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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 20 Records
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1951 (4) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
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... ... ..... owers and not for this Court. The function of this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution must be confined to pointing out the true legal position and either quashing the orders or letting those orders stand, as the case may be. It is not for this Court to exercise such powers as are ordinarily exercisable in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The Court, while entertaining an application for a writ like the present, does not act either under its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction. I would therefore allow this application, quash the orders passed by the Courts exercising jurisdiction under the order in question and direct that the application be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of law pointed out above. The applicant is entitled to his costs payable by the opposite parties 2 and 3. Hearing fee ₹ 50. It is also directed that the case be disposed of as quickly as practicable. 13 Hidayatullah J,- I entirely agree.
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1951 (4) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... de under a Rent Control order which ceased to be operative on the expiry of the Defence of India Act. In 'Amrit Lal v. Govt. of Mysore A I R 1951 Karn 26 an offence against a Mysore Food Order, 1949, read with Rule 81, Defence of India Rules, was committed on 22-11-1949, the accused was convicted, on the coming into the Constitution he applied for the quashing of his conviction on the ground that the law for infringing which he was convicted was inconsistent with the Constitution & his application was rejected. 22. Mr. Pathak also raised the question of the validity of Section 2, Defence of India Act. He argued that it was invalid as being delegated legislation. But in view of what a Bench of this Ct., of which I was a member said in 'State v. Basdeo' AIR1951All44 , he did not press his argument but did not also give it up. 23. I allow the application & quash. the proceedings against the applicants. They are discharged & their bail-bonds are cancelled.
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1951 (4) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt held was that if the new business had arisen from the old business then it may be stated that the new business and the old business canstituted only one business and the two businesses were not distinct and separate, and, therefore, both the businesses as one business may be entitled to the relief under Section 25(4). But before us we have a clear and categorical finding that the three businesses of the assessee were distinct businesses and, therefore, it cannot be stated that the relief which was intended for the money-lending business which was carried on by the assessee and which was subjected to tax under the Act of 1918 should be extended to the business of running the ginning factory and the share business which were not in existence and which were not subjected to tax under the Act of 1918. The answer, therefore, to the question put to us will be that the assessee is entitled to the benefit mentioned in Section 25(4) only in respect of his money-lending business.
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1951 (4) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he might be proceeded in contempt by the pltfs. at a later stage. If that is so, then that will be the proper stage for him to raise this question either for relief or of condonation on proper grounds. I do not therefore think I can make any order or I should make any order in respect of the window at this stage. 12. The order, therefore, will be recording of the pltfs. undertaking to the Ct. to put up the pillars as shown in the sanctioned plan attached to the decree & the pltfs. will pay the cost of this appln. to the appct. The key of the said southeasterly portion of the room is admittedly in the hands of the appct. The pltfs undertake to Ct. to commence work or construction of the pillars according to the sanctioned plan within a week from the date of the key being sent by the appct.'s solicitor to the pltf.'s solicitor. Plaintiffs further undertake to this Ct. to finish such construction of pillars within a month from such commencement of the construction.
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1951 (4) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ong discussion on this subject, since whether an application under Section 20, Arbitration Act, becomes a suit or not by virtue of these provisions in the Act, I am of the opinion that such an application is covered by the word 'action'. Before concluding I do not think it would be out of place to remark that this litigation has made it clear that a good deal of time and trouble would be saved to parties and to Courts if Insurance Companies in this country did not merely copy clauses wholesale from English insurance policies, but drew up the conditions of their Policies so as to include only words which have a definite legal meaning in this country. 9. In the circumstances I would accept the appeal with costs and restore the order of the trial Court filing the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 18 of the Policy in Court and directing further proceedings. 10. The parties have been directed to appear in the trial Court on 28-05-1951. G.D. Khosla, J. 11. I agree.
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1951 (4) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT ORISSA
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... ... ..... hat a decree showing the names of all the parties should be drawn up when the executing Court passes an order on a petition under Section 47, Civil P. C. The General Rules and Circular Orders (Civil) of the Orissa High Court do not require the subordinate Courts to prepare decrees in such cases (see Rule 11(1) of Chap. V Part I). Therefore the certified copy of the order appealed against was prepared in the subordinate Court in accordance with the rules in force in this State and it cannot be said that there was any laxity of practice in that Court. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, left to myself, I would have rejected the petition. But my learned brother seems inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner and the case is not of such importance as to justify reference to a third Judge. Consequently I do not think it necessary to express disagreement with the order proposed by him. But with great respect I have to differ from the reasons given in his judgment.
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1951 (4) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... money paid accrued as income within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act. In the present case however the profits arose and accrued by the utilisation of the machinery by the Somasundaram Mills during a period of more than one year. It cannot be seriously contended therefore that the amount received by the assessee is not income; nor can it be contended that it is merely a casual receipt not taxable under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act. It may also be pointed out that the claim of the assessee was not one for damages for retention of the machinery by the Somasundaram Mills but his claim was for compensation for the use of the machinery. The view taken therefore by the Appellate Tribunal, in our opinion, is erroneous and the answer to the question referred to us must be in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the Commissioner of Income-tax has succeeded, the respondent must pay him a sum of ₹ 250 as costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (4) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity from its shareholders and the company has nothing to do with the personality of its shareholders, nor is it concerned as to in whom the shares are vested. 35. Therefore the order we propose to pass on this petition, reversing the order of Shah J. is that the order passed by the Custodian on 28th March 1950, and the notification issued by the Custodian on 28th March 1950, are bad and will be set aside to the extent that they affect the shares of the first petitioner. There will also be a declaration that the shares of the first petitioner have not vested in the Custodian as declared by him by the notification dated 28th March 1950. 36. Considering the fact that the petitioner made an attack on several fronts and has succeeded on one and a rather narrow front, we think the fairest order to make as regards costs, both of the petition and of the appeal, will be that there will be no order as to costs throughout. 37. Liberty to the petitioner to withdraw the amount deposited.
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1951 (4) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e has to be drawn with an arbitrary firmness. This case appears to me to be very much on the border-line, if not, as I tried to show, on the right side of it. My learned brother is very definitely of the opinion that "the amount of rupees two lakhs which was paid by the Bengal Discount Company to the assessee in consideration of the so-called indentures of lease was a taxable income". His decision is in conformity with the decision of the revenue authorities and I do not propose to disturb the status quo unless the circumstances of the case were absolutely compelling and pointed definitely in a contrary direction. I have, therefore, persuaded myself eventually to adopt the answer proposed by my learned brother to the first question as well. The question whether a certain amount is capital receipt or income has always to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the purpose. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (4) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that the award was made without any jurisdiction. A question may be raised that as the hearing of the general issues before the Tribunal commenced at a time when Mr. Aiyar was absent and he had not the opportunity of being present all through the proceedings when arguments of both sides were advanced, there has been an irregularity or illegality in the procedure which vitiates the whole award. A decision on this point would require investigation of various matters which have not been placed before us at the present stage by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants Banks; and I would refrain from expressing any opinion upon it. My conclusion is that the award dated the 31st of July is not void by reason of any lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it. I am, however, of the opinion that the other awards which were made during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar or which were not signed by him must be held to be without jurisdiction. Awards declared void.
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1951 (4) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ls on which the detention order was made." It was further said "Ordinarily, the 'grounds' in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him." This envisages cases in which that would not be enough. It is therefore sufficient for me to say that in a case of this kind, where the matter has to turn on the facts and circumstances of each case, no useful purpose can be served by examining the facts of some other case for use as an analogy. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the grounds supplied were insufficient and the gist of the offending passages should have been supplied. The omission to do so invalidates the detention and each of the detenus is entitled to immediate release. Petitions dismissed.
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1951 (4) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dded to the surplus the assessee is entitled to a deduction in respect of this item also under Rule 3(a) because this amount must be considered to have been reserved for and on behalf of the policy-holders. It stands on the same footing as the sum of ₹ 22,96,068 shown as surplus under the valuation report. The same applies to the sum of ₹ 1,00,000 also added to the surplus. We would therefore answer the questions referred to us as follows - No. 1 in the affirmative. No. 2 in the affirmative. We would re-frame the third question as follows - "Whether the amounts paid to or reserved for or expended on behalf of the policy-holders within the meaning of Rule 3(a) of the Schedule to the Income-tax Act include the expenses incurred by the company for payment of income-tax, or provision for income-tax?" Having re-framed the question thus we would answer the third question in the negative. No order for the costs of the Reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (4) TMI 22 - HYDERABAD, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y as being essential for the life of the community that the State Legislature would be incom- petent to levy tax on such commodity, otherwise not. Therefore the articles in respect of which it is sought to get exemption from the levy of sales tax are not goods which are under the law declared to be essential for the life of the community and hence not exempt from the levy of sales tax. It is well known that exemption under sales tax should be strictly construed and cannot be extended. Analogical principles cannot be invoked for claiming exemption from taxation where such exemption is not specifically provided for. Therefore unless the petitioners can bring the articles for which they claim exemption under any of the items mentioned in the exempted articles under the Sales Tax Act they are not entitled to exemption. In the result the applications for the issue of writs of certiorari fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Applications dismissed.
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1951 (4) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any such exclusion expressly or by necessary implication. When Section 18 of the Act provides that no suit shall be instituted against the State unless the same is done within six months from the date of the act complained of, it necessarily implies that there is no prohibition against the filing of a suit. The section is couched in the negative form but if it is paraphrased and expressed in a positive form, the result comes to this, that a suit can be instituted against the State Government for an act done or purporting to be done under the Act if the same is done within six months from the date of the act complained against. In our opinion this section comes within the category explained by Varadachariar, J., in Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker v. Secretary of State for India in Council(2), and the suits are therefore maintainable. The civil miscellaneous appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed. (1) 1890 I.L.R. 17 Cal. 590. (2) 1935 69 M.L.J. 695 A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 269.
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1951 (4) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts that are prescribed in Section 8. I do not find anywhere in the judgments or in the evidence that has been read out to me that the petitioners come within the scope of Section 8 of the General Sales Tax Act, notwithstanding the fact that they did not obtain licence from the Government for the purpose of carrying on the agency business. If at least there was evidence to the effect that they were acting as commission agents for a fixed remuneration and were at least main- taining accounts of the transactions, then certainly there would have been some material for the courts below to go upon and decide that the petitioners were not really dealers but were merely commission agents. In the absence of any such evidence, I do not think that there is any case made out against the judgments of the courts below. I therefore hold that what the courts below have decided is correct and there are no merits in these petitions. The petitions are therefore dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1951 (4) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court and Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1951 (4) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Company – Incorporation of ... ... ... ... ..... eem to be any necessity to put an end to the agency agreement in toto. It may be that this provision, as pointed out by the learned Advocate General, was enacted for the benefit of the managing agents, as otherwise they would not have been entitled to any remuneration or commission. But there is no reason to put an end to the agreement altogether. As suggested by my Lord the Chief Justice in the course of the arguments, the difficulty can be got over by reading section 15 as terminating the managing agency agreement between the licensee on the one hand and his managing agent or managing director on the other, restricting it in so far as it relates to the undertaking covered by the licence and no more. In this view there is no necessity to hold that section 15 is also invalid. For these reasons, I am of opinion that subject to the modifications mentioned above, the petitions fail and must be dismissed with costs. Rajamannar, C.J. mdash I agree entirely and have nothing to add.
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1951 (4) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... declares that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is entitled where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, before payment of the whole of the purchase money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer for the amount of the purchase money or any part thereof remaining unpaid and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. We are not now concerned with what defence the Province may have to the claim for interest. But the provision in section 51 to which we have referred certainly shows that the claim put forward by the Official Liquidator cannot be frivolous or vexatious. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Judge dismissing the appellant s application. We give sanction to the Official Liquidator to institute the proposed suit. There will be no order as to costs but the Official Liquidator will get his costs of the appeal from the funds of the company.
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1951 (4) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... r is not entitled to get a copy of the test report because there is no provision in the Sea Customs Act for supplying a copy. 14.The Customs Authorities have come forward with the suggestion which is for the first time made in the affidavit in opposition that the flash point of the oil imported by the petitioner as recorded in the certificate of quality is the result of open Cup Test but if Abel s close test is applied it will be 15 F to 20 less. This was disputed by the petitioner in the Affidavit in reply. No opportunity has been given to the petitioner before the orders complained of were made to disprove the suggestion of the Customs Authorities. 15.The fundamentals of fair play have not been observed. In my view there has been denial of natural justice in this case. 16.In the result the petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute and the decisions dated the 9th May, 1950 and 16th June, 1950 are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the present proceedings.
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1951 (4) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... ted out that it is not the practice of the Customs Authorities to give any hearing in such matters, although in the affidavit opposition in the Matter No. 97 of 1950 it is pointed out that in some cases personal hearing is given. If public officials holding posts of responsibility have no regard for fair dealing and consistency the administrative machinery of the Customs department is bound to crumble to pieces in no time. 4. I have no hesitation in holding that there has been a total disregard of the principles of Audi Alterem Partem and a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. For the reasonings given in my judgments in Soorajmull s case (87 C.L.J. 201) and in Matter No. 97 of 1950 (judgment delivered today) I am of the view that this petition should succeed. The rule is accordingly made absolute. The decision dated the 24th April, 1950 and the order dated the 13th-27th May, 1950 are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to costs of the present proceedings.
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