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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 49 of 49 Records
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1961 (7) TMI 29
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1961 (7) TMI 8
Whether the transfer of the case papers in regard to the appellant's assessment for the year 1952-53 had been validly effected by what he described as a notification passed in that behalf
Whether Lalji is liable to pay the tax on the income in question?
Held that:- It would be idle for the appellant to contend that the proceedings had been validly transferred to any Income-tax Officer in Bombay. That being so, it follows that the proceedings are properly pending before the first respondent and the notice issued by him is valid and legal. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the question of jurisdiction raised by the appellant.
We do not think that Mr. Nambiar would be justified in resisting the enquiry which is proposed to be held by respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the impugned notice issued by him against the appellant. Under these circumstances we do not propose to deal with the point of law sought to be raised by Mr. Nambiar.
All objections which Lalji may have to raise against his alleged liability would undoubtedly have to be considered in the said proceedings. Proceedings against Chhotalal may also be taken by the Income-tax Officer and continued and concluded, but until the proceedings against Lalji are finally determined no assessment order should be passed in the proceedings taken against Chhotalal. If in the proceedings taken against Lalji it is finally decided that it is Lalji who is responsible to pay tax for the income in question it may not become necessary to make any order against Chhotalal. If, however, in the said proceedings Lalji is not held to be liable to pay tax or it is found that Lalji is liable to pay tax along with Chhotalal it may become necessary to pass appropriate orders against. Chhotalal. When we suggested to the learned counsel that we propose to make an order on these lines they all agreed that this would be a fair and reasonable order to make in the present proceedings. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (7) TMI 7
Whether the dividend income of ₹ 54,307 is to be assessed in the hands of the assessee, the Hindu undivided family ?
Held that:- The question here is one of interpretation only and that interpretation must be based on the terms of the section. The fiction enacted by the legislature must be restricted by the plain terms of the statute. Nor do we see how it can be said that the interpretation put on section 23A that it is confined to a shareholder registered in the books of the company defeats the very purpose of the section. The section will still apply to shareholders of the company and to their income will be added the notional income determined under section 23A.
Highr court correctly answered the question in favour of assessee by concluding that in respect of an income which was deemed to be distributed under the provisions of section 23A, the section in terms provided that the proportionate share of the shareholders in such distribution should be included in their income ; and as the Hindu undivided family was not and could not be a registered shareholder of the company, the amount in question could not be treated as the income of the Hindu undivided family under the provisions of that section. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (7) TMI 6
Whether in computing the profits and gains of the appellant, the remuneration paid to the agents was deductible under rule 3(2)(ix)?
Held that:- The existence of a rule seems to obliterate the frontiers between legislative, judicial and executive exercise of the power of a State, such as we understand it. There being no invariable use of a clear-cut legislative language, each general order emanating from the sovereign Ruler and promulgated in the same manner as any other rule and having its roots in a resolution of the Cabinet must be regarded as one binding upon the subject. This is the purport of the decisions of this court, and the present case falls in line with those which have been previously decided. There is nothing in the content, the character or the nature of these notifications, which would put them on a level lower than the Rules, which had been earlier promulgated. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (7) TMI 5
... ...
... ... ..... was regarded as personal and private expenditure, and the other half, as for administration. Such a rough and ready test is not possible in this case. The three sections have been made advisedly. Section (A) deals with expenditure over the army section (B), with expenditure over the official retinue and section (C), with expenses in the palace. Even if section (C) contains some items of expenditure on administration, such items are incapable of being disentangled from the rest, and unless there is clear proof, the assessee cannot claim the deduction. The expenditure under section (B), on the other hand, is clearly one connected with the administration of the land, and ought to have been allowed. We accordingly answer the first question by saying that Rs. 37,681-13-6 should be allowed as deduction, in addition to the deductions already granted. The appeal is partly allowed, and in the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs in this court. Appeal partly allowed.
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1961 (7) TMI 4
Whether the Hyderabad Income-tax Act is ultra vires in so far as it seems to levy a tax on jagirs and samasthans ?
Whether the sum of ₹ 14,390 and ₹ 38,079 or a part thereof could be allowed as revenue deduction under section 14(5)(a) or 14(5)(b) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The Nizam could withhold his assent to a law contrary to the Ain if he chose ; but once he assented to it, the law derived its vitality, not from the act of the Legislative Assembly but from the act of the Nizam. It could not be questioned any more than a Firman issued by the Nizam. The Income-tax Act must, therefore, be regarded as binding upon those affected by its terms, and the question whether it could be introduced in the Legislative Assembly hardly arises. It must be regarded as a law emanating from His Exalted Highness the Nizam, the supreme legislator in the State, whose laws promulgated in any manner were binding upon the subject. The High Court correctly answered question against the appellant.
The High Court put the burden of proof somewhat strictly upon the assessee. The Tribunal, though it gave no reasons, hold that the expenses were incurred in relation to the management. The conclusion is based on some evidence. These expenses fall within clause (a) of section 14(5) as expenditure in connection with land or its administration, and they amounted to ₹ 26,057 in the year 1358 Fasli. For the year. 1357 Fasli, the amount debatable to these items from ₹ 14,390 will have to be determined. The evidence before us is not sufficient to state the exact amount. In favour of assessee. Appeal partly allowed.
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1961 (7) TMI 3
Whether in the circumstances of this case where the Income-tax Officer, District III(2), separately assessed the business run in the name of Brijlal Nandkishore as belonging to a partnership firm consisting of Brijlal and Nandkishore, the Income-tax Officer, Non-Companies E.P.T. District, can assess the income from the same business in the hands of the assessee ?
Held that:- no special circumstances exist, on which the appellants can claim to come to this court against the decision of the Tribunal, by-passing the decision of the High Court on the question referred and the refusal of the High Court to call for a statement of the case from the Tribunal on questions which the Tribunal refused to refer to the High Court. The appeals are, therefore, within the rulings of this court in Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar [1961 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME Court] and Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,[1961 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME Court] and must be regarded as incompetent. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (7) TMI 2
Demand (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... s not legal. He, however, contended that I should not exercise my jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution, in favour of the petitioner, who is trying to avoid payment of duty. I am not satisfied with his argument. The Customs authorities are not themselves sure whether there has, in fact, been a short levy and, if so, how much actually. They merely made a demand for anticipated short levy, which they were not entitled to do. The circumstances of this case are not such as disentitles the petitioner from discretion being exercised in his favour. I hold that notices of demand for short levy were illegal. I, therefore, make this Rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) to the petition. Let a Writ of Mandamus issue commanding the respondent to withdraw and cancel and forbear from giving effect to the demands for short levy issued during the period from February 22, 1956 to July 8, 1958 as particularly shown in Annexure B to the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (7) TMI 1
Writ petition - Delay - Natural justice - Manufacturer ... ... ... ... ..... e who employs hired labour they must mean necessarily the owner of the factory. It is also not possible to accept the suggestion that when the words used are engages in their production on his own account they must mean the owner of the factory or the person who himself in doing the manufacturing process. Apart from this, the definition is an inclusive definition which must mean that the two instances mentioned would not necessarily exhaust all these who would come within the meaning of the word manufacture . The word must be construed with due regard to the present day conditions and would necessarily include persons in the position of the petitioners, who get goods manufactured by some one else for sale on their account. 18.We are, therefore, of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Central Excise Officers that the petitioners are liable to the levy is fully justified by the terms of the statute. The result is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs.
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