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Showing 41 to 60 of 85 Records
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1972 (2) TMI 72 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Pradesh 1962 13 S.T.C. 459. was referred to. That decision is of no help in interpreting the third notification dated 1st April, 1958. That notification amends the earlier notifications dated 25th March, 1955, and 14th April, 1955, and in order to interpret it, it has to be read in the light of the earlier two notifications. We are accordingly of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Revenue holding that sales tax is chargeable on ready-made garments made of wool at 3 1/8 per cent. is correct. This is in our opinion also (sic) garments includes not only the cost of the fabric of which it is made but also the labour charges for making the garments. The sales tax on ready-made garments, it appears, therefore, has been fixed at a lower rate than the tax on the fabrics of which they are made. We, therefore, answer the question as follows The turnover of the assessee in respect of the woollen coats was chargeable at the rate of 31 per cent. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (2) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice The contention was not accepted by the judge (Revisions). An attempt has been made before us on the part of the assessee to show that a contractual condition existed, but having regard to the specific finding given by the judge (Revisions), we are unable to entertain that plea at this stage. If there was such a condition, it was for the assessee to have raised that plea before the sales tax authorities. We are of opinion that the case is covered by the view taken by the Supreme Court in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd.(1) and the Judge (Revisions) is right in holding that the amount on account of freight cannot be deducted from the sale consideration disclosed by the assessee. The question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the State and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs, which we assess at a consolidated sum of Rs. 100 in all the cases. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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1972 (2) TMI 70 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y charged for purposes of the definition contained in section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act. As stated by their Lordships in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool(1), in order to enable a dealer to claim the deduction, the cost of freight should be charged for separately and not included in the price of the goods sold. In Dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd. v. State of Kerala(3), their Lordships reiterated that such deduction from the sale price is only permissible when such freight is incurred by the seller for and on behalf of the purchaser, after the sale and the freight is separately charged within the meaning of the section, i.e., in addition to the price. That is also the view taken by this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Anwarkhan Mahboob Co.(4) 17.. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. The remaining amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954, remains in force, is not liable to any taxation under either of the two Sales Tax Acts of West Bengal, viz., the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, or the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954. Subject to the two conditions aforesaid, he is also entitled to have a mandate from this court on the respondents directing them not to enforce any of the aforesaid two Acts or the incidence thereunder on the sugar candy as manufactured by the petitioner and also not to enforce any order, notice or circular issued for the assessment already made for the period from 30th November, 1960, to 31st March, 1966, vide annexure V to the writ petition, as the petitioner has specifically excluded such assessment from the scope of the present writ petition. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus do issue accordingly with a declaration as above. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner is entitled to costs-hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (2) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Supreme Court held that an employer is not bound to keep an employee in service with whom relations have reached the point of complete loss of confidence/faith between the two.
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1972 (2) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... position similar to the position of the company in this case with Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. That court took the view that neither section 23(1) nor section 21 of the Act was an impediment for sanctioning the resolution approving the amalgamation of the Central Bank of India Ltd. with the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. There is no other contention urged on behalf of the Central Government. There is no other opposition by any other persons to the above petition. I do not find that there is any ground to refuse to sanction the scheme. All the necessary procedure has been followed by the company. I am satisfied that the proposed scheme of amalgamation is a reasonable one and it is in the best interests of the company and all concerned. I, therefore, accord sanction to the scheme of amalgamation which has been unanimously approved by the members of the company at the meeting. It is open to the company to apply for further directions, if and when necessary.
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1972 (2) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Registration of change of name and its effects thereof ... ... ... ... ..... new name had been put on the register. We do not see any reason or justification for not filing the memorandum of appeal in the name which was put on the register of the joint stock companies long before the appeal was filed. This appeal by the company in a name which has been removed from the register of the joint stock companies at the time when the appeal was filed is, in our view, incompetent. Learned advocate for the respondent contended that although the appeal is incompetent, the cross-objection should be treated to be competent and dealt with by this court accordingly. We are unable to accept this contention either. This is not a case of dismissal of appeal for default, nor a case of withdrawal of the appeal. The appeal itself being incompetent the cross-objection arising out of the same must also fail. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal and the cross-objection fail and both are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. P. B. Mukherji C.J. mdash I agree.
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1972 (2) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Winding up - Preferential payments, Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... he amount payable therefore, under sub-section (6) of section 530, as a part of the expenses of the winding-up, to the exclusion of the claims for the discharge of even the preferential debts. Apart from the above arguments, it has been argued that leave should be refused to the applicant because there can be no question of nonpayment of the income-tax in this case as the company is under the management and control of the court through the official liquidator. It has, therefore, been contended that it is not necessary to anticipate the total income of the company for the assessment year in question on any hypothetical basis and that the Income-tax Officer should really wait until the close of the year and the filing of the return of income-tax by the company. I do not, however, think this argument can be upheld when the applicant only wants leave to proceed in the matter according to the law. In the result, the leave applied for is granted. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Conviction of the appellants under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, challenged
Held that:- Apart from statement Ex. 17 which was written under the supervision of Robb P.W. and was signed by him shows that statement Ex. 17 represents what had been stated by the appellant we find that the other circumstances of the case clearly point to the guilt of the appellant. Evidence of Wagh P.W. shows that the appellant was found present on the back seat of the car from the dicky of which gold was recovered. It is also in evidence that the said car before the recovery of gold was brought at an odd hour of 2 a.m. and taken on the kutcha track towards salt pans near Bassein bridge. The car was thereafter parked on the kutcha track near that bridge and its engine was kept running. After the car was intercepted the Customs Officials interrogated the appellant and Wali Mohammad accused. No statement was then made by the appellant that he did not know about the presence of gold in the dicky. The fact that the mud on the gunny bags was wet shows that the gunny bags had been placed on the dicky shortly before they were examined by the Customs Officials. All these incriminating circumstances, in our opinion, clearly point to the guilt of the appellant.
We are satisfied that the conviction of the appellant was fully justified. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Asbestos Cement Pipe - Classification - Duty liability - Expert opinion - Test ... ... ... ... ..... the pipes under Class 3, the bursting pressure should be more than twice the water tightness test. For 100 mm., diameter pipes, the bursting pressure should be not less than 30 kg. per square centimetre, and in the case of pipes having a diameter of 125 to 200 mm. it should not be less than 1.75 of the water tightness test pressure. However, the Bursting Pressure Test by itself would not be conclusive. The crucial test is the water tightness test in the case of each of the pipes of the respective diameters. That, as already held, has not been done. It is for the department which seeks to collect higher duty to conclusively establish that the pipes in question fall under Class 3 alone and not under any other class before they can claim to impose higher duty. We, therefore, do not see any reason to come to a different conclusion than the one arrived at by our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J. 4. This appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100.
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1972 (2) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Natural Justice is not violated if the person giving information is not allowed cross-examination — Burden of proof — Illegal import — Proof of
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1972 (2) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Show Cause Notice - Criteria for - Quasi-judicial proceeding should be fair and just ... ... ... ... ..... n country. If that is so, the question of giving a hearing or explanation to the show cause notice become an idle formality and mere force. It is incumbent on the part of the enquiry officer to keep open mind till it comes to a decision regarding the illicitly importation of gold into India. If it is found that they have already closed their minds in respect thereto the quasi judicial proceeding it cannot be held to be in accordance with law or in compliance with the principles of natural justice. 2. In the circumstances aforesaid a show cause notice as well as a penalty order and the order of confiscation of the gold bar cannot be sustained and must be quashed and I quash the same. The respondents are however at liberty to proceed again in accordance with law if they are so advised and is not otherwise barred. 3. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. 4. Let the operation of the order be stayed for eight weeks from date.
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1972 (2) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Tobacco received under a valid permit - Liability of purchaser ... ... ... ... ..... nal permit, Ex. 72, on January 11, 1962, had only 4 bags of Chapadia Patti, while the rest of the goods were of Stalks Kandi and Stalks Dust. Therefore, the goods, which attracted lower duty, had been substituted, when ultimately they came to the plaintiff. The substitution must be by A.J. Chaudhary, as found by the Department in its order. We need not go into this aspect, because the material question, which is to be decided, is whether Rule 40 was attracted, so far as the plaintiff was concerned. The plaintiff got the goods under a valid permit. If the authority wrongly certified payment of duty, the authority, for their fault, cannot hold the plaintiff liable, if, according to the Department, the plaintiff was innocent. In any event, Rule 40 was wrongly invoked by the Department. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit. No ground has been made out justifying interference in this appeal. This appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 32 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Dissolution Of Firm, Finding Of Fact, Firm Registration ... ... ... ... ..... sel for the Commissioner of Income-tax, has stated that the Tribunal ignored the legal effect of the dissolution deed dated August 25, 1964, and the execution of the subsequent partnership deed dated September 25, 1964. It seems to us that the finding of the Tribunal that the two firms were distinct and the income of the old firm could not be added to the income of the new firm raised a question of fact. The question whether there was a new partnership or whether the old partnership continued was a question of fact and the finding of the Tribunal that the two partnerships were different was binding on the High Court. In the circumstances, the aggregation of the income of the two partnerships by the Income-tax Officer was not justified. The view taken by us has the support of a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. B. Shamiah Setty Brothers. The application is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (2) TMI 31 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Capital Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... construed to be revenue expenditure as it is intended to bring in more profits. But, if it is a new venture that they were seeking to start, even though it may not have ended successfully at that stage, it is for the initiation of a new business and if they had started it it would have brought them benefit of an enduring nature. Even intangible initial outlay for the initiation of a new line of business, when the business is started, would be of enduring benefit to the assessee. It is, therefore, in the nature of capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure. We, therefore, in the view that what they sought to start was a new line of business, are of the opinion that the expenditure should be treated as capital expenditure and not revenue expenditure. Therefore, the deduction claimed by way of revenue expenditure cannot be allowed. The reference is, therefore, answered in favour of the department. The assessee will bear the costs of the department. Advocate s fee, Rs. 250.
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1972 (2) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Return Filed Beyond Time ... ... ... ... ..... play if the income-tax authority is satisfied that without reasonable cause the assessee has failed to furnish return of the total income which the assessee is required to furnish under section 139(1) or (2) or under section 148 or has failed to file it within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-section (1) of section 139. It is quite clear that failure to furnish return within the extended time means the time allowed by the Income-tax Officer and that time can be allowed only on an application by the assessee concerned. It appears in the facts of this case that an application was made by the petitioner in Form No. VI and time was allowed up to 30th December, 1964, but the assessee filed the return some time in 1967. In the circumstances, therefore, in my opinion, the notice under section 271 cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or prima facie invalid. The rule is, therefore, discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 29 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title ... ... ... ... ..... on the property for an amount of Rs. 11,000. It is not the assessee s case that such situation has arisen and that being so, it is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether this clause creates an overriding title in favour of the trust, in the event of a default being committed by the lessee in making payment of the lease money. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right, and that the amount in question constituted the income of the assessee. To sum up, our conclusions in answer to the questions referred are as below. Question No. 1 ---The amount of Rs. 10,000 is the income of the assessee and not that of Chhadami Lal Jain Degree College. Question No. 2 ---The amount of Rs. 14,100 which was income from properties purported to have been transferred to the trust was assessable in the hands of the assessee-family. We answer the questions accordingly. The department is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1972 (2) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Income From Property ... ... ... ... ..... ifferent points of time. We do not see how this contention can be sustained in view of the language of section 4(3)(ii) of the Act. No authority has been cited in support of the contention made. We are clearly of the view that the trust deed, when it ensured the income from the properties in perpetuity for the charitable institution, in fact amounted to the making of voluntary contributions by the author of the trust as envisaged by section 4(3)(ii). In view of the fact that we have held that the exemption could be claimed under section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, it is not necessary for us to pursue the second reason given by the Tribunal for upholding the exemption. Our answer to the question referred to us is that income from the properties in question covered by the trust deed dated November 14, 1947, were exempt from income-tax under section 4(3)(ii) of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1972 (2) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... nal when the original assessment order was passed. It was not the subject-matter of dispute in subsequent proceedings under section 148 so the original assessment order cannot be said to have merged in the order under section 148 which was restricted only to depreciation. Moreover, an order can be said to have merged in another order only if the latter is passed by a superior authority. It does not merge into a subsequent order passed by the same authority. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel that the original assessment order had merged into the order passed under section 148, and, therefore, it could be rectified under section 154 after the expiry of four years from the original assessment order. The impugned order is clearly barred by time and is liable to be quashed. We, accordingly, allow this petition and quash the order dated September 10, 1971, and the notice of demand issued in pursuance thereof. The petitioner is entitled to the costs.
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1972 (2) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Hindu Law, Sole Surviving Coparcener ... ... ... ... ..... o the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Nath Singh v. AAC 1971 82 ITR 147. In the aforesaid view of the fact and in view of the materials in the affidavit, it must be held that there were no materials for the formation of belief. Upon this ground, the notice is liable to be quashed. In the premises, the notice under s. 148 of the I.T. Act, 1961, issued to the petitioner which is annex. G to the petition is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondents are restrained from giving any effect to the said notice. Let writs in the nature of mandamus and certiorari issue accordingly. If any assessment has been made pursuant to the said notice, the said assessment is also hereby quashed and set aside. Let writs in the nature of mandamus and certiorari issue also in respect of such assessment order. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of this order for a period of six weeks is granted.
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