Item 73(23) has to be read along with the `Nichrome' which precedes that expression and, if thus read, it can only mean electrical wires having characteristics similar to those of Nichrome, namely, high resistivity. Keeping in view the low resistivity of Tungsten wire it cannot be regarded as electrical resistance wire falling under Item 73(23). No force in these appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 116 - SC ORDER
Appeal to Supreme Court - Classification dispute ... ... ... ... ..... oms for assessing goods under Heading 85.04. The learned counsel for the Revenue states that subsequent to this order passed by the Tribunal the department has already remitted the fine to the appellant and thus the main dispute in regard to confiscation of goods has come to an end. 2. We enquired of the learned counsel for the appellant if there have been subsequent imports of the same commodity to require this Court to go into the question of the correctness of the classification. He frankly stated that to his knowledge there has been no subsequent imports. The counsel for the Revenue also stated that as far as his information goes he has no idea if there have been any subsequent imports. If that be so and if there is no question of recurring liability based on classification the issue has become academic and we see no reason to go into an academic issue since more than a decade has since expired. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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