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1957 (11) TMI 37 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s offered by Prabhakar and Co. The amount of damages will be calculated and awarded accordingly. The parties will file a memo of calculation on this basis. 19. As regards Rs. 715-8-0 claimed as compensation for the delay in the completion of the work. P.W. 1 himself says that it is sought to be recovered as a penalty. There is absolutely no evidence to show that any loss or injury was caused to the plaintiff on account of the delay. It Is well settled that Courts will give damages for breach of contract only by way of compensation for loss suffered and not by way of punishment. We therefore disallow the plaintiff's claim for Rs. 715-8-0 as it is clearly a penalty. 20. In the result the appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above, with proportionate costs in this Court. As regards costs in the lower court the defendant will pay the plaintiff costs proportionate to the amount decreed to the plaintiff. The lower Court's order as to costs will be modified accordingly.
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1957 (11) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al working as envisaged by the learned Advocate General several unlocked for developments, may arise clogging rather than facilitating the speedy winding up. It is a question of balance of convenience and inconvenience. As the French proverb has it "We cannot make an omelette without breaking or scrambling a few eggs." parliament has considered that the balance of convenience lay in centralising in the company Court the disposal of all these claims by or against a Banking company, relating to winding up. It is not for us to legislate but only to declare the law. Therefore, this contention can have no bearing on the decision of these appeals. 21. In the result, the conclusions of both the courts below are correct and these second appeals have got to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with costs of the second respondent (Mr. Chary). Advocate fee ₹ 500 to be divided among the appellants. Costs of respondent 1 to come out of the estate. Leave asked and granted.
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1957 (11) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... con-text, in which that declaration was made, the above meaning can be attached to it. Really, what was intended by the learned Subordinate Judge appears to be that, as the property was defendant No. 2's, the plaintiff was entitled to attach it as his (defendant No. 2's) property. That also follows from the declaration, properly made, that defendant No. 1 was defendant No. 2's benamdar for that property and the dismissal of her claim, also properly, made The effect would, necessarily, be revival of the attachment before judgment subject, of course, to the remedies, if any, of the defendants of the Money Suit to have it cancelled or set aside in accordance with law. We do not think that anything more was meant by the learned Subordinate Judge by the declaration, to which exception has been taken by Dr. Sen Gupta, as stated above. 17. In the above view, we dismiss this appeal with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at 30 gold mohurs. P.K. Sarkar, J. 18. I agree.
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1957 (11) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ute was enacted. Under a certain Act, an accused was liable to enhanced punishment in the case of a second or subsequent conviction and it was held that previous convictions even though recorded before the Act came into force could be taken into consideration; In re Frederick Austin 1912 8 Cri App Rep 169 (N). Under a regulation come into force after the offence in question had been committed enhanced punishment was provided for the offence and In re Frank Ephraim Oliver (1942) 29 Cri App Rep 137 (O), it was held that the accused was liable to enhanced punishment. Similarly under the Amendment Act, the District Judge has the power now to revise an order of the Court of Small Causes even though it was passed before the Amendment Act came into force. 12. This application for the reasons stated cannot be granted by this Court now and must be rejected. No order about costs. Mirza Nasir Ullah Beg, J. 13. I agree. BY THE COURT 14. We dismiss this application. No orders about costs.
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1957 (11) TMI 33 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ounsel for the appellant and Mr. K.L. Kapur counsel for the Punjab & Sind Bank, Limited, have stated before me today that the parties have settled the dispute and in case the appeal is to be allowed the insurance money may be divided between the Bank and the appellant in the ratio of 75 per cent, and 25 per cent, respectively and decrees passed accordingly in favour of the appellant for ₹ 24,500/- and in favour of the Punjab and Sind Bank, Limited for ₹ 73,500/- against the Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Limited. 22. In the result, I pass a decree in favour of the appellant, Messrs. Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath, for ₹ 24,500/- against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and I also pass a decree for ₹ 73,500/- in favour of the Punjab" and Sind Bank, Limited, Dehradun, against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 23. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The costs of the appellant shall be borne by respondent No. 1.
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1957 (11) TMI 32 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncome of the previous year with reference to the income so assessed and a refund of the excess tax, if any, already paid. If the Income-tax Officer has to take action in this manner for granting this relief, it stands to reason that a time limit should be imposed for a claim to be made in that behalf, as the task of making a proper assessment for the relevant period might become increasingly difficult with the lapse of time." It is possible to conceive of cases where it may not be to the advantage of the assessee to make the claim. That is why he is given the option to make it or not. It is not alleged that the petitioner made a claim within the period of one year. Therefore, he did not exercise his option within the time limited by sub-section (5) of section 25 of the Act. Accordingly, his claim could not be recognised by the Officer and was rightly rejected. The petitioner is not entitled to the relief he asks for in this petition. The petition is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (11) TMI 31 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in that sub-section as have not expired, by instalments which may be revised according to the proviso to sub-section (2)"; and sub-section (8) of section 18A "Where, on making the regular assessment, the Income-tax Officer finds that no payment of tax has been made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, interest calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section (6) shall be added to the tax as determined on the basis of the regular assessment." It is admitted that the provisions of sub-section (3) have not been complied with and it is evident from sub-section (8) that the Income-tax Officer had the duty to add to the tax interest calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section (6). The failure to discharge this duty in Exhibit D is, a I understand it, nothing more or other than an obvious error apparent from the record of the assessment. 8. Such being my conclusion this petition should fail and has to be dismissed. Judgment accordingly.
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1957 (11) TMI 30 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for, chips and ballast, and that the same quarries produce stones which may be of rectangular shape or of some other regular dimensions and they also produce stones of irregular shapes which are used for the purpose of manufacturing chips and ballast. We may point out that these are matters of fact into which we do not wish to and cannot possibly enter for the purpose of deciding the present application. If the contention of the petitioners is that the charge of royalty on these stones cannot be equitably based on any such distinction as is sought by the State to be enforced, and that the levy of royalty on chips and ballast is altogether unreasonable or unconscionable and out of all proportion to the market value thereof we leave it to the petitioners to represent the matter to the State or to have it 'fought out in regular courts of law. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, we find that there is no force in this application, and, consequently, we dismiss it with costs.
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1957 (11) TMI 29 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ukayya, 1941 Mad WN 775 (AIR 1042 Mad 30) CE). Undoubtedly the facts of this case are somewhat similar to the facts of the present case. But in the Madras case the learned Judge was not required to interpret the effect of Section 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The decision rested on other considerations and hence is of no assistance. 11. It is unnecessary for me to decide finally the last contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the mutual dealings between the insolvent and the respondent got themselves adjusted as on the date of insolvency. It is true that the relevant date for working out the mutual dealings is the date of insolvency. But it is difficult to accept his contention that there was any adjustment on the date of the insolvency. There is no support for this contention either from the wording of the section or from any decided case. In the result this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 12. Revision petition dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 28 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... terised as being confidential in section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act and to obtain certified copies thereof under section 76 of the Evidence Act. I am also of the opinion that apart from the assessee such documents cannot be produced in evidence by any other person unless they come within the exceptions laid down in sub-section (3) of section 54 of the Income-tax Act. In that view of the matter, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified and must be upheld. Moreover, the petitioner has not made any statement in her revision application as to how she could obtain the copies and as to how, in fact, she was entitled to use them. It is not stated what interest she had in the shop during the lifetime of her husband who, as already stated, was alleged to be a working partner in that shop. In that view of the matter also, the application has to fail. The result, therefore, is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs. V. Ramaswami, C.J.-I agree.
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1957 (11) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iring Board of Directors. The petitioner's proposal was seconded and thereafter unanimously passed. The petitioner is, therefore, estopped from saying that the three persons, who were proposed by him and on whose proposal they were elected members of the new Board, could not be re-elected without the previous approval of the Registrar. This contention, therefore must be rejected. 38. For the reasons given above, all the contentions raised by Mr. A.B.N. Sinha fail, and accordingly, the rule is discharged. 39. In the result, the application fails, as no case has been made out for issuing any writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against any of the opposite party. The election of the official Chairman, opposite party 3, on the 8th May, 1956, is therefore, held to be valid and legal, and not Invalid as alleged by the petitioner. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner will pay ₹ 200/- as costs to opposite party 1. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 40. I agree.
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1957 (11) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... doubt the office prepared a draft of the notice only on October 10, 1955, which after being approved by the members of the Tribunal was despatched on the same day. The order in the notes paper dated October 7, 1955, was in my judgment the initiation of the penalty proceedings. To "initiate" means "to originate" or "to take the first step", and even if the paragraph in the order under section 33(4) which I have extract is not itself the initiation or the first step in the proceedings, the direction to the office to issue a notice on October 7, 1955, was certainly such a step. The terms of section 28(1) were thus satisfied and the order impugned was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In this view I have not considered it necessary to deal with the other contentions which Mr. Rama Rao Sahib urged in support of the legality of the impugned order. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... determine what operated in the mind of a particular officer. The real hurt does not lie in any of those things but in the consequences that follow and, in my judgment, the protections of Art. 311 are not against harsh words but against hard blows. It is the effect of the order alone that matters ; and in my judgment, Art. 311 applies whenever any substantial evil follows over and above a purely "contractual one". I do not think the article can be evaded by saying in a set of rules that a particular consequence is not a punishment or that a particular kind of action is not intended to operate as a penalty. In my judg- ment, it does not matter whether the evil consequences are one of the "penalties" prescribed by the rules or not. The real test is, do they in fact ensue as a consequence of the order made ? I would allow the appeal with costs. BY THE COURT.-In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vind Sahai and Bhagwan Sahai acquired no rights as hereditary tenants under s. 29(a) of the U. P.Tenancy Act. In Jai Singh v. Munshi Singh (supra), relied on for the respondents, it was held that " the agricultural lease granted by the mortgagee in favour of Jai Singh was a lease granted in the ordinary course of management ", and that, accordingly, the tenant acquired the rights of a here- ditary tenant. That decision has no application when the lease is, as held by us, not a prudent transaction binding on the mortgagors. In this view, the questions raised by Mr. Sinha on the construction of s. 30(6) and s 11 of the Act and s. 15 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, do not arise for decision. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed 996 by the Board is set aside, and that of the Revenue Officer, Meerut affirmed by the Commissioner, restored. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellants throughout, including the costs of the remand. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (11) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng this test, even if we accept the contention of the appellant that the impugned Act is bad, that would not finally dispose of the suit, as there are other issues, which have to be tried. We are clearly of opinion that the appeal is not competent under Art. 132, and the fact that a certificate has been given does not alter the position. It is said that the certificate is also under Art. 133, but under that article also, an appeal lies Only against judgments, decrees or final orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect of an interlocutory finding. o p /o p The result is that this appeal must be dismissed, as not maintainable. We should add by way of abundant caution that as we express no opinion on the correctness of the decision under appeal, this order will not preclude the appellant from claiming such rights as he may have, in appropriate proceedings which he may take. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1957 (11) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, is a notional assessee and the beneficiary is the real assessee. Section 41(2) makes the position further clear that even where there is a receiver, there may be a direct assessment on the beneficiaries or there may be a direct recovery from the beneficiaries although the assessment was in the name of the receiver. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the applicant is not an assessee or a person liable to pay under the Income-tax Act the demand made and to satisfy the certificate. I need only conclude by saying that the applicant did not exhaust the remedies provided in the Public Demands Recovery Act. He did go before the certificate officer who rejected his prayer. But then he did not go in appeal to the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue as provided in the Public Demands Recovery Act. For these reasons this application is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Constitution came into force, and as against the right claimed by the plaintiffs under Art. 26(b), the Government put forward the rights of the Hindu public under Art. 25 (2)(b). There has been a full trial of the issues involved, and a decision has been given, declaring the rights of the appellants and of the public. When the appellants applied for leave to appeal to this Court, that application was resisted by the Government inter alia on the ground that the decree of the High Court was a proper decree recognising the rights of all sections of the public. In view of this, there is no force in the objection that the public are not, as such, parties to the suit. It is their rights that have been agitated by the Government and not any of its rights. In the result, both the appeal and the application for special leave to appeal must be dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. The appellants will take their costs out of the temple funds. Appeals Dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... whose subject-matter was the prescription regarding assessment and collection of taxes imposed by sections 3 and 5 of the Sales Tax Act and though without their existence, it could not have been possible to levy or collect the tax, they are not in themselves laws imposing the tax within Article 286(3) or section 3 of Act 52 of 1952. Before closing I must add that the question to be decided was a very difficult one, really of first impression being uncovered by authority and I must not fail to acknowledge the assistance I have derived from the arguments of learned counsel on either side. The other point raised in the petitions regarding the validity of the retrospective operation of the G.O. dated 3rd September, 1955, from 1st April, 1955, was not argued by counsel, as this has been decided adverse to the petitioner in W.P. Nos. 625 and 626 of 1956. The petitions fail and are dismissed. The rules nisi are discharged but there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 19 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... figuring both as the consignor and the consignee, and the sales were completed at Hindupur itself. The transactions are, therefore, not hit at by Article 286 of the Constitution. Lastly, it is argued that the petitioner s firm and the purchasing firm, the Mysore Starch Manufacturing Company, are one and the same concern and, therefore, the same firm cannot sell to itself. The petitioners firm has three partners whereas the Mysore firm has four partners and each firm has separate accounts and was independently assessed to income-tax. The petitioners have not placed before the Tribunal any documents regarding the constitution of the two firms or the accounts of either firm in support of their contention. On the material placed before the Tribunal, it has no option but to come to the conclusion that the two firms are separate and distinct. The finding is one of fact and we accept it. In the result the revision is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (11) TMI 18 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er section 386(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the liability merges into a decree and execution as if it were a decree is the only permissible procedure thereafter. 9.. We are satisfied that all that we need do at present is to hold that so long as the procedure indicated in sub-section (3) of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is available to the State, it is beyond its competence to commence proceedings under the TravancoreCochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, and leave open for future adjudication the question as to whether, if and when the proceedings indicated in section 386(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, becomes unavailable, it will still be open to the State to invoke the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, or not. 10.. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be allowed and it is hereby allowed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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