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Showing 381 to 400 of 445 Records
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2001 (12) TMI 65 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd 1980-81 is concerned, Mr. Shah has not pressed the said question and, hence, it is not necessary to answer the same. Both the questions referred to us at the instance of the Revenue stand answered by an unreported decision of this court rendered on July 25, 2001, in Income-tax Reference No. 158 of 1986 in the case of Sayaji Iron and Engineering Co. v. CIT (since reported in 2002 253 ITR 749) and hence it is not neces sary to set out the facts and submissions in detail. Question No. 1, referred at the instance of the assessee, is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2, referred at the instance of the assessee, is left unanswered as the same has not been pressed on behalf of the assessee. Both the questions referred at the instance of the Revenue are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 64 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under section 147 and the merits of the addition made to the total income, would have to be determined afresh. However, in the event, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) determines the question against the assessee, he will also have a right to prefer an appeal there against wherein again both the aforenoted questions have to be considered afresh by the Tribunal. For the reasons aforementioned, the interest of justice will be sub-served if the order of the Tribunal is modified to the extent that the order of remand shall be confined to the validity of the reassessment proceedings and till a decision on such a question is arrived at by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the Revenue s appeal before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be pending. In other words, the order of remand shall be a limited remand and not an open one. With the aforementioned observations and directions, the order dated October 8, 2001, is modified and the application is disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (12) TMI 63 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... followed again the procedure of sending it to the assessee to enable him to object against the revised proposed order. There is no prejudice whatsoever caused to the assessee nor is any vested right of the assessee adversely affected thereby. Until the assessment is completed by the Income-tax Officer under section 143(3) of the Act, he remains free to exercise his powers to complete the assessment by sending a revised draft order. Yet again D.K. Jain J. on a difference of opinion between the two learned judges of this court in Sarabjit Singh s case 1998 234 ITR 641 has clearly held that section 144B of the Act is a procedural provision. It is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the answers to the questions must be rendered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (12) TMI 62 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee was a finance company, it could show a huge amount at its hands at any point of time, but the bank accounts of the assessee during the relevant period having not been produced, it was for the Assessing Officer to ascertain as to whether the advance had been paid out of the loan taken by it or not. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that it is also not expected that a financing company would advance an interest-free loan to another, when it itself takes loan and pays interest upon the principal sum. As the assessee could not produce any document in this regard, an adverse inference in terms of section 114 of the Evidence Act should be drawn to the effect that had those documents been produced, the same would have gone against the interest of the assessee, we are of the opinion that the questions of law involved in the instant case should be answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This appeal is disposed accordingly.
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2001 (12) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... application, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the Tribunal had given its decision on appreciation of facts which were not disputed by the Revenue and hence, it was not necessary to make any reference. However, inspite of the aforesaid finding recorded in its appellate order, the Tribunal has made this reference. At least, the Tribunal should have avoided the litigation about which it has expressed anguish in relation to the order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the value of the New Palace at Morvi could not be included in the net wealth of the assessee. Question No.1 referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the light of answer to question No.1, it is not necessary to deal with and answer question No.2 and hence, we decline to answer the same. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 60 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ty cannot be levied as the Assessing Officer in the proposal under section 271(1)(c) had not referred to Explanation 1(B) to section 271(1)(c). Their Lordships have taken the view that reference to the substantive provision would include even the Explanation. The ingredients of the Explanation are not required to be incorporated in the show-cause notice. However, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case as neither had the assessee claimed that the order of penalty is vitiated as specific reference to the provision has not been made nor have the Commissioner and the Tribunal allowed its claim on that basis. Thus, the decision is of no avail to the Revenue in the present case. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find that no question of law arises which may require an expression of opinion by this court. Resultantly, the petition under section 256(2) of the Act is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 59 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to money. However, salary , in its conceptual and legal sense, remains a reward for services rendered. The partners in a firm work for themselves. Not for any employer. They serve themselves. Not anybody else. They are nobody s servants. They are their own masters. Thus, the salary drawn by the partners is only a different name for the share in profits. Nothing more. The doubt, if any, was set at rest by the incorporation of section 28(v) with effect from April 1, 1993, when it was provided that any interest, salary, bonus, commission or remuneration, by whatever name called, due to, or received by, a partner of a firm from such firm shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head Profits and gains of business or profession. In view of the above, we hold that the Tribunal was not right in allowing the standard deduction to the assessee. The question is, accordingly, answered in favour of the Revenue. Since no one has appeared for the respondent, we make no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preting the provisions of a taxing statute. The interpretation should be such as would promote the object of the Act. The clear object of the Act is to grant deduction in respect of a payment made by an employer/assessee towards gratuity paid to the employees. The assessee has admittedly made the payment. The employees have admittedly got the benefit. The Life Insurance Corporation had issued the policy The policy was effective from February 1, 1992. Despite the payment having been made by the assessee and the intended beneficiaries, viz., the employees, having got the benefit, the Revenue wants to deny the deduction to the assessee. This would be grossly unfair and cannot be allowed. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find that the Tribunal has taken a possible view. It promotes justice. The case does not raise any substantial question of law so as to call for any interference under section 260A of the Act. Resultantly the appeal is dismissed in limine.
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2001 (12) TMI 57 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unt of the entire sum of royalty paid at least in relation to the first agreement. We are not in a position to render any opinion on this aspect of the matter in the absence of the relevant agreements on record. It is necessary to note at this stage that whenever any party challenges any interpretation of any document, primarily it would be the duty of that party to place such document on record so as to enable the court to appreciate whether the lower authorities have rightly read the documents. As stated, in the absence of the relevant agreements, it is not possible to appreciate and deal with this contention raised. In the light of what is stated hereinbefore, we hold that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the amount of royalty paid to the collaborator is revenue expenditure. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 56 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing marginalisation is against the definition contained in Explanation 2 to section 164(3). When the statute says that the maximum marginal rate is the rate applicable on the highest slab of income there is no scope for enquiry on the meaning of marginal and we feel the Tribunal committed an error by assigning a literal interpretation to the defi nition clause contained in Explanation 2. We therefore find that the Assessing Officer has rightly applied the maximum marginal rate at 55 per cent. which was the rate applicable on the highest slab of income for associations of persons under the relevant Finance Act. We find that the Calcutta High Court in Surendranath Gangopadhyaya Trust v. CIT 1983 142 ITR 149 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Piarelal Sakseria Family Trust v. CIT 1982 136 ITR 583, have taken a similar view in the matter. In view of our inter pretation, the questions have necessarily to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and we do so.
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2001 (12) TMI 55 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 26, 1991, while the assessment under section 143(1) of the Act for the assessment year 1981-82 was completed on January 21, 1984 and that for the assessment year 1982-83 was completed on March 6, 1985, the same was barred by limitation. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that another question of law as regards the retrospectivity of section 149 of the Act be taken into consideration cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, no such question was raised before the Tribunal. Even no question of law was formulated in the grounds of appeal. Secondly, although the matter appeared before the court on September 17, 2001, October 10, 2001, October 17, 2001 and October 29, 2001, at no point of time had such a question been raised. The submission of learned counsel is an afterthought. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for consideration of this court, they are accordingly dismissed.
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2001 (12) TMI 54 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of tax on an industrial company , it is for the assessee-company to adduce material to establish that its income attributable to the activities of manufacture or production of goods is not less than 51 per cent. of the total income. It was further held that the company engaged in the construction of buildings was not an industrial company entitled to be taxed at the concessional rate because it had failed to adduce material to establish that the income attributable to the manufacturing activity undertaken by it represented not less than 51 per cent. of its total income. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in Builders Associations of India v. Union of India 1994 204 ITR 877 (SC). The third question, therefore, must also be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. All the questions referred to this court for its opinion must thus be answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference is accordingly disposed of.
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2001 (12) TMI 53 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... king him to declare in the return whether he had any other undisclosed income. The block period is only of ten years which is not more onerous than the upper period of ten years for initiating assessment proceedings for income escaping assessment by issuing notice under section 148 read with section 149 . According to us, the reasoning given by the Tribunal cannot be accepted. What is taxed is the income for the block period. The rate of tax is different from the rate of tax in the usual procedure. What the section says is that the income has to be ascertained as per Chapter XIV-B of the Act. In certain cases, the total income has been reduced if there has been assessment or circumstances mentioned in section 158BC. When the assessment is for a block period, then it is not necessary to find out whether the income was below the taxable limit. In the above view of the matter, we answer the question referred in the negative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
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2001 (12) TMI 52 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the fact that the second-hand machineries were purchased from outside and the said machinery had been used by the assessee for the first time, the same was new to the assessee and not old one as contemplated under clause (ii) of subsection (4) of section 80J of the Act. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the aforementioned question must be answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. So far as the second question is concerned, the same is covered by Lohia Machines Ltd. v. Union of India 1985 152 ITR 308 SC). The said question must, therefore, be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. So far as the third question is concerned, it is not in dispute that the same is also covered by Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1986 160 ITR 961 (SC). It appears that an appeal is pending and, thus, the same may now be considered in accordance with this opinion. These references are thus disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (12) TMI 51 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 54(1) . The question now is no longer res integra having regard to the decision of the apex court in CIT v. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. 1997 226 ITR 625. The apex court categorically held that section 22 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, does not require registration of sale deed. The meaning of the word owner in the context of section 22 has been held to be a person who is entitled to receive income in his own right. The apex court in Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. CIT 1999 239 ITR 775 and this court in CIT v. B. L. Sood 2000 245 ITR 727 have held that registration of the document is not mandatory for claiming depreciation on the property. In this view of the matter, we have no doubt in our mind that the learned Tribunal went wrong in holding that for the purpose of applicability of section 54, registration of document is imperative. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, i.e., the assessee is entitled to exemption in terms of section 54 of the Act. The reference is disposed of.
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2001 (12) TMI 50 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ory is correct and a contrary view expressed by the Division Bench in CIT v. Jaideep Industries 1989 180 ITR 81 (P and H), does not represent the correct law. We are further of, the view that the observations made in Shahzedanand Charity Trust s case 1997 228 ITR 292 (P and H), that the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Gujarat Oil and Allied Industries 1993 201 ITR 325, is similar to the one expressed by this court in CIT v. Jaideep Industries 1989 180 ITR 81 is based on an incorrect reading of the judgment of Gujarat Oil and Allied Industries case 1993 201 ITR 325 (Guj), because the Gujarat High Court had, in fact, dissented from the view expressed in Jaideep Industries case 1989 180 ITR 81 (P and H). That apart, in Shanzedanand Charity Trust s case 1997 228 ITR 292 (P and H), the Division Bench, took the view that section 12A of the Act cannot be read as mandatory. The appeal may now be listed before the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with law.
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2001 (12) TMI 49 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shall be held as specified in the last schedule under clause 4 of the trust deed. The said properties in schedules IV, V and VI have to be aggregated with schedule I property and, therefore, one single assessment had to be made under section 21(4) of the Act. Even, if there are separate trusts during the life time of the beneficiaries, viz., Smt. Eqbal Begum. Smt. Gouher Begum and Smt. Mehrunnisa Begum, after their death, the properties, in schedules IV, V and VI revert back to schedule I and so they are merged with schedule I properties and as such all those properties have to be aggregated and a single assessment had to be made under sub-section (4) of section 21 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the opinion arrived at by the learned Tribunal on the question. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we answer the question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The R. C. is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2001 (12) TMI 48 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can look fairly at the language used. This view has been reiterated by this court time and again. Thus, in State of Bombay v. Automobile and Agricultural Industries Corporation 1961 12 STC 122, this court said But the courts in interpreting a taxing statute will not be justified in adding words thereto so as to make out some presumed object of the Legislature .... If the Legislature has failed to clarify its meaning by the use of appropriate language, the benefit thereof must go to the taxpayers. It is settled law that in case of doubt, that interpretation of a taxing statute which is beneficial to the taxpayer must be adopted . In view of the aforesaid discussion, the reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (12) TMI 47 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t helpful. In the present case now prior approval has been taken. The argument of learned counsel that enquiry must be pending is also not tenable on this ground also that as per the proviso to the amendment, prior permission of the Commissioner is necessary. Then once he gives permission it should be for collecting information before initiating proceedings, if necessary. From the aforesaid it is clear that the impugned notices were issued by the respondents in exercise of their power under section 133(6) of the Act. As no proceedings were pending against the assessee to whom the notice is issued they have taken the prior approval as required in the second proviso to section 133(6) of the Act. In view of the above discussion, we do not want to take a different view from the view taken earlier by this court referred to above. We find no error or illegality in the order of the learned single judge so as to call for any interference. Accordingly, the writ appeals are dismissed.
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2001 (12) TMI 46 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... controversy before the court. It is not desirable or proper to pick out a word and read it as laying down a principle of law divorced from the context of the subject-matter of controversy (see CIT v. Sun Engg. Works P. Ltd. 1992 198 ITR 297, 320 (SC)). We are thus of the opinion that there does not exist any circular which prohibits the Tribunal from making any reference, and, in any event, the statutory right of the Tribunal to refer a case to this court for its opinion under section 256(1) of the Act cannot be taken away by the Board by issuing a circular or otherwise. The second preliminary question raised by Mr. Aggarwal is thus devoid of any merit. However, having regard to our findings aforementioned on the first preliminary objection, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the order of the Tribunal it is not possible to answer the question referred to this court for its opinion. We, therefore, decline to answer the question. The matter is disposed of accordingly.
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