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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 113 Records
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1971 (9) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Companies Law Board – Power of, Reference to Tribunal of cases against managerial personnel, Reference to Tribunal of Resignation before making of application by Central Government, makes no difference where charges are of collusion and conspiracy, Reference to Tribunal of Where materials were held to be sufficient for investigation, Powers of Central Government to remove managerial personnel on the basis of Tribunal’s decision
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1971 (9) TMI 102 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... l has to be wound up. Many companies find themselves in this position, if their business comes to an end and their substratum is gone. This cannot be a reason for exempting the mandal from registering itself under the Public Trusts Act. If the contention that a company even if it owns property as a trustee in trust for a class of beneficiaries for public religious and charitable purposes is not required to be registered under the Public Trusts Act were accepted, it would result in large-scale evasion of the provisions of the Public Trusts Act. All that the trustees have to do is to register a company under the Companies Act, vest the trust property in the company and become its directors in order to escape the provisions of the Public Trusts Act. Such a construction is not to be favoured. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The order of the City Civil Court dated 3rd March, 1966, is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1971 (9) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ar Industries Ltd. If this company has a genuine claim, notwithstanding the winding up order against the company, the official liquidator will be in a position to proceed with the claim which the company has against Dhootpapeshwar Industries Ltd. Mere pendency of arbitration proceedings, in my opinion, is not a sufficient ground to take the view that a ground for winding up has not been made out and that the company should not be ordered to be wound up. In the result, the company is ordered to be wound up in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. The official liquidator is appointed liquidator with all the necessary powers under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, to take charge of the assets of the company and to conduct the affairs of the company in the course of winding up. Costs of the petitioner of this petition will come out of the assets of the company. Order of winding-up to be advertised in the same newspapers in which the petition for winding up was advertised.
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1971 (9) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Winding up - Body corporate to be appointed as liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... eges or attributes which may tend to show that the firm is an entity, the essence of the concept is that it is but a convenient name or description of individuals entering into a combination of joint nature. In fact, in the present case, C. Raghunatham one of the partners of the firm Rowe and Pal , has stated in his affidavit that, although the firm is appointed as the liquidator, it is he who is actually looking after the liquidation proceedings. No material has been placed before me on behalf of the Registrar of Companies to show that M/s. Rowe and Pal have got the attributes of a corporation or a body corporate. In paragraph 7 of the petition itself it is stated that M/s. Rowe and Pal is a firm of chartered accountants. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the firm Rowe and Pal is not a body corporate incurring the disqualifications referred to in section 513 of the Act. In the result, this application fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances without costs.
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1971 (9) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... n, the definition in clause (a) of section 390 merely states that a company which seeks to resort to the provisions of the said chapter must be one which is liable to be wound up under the Act, and not that it should be one which is in such a financial condition as to be capable of being wound up under the Act. Mr. Sorabjee s contention based on the definition in section 390(a) that the provisions of section 391 cannot apply to a transferee company, since it would be in a sound financial condition must, therefore, also stand rejected. In the result, all the three arguments of Sorabjee stand rejected and I make the petition absolute in terms of prayer (a). . . . . 3. For sub-clause (d) of clause 15 of the Scheme the following shall be substituted the sanction by the appropriate High Court under section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, and the necessary orders under section 394 of the said Act, being obtained, both by the transferor-company as well as by the transferee-company.
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1971 (9) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Smuggling - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... sea. If articles happen to go out of the vessel in any of these or similar other manners the Master of the ship is not liable to pay the duty on the articles and the vessel is not liable to be confiscated. The manner in which the 39 cases of whisky were taken out of the vessel was not different. They were practically stolen from it with the active connivance of the second officer and without the knowledge of the petitioner. 13.It was open to the respondent to have levied import duty on the second officer who admittedly had effected the sale. But that was not done. 14.There is no evidence either to connect the petitioner with the offence or to justify confiscation of the vessel. Ext. P-5 order in that regard exhibits clear ignorance and disregard of law. It also offends the sense of justice and fair play. There are no valid grounds to support it. 15.Hence Ext. P-5 order to the extent it is impeached in this petition is quashed. It shall stand unaffected in all other respects.
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1971 (9) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE AT BANGALORE
Packing - Whether a process of manufacture - Valuation - Cost of packing ... ... ... ... ..... espondents 2 and 3 and further issue an order directing them not to enforce the demand against the petitioner for payment of Rs. 19,889.93 P. by way of differential duty for the period from 1-3-1966 to 31-1-1968. 16. In writ petition No. 3436 of 1970, we think it is not appropriate to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. The assessing authority under the Act has to re-assess the value of the glass containers released from the bonded house in light of this order for the period in question and then refund the excess amount already collected from the petitioner. We, therefore, issue an order directing the second respondent to cause the reassessment of the duty payable on the excisable articles in question made for the period covered by this writ petition in the light of this order without taking into account the packing charges and refund the excess amount, if any, collected from the petitioner. 17. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Advocates fee Rs. 250 one set.
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1971 (9) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the powers exercised by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer were exercised within three years from the date of the assessment order, in respect of each one of those assessments?
Held that:- The Agricultural Income-tax Officer was empowered to make the rectification under section 36 of the Act. But, from the material before us, it is not possible for us to decide which of all assessments would fall within the period prescribed in section 36 of the Act. For that reason these cases have got to go back to the High Court for deciding that question in accordance with this decision. Appeals allowed. Case remanded
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1971 (9) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
A Partner, Appeal Against Assessment, Excess Profits Tax, Firm Assessment, Garnishee Order, High Court, One Partner, Writ Petition
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1971 (9) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the fact that the applicant apportioned the sum of ₹ 79,680 out of the general revenue expenses of its estate towards the immature area and capitalised the same for purposes of its accounts precluded the appellant from claiming the same as revenue expenses for the purpose of agricultural income-tax assessment ?
Whether the Tribunal ought not to have considered the nature of the expenses amounting to ₹ 79,680 for the purpose of determining whether it is allowable expenditure or not irrespective of the way it was dealt with by the applicant for the purpose of its accounts ?
Held that:- The questions set out in the application of the assessee do arise for consideration and, therefore, the High Court should have directed the Tribunal to refer those questions to the High Court for its opinion.
In the result, we allow the appeal and direct the Tribunal to refer the two questions set out in the application of the assessee to the High Court for its opinion. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, any gift-tax was payable on the goodwill of the assessee's business. If the answer be in the affirmative how much share in the goodwill was liable to such tax ?
Held that:- In the present case it has not been established that the requirements of section 5(1)(xiv) of the Act were satisfied. The assessee was certainly carrying on his business at the point of time when he admitted his two daughters into the firm. But from that fact alone it did not follow that the gift had been made in the course of the assessee's business nor could it be held that the gift was made for the purpose of carrying on the assessee's business. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the partnership did provide for the continuance of the partnership business in spite of the death of the partner and that the main intention of the assessee was to ensure the continuity of the business and to prevent its extinction on his death. A true and correct reading of the deed of partnership indicates that the partners could go out from the partnership in terms of clause 2 of the schedule in the deed of partnership. Moreover, the partnership was expressly stated to be at will. The real intention of the assessee apparently was to take his daughters into the firm with the object of conferring benefit on them for the natural reason that the father wanted to look to the advancement of his daughters. It was further provided in the deed that even the minor children would, in due course, be admitted to partnership. Clause 18 of the schedule already referred to laid down that the assessee could nominate either one or all of his minor children to be partner or partners on their attaining majority and such nomination or appointment could be made even by a will or codicil. The assessee retained complete control over the running of the partnership business and it can hardly be said that he needed any help from his daughters particularly when there is no evidence that he was in a weak state of health, his age being below 50 years. Moreover, there is nothing to show that the daughters had any specialised knowledge or business experience so as to be able to assist in the development or management of the business. Thus there was no cogent material to come to the conclusion that the gift of ₹ 25,000 to each of the daughters by the assessee was " in the course of carrying on the business " of the assessee and was " for the purpose of the business ".
The assessee had himself made a return in the matter of assessment of gift-tax payable under the Act in respect of the amount of ₹ 50,000 which had been gifted by him to his two daughters. The answer to question No. 3, consequently, would be in favour of the revenue and against the assessee so far as that amount is concerned.
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1971 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... l came to the conclusion that that tax liability was required to be taken into account in computing the value of the assets of the company. But that liability was covered by the existing reserve, advance tax paid and refund to which the company was entitled under section 18(5) of the Income-tax Act. This finding of the Tribunal is essentially a finding of fact, and it is not shown that that finding is in any manner vitiated. That being so, the ratio of the decision of this court in Kesoram Industries case is not attracted. This question we have discussed in greater detail in the assessee s wealth-tax appeals (Civil Appeals Nos. 2485 and 2486 of 1966) in which we have delivered judgment just now. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the answer given by the High Court to the question mentioned above is discharged and in its place we answer that question in favour of the department. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (9) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was gift by N. S. Getti Chettiar of ₹ 2,46,377 on which he is liable to pay Gift-tax ?
Held that:- the word "disposition", in the context, means giving away or giving up by a person of something which was his own, "conveyance" means transfer of ownership, "assignment" means the transfer of the claim, right or property to another, "settlement" means settling the property, right or claim--conveyance or disposition of property for the benefit of another "delivery" contemplated therein is the delivery of one's property to another for no consideration and "payment" implies gift of money by someone to another. We do not think that a partition in a Hindu undivided family can be considered either as "disposition" or "conveyance" or "assignment" or "settlement" or "delivery" or "payment" or "alienation" within the meaning of those words in section 2(xxiv).
The "transaction" referred to in clause (d) of section 2(xxiv) takes its colour from the main clause, viz., it must be a transfer of property in some way. This conclusion of ours gets support from sub-clauses (a) to (c) of clause (xxiv) of section 2, each of which deals with one or the other mode of transfer. If Parliament intended to bring within the scope of that provision partitions of the type with which we are concerned, nothing was easier than to say so. In interpreting tax laws, courts merely look at the words of the section. If a case clearly comes within the section, the subject is taxed and not otherwise. We agree with the view taken by the High Court of Madras, the Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the assessee made no "gift" under the partition deed in question.
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1971 (9) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Carrying On Business, Credit Facilities To Members, Interest On Securities, Providing Credit Facilities
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1971 (9) TMI 59 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Surplus of income over expenditure of a recreation club providing amenities to members on payments - " Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee-club is entitled to exemption from income-tax in respect of its income for the assessment year 1961-62 ? " - Since the club has not been formed for the purpose of making profits by trading, it is not a trade association. The surplus of receipts over expenditure derived by the assessee-club does not go to any person in the capacity other than as contributor or consumer. Therefore, the assessee club is not a trade association nor is the excess a profit taxable as income from other sources - Surplus received by the assessee-club is not income. It is therefore, not taxable either under section 10 as business income or under section 12 as income from other sources.
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1971 (9) TMI 58 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
" (1) Whether Income-tax Officer should be deemed to have granted extension of time for filing the return when he did not pass any orders on the assessee's application? (2) Whether levy of interest calculated under clause (iii) of the proviso to section 139(1), the Income-tax Officer must be deemed to have condoned the delay in filing the return of income ? (3) Whether Income-tax Officer had the power to levy a penalty under section 271(1)(a) when he had already levied interest under section 139 ? and (4) Whether Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to levy penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act where a return was filed under section 139(4) and penal interest was also levied under the provisions of this latter section ? "
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1971 (9) TMI 57 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
A question of law relating to the construction of section 58K(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, arises for consideration in this reference – Two Banks amalgamated with Bank C the provident fund accounts of the first two banks were closed and the funds were distributed among the employees under orders of court - whether the third bank is entitled to claim the payments as expenditure u/s10(2)(xv) r.w.s. 58K(2) Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1971 (9) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Scope and ambit of the charging provision in relation to capital gains tax - Whether relinquishment of interest in partnership assets due to retirement of partner from the firm attract capital gains tax also whether goodwill is a capital asset
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1971 (9) TMI 55 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessee is a private limited company. It manufactures woollen cloth and carpets. These items are also exported out of India. In the year 1966-67, the assessee could not pay the provisional demand of tax in respect of earlier assessment and approached the Income-tax Officer for time which was allowed. In respect of these delayed payments, the assessee was charged interest and he paid a sum of Rs. 6,733. This payment of interest has been claimed by the assessee as permissible deduction under sections 37 and 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax Officer disallowed this claim and held that the assessee was not entitled to claim it as a permissible deduction under the Act – held that the interest on belated tax payment is not deductible under section 10(2)(xv)
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1971 (9) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Whether a certain transaction of purchase and sale of land effected by the assessees was by way of realisation of investment or was an adventure in the nature of trade - When the assessee buys and sells non-agricultural land, whether they intend to re-sell is material to determine whether the transaction was adventure in the nature of Trade - whether there is distinction between purchase and sale by a person residing abroad and by person residing in India
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