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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 265 Records
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1986 (9) TMI 26 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... er of such findings. Now, so far as the question of profit-making activities in order to advance any object of general public utility is concerned, the matter is now set at rest by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association s case 1980 121 ITR 1. The Commissioner of Income-tax had placed reliance on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Dharmaposhanam Company s case 1978 114 ITR 463, which is admittedly no longer good law. Had the case of Dharmaposhanam Company 1978 114 ITR 463 (SC), been not overruled by the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association s case 1980 121 ITR 1, there would have been valid ground for a question of law arising in the present case but the said decision having been overruled, there remains no res integra for being considered by this court. In the result, we find no force in these reference applications and the same are dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssage of the Supreme Court, learned counsel for the applicant urged that this court is obliged to correct the mistake by noting that the argument about the applicability of section II (1)(b) had been made before it. Sri V. P. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, also stated before us that the argument about the applicability of the aforesaid provision in the alternative had been advanced by him in the High Court and wrongly the argument had not been noted and decided. In our view, the present is not a case to which the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above could be applied. We are not in a position to adjudicate upon this controversy in this application. In fact, granting of the application would result in reviewing the judgment of this court which is not the scope of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having found no merit in this application, we reject the same. But, in the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 24 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Intercorporate Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... f India 1985 155 ITR 120. A larger Bench of the Supreme Court took the view that the earlier decision in Cloth Trader s (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT 1979 118 ITR 243, by smaller Bench was incorrect and that, properly construed, section 80M, as it stood from the very outset, gave benefit thereunder only on the basis of net dividend Income and not gross dividend income. Accordingly, it was held that the insertion of section 80AA was merely to declare the law as it existed from the very outset and not to introduce an additional tax burden retrospectively. After this decision of the Supreme Court, there can be no doubt that the view taken by the Tribunal in the present case was correct. Consequently, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee as under The Tribunal was justified in construing section 80M of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to mean that the deduction thereunder should be given only on the net dividend income. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 23 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... Mal Golcha held certain shares as an individual and this is how dividend income was assessed as his individual income after partial partition. After the death of Sohan Mal Golcha, his shares became the property of his widow alone. The question is, whether the dividend income derived by his widow, Smt. Tej Kanwar, was her absolute property by virtue of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which admittedly applies to the facts of this case. The Tribunal has held that the dividend income during the relevant period was the absolute property of the widow and, therefore, it had been assessed on that basis only. No infirmity in the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal has been pointed out by learned counsel for the Revenue. Consequently, this reference is answered against the Revenue as under The Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the dividend income was assessable as the absolute property of Smt. Tej Kanwar, widow of Sohan Mal Golcha. No order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Reassessment, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... of his revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner under section 263 of the Act, only a part of the assessment order may be modified or revised without setting aside the entire assessment order but the same may also have the effect of nullifying the pending reassessment proceedings which might have been initiated on entirely different grounds. It remained open to the Commissioner to revise the order passed in reassessment but by revising the order of assessment itself, the proceeding for reassessment may be made abortive. Keeping the object of the proceedings of reassessment in view and the implications thereof, we prefer to take the view that once proceedings of reassessment are initiated, the original order of assessment loses its finality and at this stage it is no longer open for revision by the Commissioner. For the above reasons, we answer the questions referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. MONJULA BOSE J.-I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... y but only a lessee thereof. In that view, it cannot be held that the income arising from the portion of the leasehold in the possession and occupation of M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., which was being realised by M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., was the real income of the assessee arising from its business. There is no scope of any notional income arising from a business. We are not called upon to decide whether M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd. can or should be assessed in respect of the said income. In any event, M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., is not before us and it will not be proper for us to adjudicate on a question concerning M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. We make it clear that this judgment will not prevent the Revenue from assessing M/s. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. MONJULA BOSE J.-I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 20 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Interest, Offence ... ... ... ... ..... re, of section 8(1) read with s. 24(1), we are clearly of the opinion that there is no scope for the invocation of the rule that besides the mere act of voluntarily bringing gold into India, any further mental condition is postulated as necessary to constitute an offence of the contravention referred to in s. 23(1A). Section 276B of the Act also does not contain the word knowingly It provides punishment for contravention of the provisions contained in section 194A(1), etc. Section 194A requires the person making any payment of interest to deduct the tax at the rate in force. This liability is an absolute liability. Deficient deduction or non-deduction was a conscious act. Therefore, in a case under section 276B read with section 194A of the Act, mens rea was not required. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case fully apply to the present case. For all these reasons, I find no merit in these revision petitions and dismiss the same. Petitions dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 19 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ribunal allowed the appeal of the Revenue and rejected the appeal of the assessee. Hence, this reference at the instance of the assessee to answer the above quoted question of law. The question referred in the present case is covered by the earlier decision of this court in Pratap Cotton Trading Company v. CIT 1986 159 ITR 926 (Raj), wherein it has been held that such expenses are not in the nature of entertainment expenses but are within the meaning of business expenditure , which is an allowable deduction. Following that decision, the reference has to be answered in the assessee s favour. Consequently, this reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue as under The Tribunal was not justified in holding that the expenditure incurred by the assessee in serving tea, coffee, pan, meals, etc., to the customers is in the nature of entertainment expenditure and not a, business expenditure. It is an allowable deduction. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 18 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ly, the assessee filed an application in this court under section 256(2) of the Act in which a direction was given, resulting in the aforesaid question being referred to this court for its decision. In respect of the same assessee and on the same facts, a prior reference relating to some other assessment years was decided in the assessee s favour, holding that the whole of this expenditure has to be allowed as deduction treating it to be business expenditure. That decision was Pratap Cotton Trading Co. v. CIT 1986 159 ITR 926 (Raj). Following that decision, this reference also has to be answered in favour of the assessee. The aforesaid question is, therefore, answered as follows The Tribunal was not justified in holding that the messing expenses incurred for supply of bare meals to the customers and the constituents is not business expenditure and, therefore, not a permissible deduction under section 37(2B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Provision For Contingencies, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ad Current liabilities and provisions , the same could still be examined and its true nature determined for the purpose of super profits tax. The contention raised on behalf of the assessee that even assuming that some liability was in the contemplation of the assessee against which this appropriation was made, such a liability remained absolutely unascertained at the relevant time and, therefore, the entire appropriation should be treated as an excess is also not without substance. For the above reasons, we do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal in the instant case. We hold that the said amount of Rs. 26,342, though shown as a provision for contingency, must be held and treated to be a reserve inasmuch as there was no liability or no ascertained liability against which the said appropriation was made. The question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. MONJULA BOSE J.-I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 16 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ent one has been considered by the Supreme Court in Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO 1975 100 ITR 1. The Supreme Court, while reversing the decision of the High Court has observed that if the assessee has disclosed primary facts relating to the transactions, it was for the officer to make the necessary enquiries and draw proper inference as to whether the income returned is correct or not. It would be the plain duty of the officer to make an enquiry and if he did not make an enquiry, it is a case of oversight and it could not be said that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The ratio of the decision is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. Indeed, the facts of the present case are better than those referred to in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1986 (9) TMI 15 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Estate Duty, Interest, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... to the interest paid on capital. May be the capital contributed by the partners was utilised for purchasing the asset of the partnership firm, but it is not the same thing to state that the interest paid on such capital out of the profits would go to augment the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. Learned counsel then referred us to the provisions of section 13(c) of the Partnership Act, 1932, which authorises, subject to the contract between the partners, payment of interest on the capital subscribed by the partners and such interest shall be payable only out of the profits. It is true that the partners can receive interest on the capital subscribed by them subject to contract between them. But the right to receive interest under the terms of the partnership is one thing and the deduction of such interest for computing the capital gains is another thing. One has no relevance to the other. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1986 (9) TMI 14 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Capital Gains, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... that such receipts could be assessed only in the assessment year 1974-75 and that , therefore, there cannot be a different previous year in relation to the capital gain arising out of the same transaction. We are not inclined to accept this submission. Section 41(2) takes back from the assessee what had been given earlier by way of depreciation allowance and brings the amount to tax as income of the business or profession. This does not in any manner affect the assessment of the capital gain in accordance with the other provisions of the Act. We do not find any analogy or anomaly in the situation apart from the fact that there is no assessment in this case under section 41(2). We, therefore, answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1986 (9) TMI 13 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ip is a genuine or sham transaction and even where the partnership is genuine, whether the transaction of transferring the personal asset to the partnership firm represents a real attempt to contribute to the share capital of the partnership firm for the purpose of carrying on the partnership business or is nothing but device or ruse to convert the personal asset into money substantially for the benefit of the assessee while evading tax on capital gain. It is true that, in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, the Income-tax Officer will be entitled to consider all the relevant indicia in this regard and come to an appropriate conclusion. The Income-tax Officer may even now investigate into the aspects referred to by the Supreme Court and take appropriate action, if called for. Having regard to all the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not consider that any of the five questions arises for consideration. We accordingly dismiss this application.
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1986 (9) TMI 12 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Two Firms With Same Partners ... ... ... ... ..... t. Apparently, the conclusion regarding the assessability of the income relating to the two partnership firms in the hands of one single partnership firm was reached with reference to the tax law. The Tribunal examined the question from the point of view canvassed before it and came to the conclusion that there are enough factual circumstances leading to the belief that both the partnership firms are separate and the mere circumstance that one partnership firm lent funds to the other partnership firm cannot lead to the conclusion that both the partnership firms are the same. Inasmuch as the assessing authority itself did not base its conclusion for a single assessment on the conceptual perspective of the partnership and tax laws, we are unable to say that there is any error in the order of the Tribunal. In our opinion, no question of law arises on the facts aforementioned We, therefore, decline to direct the Tribunal to refer the matter to this court. Applications dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 11 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Assessment Year, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... 2(a) of article 213 of the Constitution, its effect will endure even after the expiry of the Ordinance. In other words, to matters governed by or affected by the Ordinance, even if they are considered after the lapse of the Ordinance, the Ordinance will have to be applied. Therefore, when the authority made the assessment for the assessment year 1980-81, it was required to take into consideration the Ordinance. The mere fact that the assessment order was passed subsequent to the lapse of the Ordinance did not enable the assessee to avoid the liability of surcharge imposed by the Ordinance for the period of the assessment in question. That being so, the respondent was justified in imposing the surcharge. No other contention is urged. For the reasons stated above, I do not see any good ground to issue rule nisi. Petition is accordingly rejected. Sri H. L. Dattu, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for the respondent in six weeks.
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1986 (9) TMI 10 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tigation, remove certain anomalies in, and rationalise some of, the provisions and counteract tax avoidance and tax evasion. It is, therefore, clear that an amount paid to a partner by firm otherwise than in the capacity of a partner is not caught by the provisions contained in section 40(b) of the Act. That is precisely the contention urged by Sri Anantha Babu, learned counsel for the assessee, and we have no hesitation whatsoever in accepting the same. In the aforesaid view, we uphold the Tribunal s conclusion that the sums of Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 15,000 paid by the firm to the managing partner, M. Venkatraman, and the partner S. Laxminarayana alias Bapu, respectively, are permissible deductions and the provisions of section 40(b) of the Act do not come into operation and render the payments impermissible deductions. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 9 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Money Lending Business ... ... ... ... ..... eason for depriving these three ladies of the benefit of interest accruing or arising from their own capital. It may also be seen that even if these three ladies had not become partners in Sri Goverdhana Finance Corporation , they could have deposited the said amount in Sri Krishna Finance Corporation and, in the normal course, they would have been entitled to a reasonable interest upon the said deposits. We, therefore, direct that the Tribunal, while passing its order under section 260(1) of the Act in accordance with this judgment, shall determine and award a reasonable amount of interest on the capital invested by the three ladies. It is for the Tribunal to determine what would be the reasonable rate of interest which should be awarded. It may also direct that such interest should be deducted from out of the income included in the income of Sri Krishna Finance Corporation . For the above reasons, both the referred cases are answered in the terms indicated above. No costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Commission, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... mmission. If the evidence indicated that they did render services, then the question regarding allowance of commission paid to them will have to be determined de hors the resolution dated June 18, 1969. In the absence of findings on these questions, we are unable to answer the questions referred to us. We accordingly return this reference to the Tribunal without answering either of the two questions. It is open to the Tribunal to rehear the matter and consider the question regarding the allowability of commission paid to Y. S. R. Krishna Rao, A. L. Narasimha Rao and Y. joga Rao in terms of section 40(c) of the Act, taking into consideration the evidence placed by the assessee on record and having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case. Both the Revenue and the assessee may be given appropriate opportunity to prove their respective cases. The reference is accordingly returned. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 7 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... e consideration in a case where the claim was that it was revenue expenditure. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the assessee has been carrying on business in the manufacture of locomotives. It is also not denied that the technical collaboration fee was paid to M/s. Ventra Engineering Company for the purpose of technical information furnished for the manufacture of products. In our opinion, the expenditure incurred by an assessee in obtaining technical information for the manufacture of goods is clearly on revenue account and is governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Ciba of India Ltd. 1968 69 ITR 692. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept the Revenue s contention that the expenditure incurred in the present case by the assessee was on capital account and ought to be treated in that manner for the purpose of tax assessment. We decline to call upon the Tribunal to refer the aforesaid question. The application is accordingly rejected.
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