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Showing 241 to 260 of 286 Records
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1994 (9) TMI 46 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... s under section 34 which was done without any further delay. It was accordingly that the notice was issued on October 18, 1989, to revise the order of assessment dated March 21, 1986, and, ultimately, the revisional order was passed on March 30, 1991. Having regard to the circumstances stated in the impugned order of the Commissioner and having regard to the fact that the order of assessment itself is dated March 21, 1986, and the revisional proceedings were initiated on October 18, 1989, soon after the defects in the assessment were noted, we are satisfied that there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the Commissioner in initiating the proceedings under section 34 and that the order impugned is not liable to challenge on the ground of unreasonable delay. Justifiable reasons have been stated in the order for the delay, if any. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no case for interference with the order in question. This tax revision case is accordingly dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... uestion referred cannot be dealt with under section 60(1) of the Act. The reference has to be rejected as such. So far as Original Petition No. 8837 of 1990 is concerned, the only contention raised by the learned Government pleader for the Revenue is that question No. 2 should also have been referred. The assessee s case is that he had not received any income from tapioca during the relevant accounting period for the reason that the variety of tapioca cultivated by him took a longer time to mature. A perusal of the assessment and first appellate orders shows that this was the plea agitated by the assessee all along. He was not raising it for the first time in second appeal. The question as framed proceeds on a wrong premise. There is no substance in question No. 2. We, therefore, hold in Income-tax Reference No. 40 of 1990 that the question referred does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and reject the reference as such. We dismiss Original Petition No. 8837 of 1990.
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1994 (9) TMI 44 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Accident Insurance, Advance Tax, Business Expenditure, Guest House, Income Tax Act, Investment Allowance, Question Of Law
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1994 (9) TMI 43 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Concessional Rate, Income Tax Act, Industrial Company, Manufacture Or Processing Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... d articles have undergone a process within the meaning of section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act, 1973. With great anxiety we have gone through the facts of the said case and the principle of law as discussed therein. We, however, do not appreciate that the preservation of fruits in a cold storage has got any relevance to the problem as raised in the present case or helps in answering the questions referred to above. We have, in the absence of any statutory definition of process , adopted the plain dictionary meaning therefor as given in Webster s Dictionary, which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Chowgule and Co. P. Ltd. 1981 47 STC 124 and applying the principles as discussed above, we are of the view that the activities pursued by the assessee amount to processing and we accordingly answer the aforesaid questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. This reference, accordingly, stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 42 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tion 220(2) of the Act, the notice of demand must relate back to the original notice of demand. At no stage while the appeals were pending before the different forums, had the same lost its force. The moment there is finality of proceedings, the original notice of demand comes to the surface and for any default on the part of the assessee the claim of interest can be levied and the contention raised by the assessee in the instant case does not have any merit. On the basis of the original notice of demand on finality of the proceedings, the claim of interest can be claimed. We, however, do not consider the calculation of the interest on the basis of the principal. We find that the stand taken by the Revenue authority is neither contrary to nor inconsistent with the provisions of law and the interference by the writ court in the facts and circumstances of this case is not necessary. This petition, accordingly, fails and is rejected. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Application For Reference, Assessing Officer, Business Expenditure, Business Income, Income Tax Act, Interest On Borrowed Capital, Question Of Law, Reference Application
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1994 (9) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Immovable Property By Central Government, Movable Property, Powers Of Appropriate Authority ... ... ... ... ..... ons made hereinabove and in view of the aforesaid two decisions of the two different High Courts of India, I am of the view that the proviso to section 269UD of the Act is a mandatory provision and in the absence of any power given in the Act itself to extend the period of limitation, there cannot be any question to direct the appropriate authority to reconsider the question of purchase when such period had already expired. Under these circumstances, I allow the writ petition and set aside the impugned order of the appropriate authority dated May 31, 1994, which is annexure B to this writ petition and direct the respondents to issue a no objection certificate under section 269UL of the Act for the registration of the sale deed of the said premises within three months from the date of communication of this order. The writ petition stands allowed. There will be no order as to costs. All parties concerned to act on the signed xerox copy of this judgment on the usual undertaking.
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1994 (9) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... come earned by the two groups belonged to the company and the respective groups were allowed to enjoy income as their due share out of the company s income. Learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, contended that the income never reached the hands of the company. In view of the overriding effect of the order of the High Court the income stood diverted at the very inception, to the respective groups. We do not think, it is necessary for us to go into the rival contentions. The Revenue has not suffered any loss in the instant case. Both sets of income were assessed as if they are the income of a private limited company. In other words the proportionate tax levied on each group would ultimately lead to the same result as if the entire income was assessed in the hands of the company. In the circumstances, the question raised in the reference shall have to be considered as purely academic. We decline to answer the same. The reference is accordingly returned unanswered.
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1994 (9) TMI 38 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of High Court, Natural Justice, Such Person, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... ng in article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising such power which avoids, if possible, a multiplicity of judicial proceedings and since a High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution without the person who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as a respondent, such person may appear at the hearing or make a prior application, and ask for leave to join the proceedings and when it so happens the court shall, notwithstanding section 141 of the Code and despite there being no rule of the High Court in that direction, in exercise of its inherent powers on the analogy of Order 1, rule 10 of the Code, and following the general principles of justice proceed to make him a respondent. This, then, is the answer to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Lekhi to the application under Order 1, rule 10, of the Code moved by one Jyotiraditya Scindia for being impleaded as a party to the writ petition.
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1994 (9) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Cash Credits, Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... e-tax Officer also initiated proceedings for the levy of Rs. 13,000 as income concealed. The Income-tax Officer referred the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for the levy of penalty as he found the minimum penalty leviable exceeded Rs. 1,000. It is necessary to note that the relevant year looks to be 1963-64, but the assessee filed the return after 1964 only, in response to a notice issued in the year 1968. The return was filed on October 19, 1968. If so it is clear that the Explanation added to section 271(1) would govern the return filed by the assessee. The scope of this Explanation was considered by the Supreme Court in CIT (Addl.) v. Jeevan Lal Sah 1994 205 ITR 244, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the decision in Anwar Ali s case 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC) is no longer good law. Having regard to the aforesaid decision the question referred to us shall have to be answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1994 (9) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Entertainment Expenditure, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... tioner has not purchased silver by account payee draft. Nor it was contended that the extracts of the bank account produced by the petitioner were not reliable. Further, in the affidavit in reply, it has been stated that shroff issued account payee from another bank after depositing cash in the bank account, the source of the cash deposit of Rs. 12,30,000 in the account of the shroff also causes serious doubts. This statement in the affidavit-in-reply indicates that at the most accounts of shroff are doubtful and not purchase of silver by the petitioner. Hence, this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated August 1, 1994, under section 132(5) read with section 132(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 3(3), Ahmedabad, at annexure R to the petition, is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to return the silver on or before October 3, 1994. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs
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1994 (9) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Assessment Proceedings, Burden Of Proof ... ... ... ... ..... prove that the amount of Rs. 40,000 was the income of the assessee for the year 1970-71 and/or there was any fraud or negligence on his part to invoke the penalty proceedings. The onus lies upon the authority concerned to prove the fact is clearly absent. The Tribunal, on the facts and circumstances, has rightly relied upon the decision rendered in CIT v. Vinaychand Harilal 1979 120 ITR 752 (Guj), wherein it has been held that on the admission of the assessee to the extent that the amount is not properly as lying in his hand of other sources does not ipso facto absolve the onus of proving the same as the income of the same year in penalty proceedings. Considering all the aspects of the case, we accordingly answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee and, consequently, questions Nos. 2 and 3 are to be construed as having been answered in favour of the assessee. This reference is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 34 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... ations in the aforesaid decision found (at page 758) From the narration of the dates as to the state of law, it is abundantly clear that it could not be said that the Explanation, with which we are concerned, to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was introduced to nullify the effect of the judicial decision in the case of CIT v. Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC) because, as we have mentioned before, the Explanation was added with effect from 1964 and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696 was rendered in 1970. This is a point which is important to bear in mind. It is unnecessary to refer to the said decision in greater detail having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jeevan Lal Sah s case 1994 205 ITR 244. In view of the above, we have no hesitation to conclude that the question referred to us shall have to be answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Ordered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Fixing Fair Market Value, Movable Property, Petition Against Order, Purchase Of Immovable Property By Central Government, Writ Petition
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1994 (9) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Movable Property
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1994 (9) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax in his order. Then coming to the next contention regarding the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal, the Supreme Court in P. Jayappan v. S. K. Perumal, First ITO 1984 149 ITR 696 has held that the pendency of the reassessment proceedings could not act as a bar to the institution of criminal prosecution for the offences punishable under section 276C or section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Magistrate has to independently assess the evidence to find out whether there is any fabrication of evidence suppressing the real income for the purpose of reducing the actual income. Therefore, the proceeding before the Magistrate is independent and the assessment proceedings are before the assessment authorities. Hence, the pendency of the appeal before the income-tax authorities will not be a bar to proceeding with the complaint. For these reasons the prayer of the petitioner to quash the proceedings cannot be conceded to. In the result, the petition is dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Private Company, Substantially Interested ... ... ... ... ..... character of transfer. Since the company is registered as a private company and the legal provisions concerning it do not justify having shares with different characters of transferability, the statement of learned counsel finds full legal support. The view taken by the Tribunal that only more than 25 per cent. of the shares should be transferable is not a correct reading of the provision. The free transferability clause has relevance to the word share appearing in the beginning of the provision and has no relation whatsoever with the shares held by another body or company to attract the application of the provision. Under the circumstances, the view taken by the Tribunal is patently wrong and cannot be accepted. In view of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative and against the assessee. Similarly, our answer to question No. 2 is also in the negative. Our answer to question No. 3 is also in the negative. No costs. Counsel s fee is Rs. 1,000.
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1994 (9) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Money Lending Business, Real Income, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... antile system of accounting in so far as payments are concerned and, therefore, held that this was not the correct method of maintaining accounts. No effort was made by the Income-tax Officer to ascertain the true profits of the assessee on the basis of the account books made available to him. Since the accounts maintained by the assessee during the years preceding the assessment years in question were similar and the true profits of the assessee had been ascertained during those years, there would really be no justification for the submission that true profits could not be ascertained from the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. Apparently, therefore, it is a case where the Income-tax Officer has not followed the correct legal principle for ascertaining the true profits of the assessee. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal must be held to be correct. Under the circumstances, our answer to the second question is also in the affirmative. No costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 28 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Movable Property
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1994 (9) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... ns in Purushotham Pai s case 1978 114 ITR 270 (Kar), Christine Cardoza s case 1978 114 ITR 532 (Kar) and also the decision in CWT v. Smt. Vimlabai Kantilal Porwal 1983 141 ITR 484 (MP), it has been held that the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iva) of the Act in its entirety if the assessee is the owner of agricultural lands. No contrary decision was brought to our notice as against the view taken by the Karnataka High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the decisions cited supra. Considering the facts of this case in the light of the judicial pronouncements in the decisions cited supra, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in granting full exemption to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000 to the assessee under section 5(1)(iva) of the Act. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in all these references in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 1,000 (rupees one thousand).
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