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1955 (5) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... he Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act". 19. The case will, therefore, go back for enquiry and trial with reference only to (1) the allegations in paragraphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of the application for setting aside the election, and (2) the allegations in paragraph 1 of item 1, in Schedule A attached to the application as set out above. 20. The Election Commissioner will now reconstitute an appropriate Tribunal for the purpose. The Tribunal when constituted and before proceedings to trial will call upon the petitioners to rectify the lacuna as to dates in the verification clauses in the petition and the schedule. It is to be hoped that the fresh proceedings before the Tribunal will be disposed of at a very early date. The appeal is allowed as stated above but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1955 (5) TMI 21
... ... ... ... ..... ot been made; Nandaram is said to be the sole karta of the undivided Hindu family and Kashiram only an ordinary member, without any share in managing the property. When he is not in charge of any portion of the joint family property which alone is available for payment of the debt, I cannot see how the question of his doing any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to section 51 can arises at all. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that as Kashiram Agarwalla is not a karta of the joint family and is not said to have charge and control of any part of the joint family property, the Collector has no jurisdiction to recover the arrears in question by his arrest and detention. I would, therefore, make the rule obtained by Kashiram Agarwalla absolute and quash the proceedings pending against him before the Collector. In view of the circumstances of the case, I would order that the parties will bear their own costs. Sailendra Nath Guha Ray, J. - I agree.
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1955 (5) TMI 20
... ... ... ... ..... see which are oppressive. Where, however, moneys are or may become due to a defaulting assessee and express provision is made in the Statute granting power to the Income Tax Officer to proceed against the same, the exercise of such power cannot be said to be oppressive. Mr. Mitra has argued, that a taxing statute should be construed in such a manner as will work the least possible hardship to the assessee. This statement of the law is quite correct, but where an express power is conferred by statute it is not open to the Courts to interpret it in such a manner as to take away that power. I am unable, therefore, to hold that because of the pendency of the certificate proceedings, the Income Tax Officer was not entitled to proceed under the provisions of Section 46 (5A) of the Income Tax Act. 23. The result is that all the points put forward have failed and the petition must be dismissed. The rule is discharged and all interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (5) TMI 19
... ... ... ... ..... oint Hindu family even though the person concerned became qualified to become a director only because the share of the joint Hindu family were placed at his disposal. These authorities are not relevant to the decision of this case, for the joint family property in those cases was not put in jeopardy for the purpose of earning the remuneration of the directors. In the present case. Shil Chandra deposited valuable securities with the bank which could have been completely lost to the joint Hindu family. It cannot be said, therefore, that the income derived by Shil Chandra was derived without detriment to the family property. For these reasons, I would declare (1) that the emoluments received by Shil Chandra as treasurer of the bank are assessable under the head "Profits and gains of business" and (2) that Shil Chandra's emoluments as treasurer were rightly assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of which he is the karta. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (5) TMI 18
... ... ... ... ..... tt did not press the claim of the plaintiff with respect to the land mentioned in schedule I, annexure A, as being its yearly tenant on account of its having been acquired by the State of Bihar, it is not necessary in this appeal either to confirm or set aside the decree of the lower Court with respect to the said land. Any decree with respect to this land will be inexecutable as neither the plaintiff nor the appellants can go to take possession over it. The dispute between the plaintiff and the appellants with respect to the said land will be deemed to have come to an end in this litigation. The decree for issue of permanent injunction passed by the Court below in respect of the electric under taking at Giridih with its assets is also confirmed. Thus, subject to the modification with regard to the question of title to the land as stated above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circum stances of this case, however, the parties will bear their own costs of this Court.
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1955 (5) TMI 17
... ... ... ... ..... t the excluded partners were entitled to the benefit of the renewal of the lease obtained by the other partners, they did not grant a decree for accounts but simply held that a valuation should be placed on the renewed lease and this valuation was to be treated as part of the assets of the dissolved partnership. Applying this to the present case it would mean that the value of the selling agency would have to be calculated and the plaintiff's share of this value given to him on settlement if accounts on the dissolution of partnership, which would virtually amount to a payment of liquidated damages. However, as I have said above, I am of the opinion that Deva Sharma did not render himself accountable in any way under Section 88 of the Trusts Act, and my answer to the third question therefore is in the negative. Khosla, J. 43. In accordance with the opinion given by Falshaw J. this appeal must be allowed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. Kapur, J. 44. I agree.
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1955 (5) TMI 16
... ... ... ... ..... dings in the course of which the penalty proceedings came to be initiated. The assessee has to be given notice under sub-section (3) and has to be heard and finally the penalty may be levied, notwithstanding that at the date of the actual order of levy the proceedings in the course of which the concealment etc. took place had terminated. In the present case, all the notices have been issued by the Income-tax Officer when the matter was pending before him. The fact that by the date of the hearing of the assessee under section 28(3) or of the actual order levying the penalty under section 28(1) the assessment proceedings had terminated is wholly irrelevant and does not affect the validity of the penalties levied against the assessee. These writ petitions therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. In view of the nature of question raised which made it necessary for the Advocate-General to appear, we fix the fee payable to counsel at ₹ 350 for all the petitions together.
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1955 (5) TMI 15
... ... ... ... ..... t question to be considered is whether the expenditure was incurred by the assessee solely and exclusively for his business. There cannot however be any serious dispute as regards this matter and indeed even the Tribunal did not hold against the assessee on this head. The business of the assessee was as a transport operator. He expanded his business by expenditure of new capital which resulted in the acquisition of the five buses with their route permits. The cost of acquisition was of course expenditure of a capital nature. But to assert the rights to this business which he acquired, he incurred the expenses in dispute. If that expenditure was not of a capital but of a revenue nature, it was certainly laid out for his business and solely and exclusively for it. This question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs in this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (5) TMI 14
... ... ... ... ..... hat there should be an apportionment on the basis that three rights were surrendered and released in consideration of the payment of ₹ 28,799, namely, (1) giving up the right to 50 per cent. of the profits. The amount apportionable to this item would be a revenue receipt. (2) The surrender of the right to royalty and (3) the surrender of preemption right. The consideration received for the surrender of these latter two items of rights would be a capital receipt not assessable to tax. The Appellate Tribunal should apportion the sum received to these three items and on that basis determine the assessable portion of the same. Our answer to the question referred is that the sum of ₹ 28,779 represents not merely remuneration for services rendered but also other items of a capital nature and cannot therefore be wholly treated as a revenue receipt..... As neither side wholly succeeded in this reference, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (5) TMI 13
... ... ... ... ..... ould not be given retrospective effect. No concrete case, however, came up before the Financial Commissioner in revision and as such no judicial pronouncement on the subject could be made. The intention of the Government is quite clear from the ex- emption granted by it and there is absolutely no doubt that persian wheels are agricultural implements. The fact that a specific exemption was granted in the case of this article by the Government does not take away from the Financial Commissioner the power of putting the correct interpretation on the term under dispute for the period prior to the date on which the said exemption was granted. I, therefore, declare that Persian wheels and their parts sold for bona fide agricultural pur- poses are to be treated as agricultural implements within the meaning of the term agricultural implements exempted under item No. 35 of the Schedule of Exemptions. The re-assessment in the present case shall be made accordingly. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (5) TMI 12
Charges – Registration of and Rectification of register of ... ... ... ... ..... tgages and charges require registration under section 120 of the Indian Companies Act. The learned Advocate-General requested me to leave it open whether or not the mortgages, charges and instruments at all required registration and I accordingly leave that question open. Of course if the mortgages do not require registration under section 109 of the Indian Companies Act, the application under section 120 is not maintainable. The application is dismissed. This order is without prejudice to the question whether or not the several mortgages, charges and instruments referred to in the petition at all require registration under section 109 of the Indian Companies Act and this court does not adjudge on that question. In the special circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs against the applicant. The liquidator will retain his costs out of the assets. Certified for counsel. I consider it to be a special case and I allow Mr. Banerjee fees as if he is an advocate.
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1955 (5) TMI 11
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... aragraph 1557 at page 772. It runs as follows The court may and often does impose conditions on its sanction to a scheme. This sentence may be an authority enabling a court to modify a scheme in the absence of a prohibition. But when an express prohibition has been made the case is different. As remarked earlier, the consent of the unsecured creditor was given on the understanding that the scheme, as passed by them, was not to be modified by the court. Had they known that the scheme would be modified, they might have withheld their consent. Moreover, the points on which I am asked to modify the scheme are not minor matters but are fundamental questions which materially affect the parties. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no one scheme on which all parties are agreed and the points of difference are such as cannot be reconciled. There is thus no workable scheme to which sanction can be accorded. The application, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
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