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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 224 Records
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1984 (4) TMI 281 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... that the accepted meaning of the term terracotta had indeed undergone a substantial change, and that as of today it meant something quite different from what it meant in 1961, it would be difficult for us to ignore the changed meaning. However, we are spared of this difficulty, because, on a consideration of all the authorities, we have come to the conclusion that there is no such change in the established usage of the word. 42. Our conclusion therefore is that the basic finding of the Assistant Collector, namely, that the articles of glazed tableware manufactured by the respondents, which are the subject matter of the present proceedings, were rightly classifiable as “glazed clayware” falling under Item 23B of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule was correct, and the finding of the Collector (Appeals) to the contrary was erroneous. We accordingly set aside the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) and confirm the order of the Assistant Collector.
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1984 (4) TMI 280 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... t was sought to be made liable on the basis of the documents of which they were unaware cannot be accepted. 31. Shri Ganeshan did not contest the legality of the penalty, in the sense that such a penalty could not be imposed under law. His contention was that the penalty imposed has no relation to the gravity of the offence. We are unable to agree with this contention also. The clandestine activities of the appellants would not have come to light but for the interception of a lorry belonging to their sister concern. 32. We are satisfied that the appellants had been indulging in clandestine operation. We, therefore see no reason to interfere with the quantum of penalties imposed on the appellants by the learned Collector. The penalties imposed by the learned Collector do not appear to be unjust or harsh in the circumstances of the vase. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is rejected. 33. In the result both the appeals fail and the same are rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 279 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the corrupt practice alleged has been proved against appellant?
Held that:- After a careful consideration of the documents, the circumstances of the case and the oral evidence of the witnesses placed before us. We find ourselves in agreement with the judgment of the High Court. Indeed, it is very difficult to prove a charge of corrupt practice merely on the basis of oral evidence because in election cases, it is very easy to get the help of interested witnesses but very difficult to prove charges of corrupt practice. In the instant case, the evidence-both oral and documentary-led by the appellant falls short of the standard of proof required to bring his case within the four corners of s. 123 (4) of the Act. Thus the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed
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1984 (4) TMI 278 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner had paid more than the amount due as per the provisional assessment. We think the authorities acted arbitrarily. On the facts, therefore, we hold that the penal interest in question is not recoverable. 9.. There were no intervening orders of conditional stay or orders of Government permitting payment in instalments in O.P. No. 3001 of 1980. The only special feature is that according to counsel for the petitioner, the final assessment has been set aside in appeal. The best the petitioner can, therefore, claim is relief under sub-sections (4) to (6) of section 23, as they now stand. Without prejudice to his right to claim such relief before the appropriate authorities, we dismiss O.P. No. 3001 of 1980. 10.. In O.P. Nos. 4558 and 8027 of 1983 there was admittedly delay in payment. The delay was only nominal, but then, the penal interest will also then be nominal. We find no grounds to interfere. The two original petitions are dismissed. No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1984 (4) TMI 277 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with a view to see whether the Tribunal has committed an error of law in the appreciation of evidence and reaching the conclusion that it was not established that M/s. Tolaram had transferred the business to the company. As observed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal III v. Kamal Singh Rampuria 1970 75 ITR 157, it is well-established that the High Court is not a court of appeal in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and it is not open to the High Court in such a reference to embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence and to arrive at findings of fact contrary to those of the appellate court. Since it is not our function to re-appreciate the evidence, we do not find that the Tribunal has committed any error of law in coming to the conclusion as it did. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the department. The applicant to pay costs to the respondent. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1984 (4) TMI 276 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l-settled that the period of limitation in such cases will begin to run from the date of the revised demand notice. If reference be needed, we may at once refer to, inter alia, the cases in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar, Patna v. Sheodutta Prasad Chandeshwar Singh 1970 25 STC 114, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar v. North Ramgarh Coal Company Private Ltd. 1974 33 STC 469 and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar, Patna v. Rameshwar Das Panna Lal 1974 34 STC 296, without going into further detailed statements, as the point posed for our opinion is already covered by the cases cited above, apart from others. We, accordingly, answer the question in favour of the assessee (the dealer) and against the revenue. 5.. We hold that the period of limitation in the appeal shall run from 26th September, 1969, when the revised demand notice was served on the dealer. The assessee-dealer shall be entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at rupees two hundred fifty only.
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1984 (4) TMI 275 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommodity and the exemption which is available to the textile fabrics is not available. It is held that after cutting and stitching of umbrella cloth so as to make umbrella covers a different commodity (umbrella cover) comes into existence and it ceases to be textile fabrics so as to be eligible for exemption from tax. Our answer to the first question is in affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee (dealer). As we have answered the first question in favour of the department and against the assessee (dealer) it necessarily follows that the assessing authority was right and justified in taxing the escaped turnover and therefore the provisions of section 12 of the Act were rightly invoked. The answer to the second question is also in affirmative and in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs of these references. Let further action be taken in accordance with section 15(5) of the Act.
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1984 (4) TMI 274 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... caped assessment or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate or who has been wrongly allowed any deductions or has concealed any material particulars relating to sales or purchases or has knowingly furnished incorrect returns. It has further been held in that case that no limitation is prescribed for taking action under section 33(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, against an unregistered dealer falling thereunder. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that it was held in that case that there is no overlapping between the provisions of section 33(6) and section 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, or between section 14(6) and section 15 of the Act of 1953. 4.. In our view, this decision of the Supreme Court clearly covers the dispute before us and in view of the same, the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the department. The respondents to pay to the department the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1984 (4) TMI 273 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s rightly held that even cleaning for purpose of removing the dirt or foreign material amounts to manufacture resulting in a new product. 8.. After hearing the learned counsel and after going through the case law cited on behalf of the respondent we are of opinion that the authorities cited on behalf of the respondent are distinguishable and do not help the respondent in the present case. On the contrary the Supreme Court decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Harbilas Rai and Sons 1968 21 STC 17 (SC) fully supports and helps the case of the applicant. 9.. In the result the question reframed by us is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. Our answer is The Tribunal was not justified in holding that cleaning and washing with certain chemicals and cutting into pieces of waste fibre amounts to manufacture as defined in section 2(j) of the said Act. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1984 (4) TMI 272 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... authority. The provision of section 36(3)(a)(i) of the Act can be exercised to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or penalty. Inasmuch as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has completely set aside the penalty there is nothing for the Tribunal to enhance. Thus, the decision cited above applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. Hence we are of the view that the levy of penalty by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. Accordingly, both the revisions have to be allowed in respect of the penalty levied by the Tribunal. We do not find any warrant to interfere with the rest of the finding of the Tribunal and further, no argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee in regard to the rest of the finding of the Tribunal. 9.. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Tribunal in so far as it relates to the imposition of penalty is concerned, is set aside and confirmed in other respects, costs one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1984 (4) TMI 271 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there must be an information either from external source or from the record which has come into possession of the sales tax authority subsequent to the assessment order and (2) That the sales tax authority is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to believe that any turnover of a registered dealer has escaped assessment. 19.. In the result these petitions are allowed and the order contained in annexure 3 are hereby quashed. The parties will bear their own costs. SARWAR ALI, J.-I agree that annexure 3 in all the writ applications be quashed. My learned brother, if I say so with respect, has rightly formulated the question for consideration in paragraph 3 of the judgment. For the reasons given by him, I am also of the clear opinion that what the assessing authority is purporting to do in these cases is to reopen the assessment orders for giving second thought on the same materials or in other words for changing the opinion on the materials which have already been considered.
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1984 (4) TMI 270 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can be no question of waiver or estoppel. Section 18(1) of the Act is a mandatory provision not with regard to any procedural law but, with regard to a substantive right. Any infirmity or invalidity in the notice under section 18 of the Act as under section 147 read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 goes to the root of jurisdiction of the assessing authority, as my learned brother has already held with which I have agreed, the memo in question does not amount to a valid notice under section 18 of the Act. The assessing authority, therefore, had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment proceedings on a mere ground of suspicion, which does not amount to a reasonable ground to believe that the assessee concealed his income or escaped a turnover which was liable to tax. The primary facts were before the assessing authorities and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Discount Company 1961 41 ITR 191 (SC) shall squarely cover these things.
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1984 (4) TMI 269 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ss of bakery at the relevant time. The expression manufactures any goods other than cooked food has some significance. There is a process of baking involved in the manufacture of bread of a bakery and it is no doubt a form of cooking but it cannot be called cooked food which is taken regularly during meal hours. In section 3(1)(a) of the Act, the words excluding bakery products were inserted by the Rajasthan Finance Act, 1979 (Act No. V of 1979) with effect from April 7,1979 after the expression cooked food . Adopting the reasoning given in the aforesaid Allahabad, Madhya Pradesh and Supreme Court decisions referred to above, we are of opinion that bread is not a cooked food within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) of the Act as it stood then. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the non-petitionerassessee. As nobody has appeared on behalf of the non-petitioner-assessee, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1984 (4) TMI 268 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ers really want is that they should be allowed to retain with them, till final assessment and demand, the entire tax they collect from the customers from time to time. This is the mischief that rule 21 seeks to prevent, and as already explained, there are enough provisions in the Act, even after the deletion of section 18, to authorise such a prescription. 14.. We are of the view that the rules impugned are valid. The original petitions are accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. However, having regard to the circumstance that the financial year has come to a close and that orders of stay were in force all the while, we would direct that further steps for collection of tax from the petitioners under the amended sub-rules (7) to (14) of rule 21 will be kept in abeyance till final assessments are made for the year, if the petitioners have complied with the terms of the stay orders. Of course, collection after such final assessments can only be on their basis.
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1984 (4) TMI 267 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... (6) of section 14 of the said Act are in pari materia with those of sub-section (6) of section 33 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. Similarly, the provisions of section 15(1) are in pari materia with those of subsection (1) of section 35 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. It is common ground that the question is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai 1979 44 STC 137 (SC), which lays down that there is no limitation for taking any action under sub-section (6) of section 33 of the Act, 1959. In view of the said decision, there would be no limitation for taking action under sub-section (6) of section 14 of the Act, 1953. In view of the above, the question referred to us for determination will have to be answered in the negative and in favour of the department. When the matter goes back to the Tribunal it will have to be disposed of on merits and in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1984 (4) TMI 266 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ). Therefore, wherever there are two sales transactions without there being any privity of contract between the foreign seller and the local buyer, it is only that sale by the foreign seller by himself or through his agent that will be taken to have occasioned the import of the goods. In this case the assessee is found to be an agent of the foreign manufacturer, and therefore, there is only one sale and that sale was the one by the assessee as agent of the foreign manufacturer. Thus following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Khosla s case 1966 17 STC 473 (SC) we have to hold that the turnovers in dispute in these cases represent the sales in the course of import and therefore, they are exempt under section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. The tax revision cases are, therefore, dismissed. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (one set).
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1984 (4) TMI 265 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of business as closure of a line of business could not be incidental or ancillary to its carrying on or on the alternative basis of application of rule 6(d) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules which provides that all amounts realised by a dealer by the sale of his business as a whole will not form part of the taxable turnover of a dealer. In this case the assessee is not only carrying on business in transport but was also carrying on a workshop. But it decided to close down the workshop and transfer it to another Corporation. Therefore the amounts for which the workshop was transferred will not form part of the taxable turnover. Hence the assessee will not be liable to pay tax on the said sum of Rs. 7,31,915.15 which represents the value of the articles transferred to another company as a result of the closing down of the workshop of the assessee. The result is the tax cases are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1984 (4) TMI 264 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ous notifications, the whole mixture itself should be taken to have been exempted. But the basis of the said contention of the learned counsel is that the sale of maize is also exempted under Notification No. 89 of 1970 dated 14th March, 1970. A close scrutiny of the said notification shows that it exempts all sales of products of millets like rice, flour, brokens and bran of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai, varagu, samai, kudiravali, milo and maize. The said notification does not exempt maize as such, but it exempts bran of maize. It is not the case of the assessee that the mixture sold in this case contained bran of maize. Admittedly maize itself has been used and not bran of maize, which is exempted. Since maize has not been shown to have been exempted by any notification, any mixture containing maize cannot be said to have been exempted. In this view of the matter, the decision, of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. The tax revision case is therefore dismissed.
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1984 (4) TMI 263 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thin the meaning of section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Thus, the third case instead of supporting the Revenue supports the assessees case as seen from the following observation If the purchasers were holding the import licence and the assessees had helped them in importing the goods as in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Kotak and Co. 1973 32 STC 6 (SC), the position would have been different. As we are clearly of the view that the facts of this case squarely fall within the decision of the Supreme Court in Kotak s case 1973 32 STC 6 (SC), we have to hold that the disputed turnover of Rs. 1,50,06,767 represent the turnover of sales in the course of import and as such it is exempted under section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In this view, no interference is called for with the order of the Tribunal. The tax cases are, therefore, dismissed. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessees. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1984 (4) TMI 262 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t that existence of alternate remedy is no statutory bar and is only a self-imposed restriction which the Courts have put upon themselves we are not inclined, to uphold this point in this case for variety of reasons. The first is that by now the appeal has become time-barred. Secondly, pure question of law of general public importance is involved in the matter. Thirdly, the Department is unlikely to depart from its stand. We are informed that orders to reopen all assessments previous to 1978 are already issued. 13.. To conclude, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute in the above terms. The impugned orders dated 29th December, 1983 (annexures 1 and 2) are quashed and set aside. Needless to mention that the Department is free to make fresh assessment in the light of what has been observed above. As pure question of law of some importance is involved in this petition and as the parties have contested the matter as a test case, we would make no order as to costs.
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