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Showing 61 to 80 of 587 Records
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2011 (10) TMI 720 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Registrar of Companies. 6) At least 14 clear days before the date fixed for hearing, notice of hearing of the Petition be served by R.P.A.D. upon all its Unsecured Creditors. 7) At least 10 clear days before the date fixed for hearing, Petitioner to publish the notice of hearing of Petition in two newspapers, viz; „Free Press Journal‟ in English language and „Maharashtra Times‟ in Marathi language both circulated in Mumbai. 8) Publication of notice in the Maharashtra Government Gazette is dispensed with. 9) Petitioner to file in the Registry an Affidavit of Service as per Rule 30 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959
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2011 (10) TMI 719 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle." (emphasis supplied) 21. Since we are agreeing with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, we have reflected as above in a brief manner, lest parties are prejudiced at the trial and needless to state observations made by us herein above are tentative and limited to what we need to observe and note at the stage of interim relief. The final decision, post trial, would obviously be with reference to the evidence led. 22. However, one direction needs to be issued. Which we do. 23. The respondent would maintain an account of the sales affected by it and would file the same if required to be filed before the Court by the learned Single Judge. 24. Subject to the direction issued in para 22 above, the appeal is dismissed. 25. No costs.
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2011 (10) TMI 718 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts and powers of the Transferor Company be transferred to and vest in the Transferee Company without any further act or deed. Similarly, in terms of the Scheme, all the liabilities and duties of the Transferor Company be transferred to the Transferee Company without any further act or deed. Upon the Scheme coming into effect, the Transferor Company shall stand dissolved without winding up. It is, however, clarified that this order will not be construed as an order granting exemption from payment of stamp duty or taxes or any other charges, if payable in accordance with any law; or permission/compliance with any other requirement which may be specifically required under any law. 20. Mr. Virender Ganda, learned senior counsel states that the Petitioner Companies would voluntarily deposit a sum of ₹ 1.50 lacs with the Common Pool fund of the Official Liquidator within three weeks from today. The said statement is accepted. 21. The Petitions are allowed in the above terms.
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2011 (10) TMI 717 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es is a matter which can be dealt with and is covered by section 536(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 and the same principles which apply with regard to the dispositions of property would apply and govern the transfer of shares or alteration in the status of the members. However, finding that the claim is belated, there being unexplained and erroneous delay in raising it, so also, it being highly disputed, that it will not be possible to grant any relief on this application. If the claim was not belated as referred to above, possibly all other aspects could have been gone into and then a view in favor of the applicant on other aspects could have been taken. However, finding that the parties are involved in litigation in relation to the very transaction and that it is not a case of admitted transfer of shares on the own showing and going by own version of the applicant, that the company application fails. It is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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2011 (10) TMI 716 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the record. In their evidence, the plaintiffs have, in fact, proved the facts stated in the plaint and have also exhibited the relevant documents in support of their case. The evidence filed by the plaintiffs has gone unrebutted as no cross-examination of the plaintiffs’ witness was carried out. Therefore, the statement made by the plaintiffs is accepted as correct deposition. Under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. Hence, the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed in terms of paragraph-38(a) & (b) of the plaint. As far as the relief of damages and rendition of accounts are concerned, I am of the view that in view of the orders earlier passed in favour of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to the damages to the tune of ₹ 2 lac in their favour. The plaintiffs are also entitled to the cost of the suit. Ordered accordingly. Decree be drawn accordingly. The suit and the pending applications are disposed of.
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2011 (10) TMI 715 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the record. In their evidence, the plaintiffs have, in fact, proved the facts stated in the plaint and have also exhibited the relevant documents in support of their case. The evidence filed by the plaintiffs has gone unrebutted as no cross-examination of the plaintiffs’ witness was carried out. Therefore, the statement made by the plaintiffs is accepted as correct deposition. Under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. Hence, the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed in terms of paragraph-38(a) & (b) of the plaint. As far as the relief of damages and rendition of accounts are concerned, I am of the view that in view of the orders earlier passed in favour of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to the damages to the tune of ₹ 2 lac in their favour. The plaintiffs are also entitled to the cost of the suit. Ordered accordingly. Decree be drawn accordingly. The suit and the pending applications are disposed of.
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2011 (10) TMI 714 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a specified officer empowered under Section 54(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 as amended by the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 16 of 2003) to compound offences has power, competence and authority, on payment of a sum of money by way of composition of the offence by a person who is suspected to have committed offence against the Act, to order forfeiture of the seized items? - Held that:- When the language of the statutory provision is plain and clear no external aid is required and the legislative intention has to be gathered from the language employed. In our view, neither Section 54(2) of the 1972 Act by itself nor Section 54(2) read with Section 39(1)(d) or any other provision of the 1972 Act empowers and authorizes the specified officer under Section 54, on composition of the offence, to deal with the seized property much less order forfeiture of the seized property used by the person suspected of commission of offence against the Act.
The order passed by the Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad for forfeiture of the vehicle and two rifles to the state government is de hors the provisions of the 1972 Act and unsustainable. The High Court has rightly set aside such illegal order. However, the Single Judge was not right in his order dated March 29, 2005 in directing the Respondents therein (present Appellants) to release the vehicle and rifles. The Division Bench also erred in maintaining the above direction. Since the items were seized in exercise of the power under Section 50(1)(c), the seized property has to be dealt with by the Magistrate under Section 50(4) of the 1972 Act. The Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 must accordingly apply to the concerned Magistrate for the return of seized items who obviously will consider such application according to law.
We hold, as we must, that a specified officer empowered under Section 54(1) of the 1972 Act as substituted by Act 16 of 2003 to compound offences, has no power, competence or authority to order forfeiture of the seized items on composition of the offence by a person who is suspected to have committed offence against the Act. Our answer to the question framed at the outset is in the negative.
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2011 (10) TMI 713 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... company. He quoted ₹ 3,149 per share. On this submission learned counsel relied upon various citations. There is no doubt that this Bench has ample power under section 402 of the Companies Act If the company or any of its shareholders are willing to buy out the shares on the basis of valuation arrived by the valuer and the valuation is to be taken as on the date of the filing of the petition, i.e., December 12, 2008 and the company may appoint an independent valuer in consultation with the petitioner. In the case of buy out of shares the company is permitted to reduce its capital. The petitioner and the company shall share equally the remuneration and expenses of the valuer. In view of the reasons and facts stated above the petitioner has not made out any case either on oppression or on mismanagement and not entitled for the reliefs and the company petition is dismissed. No orders as to costs. All the interim orders stand vacated and all applications stand disposed of.
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2011 (10) TMI 712 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking adequate compensation for the victims of the Uphaar tragedy - violations of fundamental and indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the statutory obligations - acts of omission and commission by the public authorities concerned namely Delhi Vidyut Board ('DVB'), MCD Fire Force and the Licensing Authority - The High Court after exhaustive consideration of the material including the reports, recorded statements and other material, allowed the writ petition. In the said order, the High Court identified the causes that led to the calamity and persons responsible therefore. It held the theatre owner, DVB, MCD and the Licensing Authority responsible for the fire tragedy and held jointly and severally liable to compensate the victims. It exonerated the Delhi Fire Force. The High Court approved the recommendations of Naresh Kumar Committee which were extracted in detail in the judgment of the High Court. The theatre owner, Delhi Police and MCD have not accepted the judgment of HC and have filed these appeals.
In regard to performance of statutory functions and duties, the courts will not award damages unless there is malice or conscious abuse. The cases where damages have been awarded for direct negligence on the part of the statutory authority or cases involving doctrine of strict liability cannot be relied upon in this case to fasten liability against MCD or the Licensing Authority. The position of DVB is different, as direct negligence on its part was established and it was a proximate cause for the injuries to and death of victims. It can be said that in so far as the licensee and DVB are concerned, there was contributory negligence. The position of licensing authority and MCD is different. They were not the owners of the cinema theatre. The cause of the fire was not attributable to them or anything done by them. Their actions/omissions were not the proximate cause for the deaths and injuries. The Licensing Authority and MCD were merely discharging their statutory functions (that is granting licence in the case of licensing authority and submitting an inspection report or issuing a NOC by the MCD). In such circumstances, merely on the ground that the Licensing Authority and MCD could have performed their duties better or more efficiently, they cannot be made liable to pay compensation to the victims of the tragedy. There is no close or direct proximity to the acts of the Licensing Authority and MCD on the one hand and the fire accident and the death/injuries of the victims. But there was close and direct proximity between the acts of the Licensee and DVB on the one hand and the fire accident resultant deaths/injuries of victims.
In view of the well settled principles in regard to public law liability, in regard to discharge of statutory duties by public authorities, which do not involve malafides or abuse, the High Court committed a serious error in making the licensing authority and the MCD liable to pay compensation to the victims jointly and severally with the Licensee and DVB.
It was contended that DVB have installed a transformer of a capacity of 1000 KV without obtaining the statutory sanction/approval and without providing all the safety measures which it was duty bound to provide under the relevant Electricity Rules, and therefore, DVB alone should be responsible for the tragedy. This contention has no merit. In fact none in the main hall (ground floor of the theatre) died. Those on the second floor also escaped. It is only those in the balcony caught in noxious fumes, which died of asphyxiation. The deaths were on account of the negligence and greed on the part of the licensee in regard to installation of additional seats, in regard to closing of an exit door, parking of cars in front of transformer room by increasing parking from 15 to 35 and other acts. We therefore reject the contention that DVB should be made exclusively liable to pay the compensation. We have already held that the Licensing Authority and MCD are not liable. Therefore, the liability will be 85% (Licensee) and 15% (DVB).
Whether the income and multiplier method adopted to finally determine compensation can be arrived while awarding tentative or palliative compensation by way of a public law remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution - It can be by way of making monetary amounts for the wrong done or by way of exemplary damages, exclusive of any amount recoverable in a civil action based on tortuous liability. But in such a case it is improper to assume admittedly without any basis, that every person who visits a cinema theatre and purchases a balcony ticket should be of a high income group person. In the year 1997, ₹ 15,000 per month was rather a high income. It is known that zealous movie goers, even from low income groups, would not mind purchasing a balcony ticket to enjoy the film on the first day itself. To make a sweeping assumption that every person who purchased a balcony class ticket in 1997 should have had a monthly income of ₹ 15,000 and on that basis apply high multiplier of 15 to determine the compensation at a uniform rate of ₹ 18 lakhs in the case of persons above the age of 20 years and ₹ 15 lakhs for persons below that age, as a public law remedy, may not be proper. While awarding compensation to a large group of persons, by way of public law remedy, it will be unsafe to use a high income as the determinative factor. Therefore the proper course would be to award a uniform amount keeping in view the principles relating to award of compensation in public law remedy cases reserving liberty to the legal heirs of deceased victims to claim additional amount wherever they were not satisfied with the amount awarded. Taking note of the facts and circumstances, the amount of compensation awarded in public law remedy cases, and the need to provide a deterrent, we are of the view that award of ₹ 10 lakhs in the case of persons aged above 20 years and ₹ 7.5 lakhs in regard to those who were 20 years or below as on the date of the incident, would be appropriate. We do not propose to disturb the award of ₹ 1 lakh each in the case of injured. The amount awarded as compensation will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of writ petition as ordered by the High Court, reserve liberty to the victims or the LRs. of the victims as the case may be to seek higher remedy wherever they are not satisfied with the compensation. Any increase shall be borne by the Licensee (theatre owner) exclusively.
three factors are available the compensation can be determined - The first is the age of the deceased, the second is the income of the deceased and the third is number of dependants (to determine the percentage of deduction for personal expenses). For convenience the third factor can also be excluded by adopting a standard deduction of one third towards personal expenses. Therefore just two factors are required to be ascertained to determine the compensation in 59 individual cases. First is the annual income of the deceased, two third of which becomes the annual loss of dependency the age of the deceased which will furnish the multiplier in terms of Sarla Verma. The annual loss of dependency multiplied by the multiplier will give the compensation. we direct the Registrar General of Delhi High Court to receive applications in regard to death cases, from the claimants (legal heirs of the deceased) who want a compensation in excess of what has been awarded that is ₹ 10 lakhs/Rs. 7.5 lakhs. Such applications should be filed within three months from today. He shall hold a summary inquiry and determine the compensation.
Re: Punitive damages the question of award of punitive damages of ₹ 2,50,00,000/- against the licensee. Before examining whether such punitive damages could be awarded at all, we have to notice the apparent mistake in arriving at the sum of ₹ 2.5 crores. What were illegal seats were the 15 seats that were added by securing an order dated 4.10.1980. The remaining 37 seats were found to be valid by the authorities. Therefore, if at all the licensee is to be made liable to reimburse the profits earned from illegal seats, it should be only in regard to these 15 seats and the eight seats in the Box which was the cause for closing one of the exits. In so far as the eight seats in the owner's box, though it is alleged that they were intended to be used only as complimentary seats, for the purpose of award of punitive damages, they are treated at par with other balcony seats. The High Court also wrongly assumed that the ticket value to be ₹ 50/- from 1979 to 1996, because it was ₹ 50/- in the year 1997 for a balcony seat. Another erroneous assumption made is that for all shows on all the days, all these additional seats would be fully occupied. On a realistic assessment, (at a net average income of ₹ 12/- per seat with average 50% occupancy for 23 seats) the profits earned from these seats for 17 years would at best ₹ 25,00,000/-. Be that as it may. the appropriateness and legality of award of punitive damages. In this context, we may refer to the decision in M C Mehta v. Union of India[1986 (12) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT] wherein this Court considered the question as to what should be the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured.
K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan J. Consenting Decision - In this case, where life and personal liberty have been violated the absence of any statutory provision for compensation in the Statute is of no consequence. Right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most sacred right preserved and protected under the Constitution, violation of which is always actionable and there is no necessity of statutory provision as such for preserving that right. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is, therefore, very high, compared to the statutory powers and supervision expected from officers functioning under the statutes like Companies Act, Cooperative Societies Act and such similar legislations. When we look at the various provisions of the Cinematographic Act, 1952 and the Rules made there under, the Delhi Building Regulations and the Electricity Laws the duty of care on officials was high and liabilities strict.
Constitutional Torts and Punitive Damages - Constitutional courts can in appropriate cases of serious violation of life and liberty of the individuals award punitive damages. However, the same generally requires the presence of malicious intent on the side of the wrong doer, i.e. an intentional doing of some wrongful act. Compensatory damages are intended to provide the claimant with a monetary amount necessary to recoup/replace what was lost, since damages in tort are generally awarded to place the claimants in the position he would have been in, had the tort not taken place which are generally quantified under the heads of general damages and special damages. Punitive damages are intended to reform or to deter the wrong doer from indulging in conduct similar to that which formed the basis for the claim.
We have highlighted all these facts only to indicate that rapid changes are taking place all over the world to uphold the rights of the citizens against the wrong committed by Statutory Authorities and local bodies. Despite the concern shown by this Court, it is unfortunate that no legislation has been enacted to deal with such situations. We hope and trust that utmost attention would be given by the legislature for bringing in appropriate legislation to deal with claims in Public Law for violation of fundamental rights, guaranteed to the citizens at the hands of the State and its officials.
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2011 (10) TMI 711 - ITAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... insertion of Explanation 2 in sub-section 2 of section 50C was introduced w.e.f. 1-10-2009 so as to clarify the meaning term ‘assessable’ and it was provided that mere consideration received or accruing as a result of transfer of a capital asset, being land or building or both is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by an authority of state government for the purpose of payment of stamp duty in respect of such transfer, the value so adopted or assessed or assessable shall be deemed to be the full value of consideration received or accruing as a result of such transfer for computation of capital gains. Accordingly, this issue of the assessee’s appeal is allowed as the provision of section 50C will not apply in the relevant assessment year 2006-07. Appeals of the assessee are partly allowed. 8. In the result, appeal in ITA No.1866 of 2010 is allowed and in ITA No.1867 of 2010 is partly allowed. 9. Order pronounced in open court on 31.10.2011.
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2011 (10) TMI 710 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quidation in favour of M/s.Tex Raj nor any further steps by M/s.Tex Raj would in any manner defeat the rights and contentions of GIIC. All pleas of both sides in that behalf are kept open and can be raised irrespective of the conclusion rendered in this report. The findings and conclusions in this order should be read as confined to this report and the request of the purchaser M/s.Tex Raj not to disturb or set aside the sale. Beyond that neither the claim of GIIC nor that of the workers can be said to be prejudiced or concluded by this order. Equally this order does not prevent the Liquidator from taking possession of the other assets and properties, particularly, those enlisted in para 10 of his report dated 3rd November 2010. All such steps may be taken irrespective of the conclusions and findings in this order and it would be open for the Liquidator to proceed in winding up in accordance with law. Subject to above, all applications and reports stand disposed of. No costs.
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2011 (10) TMI 709 - SUPREME COURT
Benefits of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 availability to the appellants - Held that:- Section 97 of C. P.C. that provides that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of the Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree does not create any hindrance or obstruction in the power of the court to modify, amend or alter the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree if the changed circumstances so require.
It is true that final decree is always required to be in conformity with the preliminary decree but that does not mean that a preliminary decree, before the final decree is passed, cannot be altered or amended or modified by the trial court in the event of changed or supervening circumstances even if no appeal has been preferred from such preliminary decree. The view of the High Court is against law and the decisions of this Court in Phoolchand1 and S.Sai Reddy2.
We accordingly allow this appeal; set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the trial court dated June 15, 2009. The trial court shall now proceed for the preparation of the final decree in terms of its order dated June 15, 2009.
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2011 (10) TMI 708 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... directed by this Court at the time of final disposal of the appeals; and (iv) the successful party in these appeals shall be entitled to interest on the amount stayed by this Court at such rate as may be directed at the time of final disposal of the appeals. It is clarified that this interim order shall apply only in the case of those appellants before us, who file the requisite affidavits within a period of four weeks from today. We further direct that any default in deposit of any one of the instalments by the dates fixed above, would result in vacation of this stay order and it will be open to the department to recover the balance amount in accordance with law. We clarify that there is no stay of imposition of service tax under sub-clause (zzzz) of clause (105) of Section 65 read with Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended), insofar as the future liability towards service tax with effect from 1st October, 2011 is concerned. Tag with Civil Appeal No. 8390 of 2011.
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2011 (10) TMI 707 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ict or detenu. If a further requirement regarding establishing any link or nexus is imposed upon the competent authority, the provisions of Section 8 regarding burden of proof will become otiose and the very purpose of enacting such a Section would be defeated." 18. The statutory framework appears to be founded upon the fact that the details and particulars as to how a particular property has been acquired by a person are within his special knowledge. It is for him to explain as to how he has acquired it, and the source of the funds from which the property had been acquired. 19. The petitioner was a minor in the year 1985 when the properties were acquired. He is a younger brother of the detenue. This being the position, the consistent conclusions and findings of fact reached by the competent authority as well as the appellate authority do not call for any interference in these proceedings. 20. Accordingly the present petition is dismissed with costs of ₹ 50,000/-.
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2011 (10) TMI 706 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uch powers are limited in the sense that the Commissioner statutorily is not authorized to condone delay beyond certain period. Admittedly, the petitioners presented their appeal beyond such period. In that view of the matter, the Commissioner was justified in not condoning the delay. The Tribunal, in appeal, was correct in not entertaining petitioners' appeal. 8. We are not unmindful of decision of this Court in case of D.R.Industries vs. Union of India 2008 (229) ELT 24 , wherein the Court has taken the view that in extraordinary circumstances, in such cases, the writ petition can be entertained. In the present case, however, we do not find any such justification. No strong grounds have been made out to demonstrate that the order passed by the adjudicating authority was wholly illegal or without jurisdiction. We would not be justified in allowing the petitioners to routinely convert this Court into first appellate court. In the result, petition fails. Hence, dismissed.
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2011 (10) TMI 705 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... gives an impression that the assessee is not interested in pursuing its appeal. We, therefore, have no option but to dismiss the appeal preferred by the assessee, placing reliance on the ratio of decisions in the following cases CIT Vs. Multiplan (India) Pvt. Ltd. 38 ITD 320 (Del.); and Late Tukoji Rao Holkar 223 ITR 480 (MP). 3. Assessee’s appeal stands dismissed. Order pronounced in open court on 25-10-2011.
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2011 (10) TMI 704 - ITAT KOLKATA
Addition u/s 68 - Held that:- As find from the remand report that the AO declined to examine his witnesses nor allowed the assessee the opportunity of cross examination. We also note even though in the remand proceeding the CIT(A) expressly directed the AO to investigate the alleged trail of cash the AO did not bring on record any evidence to substantiate his conclusion that assessee’s own cash was returned to him in form of cheques. Failure on the part of the AO to even investigate the alleged cash trail justifies the CIT(A)’s conclusion that the AO had no material or evidence with him to prove that the capital gain earned by assessee on sale of shares represented assessee’s undisclosed income.
We find that in the present case the confessional statement of Shri Khemka was not backed by any other independent evidence. On the other hand the assessee’s explanations were backed by relevant documentary evidences which substantiated purchase & sale of shares. Having regard to the totality of the facts and evidences as brought on record and examined by the CIT(A) we find that there was no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition of ₹ 67,04,678/- made u/s 68 of the Act. Accordingly we uphold the order of the CIT(A) and dismiss the revenue’s appeal.
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2011 (10) TMI 703 - ITAT MUMBAI
Benefit u/s 28(iv) or any capital gains on re-transfer of the shares - Held that:- When there was no transfer and the premium estimated by the Assessing Officer at the time original transfer is based on the some future development and events then, there is no question of either any benefit u/s 28(iv) or any capital gains on retransfer of the shares. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed.-
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2011 (10) TMI 702 - ITAT JAIPUR
Payment to DAV Trust being reimbursement for running school in the premises of the assessee is allowable as staff welfare expenses u/s 37 - claim of depreciation on catalyst - deduction u/s 80IA - addition of club expenses - disallowance u/s 43B - disallowance of loss on account of sale of inventory and store items to sister concern made by the AO by invoking the provisions of Section 40A(2)(a) - disallowance of loss on account of revaluation of inventory of two imported pumps - credit of TDS on receipt from IMACID (Morocco)- pre-payment of deferred sales tax liability as capital receipt
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2011 (10) TMI 701 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... completed by the Assessing Officer on 14.3.2001. Thus, the assessee could have made a claim of the arrears of wages during the assessment proceedings for assessment year 1998-99. It did not do so. After more than 8 ½ years, the assessee moved a rectification petition on 26.8.2009. This factual aspect of the case has not been dealt with by the authorities below. The rectification petition moved by the appellant is hopelessly time barred and the same could not have been adjudicated upon by the Assessing Officer. Even otherwise it is quite obvious that a claim which has not been made before the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings cannot give rise to a mistake apparent from the record. In the above view of the matter, we find no merit in the appeal filed by the assessee. We reject all the grounds raised by the assessee. 15. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. 16. Order pronounced in the open court on the 21st day of October, 2011.
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