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Case Laws
Showing 321 to 340 of 401 Records
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1996 (10) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the element of deliberate or conscious omission had been established?
Held that:- The Tribunal has by the impugned order rightly come to the conclusion that the communication of 22-7-1985 does not purport to be "a show cause notice" and the two demand notices cannot be construed as show cause notices as envisaged by the Act. It has further taken note of the fact that the two demand notices do not refer to any suppression of facts. On the question of suppression the Tribunal notices that there is no material tendered by the Department to indicate that there was any attempt on the part of the assessee to deceive the Government or induce the authorities to release the goods notwithstanding the expiry of the period of the exemption notification. The Tribunal notices that there is no active concealment: it rightly states that suppression envisages a deliberate and conscious omission to state a fact with the intention of deriving wrongful gain.
the presentation of the Manifest to the Customs Authority could be effected before or after the arrival of the vessel and in the instant case the Manifest had been effected after the arrival of the vessels. Therefore, the authorities were also aware that the vessel had arrived after 31st December, 1983, the last date for availing of the benefit of the exemption notification. The Tribunal, therefore, also came to the conclusion and in our opinion rightly, that the element of deliberate or conscious omission had not been established and, therefore, even on that count it did not uphold the Department's contention. We see no reason to take a different view. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a particular variety of fabric known as Sort No. 89225 manufactured by assessee will fall under Item 22 of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule,or under Item No. 19 (sic) of the Tariff Schedule?
Held that:- The appellant cannot derive any assistance from the decision of Collector of Central Excise v. Rajasthan Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd.[1992 (1) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]. It merely lays down that in the case of composite yarn even though acrylic fibre constituted 50 per cent in weight, it will be deemed to be the predominant fibre by virtue of the specific statutory provisions to that effect contained in Explanation III to sub-item (iii) under Tariff Item No. 18. The case before us is in respect of fabric and not yarn. Either percentage-wise or weight-wise, cotton has not been found to be the predominant fibre as a matter of fact. There is no law that in such a situation, cotton must be deemed to be the predominant fibre and the fabric must be treated as cotton fabric. Against assessee.
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1996 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Rubber Processing Chemicals ... ... ... ... ..... ng chemicals. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in taking the view that it had to be established that the chemical before it was predominantly or commonly used as an antioxidant in the processing of rubber. It is not enough that the chemical should be an antioxidant. Having regard to the terms of Tariff Item 65, the use to which the antioxidant can be put is relevant. The antioxidants covered thereby are such as can be used in the processing of chemicals. The conclusion of the Tribunal on facts is that the predominant or common use of BHT is not as an antioxidant in the processing of rubber. BHT must, therefore, be held to fall outside Item 65 and, there being no other entry specific to it, within the residuary Item 68. 4. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs. 5. Civil Appeal Nos. 1834-42/87, 3708-09/87. - The chemicals in these appeals are covered by the aforestated reasoning. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 78 - SC ORDER
Appeal to Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... or combinations thereof, including (i) Old scrap of copper and (iv) Copper in any crude form purchased from the market on or after the 20th day of August, 1966. The case of the appellants before the Tribunal was based on the aforesaid Clause (iv). The Tribunal did not accept the appellants argument that importation could be equated to purchased from the market . 3. What is now argued before us is based on the show cause notice which stated that the material had been manufactured from imported copper scrap and the words old scrap of copper in the aforesaid Clause (i). Even though the case before the Tribunal was on an entirely different basis, it was submitted that, having regard to terms of the show cause notice, the appellants were not estopped from arguing on the different basis. We do not agree. The appellants cannot be permitted to resile in this Court from the basis on which they argued their case before the Tribunal. 4. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 77 - SC ORDER
Appeal - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... eal to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal to hear it on merits. 2. The appeal is allowed, the order under appeal dated 10-12-1984 is set aside and the Appeal No. ED(SB)(T)1564/81-C is restored to the file of CEGAT, New Delhi, to be heard and disposed of on merits with as much expedition as is possible. 3. No order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plastic piece parts fell outside the ambit of Entry 15A(2), as sought to be amended, with effect from 28th February, 1982, and were then liable to excise duty under Entry 68?
Held that:- The plastic piece parts were, even under the unamended Entry 15A, exigible to excise duty but, by reason of the Exemption Notification, exempted from the payment thereof. That, consequent upon the amended Entry 15A, the plastic piece parts would become liable to the payment of excise duty did not mean that there was an "imposition" of excise duty upon them or that they became liable thereto under Entry 68, not when the said Bill was enacted, but from 28th February, 1982.
It cannot be held that in advancing the argument which the Tribunal accepted, as we do, the Revenue made an attack on its own declaration. The revenue was entitled to urge the true scope of the declaration as applying only where there was, in fact, an imposition or increase in excise duty by virtue of the said Bill. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cap forms part of the tube cleared and sold by the respondent, or not?
Held that:- This is a question of fact to be decided in a given case and no generalisation is possible. There has been no investigation of this factual aspect in this case because the respondent rushed to the High Court soon after receiving the demand notice. Moreover, the said decision was rendered prior to the decisions of this Court in Bombay Tyre International and Madras Rubber Factory Limited. We do not, however, express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the said decision of the Tribunal in Metal Box of India Ltd. [1983 (3) TMI 258 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI]. The proper course in the circumstances is to leave the matter to be gone into and determined by the appropriate authority in charge of approving the price list. The authority shall decide the said question after ascertaining the relevant facts and in the light of the law declared by this Court.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is set aside subject to the direction that insofar as the inclusion of the value of the plastic caps in the value of the extruded tubes is concerned, the matter shall be gone into and determined by the authorities under the Act in accordance with law.
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1996 (10) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the articles manufactured by the respective appellants fall under Tariff Item 52 (Specific Entry) or under Tariff Item 68 (Residuary Item) of Central Excise Tariff?
Held that:- The Tribunal has misdirected itself while reaching the conclusion. While the Tribunal was prepared to accept the order of the Appellate Collector dated 8-5-1978 as above, we fail to understand why the same principle has not been applied to the facts of this case. If the screws and bolts because of the size and weight could not be brought under Item 52, the same is the case with articles with which we are concerned. As pointed out earlier by the Tribunal by deviating from the correct line of analysis of the issues misdirected itself into various other aspects and ended in wrong judgment. Therefore, we find it difficult to sustain it.
Thus the article under consideration did not fall within Item 52 of the Tariff Item and there being no specific Entry, they fall under Tariff Item 68.
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1996 (10) TMI 73 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ound to interfere with the opinion given by the High Court based upon the material on record including in particular the admissions of the assessee himself. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 72 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... TR 825, the Karnataka High Court in K. Sampangirama Raju v. Fifth, ITO 1988 173 ITR 609, the Bombay High Court in CIT v. J. Pitambardas and Co. 1995 216 ITR 172 and the Kerala High Court in Mary Issac v. IAC 1987 163 ITR 341 We agree with the reasoning given by the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Bombay and the Kerala High Courts and disagree with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at in the judgment under appeal. Since the provision has been repealed long ago, we do not think it necessary to say more on the subject except to say that these appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 71 - SC ORDER
Insurance Company, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... spondent A. Subba Rao, Advocate, for the respondent. JUDGMENT Heard counsel for the parties. Dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether instead of remitting the amount to the foreign reinsurers first and receiving the commission due to the appellant later, the arrangement by which the appellant remitted the reinsurance premia, after retaining the fee due to it for technical services rendered, will satisfy the requirement of section 80-O of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- On a perusal of the nature of the transaction and in particular the statement of remittance filed in the Reserve Bank of India regarding the transaction, we are unable to uphold the view of the respondent that the income under the agreement is generated in India or that the amount is one not received in convertible foreign exchange. We are of the view that the income is received in India in convertible foreign exchange, in a lawful and permissible manner through the premier institution concerned with the subject-matter -- the Reserve Bank of India. In this view, we hold that the proceedings of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated March 11, 1986, declining to approve the agreements of the appellant with Sedgwick Offshore Resources Ltd., London, for the purposes of section 80-O of the Income-tax Act, are improper and illegal. We declare so. We direct the respondent to process the agreements in the light of the principles laid down by us hereinabove. The appeal is allowed.
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1996 (10) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 1,56,971, relating to the estate of late Mazharunnisa Begum is includible in the estate of the deceased as passing under section 5 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
Whether the sum of ₹ 8,23,697, representing the amount spent on the construction of quarters for dependants and Khanazadas, is includible in the estate of the deceased under section 9 of the Estate Duty Act ?
If the answer to the above question is in the negative, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the claim for the allowance of the sums of ₹ 12,61,649 and ₹ 8,85,850 as debts due was hit by limitation imposed by section 46 of the Estate Duty Act ?
Whether for purposes of determining under section 36 of the Estate Duty Act, the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased, the amount of estate duty payable is liable to be taken into account and the principal value of the estate should be reduced accordingly or whether the amount could be deducted as a 'debt' under section 44 of the Estate Duty Act ?
Whether the sum of ₹ 5,01,460 being the value of the properties in the occupation of Sahabzadas and Sahebzadis was includible in the hands of the deceased as property passing ?
Held that:- The High Court noted that it was not in dispute that the late Nizam was closely associated with the said Begum and they were living like husband and wife. That after her death, the Nizam took several legal proceedings holding out that he was the husband of said Begum. The Nizam himself in several proceedings mentioned her as his wife. On this evidence, therefore, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that Mazharunnisa Begum was the wife of the late Nizam and, consequently, the amount relating to her estate passed on to the Nizam after her death and, therefore, was rightly includible in the estate of the late Nizam. The aforesaid finding of the High Court is well sustained on evidence on record and calls for no interference. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
The stand taken by the concerned accountable person in wealth-tax proceedings wherein it was submitted that the quarters after construction were handed over to the khanazadas and the Nizam had divested himself of the right over them and as such they were in the nature of gifts made by him to the khanazadas. Once the said stand was taken by the accountable person in wealth-tax proceedings obviously the cost of these constructions had to be taken as gifts made by the Nizam to the khanazadas and as the said disposition of property was within two years of his death, in the present estate duty proceedings there was no escape from the conclusion that these gifted amounts by fiction of section 9 of the Act were deemed to be property passing on his death. Question No. 2, in our view, was rightly answered against the appellant by the High Court.
There was jural relationship between the Nizam on the one hand and these beneficiaries on the other, who were the equitable owners of these amounts only as trustees and beneficiaries. No debtor-creditor relationship existed between them. Consequently, section 46 was out of the picture. In our view, the High Court, therefore, was not justified in treating these amounts as debts due from the Nizam to the concerned beneficiaries and in invoking section 46(1) in that connection. It could not be said that the claim for allowances of the aforesaid sums was hit by the limitation imposed by section 46 of the Act. Question No. 4, therefore, will have to be answered in favour of the appellant.
As there is no clear evidence on record to show that the amount represented the value of properties which were occupied by way of full ownership by the said Sahebzadas and Sahebzadees, the said amount was rightly included in the estate of the deceased. On the scanty material on record, it is not possible for us to take any view contrary to the one taken by the High Court as well as by the authorities below. Question No. 6, therefore, will also have to be answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Appeal partly allowed.
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1996 (10) TMI 68 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
In Part, Interest In Property, Minor Admitted To Benefits Of Partnership, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... mit of further consideration as suggested by learned counsel for the assessee, we are of the opinion that on the facts of this case, the question is academic. It is not in dispute that the assessee was a minor on the relevant valuation dates and he was only admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Therefore, the assessee did not have any share in the assets of the firm. That was the reason why the Appellate Tribunal upheld the order of the Appellate Commissioner excluding the value of the building from the net wealth of the assessee. Though the Appellate Commissioner excluded it on the ground that it was exempt under section 5(1)(iv), the value itself was not includible as the assessee had no share in the assets of the firm. That being the accepted position, the question whether he is entitled to deduction under section 5(1)(iv) in respect of an asset not includible in the net wealth is clearly academic. In the circumstances, we decline to answer the questions. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 67 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Question Of Law, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... nt of the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. s case 1985 155 ITR 120. There is no subsequent judgment of this court after the decision of the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. s case 1985 155 ITR 120. Final opinion is not to be given at this stage and the only point to be considered is as to whether a question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal or not. In view of the decision of this court in Punjab State Co-operative s case 1981 128 ITR 189, in our opinion, a question of law does arise from the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, we direct the Tribunal to refer the following question of law along with the statement of the case for the opinion of this court Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the amount to be deducted under section 80P(2)(a)(iv) of the Act, is the gross income from the sale of fertilizers to its members or whether proportionate expenses are to be reduced from such income before allowing the said deduction ?
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1996 (10) TMI 66 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
A Partner, Assessment Proceedings, Estate Duty, Principal Value Of Estate, Reassessment Proceedings
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1996 (10) TMI 65 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Additional Tax, Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... the purposes of adjustment of the past tax liabilities and the current year s tax liability. As we have already seen, the assessee had, in the current year, earned profits which were finally determined at Rs. 10,34,427 out of which, tax liability for the current year amounted to Rs. 7,34,664. The balance profit earned, i.e., Rs. 3,00,000, was not sufficient to meet the balance tax liability of Rs. 4,63,715 relating to the earlier years. Thus, there is a deficit or, in other words, negative profit in this year. In the result, in our opinion, no tax was leviable under section 104 of the Act inasmuch as the assessee-company had much tax liability relating to the earlier years to be discharged. After meeting the tax liability of the current year, the balance amount of Rs. 3,00,000 available in the hands of the company was not sufficient to meet the total past tax liability. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1996 (10) TMI 64 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Law Applicable To Assessment, Question Of Law, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... o 1959-60 was the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and there was no provision in that Act for the levy of interest for delay in filing the return. It was further observed as under The language of section 139 of the Act neither expressly nor by necessary implication makes its operation retrospective. Charging of interest under the Act of 1961 is not merely a matter of procedure and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be retrospective. We find no substance in the plea put forward by Shri Sawhney that interest could be charged in the light of the amendments made in sections 139 and 215 of the Act. The amendments were explicitly made effective from April 1, 1985, and, therefore, could not be made applicable retrospectively. Since it was not a case of regular assessment, no interest could be levied under the pre-amended law. We, therefore, find that the question sought to be referred is not a referable question of law and is, therefore, declined. The applications are, therefore, rejected.
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1996 (10) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Question Of Law, Reassessment Proceedings
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1996 (10) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ention of the assessee-trust that there is no violation of the provisions of section 13(2)(h) of the Income-tax Act ? in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. C. Was the Appellate Tribunal justified in holding that laying out money for acquisition of interest in partnership obviously with intent to get income and, therefore, it clearly amounts to investment ? Is not the said reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal illegal and unjustified ? The question is essentially of facts and we decline to answer the same. D. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it can be said that section 21A of the Act is attracted so as to deny the exemption available under section 5(1)(i) of the Act ? in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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