Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1956 1956 (8) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 3 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 41 to 46 of 46 Records

• 1956 (8) TMI 32 - PATNA HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... unconstitutional to the extent that it makes the imposition of forfeiture retrospective in operation. I further hold that the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Purnea, had no authority to order the forfeiture of the sales tax collected by the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 2,11,222 and odd and the order of the Superintendent of Sales Tax dated the 10th of February, 1955, directing the petitioner to deposit the amount in the Government Treasury is legally invalid. In my opinion, a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings taken against the petitioner under section 14A of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and also to quash the order of the Superintendent of Sales Tax dated the 10th of February, 1955, forfeiting the amount of sales tax and directing the petitioner to deposit it in the Government Treasury. I accordingly allow the application with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.

  ---

• 1956 (8) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
  

  Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of and Registered office of company

  ---

• 1956 (8) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Director – Disclosure of interest by

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... h these situations, what is aimed at is the avoidance of a director who has a personal interest in a transaction of the company from getting the board of directors to agree to it without informing the co-directors of his interest and by taking part in the voting. It is this conflict between the personal or self interest of the director and his duty to the company to render independent and un-biassed advice, that is the mischief, which these provisions are intended to remedy. Viewed thus it would be clear that in the present case the resolutions of the board constitute but a delegation of the power of the board to certain of their members and there is no element of personal interest involved in it so as to give room for any conflict between interest and duty and therefore no violation of section 91B. The order of the Magistrate acquitting the accused in these three prosecutions are therefore correct and the appeals are rejected under section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

  ---

• 1956 (8) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Winding up – Fraudulent preference

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... f this section. Moreover the official liquidator stated in his counter affidavit, The (second) respondent was specifically informed by my letter dated 5th March, 1953, that he was being admitted as a creditor only subject to this fraudulent preference. The second respondent has acknowledged the same by his reply dated 20th March, 1953. In the circumstances, I find it difficult to see how any estoppel arises. On the evidence I am inclined to conclude that this transaction was put through only after the presentation of the winding up petition. It is, therefore, void. I would also set it aside on the ground that it amounts to a fraudulent preference. This means that Veerappa Chettiar will pay the full amount due from him to the bank with interest at the contract rate. Lakshmi Achi will, of course, be entitled to rank as an ordinary creditor in respect of the money due to her on her fixed deposit. The respondents will pay the official liquidator his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 690.

  ---

• 1956 (8) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Prosecution

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... . Their Lordships laid down further When such a breach is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate hellip Apparently the learned counsel relied upon this principle to support his contention that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition. But, as I have held, he failed to establish that the third respondent was doing anything illegal, anything prohibited by the statute in conducting the investigation with which he has been entrusted. The writ asked for is one of prohibition. If the third respondent had jurisdiction to undertake and continue the investigation, the writ asked for cannot issue. The third respondent has that jurisdiction. This application fails. The rule is discharged and this petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

  ---

• 1956 (8) TMI 7 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Notice for meeting

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... his petition. Their contention also was that by two resolutions of the board of directors in May-June, 1954, it was decided that the director s meeting should be held on the first Saturday of every month at 10-30 a.m., and that those resolutions were duly served on Kalairaja Chettiar mdash a fact which Mr. Nambiar was not prepared to controvert. But he contended that any such intimation of meetings for all times would not be in conformity with the requirements of section 286 of the Companies Act. But that section does not prescribe the form of the notice or the mode of its service, and if the directors are duly informed that in future the meetings would be held on the first Saturday of every month, we fail to see why it should not be a sufficient compliance of the statute. In our opinion, therefore, the circumstances of this case do not call for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other writ or direction, and we accordingly dismiss this petition with costs (separate sets).

  ---

123