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Case Laws
Showing 341 to 360 of 410 Records
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1998 (12) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Recovery Of Tax, Notice Of Demand, Addition, Rectified Assessment Order, Cash Credits, Revision
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1998 (12) TMI 69 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing, Net Principal Value, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... he Bombay High Court, in C. J. Thakar s case 1995 214 ITR 323, where the attraction to the calling depended solely on the name of the person and not on the name of the firm and the firm name changed in tune with the name of the partner who were currently manning it, the firm of professionals may not have any goodwill. Viewed in this light, when we find that the name of the firm does not reflect in any manner, the name of the persons who were partners at the time when Mr. Jhaveribhai died, the only other partner was also not connected in any way with the name of the firm which had acquired considerable reputation as found by the Tribunal, referring to the firm s income shown in the returns. We do not see any reason to take a different view, about the existence of goodwill of the firm. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we answer question No. 2 also in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 68 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Interest, Refund, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... cause the claim of the refund has been made after April 1, 1989, is patently erroneous and contrary to the clear provisions of section 243(3) itself, and we are further of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to claim interest on delayed payment of the amount payable to him under section 132B(3) read with section 237 in terms of section 243. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Commissioner, dated February 18, 1997, is quashed and the respondents are directed to compute the amount of interest on the amount which became payable to the assessee after discharge of liabilities on regular assessment for the assessment year 1987-88 in terms of section 243 and pay the same to the assessee-petitioner within a period of two months from today. As it has been found by the Commissioner of Income-tax that there has been no delay on the part of the assessee, no deduction of period on that ground shall be made. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 67 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... such cases, the expenditure may or may not be incurred in India. Every case will have to be examined in the light of the provisions of the sub-clauses and the facts proved by the assessee. In the light of the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court, it is necessary to see that the expenditure distinctly falls under clause (b) of section 35B(1). Since none of the expenditures mentioned in the question falls under any of the sub-clauses of clause (b) of section 35B(1) of the Act, these cannot be said to be eligible for deduction. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, However, in case certain expenditures under any head have been allowed for deduction under section 35B of the Act by the Assessing Officer and those were not under challenge before the Tribunal at the instance of the Revenue, those deductions shall not be withdrawn as the order of the Assessing Officer to that extent has attained finality.
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1998 (12) TMI 66 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Method Of Accounting, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... e entered into agreement on transfer of technical know-how with the permission of the Government of India. Under it the liability of the assessee to pay the fee for technical know-how accrued. The fact that actual payment could be made only with the permission of the Reserve Bank of India, only put him under obligation to apply to the Reserve Bank of India for grant of necessary permission for releasing payment of the amount to a non-resident. But its enforceability is not a contingent one. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has erred in allowing the sum in question as deduction for the assessment year in question by holding the liability in the preceding year was contingent and became due and payable in the year in question only. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The assessee has not appeared in spite of service. No order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... petitioner (sic-respondent), the petitioner cannot avail of the benefit of this scheme because the Income-tax Department has realized the tax amount and no amount of tax can be said to be due as arrear on September 1, 1998, when the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, came into operation because tax amount was actually received by the Department from the petitioner on August 29, 1998. This argument is not correct because if we read the definition of tax arrear along with the Explanation, it becomes clear that the petitioner had neither voluntarily paid the amount nor had paid the amount under protest nor he had deposited the amount pending any appeal nor this amount was paid in pursuance of the court s order and, therefore, the petitioner shall be deemed to be in arrear of tax for the purpose of the said scheme and it is entitled to avail of the benefit of the same in accordance with the provision of the said scheme. With these observations, the petition is disposed of finally.
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1998 (12) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reference, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ith a direction to make assessments de novo after making such other enquiries as may be deemed necessary for that purpose. That being so, the Income-tax Officer has the same powers in making the fresh assessments as he had originally when making an assessment under section 143(3) of the Act. The scope and ambit of the enquiry for assessment is in no way restricted in such a case. In the instant case, the entire assessments had been set aside by the first appellate authority with a direction to make fresh assessments de novo after making necessary enquiries. The Income-tax Officer acted accordingly and made the fresh assessment under section 143(3) of the Act having regard to the material available with him. There is no infirmity in this action of the Income-tax Officer. However, in view of the fact that the assessee, at whose instance this reference is made, is absent, we do not propose to answer the question referred to us. This reference is, therefore, returned unanswered.
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1998 (12) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction, Reference, Business Expenditure, Question Of Fact, New Industrial Undertaking
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1998 (12) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... ry contribution and the fact that this has been treated as a capital income in the hands of the Cochin Stock Exchange does not automatically follow that it is a revenue expenditure in the hands of the assessee. That apart, the question, though raised, was not pursued further. On the contrary, the petitioner had conceded before the authorities that this is a capital expenditure and therefore it has to be treated as income. There is no error or illegality in exhibits P-3 and P-4 orders. Therefore, there is no scope to interfere with the confirming orders by invoking the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. In O. P. No. 17756 of 1998 in reference to a similar claim, I declined to interfere, though it may be on the basis of the judgment in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 1997 5 SCC 536. For all these reasons I do not find any grounds to interfere with the orders, exhibits P-3 and P-4. Accordingly, the original petition fails and it is dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Recovery Of Tax, Company, Director ... ... ... ... ..... he affidavit any such assertion has been made that in spite of making efforts against the company, it is not possible to recover the amount from the company by reaching its assets. On the other hand, there is clear indication that section 179 is being put to use by the Revenue authorities to resolve the dispute between the erstwhile directors and the present incumbent about the terms of the agreement between them. The Income-tax Act has not assigned any such role to its authority to act as an arbiter of inter se dispute between the parties which does not concern it. We are therefore satisfied that the provisions of section 179 have been invoked without laying the necessary foundation for the same. The order therefore suffers from the error apparent on the face of it and is ultra vires section 179. Accordingly, this petition succeeds. The impugned order (annexure-A) under section 179 of the Income-tax Act is quashed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 60 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction, Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure
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1998 (12) TMI 59 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Expenditure Tax, Interpretation Of Taxing Statutes, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... Therefore, the levy in all these cases on the total receipts of the hotelier, taking it to be the chargeable expenditure, cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside. In view of the conclusion of ours, the writ petitions are allowed to the extent of quashing the orders of assessment as also the orders passed by the appellate authority with a consequential direction to every one of the assessing authorities concerned in these writ petitions, to re-assess and redetermine the tax due, in accordance with our decision and thereupon proceed to recover the sum found to be due on such re-determination. If any amount has been recovered in excess already from the petitioners, it is but inevitable and necessary for the assessing authority to direct refund of the same, while passing orders of reassessment in re-determining the tax due under the Act. These writ petitions are allowed on the above terms and to the extent indicated above. No costs. Interim orders are vacated.
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1998 (12) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Return, Advance Tax, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... vance tax. The two sections deal with entirely different fact situation. The interest levied in respect of two different lapses is permissible under law. Counsel for the respondent brought to my notice that the discretion vested in the third respondent has been exercised by him as could be seen from exhibit P-3. He points out that interest was payable from April 1, 1988 till October 25, 1992, the date on which exhibit P-2 was passed. But interest under section 215 of the Act is claimed only up to January 31, 1990. Thus, it is contended that substantial benefit has been given to the petitioner. Though there is no power for the second respondent to review its own orders, the application was considered on the merits also. In the circumstances, I cannot find fault with the second respondent for not treating the application as one for correction of the mistake crept in exhibit P-2 order. In view of what is stated above, the original petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.
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1998 (12) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Firm, Valuation Of Stock, Dissolution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... -in-trade should be made on the basis of the prevailing market price, affirming the view taken in the case of G. R. Ramachari and Co. v. CIT 1961 41 ITR 142 (Mad). The assessee-firm was constituted under the partnership deed dated April 21, 1956, at will and on the death of Paranjothi Nadar, one of the partners of the firm, the firm stood dissolved and a new firm was constituted and two separate assessments were made by the Assessing Officer. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in A. L. A. Firm v. CIT 1991 189 ITR 285, we hold that the closing stock of the firm as on October 31, 1981, is to be valued at market price. On the death of Paranjothi Nadar, the firm stood dissolved and so, the closing stock as on October 31, 1981, being the date of dissolution of the firm, should be valued on the basis of market price. The view taken by the Tribunal is not justified. We answer the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Wealth Tax, Exemption, Association Of Persons, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... exemption under section 5(1)(xxxii), but the assessee will be entitled to the exemption in respect of his interest in the assets of the other firm A. Thus the principles of law are settled by a catena of decision of various High Courts, none of which has opined contrary to what we have stated earlier. It we look at the facts found by the Revenue authorities, they go to show that no direct involvement of the assessee with any processing act has been found to exist. In that view of the matter, the assessee cannot be said to have interest in a firm which is engaged in the business of manufacture of goods or processing of goods and, therefore, she is not entitled to claim the benefit of exemption under section 5(1)(xxxii), in respect of her share in the value of its assets. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The assessee has not appeared in spite of service. No order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 55 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Revision, Powers Of CIT ... ... ... ... ..... that his appeals were against the assessment orders. He could not have raised the issue of interest and the same could be raised only before the revisional authority. I am unable to accept the said stand. The order in appeal before the appellate authority as well as before the Tribunal comprises the order relating to the interest under section 234B of the Act. It is an integral part of the assessment and appellate orders as admitted in the original petition itself. Therefore, a statutory revision under section 264 of the Act cannot be sustained against the interest. However, the petitioner has preferred a waiver application exhibit P-3 by invoking the powers of the Commissioner. The said application is still pending. In the above circumstances, I do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax. However, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner, if any, to pursue his waiver application exhibit P-3, this original petition is disposed of.
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1998 (12) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Plant, Building, Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... r by way of depreciation or otherwise in computing the income chargeable under the head Profits and gains from business or profession from consideration for the purpose of computing investment allowance. The section had been inserted with effect from April 1, 1976, by the Finance Act, 1976. This also makes clear that where the Legislature wanted that any benefit is not to be extended in case where depreciation or whole of the cost has been allowed by way of deduction either by way of depreciation or otherwise, it has made a specific provision about it. For the conclusion to which we reach, we find support of the decisions in Bralco Metal Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1994 206 ITR 477 (Bom) and CIT v. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. 1979 117 ITR 321 (All). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we answer question No. 2 referred to us in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... clause could not be pressed into service. Rule 6DD(f) and rule 6DD(j) are quite different in their scope and nature and, therefore, a precise finding is required as to whether under which clause the case of the assessee falls. On these facts, we return the above-mentioned question unanswered to the Appellate Tribunal with the direction that it will record clear findings whether the case falls under rule 6DD(f) or rule 6DD(j). If the Appellate Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the payment in question falls under rule 6DD(f), then a clear finding will be recorded whether payment was made through Rajan, who is said to be a conduit, to the grower or producer of the products of horticulture. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the payment is covered by rule 6DD(j), then for that entirely different considerations will follow and the findings relating to the circumstances as stated under rule 6DD(j) would have to be recorded. The references are accordingly disposed of.
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1998 (12) TMI 52 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Initial Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... herefore, the assessee is not entitled to the claim of initial depreciation (sic). Both the learned counsel submitted that since the submission of the statement of case, the issue is no more res integra. The Supreme Court in Ujagar Prints v. Union of India 1989 179 ITR 317, has held the activities which the assessee has found to be carrying on as activities amounting to manufacture. In that view of the matter, question No. 1 and consequential question No. 2 referred to us at the instance of the Revenue is to be answered in the negative (sic), that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by holding that the assessee on the facts found by the Tribunal must be held to be engaged in the business of manufacture of textiles and was entitled to initial depreciation. In view of our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2, the question raised and referred it the instance of the assessee has become of academic importance which we decline to answer. No order as to costs.
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1998 (12) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Condition Precedent, Income Escaped Assessment, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... To say the least, such ultra vires instructions cannot be pressed into service to save the initiation of proceedings under section 147, in the absence of holding of any belief by the Assessing Officer, by arrogating the power to itself by the Board by issuing such directions contrary to the provisions of law at the pain of subjecting the officer to pain of exposing him to charge of insubordination. As in the present case, we are satisfied, on the basis of the record made available to us, in the light of averments made in the petition, that the respondent did not hold the belief at any point of time that income of the assessee has escaped assessment on account of erroneous computation of benefit under section 80HHC, it cannot but be held that the reasons recorded on file are a mere pretence. The action, therefore, must fail. Accordingly, this petition succeeds. The impugned notice dated February 18, 1997, is quashed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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