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1955 (7) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... ence to the grant to Kasim Ali Beg, (2) that the form of the transaction as a lease of land in which the operative words "were to demise, let and farm let" did not detract from the transactions being a grant and (3) that the subsequent conduct of the lessee and his tenants in invoking the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act on the footing that the village was an estate would throw light upon the nature of the tenure created by the lease. Our discussion of the case would show that the Tribunal committed a patent error in respect of all these three matters. If their conclusion had been reached on the basis of such erroneous premises which go to the root of the matter, we are clear that the case is one not merely of an erroneous decision but of error on the face of the record which would attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1955 (7) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... stock of descent under this system who is past the child-bearing age which is fixed at 50 and a female who is capable of bringing into existence new members. 176. We do not see anything irrational either in fixing the critical age at 50, or in the provisions consequent upon the condition of such a female member. A similar attack is made on the distinction between the provisions in sub-s. (4) and that in sub-s. (5) and the devolution prescribed in the latter provision. But all these were part of the system which the enactment has merely adopted and rationalised. We do not see therefore any substance in this objection that S. 35 or S. 36 violates' Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result, we are clearly of the opinion that the impugned provisions of the Madras Aliyasathana Act are valid in their entirety. The records, will be transmitted to the Sub-ordinate Judge of South Kanara who will dispose of the suits in the light of our decision. V.S.B 177. Answer accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 34
... ... ... ... ..... s a case of escapement of tax and proceeding under Section 26 of that Act. 8. In the present case, as I have pointed out, the assessment proceedings had not come to an end. The return was still pending. Whether it was pending before the territorial Income Tax Officer or the Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, is immaterial so far as the assessee is concerned. He had filed a return and an assessment could have been made by the department under Section 23 in pursuance of that return. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that the income chargeable to Income Tax had escaped assessment, and therefore, the Income Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 34 of the Act. 9. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the negative and hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessment under Section 34 is not valid. The assessee is entitled to his costs. 10. Hearing fee one hundred rupees. S.P. Mohapatra, J. 11. I agree.
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1955 (7) TMI 33
... ... ... ... ..... transfer or settlement as disclosed by the partnership deeds. Only we wish to add that if we had reached a conclusion favourable to the assessee on the construction of section 16(1)(c) and we are inclined to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in D.R. Shahapure's case (supra)we would have directed the Tribunal to take these documents into consideration and submit a better statement of the case, with reference to the conclusions to be drawn on the nature of the property or asset, which was the subject matter of the disposition. But in view of the conclusion we have reached on the construction of section 16(1)(c) even on the footing that the transfer in the present case satisfied the requirements of the third proviso we do not find it necessary to refer the case back to the Tribunal. The result is that the question which has been referred to this Court for its decision has to be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs.
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1955 (7) TMI 32
... ... ... ... ..... 953 23 I.T.R. 278. It follows quite clearly that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has powers to set aside the entire assessment and remand the case directing the Income-tax Officer to make fresh assessment after making such further enquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct. On receiving the cases on remand the Income-tax Officer has powers to make fresh assessment as directed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to determine afresh the amounts of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment. Therefore, the director of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to make fresh assessment by including the sum of ₹ 64,000 in the amount of tax payable was perfectly legal and valid. I, therefore, answer the question in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The Income-tax Department is entitled to their costs. Hearing fee ₹ 200 only. DAS, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 31
... ... ... ... ..... icated, once the detention becomes unlawful, it cannot later become lawful on the grounds being communicated but would remain unlawful notwithstanding the communication. 35. I agree with my learned brother that the applicant's detention is illegal, because he was not informed of the reasons for his arrest as soon as it was possible to do so and that he should be forthwith released from custody. There is no question of our quashing the proceedings pending against him, because whether he has done the act alleged to have been done by him and whether it amounts to an offence punishable under Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act are questions which will be decided during the trial and cannot be decided in advance of it. It may be that the applicant's freedom will be short-lived because he can be arrested again and detained after full compliance with the provisions of Article 22(1), but that would be no ground for our not releasing him from the present unlawful detention.
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1955 (7) TMI 30
... ... ... ... ..... s of this case we must hold that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The order passed by the learned Principal Judge that the plaint should be re-turned to the plaintiffs to be presented to the proper Court will be set aside. Since on the merits the learned Principal Judge has stated that if his view was wrong on the question of jurisdiction he would have passed the decree which he has set out in the record, we will pass that decree because there is no dispute that the learned Judge's judgment was right on the merits. The decree therefore will be in favour of the plaintiffs for ₹ 4,000 and interest at 4 per cent on ₹ 4,000 from the date of the suit till judgment. The decree will be against defendant No. 1 and against defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to the extent of their interests in the joint family property, and costs of the suit and interest on judgment at 4 per cent. The appellants will also have the costs of this ap peal. Order accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 29
... ... ... ... ..... unce any opinion either on the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee, that, in any event, only a pronouncement of a High Court which had preceded the assessment, which pronouncement had been overlooked by the Income-tax Officer in the relevant assessment years, could at all be brought within the scope of section 34. Our answer to the first question is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, the Patna decision referred to in this question did not satisfy the requirement of section 34. We answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee, though the reason formulated in the question itself, that the department had hitherto treated such income as exempt from income-tax, is not what affects the validity of the proceedings under section 34 of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Questions answered in favour of the assessee.
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1955 (7) TMI 28
... ... ... ... ..... ture can be lawfully deducted from the income liable for assessment, the burden will shift on the assessee and if there is any ambiguity in the construction of the various clauses of section 6 or of the rules made under that section, a construction in favour of the State should be made. 14. I would therefore hold that in clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of rule 3 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Rules, descendants in the male line of the present proprietor were designedly omitted and that the maintenance allowance given to the son of the present proprietor cannot be taken as a permissible deduction merely because that son also happens to be the grandson of the previous proprietor within the meaning of that clause. The answer to the question raised by the Member, Board of Revenue, is therefore in the negative. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The petitioner should pay hearing fee of ₹ 100 to the Department. MOHAPATRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 27
... ... ... ... ..... ey which is proposed to be spent for the widow but not actually spent. We may in this connexion refer to the meaning of the word "maintenance" given in Iyer's Law Lexicon, 1940 Edition, page 767 "Maintenance also means of subsistence, supply of necessaries and conveniences; aid, support, assistance; the support which one person who is bound by law to do so, gives to another for his living. (Bouvier L. Dict.)" For the above reasons, the second question is answered that a further sum of ₹ 4,505-14-0 spent by the assessee on the subsistence, supply of necessaries and conveniences for the lady and transferred to the maintenance allowance of the lady constitutes maintenance allowance within the meaning of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947. 11. The reference is disposed of accordingly. The assessee is entitled to costs of this Court. Hearing fee is assessed at one hundred rupees (Rs. 100). MISRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 26
... ... ... ... ..... e their decisions can only be upset on appeal if they have been positively wrong in law. The court is not a second opinion, where there is reasonable ground for the first. But there is no reason to make a mystery about the subjects that commissioners deal with or to invite the courts to impose any exceptional restraints upon themselves because they are dealing with cases that arise out of facts found by commissioners. Their duty is no more than to examine those facts with a decent respect for the tribunal appealed from and if they think that the only reasonable conclusion on the facts found is inconsistent with the determination come to, to say so without more do. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. LORD TUCKER. My Lords, I agree, for the reasons which have been stated, that this appeal should be allowed. LORD SOMERVELL OF HARROW. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading the opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Radcliffe, in which I concur. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (7) TMI 25
... ... ... ... ..... st the said decision confirmed by the Tribunal, the Revenue did not prefer any revision contending that the abovesaid entire collection represented only the tax leviable on the sale effected by the assessee, if it were a taxable sale and that hence the penalty could be levied under section 22(2) of the Act on the said entire collection itself. Only the assessee preferred revision against the abovesaid decision of the Tribunal confirming that of the lower authorities and we saw no reason to interfere with the said decision of the Tribunal therein, under section 38 of the Act. Therefore, we also point out that there is actually no inconsistency between the said our order in T.C. (R) Nos. 7 and 8 of 1989 (Speed-Away Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 1997 106 STC 367 supra) and the present order in this T.C.(R) No. 82 of 1989. 11.. The net result is, no interference is called for by this Court in the present case. Accordingly the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (7) TMI 24
... ... ... ... ..... the Schedule. 11. The scheme of taxation in all countries shows that only certain commodities are selected for the imposition of sales tax. It has not been contended before this that any discrimination results from the taxation of one article as against another. If the argument is carried to its extreme, every sale transaction will have to be taxed, and also equally, before sales tax can be imposed on any commodity. Such taxing measures imposing sales tax on selected commodities and not on others cannot be regarded as discrimination between one dealer and another. We do not think that there is any discrimination when betel leaves are sought to be taxed and vegetables are exempted. (1) 1952 3 S.T.C. 143 A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 378. 12.. In our opinion, the petition has no force and must be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss it with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. The petitioner shall be entitled to a refund of the outstanding amount of the security deposited by him. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (7) TMI 23
... ... ... ... ..... hority was justified in assuming that these stocks must have been received and sold by the petitioner. This contention on behalf of the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected. In the result, we remit the Tax Revision Case to the Appellate Tribunal to give an opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence as to whether the purchase of the railway receipts sought to be charged to tax falls within the explanation to Article 286(1)(a). There will also be a direction to the Tribunal that in arriving at the estimate of gross profits it should give full opportunity to the assessee to place any relev- ant material on the point and the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, remit the case to the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer for making a fresh assess- ment after taking such further evidence as is furnished by the assessee or the department. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner on points (1) and (4) having failed, there will be no order as to costs. Ordered according.
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1955 (7) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... f the appeal. (1) 1953 23 I.T.R. 464. Even on the supposition that the delay had been condoned, their Lord- ships observed as follows But it is open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, having taken the view at the intermediate stage under section 30(2) that delay should be condoned, and having admitted the appeal, to revise his decision and, when the appeal comes on for hearing under section 31 to take a different view and dismiss the appeal on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay . The facts in the present case, however, are not similar to those in that case, as here no notice to show cause why the delay should be condoned was issued to the assessee. We think that it was open to the Collector of Sales Tax to decide after hearing the applicants that their application should be rejected as time-barred. 3.. We, accordingly, see no reason to interfere with the order of the Collector, and this application is dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1955 (7) TMI 21
... ... ... ... ..... nnot realise the tax from the petitioners. The Department was also proceeding with the levy of the tax against the petitioners keeping pending the direction of this Court to state a case for the decision of this Court. O.J.C. No. 35 of 1954 is therefore allowed and the opposite parties therein are directed not to proceed with the certificate cases against the petitioners for realisation of the tax. The petitioners shall have their costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100. The petitioners are also entitled to a refund of the tax paid as also a refund of the court-fee paid. For the same reasons, O.J.C. No. 36 of 1954 is also allowed and the opposite parties therein are directed not to proceed with the certificate cases against the petitioners for realisation of the tax. The petitioners shall have their costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100. The petitioners are also entitled to a refund of the tax paid as also a refund of the court- fee paid. PANIGRAHI, C.J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 20
... ... ... ... ..... s to which it was subjected, was altered, nor can it be said that after such processing it ceased to be cloth. Even after the processing, the elements required in order that the cloth might be medium cloth within the meaning of entry 11 were still present. That being so, it is difficult for us to agree with the view taken by the Collector of Sales Tax. We think that however stiff or non-porous or highly moisture resisting article it may have become by its being subjected to the process of bleaching, dyeing, starching and calendering, it did not lose the essential attributes which originally brought it under entry 11, viz., its being cloth in which the count of warp yarn employed (excluding the border) is 17s or finer but is less than 35s. The view taken by the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax was correct. 3.. We, accordingly, allow the application, set aside the order of the Collector of Sales Tax and restore that of the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax. Application allowed.
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1955 (7) TMI 19
... ... ... ... ..... only a continua- tion of the procedure prescribed by sub-rules (3) and (4). The rule may not be happily worded but, when it says that the Commercial Tax Officer shall satisfy himself whether the returns filed are correct and complete, it can only mean when the returns are filed. It can even be held that the word complete is comprehensive enough to take in a case where all the monthly returns are not filed. When the liability is clear and the duty on the part of the Commercial Tax Officer to assess is also not in doubt, we think sub-rule (5) can reasonably be construed, without doing violence to the language, as being intended to cover all the cases contemplated by rules 3 and 4. In this view, the assessment made at (1) (1933) I.L.R. 57 Mad. 237 1 I.T.R. 289. one point of time is valid as the assessment was based only on monthly returns and in the manner provided by rule 4. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (7) TMI 18
... ... ... ... ..... only a continua- tion of the procedure prescribed by sub-rules (3) and (4). The rule may not be happily worded but, when it says that the Commercial Tax Officer shall satisfy himself whether the returns filed are correct and complete, it can only mean when the returns are filed. It can even be held that the word complete is comprehensive enough to take in a case where all the monthly returns are not filed. When the liability is clear and the duty on the part of the Commercial Tax Officer to assess is also not in doubt, we think sub-rule (5) can reasonably be construed, without doing violence to the language, as being intended to cover all the cases contemplated by rules 3 and 4. In this view, the assessment made at (1) (1933) I.L.R. 57 Mad. 237 1 I.T.R. 289. one point of time is valid as the assessment was based only on monthly returns and in the manner provided by rule 4. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (7) TMI 17
... ... ... ... ..... tion itself does not establish proper service and it was quite in order for the accused to put forward the contention in question on the basis of the prosecution case put forward by them. It is also urged that the assessee had accepted the service as suffi- cient and had preferred an appeal from the order of assessment. There is no material to show that there was any such acceptance by the assessee, nor can it be inferred from his preferring an appeal from the assessment order. In preferring an appeal he was only availing him- self of a remedy which was open to him and that step could not imply his acceptance of the service of notice. Proper service of the notices under rule 28 not having been effected in this case and such service being the foundation for any penal action under section 15(b) of the Act, it follows that the prosecution has to fail. The decision of the learned Sessions Judge must, therefore, be up- held. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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