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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 486 Records
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2003 (4) TMI 571 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d without considering the request the remission was confirmed. Appellants relied upon the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Dudhganga -Vedganga Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and Ors. vs. CCE, Pune and Ors. reported in 1987 (29) ELT22 (T). 5. The contention of the revenue is that the molasses were allowed to be stored in kachha pits on execution of Bond. As the molasses had become unfit for marketing, the appellants are liable to pay duty. 6. In this case, it is not disputed by the revenue that the molasses became unfit for marketing due to natural causes. In this situation, the Tribunal in the case of Shri Dudhganga - Vedganga Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and Ors. (supra) held that where the molasses were deteriorated due to natural cause, no duty can be demanded in respect of such molasses. This view was followed in number of decisions by the Tribunal. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Pronounced in Court
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2003 (4) TMI 570 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s found that Dr Greenberg is not attending at the time/s fixed, without any sufficient cause, then it would be open for the Magistrate to disallow recording of evidence by video conferencing. If the officer finds that Dr. Greenberg is not answering questions, the officer will make a memo of the same. Finally when the evidence is read in Court, this is an aspect which will be taken into consideration for testing the veracity of the evidence. Undoubtedly the costs of video conferencing would have to be borne by the State. 25. Accordingly the impugned judgment is set aside. The Magistrate will now proceed to have the evidence of Dr. Greenberg recorded by way of video conferencing. As the trial has been pending for a long time the trial court is requested to dispose off the case as early as possible and in any case within one year from today. With these directions the Appeals stand disposed of. The Respondent shall pay to the State and the complainant the costs of these Appeals.
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2003 (4) TMI 569 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... l leave petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay.
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2003 (4) TMI 568 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to a larger Bench. We are not satisfied that the said reasons justified their deciding the matter and not referring it to the larger Bench. In the circumstances, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of inter se seniority of the Judicial Officers impleaded as respondents in the writ petition. The impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of seniority of the respondent - Judicial Officers is set aside. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs." 14. In the instant case, the position is still worse. The latter Bench did not even indicate as to why it was not following the earlier Bench judgment though brought to its notice. Judicial propriety and decorum warranted such a course indicated above to be adopted. 15. Appeals are allowed. Costs, cost in the cause. Civil Appeal No. 3614 of 2002 16. The appeal is allowed in view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 3615-3618/2002.
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2003 (4) TMI 567 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... old (Control) Appellate Tribunal he seeks permission to withdraw this Appeal. Permission granted. The Civil Appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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2003 (4) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... being inter- parties and having attained finality would operate as res judicata. The further contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that as the respondent had already filed an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, wherein an amount of ₹ 1,33,200/- was awarded in her favour, the impugned proceeding was not maintainable. The two proceedings are absolutely separate and distinct. The impugned judgment does not show that the said question was even argued before the High Court. As indicated hereinbefore, the factual issue involved in this appeal revolved round as to whether Exhibit A1 was obtained by applying force or undue influence upon the appellant. The said contention has been negatived by both the Family Court as also the High Court. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at ₹ 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only).
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2003 (4) TMI 565 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... .m. to ₹ 1200/- p.m. As noted supra, with the consent of the parties, the High Court had exercised powers under Order 41, Rules 30, 32 and 33. It took note of the ground realities which were not disputed before us. High Court recorded a positive finding that in the normal course the appellant would have paid at least ₹ 1200/-p.m., though the amount payable was more than, even for the period for which accounts were rendered or were to be rendered. It was fairly accepted by learned counsel for the appellant before us that the rentals in the area have increased by leaps and bounds after 1980. That being so, the specious plea that there was no scope for enhancement of the quantum of damages fixed by the Trial Court is indefensible. Judged from any angle, the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves dismissal with costs which we direct. In a case of this nature, waiver of costs would be acting with leniency on a person who deserves none. Costs fixed at ₹ 25,000/-.
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2003 (4) TMI 564 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that the grounds not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time of the superior courts is not to be wasted in enquiring into the question whether a certain ground to which no reference is found in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before that court or not?" In usual course stands taken before this Court would have been ignored in view of the settled position of law indicated above. But, in view of the fact that in the connected matter, directions have been given for consideration of the age aspect, it would be appropriate if similar consideration is made in respect of the appellants. The directions shall operate in respect of present appellants also. Appeals are disposed of on aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs in both the appeals.
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2003 (4) TMI 563 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... duced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceedings shall continue but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision. In view of what has been stated above the inevitable conclusion is that the High Courts were right in the conclusion about non-maintainability of revision applications. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that even if the revision applications are held to be not maintainable, there should not be a bar on challenge being made under Section 227 of the Constitution. It was submitted that an opportunity may be granted to the appellants to avail the remedy. If any remedy is available to a party under any statute no liberty is necessary to be granted for availing the same. If the appellants avail such remedy, the same shall be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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2003 (4) TMI 562 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t 'Dolomite' can be used as a fertilizer. It is also clear that the petitioners are not manufacturing tiles or any items of building material. The mere fact that the commodity can be used for making tiles cannot mean that the tax can be levied under Entry 42. If the rule in M/s. Marbles India case (supra) is to be interpreted as entitling the assessing authority to levy tax under Entry 42, in our opinion, it does not contain the correct enunciation of law. So far as the present case is concerned, 'Dolomite' can only be assessed under Entry 50 of the First Schedule in the Act. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is allowed. It is held that the sales of dolomite can be assessed only under Entry 50. The view taken by the Division Bench in Marbles India v. State of Kerala, (1996) 4 KTR 445 was based on the admission of the assessee. However, it does not contain the correct statement of law. It is, consequently, over-ruled. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2003 (4) TMI 561 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... there was substantive appointment. The Full Bench has recorded a factual finding that non-official respondents have not been confirmed in the posts in the Co-operative Department. It has been specifically recorded that no material was placed to show that any order has been passed by the Co-operative Department confirming the concerned employees in their posts. With reference to Rule 24 it was noted that mere completion of probation does not result in automatic confirmation. It is a settled position in law that a person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier. See Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. (AIR 1992 SC 496) and Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 36) Above being the position, the Full Bench’s decision does not suffer from any vulnerability to warrant interference. The appeals are dismissed, but in the peculiar circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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2003 (4) TMI 560 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 30 per cent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum."" 36. In these cases, also, it is said that the arbitrators have not yet been appointed despite the demand made in this behalf by the respondents. The amount of solatium at the rate of 5 per annum and the interest thereupon had been paid in early eighties when the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared the said Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 37. In the peculiar fact situation obtaining in these cases and inasmuch as the amounts sought to be recovered are small which were paid to the respondents decades back, we are of the opinion that interest of justice shall be met if the appellants are directed not to recover the amount of compensation from the respondents pursuant to or in furtherance of this judgment. However, we hasten to add that this direction shall be not treated as a precedent. 38. These appeals are allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions. No costs.
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2003 (4) TMI 559 - CEGAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... se records, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is not sustainable as it has computed the duty liability without applying the exemption Notifications prescribing effective rates of duty from time to time. We also observe that penalties have been imposed both under Section 112 and under Section 114A which are mutually exclusive. The Commissioner has also not quantified the amount of penalty under Section 114A and has merely stated that the appellants are liable to pay mandatory penalty as envisaged under Section 114A. In view of the foregoing, we have no opinion, but to set aside the Order-in-Original and remand the same for re-adjudication with the direction that appropriate effective rates of duty should be applied, the appellants should be heard and while determining the penal liability due consideration should be given to the fact that the appellants have paid the duty amount even before the issue of Show Cause Notices. 4. The appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2003 (4) TMI 558 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2003 (4) TMI 557 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... case of Sinkhai Synthetics and Chemicals (P) Ltd. Vs. CCE. In view thereof, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The appeal stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (4) TMI 556 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... 9-2002 and reported in 2003 (151) E.L.T. 393 (Tribunal) (Commissioner v. Indchem. Electronics). The Appellate Tribunal in its impugned order had held that Modvat/Cenvat credit is not deniable on inputs destroyed in fire accident when the fact that inputs were actually issued and thereafter destroyed in fire accident, is not disputed by Department.
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2003 (4) TMI 555 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under section 8(1) there is no scope for consideration of any reasonable cause or mala fide. The consideration of reasonable cause and mala fide, may be relevant for the purposes of penalty under section 15A(1)(a) for delayed deposit of tax but not relevant for interest under section 8(1). Section 8(1) says that the tax admittedly payable shall be deposited within the time prescribed, failing which, simple interest at the rate of two per cent per mensum shall become due and be payable on the unpaid amount with effect from the day immediately following the last date prescribed or till the date of payment of such amount. For the reasons stated above, the order of Tribunal is not correct and liable to be set aside. In the result, the revisions are allowed and the order of Tribunal dated September 18, 1990 passed in Appeal Nos. 888 of 1984 and 889 of 1984 are set aside and it is held that the dealer was liable for interest under section 8(1) for delayed payment of admitted tax.
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2003 (4) TMI 554 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , we are of the view that a fresh look at the issue in the context of imposition of penalty is required with reference to the existing documents particularly annexure A and on the basis of the documents to be produced by the petitioner along with an affidavit explaining the circumstances under which the petitioner could not produce the same before the authorities concerned. For the said purpose, we set aside the orders of the two appellate authorities and remit the matter to the Intelligence Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with law. This exercise will be done by the Intelligence Officer within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The petitioner will produce a certified copy of this judgment before the Intelligence Officer to enable him to comply with the directions issued in this judgment. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter in this judgment. T.R.C. is disposed of as above.
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2003 (4) TMI 553 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion State from which the movement of goods started had a jurisdiction to levy tax. Thus State of U.P. from where the movement of goods started had a jurisdiction to levy tax. The fact as found by the authority below which are referred above and which could not be controverted, namely, that M/s. Kedia Brothers, the sole distributors given the orders through the managing agent and managing agent passed on the orders to the company and on the basis of such orders the goods had been dispatched, in which R.R. was made either in the name of managing agent or in the name of self and are subsequently endorsed in favour of M/s. Kedia Brothers clearly establishes the conceivable link between the movement of goods from Bareilly and buyers order and movement of goods to outside the State of U.P. in pursuance of the prior contract of sale and thus those transactions were inter-State sale. In the result, all the revisions are allowed. Order of Tribunal dated February 5, 1991 is set aside.
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2003 (4) TMI 552 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acted in a manner that lacks the care and caution of a reasonable man . In the present case, the declaration form in form Nos. VII-G and VII-H were found genuine and no defects were found. Therefore, so far as the dealer was concerned, it had complied with the requirement of rule 27-D and accordingly entitled for benefit of rebate under rule 27-D. It was not for the dealer to further enquire and to satisfy that the purchasing dealer had sold the manufactured goods inside the State of U.P. or in course of export. In case the purchasing dealer had not sold inside the State of U.P. or in the course of export the finished goods which were manufactured out of the oil and in respect of which declaration in forms VII-G and VII-H were given, the necessary action may be taken only against the purchasing dealer who had issued the wrong declaration. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that there is no error in the order of Tribunal. In the result, the revision is dismissed.
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