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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 68 Records
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1962 (11) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the cloth and yarn manufactured and produced by it in accordance with the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan on April 1, 1950.
Whether the same appellant if liable to pay income-tax in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 from the date on which those provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan?
Held that:- Appeal rejected. The question of frustration of the contract was canvassed and gone into. The courts found that the contract was frustrated. In view of the findings it is now unnecessary to consider that question.
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1962 (11) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Application under article 226 of the Constitution made by the respondent-assessee for a writ quashing an order of assessment made under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 questioned - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. State sought leave to contend that the order of July 30, 1957, could be supported under section 35 of the Income tax Act. This leave was refused for such a point was not raised in the court below and the action by the revenue authorities had expressly been taken under section 34 of the Act.
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1962 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary for the Income-tax Officer to initiate action under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act in order to tax the deemed income distributed by virtue of the order under section 23A(1) of the Act made in the case of the A. C. E. C Private (India) Ltd. ?
If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether the notice served on 1st April, 1954, was out of time ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As an assessment cannot be made under section 23A of the Act because that section does not make provision for an assessment to be made and assessment can only be made under section 34 of the Act. Answer given by the High Court to the second question was correct and the assessment made under section 34(1)(b) of the Act after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was out of time.
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1962 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on its true construction, subsection (10) of section 35 applies in a case where a company declares dividends by availing itself wholly or partly of the amount on which a rebate of income tax was earlier allowed to it under clause (i) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part 1 of the relevant Schedules to the Finance Acts, when such dividends were declared prior to the coming into force of the sub-section, that is prior to April 1, 1956?
Whether sub-section (10) can apply to an assessment which had been made before sub-section (10) came into force?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Interpretation of section 35(10) as opined in the judgment of the High Court was right. Unable, to agree with the respondent that the language of sub-section (10) by necessary implication takes the legal fiction back to a period earlier than April 1, 1956
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1962 (11) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the right to refund was a right existing an September 1, 1956?
Whether it appertained to the life insurance business of the appellant within the meaning of section 7?
Whether the right to the refund was one appertaining to the life insurance business?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As considered as a separate business no tax would have been payable out of its assets and so, as between the two departments, no part of its income was liable to be applied in payment of the tax. The entire amount of Rs. 3,245.25 should be refunded to it. The balance which must represent the deduction out of the income of the life insurance business or an amount treated as paid in respect of that business and therefore appertaining to it, should be made over to the respondent Corporation. This is the view taken by the Tribunal and with it we agree
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1962 (11) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Whether provisions of Explanation 2 added to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act are discriminatory against agricultural income from rubber plantations?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The provision for the computation of agricultural income from tea plantations has to be different and is to be found in the Rules made under section 59(3) of the Income-tax Act for determining the proportions of agricultural income and income from business in the entire income from the sale of tea. The difference in the provisions for the computation of agricultural income from tea plantations and from rubber plantations is therefore based on good reasons. Thus the provisions of Explanation 2 are not discriminatory against agricultural income from rubber plantations.
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1962 (11) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proportionate profits on the sale proceeds aggregating. Rs. 9,53,304 for the assessment year I94I-42 and Rs. 6,04,588 for the assessment year I942-43 or any part thereof were received by or on behalf of the assessee company in British India ?
whether the order passed asking for a supplemental statement with a direction for taking additional evidence was permissible to the High Court under section 66(4) of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- The Appellate Tribunal held that the income did not accrue to the assessee in Baroda State but did not decide the question whether she was entitled to the benefit of the Taxation Concessions Order. The High Court field that the Taxation Concessions Order did not apply to the assessee but did not decide the question as to whether the income had accrued to the assessee in Baroda State. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal raised one question and the High Court answered another. This court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in going out of the point raised by the Appellate Tribunal and decided a different point of law and that section 66 of the Income-tax Act empowered the High Court to answer a question of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal and it did not confer any jurisdiction to decide a different question of law not arising out of such order but it was possible that the same question of law may involve different facts and the High Court could amplify the question to take in all the facts but the question must still be one arising out of the Appellate Tribunal's order which was before the Tribunal or was decided by it. It could not decide an entirely different question.
The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Tribunal to submit a supplemental statement of the case aftertaking additional evidence.
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1962 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
Praying for a declaration that the Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1961 enacted by the Kerala State Legislature, is null and void - that the State's power to tax income from tea to agricultural income-tax is limited to taking 60% of the income computed for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act as if it were income derived from business and for the issue of appropriate orders to the respondents, viz., the State of Kerala.
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Declare that Explanation 2 to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act added by the Amendment Act does not cover the expenses incurred in the upkeep or maintenance of immature tea plants from which no income has been derived during an accounting year and that the agricultural income derived from tea plantations will be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Income tax Rules - writ be issued to the respondents restraining them, their agents and servants, from enforcing or acting upon the provisions of Explanation 2 to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act against the Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd., Kottayam, viz., petitioner No. 1.
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1962 (11) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether by virtue of the grant, exhibit A, the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is invalid so far as the plaintiff company is concerned during the continuance of the grant?
Whether in view of article 295 and clause 18 of the grant, it can be said that the legislative power of the Union of India contained in article 245 is in any way fettered so that the Union of India cannot pass any law which would take away the exemption in clause 18, assuming it to be there?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As relying on Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [1962 (11) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT]Grant dated May 2, 1945, was not law and did not continue as such in Kotah and, secondly, article 295(1)(b) did not in any way invalidate the Finance Act, 1950, which extended the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to the territories of the State of Rajasthan including Kotah.
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1962 (11) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ir conclusion. In our view the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was not right in the conclusion it reached. In the light of the limited construction which we placed upon the Coffee Board case, we are satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to have dealt with the question whether the canteen sales were liable to sales tax or not. It is conceded on behalf of the department that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gannon Dunkerley case, the turnover of the canteen sales is not turnover within the meaning of the Act liable to sales tax. Though in different circumstances if the dispute called for any further enquiry we would have remitted the matter to the Tribunal for determination, in the present case since the question has been settled, the relief that the petitioner asks can be granted by us. We accordingly direct the deletion of the disputed turnover from the order of assessment. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the course of his business. The further argument that there can be no profit motive fails to impress us. It is true that an independent profit motive in so far as these transactions are concerned cannot be said to exist. But it is not necessary to discern the profit motive in respect of each and every part of the business carried on by a dealer. In a decision of this Court in United Bleachers Ltd. v. State of Madras 1960 11 S. T. C. 278., it has been held that the profit motive necessary to be examined is one which embraces the whole business of the assessee and not in respect of each one of the component parts of the business. Whether a particular sale resulted in a profit or a loss is not the matter for consideration. It is whether a course of business activity is or is not intended to be engaged in with the profit motive. The contentions advanced by the assessee accordingly fail. The revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat in regard to the supply and distribution of refreshments by the Cosmopolitan Club to its members against payment, it cannot be said that there has been a transfer of property by the Club as an absolute owner to its members as purchasers. The case is more analogous to that of an agent or mandatory investing his own moneys for preparing things for consumption of the principal, and later recouping himself for the expenses incurred. The circumstance that a small margin of profit results occasionally in such a transaction can only be regarded as incidental to the transaction, as it is not always possible to fix the price of refreshments with exactitude. That cannot obviously convert the transaction into one of sale. It follows that the Club cannot be regarded as a dealer nor can the supply of refreshments to its members be regarded as a sale within the meaning of the Act. A writ of mandamus will therefore issue in the terms prayed for. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a chemical. When a question is put what was sold by the assessee? , it would be truer to say that he sold a chemical than to say that he sold a colour. If an article is capable of being used as a chemical and also as a colour, the answer to the question what he sold would depend upon how it was treated by the vendor. If he stocked and sold it as a chemical, it would be a chemical sold by him and more so if it was bought by the vendee also as such. We, therefore, hold that the two articles were chemicals and that the tax on the proceeds of their sale is governed by the earlier notification of 8th June, 1948 We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11(6). We further direct that the Commissioner of Sales Tax will get his costs of this reference, which we fix at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (11) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpted from the payment of sales tax. This amendment followed two conflicting instructions given by the Sales Tax Commissioners to Sales Tax Officers. The amendment does not necessarily show that the State Government did not intend to include crushing and sieving in a manufacturing process within the meaning of the notification the amendment might have been the result of a change in the policy of the State Government. My answer to the question would, therefore, be in the negative. PATHAK, J.-I agree and have nothing to add. ORDER Our answer to the question is No . We direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, and the Commissioner of Sales Tax under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the Court, as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100 from the applicant-assessee. Reference answered in the negative.
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1962 (11) TMI 37 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the total turnover by an assessing authority that would justify the Commissioner invoking his revisional jurisdiction. There are cases where the omissions or commissions are trivial in nature and do not materially affect the fiscal interest of the State or of the assessee the orders passed in such cases, though technically erroneous may not be called improper or unjust. Before invoking his powers of revision under section 15 of the Act the revising authority must be satisfied that the relevant order is improper, unjust or that the order levying tax is substantially adverse to the financial interest of the State or of the assessee. The power ought not to be exercised lightly or where it is likely to result in harassment. In our opinion, the facts before us disclose that the omission was of a substantial nature and the Commissioner was justified in enhancing the tax. The appeals fail and are therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate s fees Rs. 50, in one set. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he sale of the goodwill etc., and it is not possible to say that a particular portion of the proceeds of the sale of the business should be included in the turnover. Our reply to the question is that proceeds of the sale of the business sold by the assessee are not to be included in the turnover over which tax is payable under section 3 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and that no question of goods being single point goods or multiple point goods can possibly arise. Further rule 44(f) is of general application and applies in all cases regardless of the question of goods being single point goods or multiple point goods. We direct that copies of this Judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11(6). We further direct that the Commissioner of Sales Tax will get his costs of this reference, which we fix at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (11) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the entry of any goods in the certificate of registration of the purchasing dealer does not satisfy the purposes set out in section 8(3)(b) of the Act. In our view therefore the selling dealer is entitled to depend solely upon the declaration furnished to him by the purchasing dealer and if that certificate brings the case within section 8(1) of the Act, whether or not the goods really fall within section 8(3)(b) of the Act is not a matter which will affect the right of the selling dealer to the benefit of section 8(1) of the Act. Though we agree with the Appellate Tribunal as regards the final result, we must however observe that it was wholly unnecessary for the Tribunal to have examined the question whether the goods themselves were of the class which would come within the description of goods intended to be used in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... laws and regulations in the territories taken over and merged into the new State and not to nullify the reorganisation itself by creating a fiction that they still form part of their previous State of origin which in some cases altogether ceased to exist. The petitioner cannot possibly contend that the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act must apply as if the Travancore-Cochin State itself were now in existence. Such a State is no longer a constitutional unit within Part A of the Constitution. It seems to us that though statutes some times do create a fiction, no such fiction was within the intendment of the Legislature in enacting section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. We agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the petitioner is the last purchaser liable to be assessed under the TravancoreCochin General Sales Tax Act, and that he was righly assessed by the department. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed. By no stretch of imagination can it be construed that Messrs Voltas were engaging in a sale of certain items of machinery to the Bombay Mutual Insurance. They contracted for the performance of a particular item of work which involved as part thereof supply and utilisation of certain materials. Obviously no contractor would be willing to wait for the payment till the completion of the work when the contract called for purchase and utilization of material at a high cost for the purpose of the contract. The mode of payment does not carry with it any implication that there was a sale of the goods as such at any stage of the contract. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Tribunal reached the only possible conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the case. There was no agreement which stipulated for the sale of materials as such as a divisible part of the contract entered into. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat they purchased the goods from the Bombay dealer for the purpose of resale. A strict scrutiny of the recitals in the C Form certificate would lead to the inference that these purchases were made by the assessee only for themselves and not for the purpose of accommodating any other customer. But, it is also open to the construction that though the sales were accommodation sales, in fact and in truth, the assessees were the purchasers, because they had necessarily to purchase before they can acccommodate their customers. This is a dubious circumstance and we cannot say that that by itself would be sufficient to disregard the other evidence on record which indubitably points our that this transaction must have been in the nature of accommodation sale. The finding of the Tribunal, which is certainly one of fact, is based upon the materials on record and is fully supported by them. The petition fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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