Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 278 Records
-
1987 (4) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction From Total Income, Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... ncompasses two items. The first relates to the amount of Rs. 1,78,606 realised by the assessee upon the sale of its assets. It is common ground that, in so far as this item is concerned, the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1978 113 ITR 84. The second question for the assessment year 1969-70 also relates to the item of Rs. 2,65,548 which represents the recoveries of rent by the assessee from its staff and workers. It is common ground that this amount has been treated as part of the assessee s business income. So treated, it must necessarily be attributed to the priority industry carried on by the assessee and must, therefore, qualify for deduction under section 80-I. In the circumstances, the second question for the assessment year 1969-70 must also be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 37 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ee from the Explanation. The Tribunal ought not to have treated this matter in a cavalier fashion or as a summary proceeding, more particularly when it was reversing the finding of the authority below. Until and unless the assessee succeeded in rebutting the presumption arising from the Explanation, no occasion could have arisen for the Tribunal to see whether and what material the Department has brought on record to sustain the penalty. For the above reasons, we decline to answer the first question and call upon the Tribunal to re-hear the appeal only to the extent of the first question and pass orders afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. We make it clear that it shall be open to the Tribunal to hear the counsel/representatives of the parties over again, but it shall not be open to it to receive any fresh material or evidence on the part of either the assessee or the Revenue. Reference is answered in the above terms. No costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Charitable Trust, Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the public and there is no transfer of that beneficial interest, the ownership continuing in the beneficiary, viz., the public as specified therein. The contention that the deed creates a trust over a trust is equally untenable. In the present case, there are two different, independent and separate trusts. This is not a case of one trust created overlapping with another trust. What is sought to be assessed is the income from the trust properties. It is the trustee who is to be proceeded against and not the beneficiary and, therefore, the income in his hands alone constitutes wealth. That income is property and that property is held for a public charitable purpose and in this view, the assessee will be entitled to the protection of section 5(1) in respect of the income which he derives under the terms specified in paragraph 8 of the trust deed. For the reasons stated above, question No. 2 is answered in the negative, i.e., against the Department and in favour of the assessee.
-
1987 (4) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Jewellery, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 1957, as retrospectively amended, applied to the case of the assessee in so far as the claim for exemption of jewellery and ornaments of the aggregate value of Rs. 3,55,966 was concerned ? We find that the first question arises not out of the order of the Tribunal but out of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal decided the issue on the basis which is indicated in the second question, namely, the retrospective amendment of section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. We, therefore, decline to answer the first question. The second question has to be answered, it is agreed, in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue, having regard to the judgment of this court in CWT v. Rasesh N. Mafatlal 1980 126 ITR 173. In giving effect to this answer, the Tribunal shall, we trust, bear in mind our judgment in Wealth-tax Reference No. 13 of 1975, delivered on March 31, 1987 CWT v. Godavaribai R. Podar, 1988 169 ITR 245. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift, Goodwill In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... 960. The deceased died on December 19, 1963. The gift of Rs. 1,25,000 made by the deceased to his then minor son, it is agreed, is covered by the Supreme Court decision in the case of CED v. R. V. Viswanathan 1976 105 ITR 653 (SC) and the answer has got to be in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. As regards the amount of Rs. 50,000 gifted to Smt. Rampyaribai also, the issue is covered by another Supreme Court decision in the case of CED v. Kamlavati and CED v. Jai Gopal Mehra 1979 120 ITR 456 (SC) and the answer has got to be in the negative and in favour of the accountable persons. The second question, it is further agreed, is also covered by this court s decision in the case of CED v. Ratanlal Budhamal Taki 1983 142 ITR 151 (Bom) and the answer to this question has got to be in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. In the result, both the questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 33 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... ent by him is not liable to be added back under section 40(b). The view to the contrary taken by some other High Courts was not accepted by the Full Bench. The present application has been made on behalf of the Commissioner under section 261 of the Act for grant of a certificate of fitness. Having heard counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that there is no manner of doubt that the question which came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this court, is a substantial question of law of general importance. We are further of the opinion that since there is divergence of opinion among various High Courts, this is a fit case where the question involved may be decided by the Supreme Court so that the controversy may be finally set at rest. In the result, we certify that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In the circumstances of the case, however, parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... d bring the gift within the purview of section 10 but where the gift is subject to some reservation or qualification, that is to say, if the subject-matter of the gift is property shorn of certain rights and the possession or enjoyment of some benefit in that property by the donor is referable to those rights, i.e., rights shorn of which the property is gifted, then in that case the subject-matter of the gift will not be deemed to pass on the death of the deceased donor. In other words, if the deceased donor limits the interest he is parting with and possesses or enjoys some benefit in the property not on account of the interest parted with but because of the interest still retained by him, the interest parted with will not be deemed to be a part of the estate of the deceased donor passing on his death for the purpose of section 10. Following the Supreme Court s decision, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Amounts Paid Under Insurance Policies, Estate Duty, Is Kept Up ... ... ... ... ..... agraph, submitted that the words in proportion to the premiums paid by him in section 14 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, referred to the share of the assured in the payment of each premium they did not mean that some premium payments could be made by the assured and some by the donee. There is no justification for reading the words as excluding premium payments made by one or the other, the assured or the donee. While the words may cover part payment of each premium by the assured and the donee, they certainly cover cases where the premiums have been paid at one time by the assured and at another by the donee. Upon a construction of section 14 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the question, in so far as it relates thereto, must be answered against the assessee. It is answered thus The provisions of section 14(1) are attracted to the sum of Rs. 1,74,766 received for the two policies by the assignees from the insurance companies after the death of the deceased. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 30 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Speculative Transactions ... ... ... ... ..... t was entered into between the assessee and M/s. R.C.S. Vanaspati Industries Ltd. was subsisting and the said settlement was in the nature of a settlement of the contract and not settlement of a dispute for damages on account of a breach of the contract. Since this is a case of a settlement of the contract, it is covered by section 43(5) of the Act and it must be held to be a speculative transaction and the loss suffered by the assessee in this transaction cannot be held to be a trading loss as found by the Tribunal. For the reasons aforesaid, the question referred for the opinion of this court is answered in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue, as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not right in law in treating the loss of Rs. 13,050 in groundnut oil as a trading loss. The said loss was in the nature of loss sustained in a speculative transaction. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... le the Revenue to ascertain what had happened in regard to the allied reference aforementioned. The matter having reached once again today, we find that neither that information is available nor can the Revenue produce any copy of the statement of the case which the Commissioner of Income-tax undertook to produce as recorded in the present statement of the case. Mr. Jetly applies for an adjournment to enable the Revenue to produce such statement of the case. We have already adjourned the matter. We decline to adjourn it again because no information can be given to us as to the steps, if any, taken by the Revenue between March 26, 1987, and today. Having regard to the failure of the Commissioner of Income-tax to abide by his undertaking given before the Tribunal, upon the basis of which the Tribunal stated the case in this reference, we decline to answer the questions in this reference. The reference is accordingly returned with the questions unanswered. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... considered the Explanation to section 12(1) care fully. In our view, the word and used in the Explanation to section 12(1) cannot be read as or as held by the Gujarat and the Madras High Court decisions Kikabhai Samsuddin v. CED 1969 73 ITR 241 (Guj) and (ED v. K. .4. Kader 1974 96 ITR 289 (Mad). It may be true that if there was any reservation of interest in favour of the settlor/deceased, the provisions of subsection (1) of section 12 would have applied. The Explanation is, however, to our mind, enacted to meet a situation where reservation of interest is for the settlor as well as his relatives and an argument might be advanced that the reservation of interest being not for the settlor himself alone, sub-section (1) would not apply. Any decision where a contrary view may have been taken has not been brought to our notice. In the above view of the matter, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 27 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... t liability payable in future had been incurred by the assessee, was that liability, which was under the agreement taken over by the buyer, liable to be deducted in the computation of the actual sale price for the purpose of finding out the capital gains ? These are matters on which, in the absence of findings by the authorities, we express no view. The finding of the Tribunal that the gratuity liability was deductible without considering whether, on the material produced by the assessee, such liability had in fact been incurred, was uncalled for. We have no doubt that the Tribunal will consider these facts and, if necessary, remit the matter to the appropriate authority, For the reasons stated above, we decline to answer the questions. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
-
1987 (4) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... aya Rani Puny 1986 157 ITR 330 (SC). The case of Jain Bros. 1970 77 ITR 107 (SC), he said, was rightly not cited in the case of Suresh Seth 1981 129 ITR 328 (SC), because the latter was under the Wealth-tax Act. Without reference to Jain Bros. case 1970 77 ITR 107 (SC), he averred that the case of Suresh Seth 1981 129 ITR 328 (SC) is rightly decided. As far as we are concerned, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Maya Rani Punj 1986 157 ITR 330 (SC) is binding and it holds that the case of Suresh Seth 1981 129 ITR 328 (SC) was contrary to law. Following the case of Maya Rani Punj 1986 157 ITR 330 (SC), the ratio of which applies to section 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, we must hold that penalty was imposable upon the assessee under the unamended section 18(1)(a) for the period of delay prior to April 1, 1969, and under the amended section 18(1)(a) for the period of delay subsequent thereto. The question is answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 25 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ended that the date of vesting of the property in the Government should be deemed to be the date of the notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. This contention, being contrary to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot obviously be accepted. This question is also, therefore, to be answered against the assessee. Consequently, the reference is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue as under 1. That, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the property in question was not agricultural 2. That, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was capital gain of Rs. 3,27,994 and 3. That, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in including the said capital gain in the previous year pertaining to the relevant assessment year under consideration. The parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... rd education as used in clause (xii) does not mean education in the ordinary sense which father is obliged to arrange for. It means higher or specialised education whether in India or abroad. The circular of the Department on which Shri Mehta placed reliance by referring to Gulanikar s Treatise on Law and Practice of Gift-tax and Wealth-tax, 1984 edition, at page 3.114, clearly indicates that for exemption under section 5(1)(xii), the provision has to be for higher education in India or abroad. The exemption is thus available to the extent to which the gifts are proved to the satisfaction of the Gift-tax Officer as being reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case. On the facts and material on record, it is not possible to agree with Shri Metha that any portion of the gift is in fact for the education of the child. Accordingly, on the facts before us, we answer the third question of law also in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... rcise the power of review or of recalling its previous judgment purporting to exercise power under Order 47, rule 1, or section 151, CPC. We are conscious of the fact that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in order to do justice in special circumstances, such as to rectify a mistake of clerical nature which had crept in by inadvertence or restore a case when dismissed in default on the cause being shown reasonable or even when the case was decided on merits without due notice to parties or to a party concerned on account of the mistake of the High Court office. The exercise of such power is different from those conferred under Order 47, rule 1 or under section 151, CPC. The grounds on which the present application has been moved seeking review or recalling of our order dated January 22, 1987, are not of the type on which any review can be sought invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court. For what has been stated above, this application is rejected.
-
1987 (4) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... d in Ram Singh and Sons Engineering Works case 1979 43 STC 195 (SC). It is, however, of particular significance that in State of Gujarat v. Variety Body Builders 1976 38 STC 176 (SC), the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of McKenzies Limited v. State of Maharashtra 1965 16 STC 518 (SC) (sic) with approval. The assessee in McKenzies Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 1965 16 STC 518 (SC) was a body builder over chassis as in the case before us. The question involved was whether was a dealer for sales tax purposes. The answer depended upon whether a body builder transferred the property in the body after it was built over the chassis. It was held that it was so. Thus, we do not find anything in the above two Supreme Court decisions relied upon by Shri Dhanuka supporting the case of the Revenue. Having regard to the above discussion, we answer all the five questions of law referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 21 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Quasi-judicial In Character, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... rt of the conclusion of the Commissioner that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The power of the Commissioner under section 263 is quasi-judicial in character. He must give reasons in support of his conclusion that the assessment order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. If he does not give reasons, the order would be vitiated. This was the view taken by this court in the case of J. P. Srivastava and Sons Ltd. v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 326 (All) and CIT v. Sunder Lal 1974 96 ITR 310 (All). In the instant case, since the Commissioner has not applied his mind to the relevant material on record and has not given reasons for his conclusions that the assessment order was prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, the Tribunal was justified in reversing that order. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
-
1987 (4) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... 983 141 ITR 841 (Bom), was entirely different, there is an observation in the judgment which is adverse to Mr. Salve s contention. It reads thus (p. 845) The mere fact that the machinery which is availed of for the purpose of assessment under section 143 or section 144 of the Act can be availed of while making a reassessment under section 147 does not make the reassessment under section 147 the same as an assessment under section 143 or section 144. To conclude, we hold that where an assessee does not respond to notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, it is permissible for the taxing authority to assess him on a best judgment basis under section 144 of the said Act. The first question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The second question is not pressed and is, therefore, not answered. The third question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee shall pay to the Revenue the costs of the reference.
-
1987 (4) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Disclosed, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... opinion, is whether any asset has not been shown in the balance-sheet. If there is an asset as defined and it has not, for good reason or otherwise, been shown in the balance-sheet, the Wealth-tax Officer is entitled to apply the provisions of rule 2C. The word disclosed therein only means shown. It must follow that the Wealth-tax Officer was entitled in the instant case to apply the provisions of rule 2C. It may well be true that, upon this interpretation, the assessee would not be entitled to claim a deduction in respect of his income-tax liability upon the outstanding fees and that he would, therefore, be taxed on an amount of wealth which is unrealistic. Even so, we cannot place upon the word disclosed in rule 2C any meaning other than its ordinary dictionary meaning. Mr. Palkhivala fairly stated that he would not press for an answer to the second question. In the result, the first question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
....
|