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Showing 21 to 25 of 25 Records
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1953 (5) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah was subject to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court?
Whether Mr. Justice Shah was right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Registrar in refusing registration of the appellants’ mark?
Held that:- So far as the present case is concerned the goods sold under the respondents’ trade mark are well-known and are commonly asked for as II Eagley " or " Eagle ", and the particular feature of the trade mark of the respondents by which the goods are identified and which is associated in the mind of the purchaser is the representation of an Eagle appearing in the trade mark. If the trade mark conveys the idea of an Eagle and if an unwary purchaser is likely to accept the goods of the appellants as answering the requisition for Eagle goods, then undoubtedly the appellants’ trade mark is one which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
It is quite clear that the onus in a passing off action rests on the plaintiff to prove whether there is likelihood of the defendant’s goods being passed off as the goods of the plaintiff. It was not denied that the general get up of the appellants’ trade mark is different from the general get up of the respondents’ trade mark. That being so, it was held by the Madras High Court in the passing off action that on the meager material placed on record by the plaintiffs they had failed to prove that the defendants’ goods could be passed off as the goods of the plaintiffs. The considerations relevant in a passing off action are somewhat different than they are on an application made for registration of a mark under the Trade Marks Act and that being so the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above could not be considered as relevant on the questions that the Registrar had to decide under the provisions of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (5) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the various acts in respect of which the appellants were convicted constituted offences in this area only from the date when Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 was passed or were already so prior thereto?
Held that:- There is therefore no substance in the argument that the amendment of section 21, Indian Penal Code, by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 brought about any change in the situation of the first appellant as a public servant.
(1) The appeal to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the Special Judge was competent; (2) The trial of the appellants under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance No. V of 1949 is not open to objection under article 14 of the Constitution; (3) The criminal law relating to the offences charged against the appellants at the time of their commission was substantially the same as that which obtained at the time of the convictions and sentences by the appellate court. This was so both in respect of offences committed within the limits of the State of Vindhya Pradesh and those committed outside it ; (4) The law relating to the offence committed by the first appellant outside the State of Vindhya Pradesh (at New Delhi) was perfectly within the competence of the appropriate legislative authority at the relevant time; and (5) Consequent on 3 and 4 above, the objection to the convictions and sentences of the appellants ,under article 20 is not sustainable.
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1953 (5) TMI 11 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order which the Commissioner sought to revise. It is difficult for us to say whether the Legislature intentionally sought to circumscribe the right of the dealer or had inadvertently patterned Section 32(2) of the present Act on the old provisions of the Income-tax Act where similar words of limita- tion occurred. There can be no doubt, however, that the resultant effect is the deprivation of a very valuable right of the dealer which has been conceded under similar statutes prevailing in other sister States but these are considerations beyond the purview of this Court and meant for the Legislature itself. In the circumstances, we feel bound to hold that these applications are not maintainable and they must accordingly be dismissed but we are not satisfied that the Sales Tax Department is entitled to any costs of these applications, which the parties will respectively bear themselves. The Rules are discharged. RAM LABHAYA, J.-I agree. DEKA, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1953 (5) TMI 10 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, show that the emphasis is on the element of the transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration in other words, the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, imposed a tax on sales in Bihar, that is, the transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration in Bihar. That being the position, the assessee was not liable to tax on sales which were (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 188 A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 274. effected outside Bihar. The question whether he paid tax in Bengal or not is, in my opinion, irrelevant. We must construe the provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, as they stood during the relevant period, and on that construction the liability of the assessee be determined. For the reasons given above, I would answer the second question in exactly the same way as it has been answered by my learned brother Ramaswami, J. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (5) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in addition to the export-sale and import-purchase, which were held in the previous decision to be covered by the exemption under clause (1)(b), the following two categories of sale or purchase would also fall within the scope of that exemption.
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The last type of transaction in African raw cashew-nuts is where the purchase takes place after the cashew-nuts arrive in Travancore port and are thereafter sold and delivered ex-godown to the respondents. This is clearly a case of intra-State sale and clauses (1)(a) and (2) of the Article can have no application to it. The respondents cannot claim exemption under clause (1)(b) for reasons stated above. As the respondents do not claim any exemption from taxation with res- pect to pre-Constitution purchases, the same need not be discussed separately. For reasons stated above, the decision of the High Court must be upheld only to the extent that the assessments should be quashed. The matter must, however, go back to the Sales Tax Officer who must make a reassessment in the light of the principles laid down in the two previous cases referred to regarding clause (1)(a), the Explanation and clause (2) and in the light of the principles discussed above regarding clause (1)(b).
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