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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 73 of 73 Records
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1961 (9) TMI 45
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... ... ..... ia shall, until the 31st day of March 1951, continue to be levied notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of clause (2) of Article 286 of the said Constitution. The assessment year in question in the present case is the year 1950-51. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that there are various objections to the taxability of the purchase of cotton and he submitted that the Board has not gone into the matter fully and properly and has not set out all the available evidence on record. In view of the paucity of evidence in the case and the absence of materials before us to find out whether the purchase value is taxable or not, we would have remitted the matter for a fresh disposal to the Board, if we had taken the view that the proceedings were not barred by limitation. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue is set aside. The appellant will have his costs from the respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (9) TMI 44
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... ... ..... that these sales are for a large sum of money in a mill of the magnitude of the respondent-company by itself cannot be a criterion to hold that it is an item of business activity carried on by the said mills. The Tribunal has observed in the course of its order that the articles of association of the respondent-mills make it clear that their objects are only to manufacture and sell cotton, woollen and silk goods and nothing more. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the sale of sundries effected by the respondent-mills are not liable for any taxation. Thus all the three contentions raised by Shri Venkataswamy, the learned High Court Government Pleader on behalf of the State, are answered against the State. No other point was raised before us in these revision petitions. In the result these revision petitions fail for the reasons stated above and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1961 (9) TMI 43
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... ... ..... properly described only as a compounding fee . To this compounding fee or penalty , the provisions of section 15-A of the Act have no application at all. Accordingly, in order to require the dealer to pay this compounding fee, it was not necessary to obtain the previous approval of the Commissioner, nor was it necessary to issue a notice to the petitioner as required by section 15-A. If the petitioner was minded to take advantage of the concession by way of exemption fee, he should have complied with the condition of deposit of the further amount. Not having done so, under the provisions of the rules, he became liable for payment of sales tax, which, as I have already pointed out, amounted to Rs. 468-75 nP. As the petitioner admittedly did not pay this amount, it was inevitable that recovery proceedings in respect of this amount should have followed upon the framing of the assessment order. I therefore, see no force in this writ petition, which I reject. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (9) TMI 42
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... ... ..... six miles from the coast line. It does not appear to us that the decisions of the Supreme Court in which the customs frontier has been referred to look upon that expression as indicating the enlarged construction which the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court have placed upon it. It is not necessary for us to express our views upon this question as we have come to the conclusion that, even looking upon the expression customs frontier in the more limited sense which we have ascribed to it, the present cases are still outside the scope of the exemption contemplated by Article 286(1)(b). It follows that the view taken by the Tribunal that the sales were in the course of import cannot be sustained. T.C. Nos. 151 of 1959, 160 of 1959 and 23 of 1960 are allowed with costs. The assessees in T. C. Nos. 151 of 1959 and 23 of 1960 will pay Rs. 50 as counsel s fee (one set) and the assessee in T.C. No. 160 of 1959 will pay a like amount as counsel s fee. Ordered accordingly.
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1961 (9) TMI 41
A dispute between the appellant and the respondent arising out of a contract for the supply of fuel was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators gave an award directing the appellant to pay a certain sum of money to the respondent and filed the award in the court of the Subordinate judge. The appellant made an application for setting aside the award but it was rejected. Against this order the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court under s. 39(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, and a Single judge allowed the appeal and set aside the award. Thereupon the respondent filed a Letters Patent appeal against the judgment of the Single judge - Held, that an appeal against the appellate order of the single Judge was barred by s. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. The expression "second appeal" in s. 39(2) means a further appeal from an order passed in appeal under s. 39(1) and not an appeal under s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, and includes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
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1961 (9) TMI 40
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof and Overriding preferential payments
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1961 (9) TMI 39
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... ention of the learned counsel for the company that this application does not come within the scope of section 155. Incidentally, I ought to mention that learned counsel for the company submitted to me that proceedings under section 155 are of a summary nature and an application where a complicated question of title is involved does not come within its purview. He referred to Jayshree v. Rajkamal Kalamandir (P.) Ltd. 1960 30 Comp Cas 141 AIR 1960 Bom. 136. Since I have dismissed the application of Manzoor Ahmed this point need not be considered in this application. In the result, therefore, there will be an order that the share register or register of members of the respondent company be rectified by inserting the name of the petitioner as the holder of 11,825 fully paid up ordinary shares and 591 fully paid up 7 per cent, cumulative preference shares in the place and stead of Mohamed Bashir, deceased. The company would pay the costs of this application. Certified for counsel.
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1961 (9) TMI 25
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... nt to the company was utilised for meeting the company s liabilities to the land customs authorities. The company was in need of funds and the truck was sold to the applicant to keep the company going or for keeping things going generally. It may be that only a part of the sum of Rs. 11,000 paid by Gasper was utilised by the company to liquidate its indebtedness to the land customs authorities but on the evidence available to me I shall be justified in drawing the inference that the truck was sold to enable the company to continue to carry on its business, inter alia, of clearing, forwarding and shipping agents. If that was not the case the company s directors would not have been anxious to meet their liabilities to the customs authorities. In my opinion, therefore, this transaction ought to be validated. In the premises, I make an order in terms of clause (a ) of the summons. But I make no order as to costs except that the liquidator shall retain his costs out of the assets.
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1961 (9) TMI 24
Winding up – Delivery of property to liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... gh Caveeshar cannot claim the privilege under article 20(3) of the Constitution in proceedings under section 185 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (a)The proceedings under section 185 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, do not partake of the character of criminal prosecution, and he is not an accused person (b)He is not being subjected to a compulsion to make any Statement, and it is within his option to offer or not (c)As a witness, he cannot claim protection beyond what is contained in the proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act (d)The appropriate time when the privilege can be claimed is after the question is put and not in advance of the examination and (e)The privilege of silence is restricted to real dangers and not to remote possibilities. In the light of the above discussion, the arguments of the learned counsel for S. Sardul Singh Caveeshar are unpersuasive. In the result, the application, L.M. 89 of 1960, is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (9) TMI 23
Winding up – Power of court to make calls tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... ive to the normal remedy by way of suit. The question then is only to ascertain their respective fields of operation. It can be presumed that the legislature intended them for different categories of cases, thus avoiding a duplication of summary remedies. We have shown earlier that section 187 would apply also to cases of calls made before liquidation. Therefore, those calls should fall outside section 186. This construction would give full scope to the words of section 186 which specifically excludes from its operation call monies due under the Act. We are, therefore, of opinion that section 186 would apply only to the case of a claim ex contractu other than call money whether due or yet to be called, while section 187 would apply for the recovery of all call monies whether exigible at the time of liquidation or otherwise. We agree with Balakrishna Aiyar J. that the liquidator in the instant case cannot proceed under section 186. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (9) TMI 3
Whether Section 178A is obnoxious to the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) and (g)?
Held that:- Section 178A was constitutionally valid
The rule as to the burden of proof enacted by that section applies to a contravention of a notification under Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, by virtue of its being deemed to be a contravention of a notification under Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act.
The preliminary requirement of Section 178A that the officer seizing should entertain “a reasonable belief that the goods seized were smuggled” was satisfied in the present case. The result therefore is that the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent before the High Court should have been dismissed. We accordingly allow appeals 408 and 409 with costs throughout (one set of hearing fees), the writ petitions filed by the respondent being directed to be dismissed.
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1961 (9) TMI 2
Demand and review - Interpretation of statute ... ... ... ... ..... ed by the notice dated the 15th September, 1958. If the respondents do not take any steps to have the notice declared as invalid or as one tending to give rise to a useless and infructuous proceeding, they will have to suffer unnecessary harassment and expense of resisting the proceeding, and defending themselves against an illegal claim. The amount being irrecoverable by reason of Section 39, by revising the order of refund or by revoking it, the Customs authorities cannot realize the amount from the respondents in any case. So it is difficult to see why the respondents cannot put an end to the proceedings at the very initial stage. There is no jurisdiction in the Customs authorities to reopen a claim barred by limitation by having recourse to Section 190A so any step taken to initiate a proceeding to reopen a claim can be prohibited or quashed as being one taken without jurisdiction. I, therefore, agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs as proposed by My Lord.
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1961 (9) TMI 1
Origin of goods - Smuggling ... ... ... ... ..... assed the order of confiscation. It is, however, stated in paragraph 21 of the affidavit-in-opposition that the aforesaid trade opinions did not relate to the goods seized from the petitioner and were sent to him by mistake. It also appears from the order made by the Collector that he had discarded trade opinions both in favour and against the petitioner. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find much substance in this last argument advanced by Mr. Roy Mukherjee. For the reasons aforesaid I am compelled to discharge this Rule, but nothing contained herein shall preclude the petitioner from resorting to such other remedies as he may have against the order of confiscation of betel nuts made against him. There will be no order as to costs in this Rule. C. R. 3215 of 1959. It is conceded before me that the points involved in Civil Rule No. 3215 are the same as those in Civil Rule No. 3214 of 1, 1959. The same order as made in Civil Rule No. 3214 of 1959 will govern this Rule also.
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