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Showing 1 to 20 of 38 Records
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1959 (7) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f petitioner 3 that he was a treasurer for only twelve days from 18 June, 1956 to 30 June, 1956 and also denying the allegation that petitioner 3 was relieved of his office as treasurer on 1 July, 1956. As these alleged facts are denied, it is not possible for us to hold that petitioner 3 was a treasurer only for twelve days from 18 June to 1956 30 June, 1956 and that the Central Railway was not justified in framing a charge against him for the period 1 July, 1956 to 31 August, 1958. The fact whether he was a treasurer only for twelve days and not during any part of the period which is the subject-matter of the charge against him, will have to be decided in the first instance at the disciplinary enquiry. As the main fact on which the petition of petitioner 3 is founded has not been proved or admitted, his petition also will have to be rejected. It is dismissed with costs. It is of course open to petitioner 3 to prove these facts at the enquiry which is being held against him.
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1959 (7) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e powers under Article 226 are very wide and are not confined to the mere issue of prerogative writs and though the High Counts can pass suitable orders or directions, the said orders or directions must be passed for the same object for which usually the prerogative writs are issued, I have already held above that in the circumstances of the present case the proper remedy for the petitioner would be to file a regular suit. I have also held that in the circumstances of the present case a writ of mandamus cannot be issued. It cannot also be denied that for the object which the petitioner has in view no writ can be issued. I am therefore of the opinion that an order or direction as contemplated by Article 226 of the Constitution of India can also not be issued in the present case. 46. Having considered the matter very care fully I am of the opinion that this petition must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim stay order that was passed in the case is vacated.
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1959 (7) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Income-tax Act, 1922, was amended in the year 1948. It is true that under the Taxation Laws (Extension to Merged States and Amendment) Act, 1949, if before 26th August, 1949, there was in force in any of merged States any law relating to income-tax, super-tax or business profits tax, such law shall be deemed to remain in operation for purposes connected with the levy, assessment and collection of such tax. If before the Tribunal the Department chose to argue the question on the footing that the income-tax law immediately before 26th August, 1949, in force in the territory of the Raigarh State was as amended by the Income-tax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, it is not open now to the Department to contend that the assumption implicit in the question and in the arguments advanced before the Tribunal was unwarranted. On that view of the case, the answer to the question must be in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the assessee.
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1959 (7) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cted before ascertainment of the profits. R. R. Jacques's case is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the present case, if the salary paid to the assessee is to be deducted from the gross earnings of the company before ascertaining the commercial profits, the payment to the assessee is not out of or determined with reference to the profits of the business. Again, the disallowance is not by reason of the mode of payment or determination of the salary out of the profits of the business; it is disallowed because it is not an expenditure laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. In that view of the case, the second condition is also not fulfilled. We are, therefore, of the view that the principle of the case of R.R. Jacque's case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. On that view of the case, the answer to the question will be in the negative. Assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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1959 (7) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e in the submission made by Mr. Kolah that because the amount of ₹ 60,000 is referred to in the amended agreement as paid as "goodwill in consideration of waiving the royalty" it was intended to make it a part of the goodwill of the partnership nor is there any substance in the submission that by the agreement the right to the quota of steel transferred was unrestricted. Evidently the modification made by the agreement, dated 9th September, 1954, was to the original agreement dated 29th September, 1948, and it was to be incorporated therein and under the original agreement the rights and obligations were to ensure so long as the lease or the quota system continued whichever was the later date. In our view, the answer to the question referred to us will be "The sum of ₹ 60,000 received by the assessee-company from K.R. Irani is a revenue receipt and liable to the appropriate tax." The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income-tax.
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1959 (7) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 18A(1) may under sub-section (2) of that section pay such amount as accords with his own estimate. If he excludes the amount of super-tax on dividend income from his estimate he 'takes the risk of the application of the ratio of eighty per cent. resulting in a shortfall and he would have to pay interest "upon the amount by which the tax so paid falls short of the said eighty per cent." The eighty per cent. would be of the amount of tax determined on the basis of the regular assessment so far as such tax relates to income to which the provisions of section 18 do not apply. The provisions of section 18(5), as I have already pointed out, do not apply to super-tax and the amount of supertax on the dividend income must be included and taken into consideration in the computation necessary for the purpose of fixing the quantum of tax to. which the ratio of eighty per cent. is to be applied. I would, therefore, answer the question as refrained by us in the affirmative.
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1959 (7) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was attributable to the loss of future prospects which the assessee had of becoming a partner in future in the firm, that will not, in our judgment, be regarded as "profit received in lieu of salary" within the meaning of section 7(1) or the Explanation thereto; and if such payment is not regarded as salary or profits in lieu of salary, there is no other head of income, profits or gains under which it will fall so as to make it taxable. In the ultimate analysis, we have to decide in this reference whether the payment can be regarded as a capital receipt or a revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee; and if, on the view we have taken, it is not a revenue receipt, then it must be regarded as not liable to tax. On that view of the case, the answer to the question referred will be "The amount of ₹ 2,21,000 is not income of the assesses assessable under section 7 of the Income-tax Act." The Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the assessee.
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1959 (7) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een let out is the building constructed by the assessees, and for making the building fit for running a hotel or a boarding and lodging house or a restaurant, furniture and fixtures have been installed. It cannot be said in the case of such a lease that the lease was primarily of furniture and not of the building. Mr. Palkhivala invites our attention to the facts that in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Tribunal, an erroneous statement was made by them as to the true effect of section 10(2)(vi.) and (v.) but we do not think that anything turns in this case upon the alleged erroneous statement relating to the true effect of these clauses. On the view taken by us, the question will be answered as follows "The income from the building will be computed under section 9, income from furniture and fixtures under section 12(3.) and that no part of the income is taxable under section 10." The assessee to pay the costs of the Commissioner. No order on the notice of motion.
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1959 (7) TMI 58 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat was the nature of that allowance. The allowance was a sum of money which Babu Har Narain Singh and his successors received because of being granted a right in the land revenue itself. The use of the word “allowance” or even the use of the word “pension,” as it was used in paragraph 6 of the letter of 7th July, 1837, would make no difference to the actual nature of the right which was granted under the said agreement. The nature of the right has to be gathered from the terms of the settlement and, as we have held above, the right being a right to receive revenue or part of revenue derived from land, the income accruing under that right was agricultural income. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to receive ₹ 400 as costs of this reference from the Department. For purposes of assessment of the fees of the learned counsel for the Department the same amount will be treated as his fees.
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1959 (7) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rkmen for misconduct or other sufficient reason. All that it lays down is that the management should inflict the punishment or terminate the services of such workmen with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal. If the management have good reasons for their proposed action, we do not expect the Appellate Tribunal to withhold arbitrarily such permission. 8. As the dismissal of the respondent was in contravention of Section 22 of the Act of 1950, the dismissal was rightly set aside. In this view it was not necessary for the Chairman of the Tribunal to go into the merits. Indeed, this would in a way preclude him from dealing with an application by the management for permission to dismiss the respondent if they choose to file such an application. As a finding on the merits was unnecessary, we make it clear that we should not be taken as having accepted the decision of the Chairman. The question is left open. 9. In the result the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1959 (7) TMI 56 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ance payment of tax the purpose of borrowing the money in order to pay advance tax was to discharge the statutory obligation upon the assessee, that receipt of interest on that tax was purely incidental and, therefore, the assessee could not claim the deduction on that ground either. A similar view has been taken by a Bench of this High Court in a previous case of the same assessee, Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 32 I.T.R. 377, 387. For the reasons expressed by me, I hold that the assessee is not entitled to a deduction of the amount of interest paid by him for the money borrowed for payment of the advance income-tax under section 18A. Accordingly I answer the question of law referred to the High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. KANHAIYA SINGH, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (7) TMI 55 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he period of one year was to commence from the date when the amount of the last instalment was due, that is, the 25th March, 1958. Any right which might have accrued to the Department to enforce the default clause being a term of the contract is not relevant in interpreting the provisions of section 46(7) of the Act. The Advocate-General has further relied upon proviso (iii) of section 46(7) in support of the contention that the proceedings are not barred by limitation. His contention was that the date of payment of the tax had been extended from time to time, and, as such, the period of one year was to be reckoned from the date from which the time for payment was extended. But as I am of opinion that the recovery proceedings are not barred, in view of proviso (iv) it is not necessary to examine this question. In the result, therefore, we see no force in this petition and it is rejected with costs which we assess at ₹ 300. C.P. SINHA, C.J.--I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (7) TMI 54 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y ground open to him under section 28(1), even though it related to a prior proceeding. Learned counsel referred to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mayaram Durga Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1931 5 I.T.C. 471. With great respect I think that that decision does not lay down the correct taw on the point. On the contrary, I would prefer to follow the decision of the Madras High Court in Govindarajulu Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1948 16 I.T.R. 391, as I have already indicated. For the reasons expressed I hold that in the circumstances of tins case the levy of penalty upon both the assesses under section 28 of the Income-tax Act is legally valid. I would accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court in favour of the Income-fax Department and against the assesses. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. KANHAIYA SINGH, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (7) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uing the provisions of section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, the obligation to initiate proceedings within the period not longer than the period prescribed by section 15 will not be implied. Mr. Mistree for the assessees contends that even on that view, the rule that revisional jurisdiction will be exercised within a reasonable period is not abrogated by legislation. But by section 31 no period has been prescribed for the exercise suo motu of the jurisdiction of the Collector to revise the order of authorities appointed under section 3 and by Act XXII of 1959 the rule of interpretation adopted by the Court in Narsee Nagsee s case 1957 31 I.T.R. 164. and applied in cases under the Sales Tax Act has been expressly superseded. We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioners have made out no case for the issue of a writ. The petition fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs of this application. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (7) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion in section 2(6). The Tribunal has submitted the following question for determination Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the applicant can be held to be an agriculturist falling within the exception to sub-section (6) of section 2 of the Act of 1953? But it is not disputed that the assessee is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act and section 2(6) does not define an agriculturist. The question in our judgment does not bring out the real matter in dispute between the taxing authorities and the assessee. We therefore reframe the question as follows Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the applicant can be regarded as a dealer within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953? To the reframed question, our answer for reasons already set out will be in the negative. The State to pay the costs of the assessee. There will be only one set of costs in these three references. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (7) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The dismissal of the application on the ground of limita- tion did not, therefore, amount to a refusal of the prayer made in the application. A question of refusing a prayer can only arise where the authority, considering that question, is competent to accept that prayer. If acceptance is beyond the jurisdiction or competence of the authority, no occasion can arise for that authority to pass any order of refusal. The order, which the authority had to pass, was one of rejection of the application which amounted to saying that the revising authority was not going to consider the prayer at all and it was only after the consideration of the prayer that an occasion for refusal or acceptance of the prayer could arise. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that, in this case, the application under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act before this Court is also incompetent and not maintainable. The application is dismissed with costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (7) TMI 50 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner. Despite this fact we think that these are fit cases which should be sent back to the Tribunal for investigation into the question as to whether these respondents are non-resident agents since it appears from a copy of the affidavit produced by Sri Rajaram Aiyar that some such point was sought to be raised before the Tribunal. In all the remanded cases the respondents will pay costs to the petitioners as the main contention advanced on their behalf was the same as that involved in the other cases. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 100 in each. Writ Petitions Nos. 291 and 496 of 1957 are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. We are told that the petitioners have also preferred appeals before the Deputy Commissioner against the assessments raising various contentions. Our order in these writ petitions does not preclude the petitioners from raising other points since the arguments here were confined only to the effect of the Validation Act. Ordered accordingly.
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1959 (7) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mere fact that the assessment has to be in respect of a period of one year does not support the view that the notice issued under sub-section (3) must also be restricted to a period of one year. The second contention also, in our judgment, has no force. It is true that in the notice, which is on a printed form in which some of the blanks are filled in, there is a reference to clauses (6) and (7) of section 14. But from the terms of the notice there can be no doubt that the notice was one which was intended to be issued by the Collector in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3). We do not think that failure to strike out from the printed form words which were inappropriate affects the validity of the notice. On that view of the case, the answers to the questions will be (1) in the negative (2) in the negative (3) not argued (4) does not arise. The assessee to pay the costs of the Collector of Sales Tax. Costs quantified at Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (7) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hase tax by virtue of clause (1) of section 18. Unless there is any strong indication to the contrary, we will not be justified in ignoring the expression direct used by the Legislature. In our view, the expression as a direct result of a sale governs both the preceding clauses. Before, therefore, purchase tax is made payable by a purchaser of goods notified by the State Government, it must be established that as a direct result of a sale the goods had been despatched or brought from any place in India outside the State of Bombay and were actually delivered to a buyer. In the present case, however, the Tribunal has not decided the question whether the bringing of the vehicle into the Bombay State was as a direct result of a sale to the assessees. We, therefore, call upon the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of fact on the question whether the despatch or bringing of the vehicle into the Bombay State was as a direct result of a sale to the assessee. Case remanded.
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1959 (7) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of the notices of 4th July, 1958, in view of section 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Validating Provisions and Amendment) Act, 1959, which came into force on 18th April, 1959. The position then that emerges is that the notices dated 20th July, 1955, under section 11(2) of the Act were validly given and they had at no time lapsed. The proceedings that are being taken against the petitioner were thus initiated under the said notices within three years of the expiry of the assessment periods. It, therefore, cannot be said that the proceedings that are being taken against the petitioner are bad in law or that the Sales Tax Officer has no jurisdiction to deal with them. Subsequent notices given on 4th July, 1958, cannot affect this position. They are not notices initiating the proceedings against the petitioner and, therefore, are not liable to be quashed. In the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Only one set of costs is allowed. Petitions dismissed.
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