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Showing 21 to 40 of 68 Records
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1963 (3) TMI 68
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... ... ..... ken under section 34 of the Act." It seems to us that this decision is only of limited application. It does not lay down any principle that penal interest is not leviable in cases where even the initial assessment of the assessee is made by resort to section 34. As we understand the decision it must be confined to cases where there has been an initial assessment under section 23, which is however reopened under section 34 and a reassessment is made. As we have pointed out, the expression "regular assessment" is used in contrast with a provisional assessment. An initial assessment, though made by resort to section 34, is none the less a regular assessment. We are accordingly of the view that the power conferred under section 18A(6) was rightly exercised by the Income-tax Officer. The contention that the imposition of penal interest is illegal fails. The petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee in W.P. No. 1147 of 1961--Rs. 200. Petitions dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 67
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... ... ..... f gift even to the other members of the coparcenary. It is obvious that section 10, which deals with property taken under a gift, has no application to the facts of the case. The correct view to take would appear to be that the family became divided on the date in question and that no partition by metes and bounds was in fact effected. It should, therefore, follow that the deceased, Annadurai Aiyangar was at the time of his death possessed of a fourth share in the items of joint family properties and under the law it is only that share that could be deemed to pass on his death. Since we are not however called upon to decide under what provision of law the assessment to estate duty could be made in this case, we content ourselves with stating that the properties mentioned in schedules B, C and D could not be included in the estate of the deceased as property deemed to pass under section 10 of the Act. The applicant will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1963 (3) TMI 66
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... ... ..... ed to have been waived by the assessee." In the instant case, however, I am definitely of the opinion that there was no irregularity in the notice, to all intents and purposes, the notice related to the assessment year 1948-49, it was understood to be so by the assessee and the mere clerical mistake in mentioning the year of assessment in the notice did not have, on the facts of this case, the effect of making it a notice under section 34 of the Income-tax Act for reassessment of the income in respect of the assessment year 1947-48. At the worst, the mistake amounted to an irregularity which was waived by the assessee. My concluded opinion, therefore, is that the question of law as referred above must be answered in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to get the costs of this reference, the hearing fee of which is assessed at ₹ 250. RAMASWAMI C.J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (3) TMI 65
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... ... ..... ,87,000 odd which represented the Capital Obligation Business. These investments were rated at half their book value by the Corporation. The Tribunal reversed the entries in respect of the investments relating to sundry funds. It is contended that the Tribunal reversed only a few of the book entries which had been made on the eve of vesting but not all and did not restore the status quo existing on December 31, 1955. It is also contended that the Corporation should not be allowed to pick and choose from the investments. The point about fr., picking and choosing" and that about reversing the entries lose all force in view of the fact that before the Tribunal the Company conceded that the Corporation may pick any investments of the value of ₹ 12,80,890 which represented the Capital Obligation Business. In view of this concession the points now sought to be pressed cannot arise. There is no force in this appeal. It fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 64
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... ... ..... but, that would not avail the petitioner in avoiding tax on his share income from the firm. This position has now been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in Muthappa Chettiar v. Income-tax Officer 1961 41 I.T.R. 1; 1961 1 S.C.R. 788. We have reached the conclusion that there is no error of law or jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record to justify the issue of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner had certainly another remedy to the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 23A of the Act against the order of rectification passed by the Income-tax Officer. But, in the view which we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider how far this remedy by way of revision would have been quite adequate and effective, and, whether the present writ should be entertained though he had an alternative remedy under the Act. This writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The rule nisi is discharged. Counsel's fee ₹ 150. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 63
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... ... ..... arks which defeated the very purpose he had in mind. Having said all this, we must add, lest we be misunderstood, that the conduct of Mohammad Naim and officers like him deserves the severest condemnation, and the learned judge rightly observed that such conduct required very serious notice by superior officers of the Police. It is difficult to avoid the reflection that unless an example is made of such officers by taking the most stringent action against them, no improvement in police administration is possible. For the reasons given above, we have come to the conclusion, a conclusion which justice demands, that the present case is one of those exceptional cases where the inherent jurisdiction of the court should have been exercised and the remarks earlier referred to as (a), (b) and (c) should have been expunged. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that the aforesaid remarks do stand expunged from the order of the learned judge dated August 4, 1961. Appeal allowed.,
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1963 (3) TMI 62
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... ... ..... be regarded as a matter which was "heard and finally decided". The decree might have created an estoppel by conduct between the parties; but here the appellants are in an unfortunate position, because they did not plead this estoppel at any time. They only claimed that the principle of res judicata governed the case or that there was an estoppel by judgment. By that expression, the principle- of res judicata is described 'in English law. There is some evidence to show that the respondents had paid two sums under the consent decree, but that evidence cannot be looked into in the absence of a plea of estoppel by conduct which needed to be raised and tried. The appellants are, however,, protected in respect of these payments by the proviso to cl. (iii) of s. 16 of the Amending Act. In our opinion, this appeal has no merits and must fail. It is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order about costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 61
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... ... ..... d v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta 1961 41 I.T.R. 191; 1961 2 S.C.R. 241 and Maharaja Sri Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, New Delhi 1962 44 I.T.R. 303, relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee, were under section 34(1)(a) and the observations in those cases are not a safe guide for construction of section 34(1)(b). Several cases from the Allahabad and other High Courts, cited on behalf of the assessee, refer to interpretation of the provision before an amendment of the section in 1948 and they, in the circumstances, cannot be treated as a dependable guide for construing the amended provisions. The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income- tax(2) are nearest to the matter arising in this case and following the ratio in that case the assessee's contention cannot prevail. I would, therefore, dismiss both the petitions with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 60
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... ... ..... hin one month from to- day, shall make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner or to such other competent authority as may have been empowered to grant the necessary sanction to transfers like the one in, question, and further that within one month of the receipt of that sanction she shall convey to the plaintiffs the property in suit. In the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to the damages as decreed by the High Court. The appellant sought to raise certain other pleas which had not been raised in the High Court, for example, that this was not a fit case in which specific performance of contract should be enforced by the Court. This plea was not specifically raised in the High Court and the necessary facts were not pleaded in the pleadings. It is manifest that this Court should not allow such a plea to be raised here for the first time. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 59
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... ... ..... uous object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the gazetted government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise. The rule-making authority presumably thought that having regard to the status of the gazetted government servants, it would be legitimate to give such an opinion to them. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in accepting the view taken by the High Court that rule 4(2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made by the gazetted government servant that' his case should be referred to the Tribunal under the Rules. Such a request was admittedly made by the respondent and has not been granted. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was right in quashing the proceedings proposed to be taken by the appellant against the respondent otherwise than by referring his case to the Tribunal under the Rules. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 58
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... ... ..... ceases to have the force of law under the provisions of the said Act when it comes into operation as an enactment with or without amendment. Therefore, the declaration in respect of Clauses 11 and 13 of the Finance Bill has ceased to have any force of law on 29-4-1961 when the Finance Act, 14 of 1961 was passed, and in my view the provisions regarding declaration regarding this matter have been passed with an amendment in the Finance Act. That is, the Explanation found in item 23-B in the Finance Act as passed does not find a place as against item 23-B in the Finance Bill, 10 of 1961. As we are concerned with a period to this case taken in by the Finance Bill 10 of 1961, and as I have already held that the expression "chinaware" does not include stoneware articles manufactured by the petitioner concern, it follows that the demand under Ext. P-l will have to be quashed and this writ petition allowed. Parties will bear their own costs. 40. The C. M. P. is dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 57
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... ... ..... f Shankarlal shows that this accused got the best legacy under it. He was the connecting thread passing through the web of conspiracy from beginning to end. Evidence Considered omitted x x x x x x x x Learned counsel appearing for this accused Could only argue that the accused was a subordinate of the Directors and that he had followed only loyally the directions given by the Managing Director without any knowledge of the conspiracy. This argument is an oversimplification of the part taken by Accused-10 in this huge fraud. Both the Courts below have held, on the aforesaid circumstances and other evidence; that Accused-10 was an active participant in the conspiracy. In our view, there is ample material to justify it. In the result Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1959 is dismissed. Cr. A. No. 82 of 1962 dismissed. Sentence modified. Cr. A. No. 83 of 1962 dismissed. Sentence modified. Cr. A. No. 136 of 1959 dismissed. Cr. A. No. 172 of 1959 dismissed. Cr. A. No. 67 of 1959 dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 56
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... ... ..... of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 64 is that, where two or more Income-tax Officers have territorial jurisdiction in respect of the same income, they exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the matter of issuing notices to the assessee and where notices have been issued by one officer it is unnecessary for the other officer to issue the same notices again. Sub- section (3) of section 64 applies only when a question arises as to the place of assessment and when there is no dispute between the assessee and the Income-tax Officer as to the proper place of assessment the point need not be referred to by the Commissioner under that sub-section." It would seem that this decision is more against the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner rather than in his support. In our opinion, this decision has no bearing on the facts of the present case. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The rule nisi is discharged. Counsel's fee ₹ 150.
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1963 (3) TMI 55
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... ... ..... are disclosed fully and truly, section 34(1)(a) would not be attracted. Mr. Bobde on behalf of the petitioner has also requested us to note here that the notice impugned in the present petition was not sought to be justified under the provisions of the new Indian Income-tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961). The question was raised but Mr. Natu on behalf of the department did not invoke any of the provisions of that Act in support of the notice. The notice in the instant case was issued prior to the new Act, XLIII of 1961, came into force on April 1, 1962. However, as we have said, it is not necessary to consider all these questions because of the view we have taken that under section 34(1) of the Act of 1922, as it stood after the 1956 amendment, the notice was bad, even having regard to its other provisions as amended in 1956 and 1959. In the result, therefore, we allow the petition and quash the notice dated January 5, 1962. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1963 (3) TMI 54
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... ... ..... red, for an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation. It is true that Butchi Tirupati who was one of the devisees under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy was a member of the joint family consisting of himself, his five brothers and his father Bala Konda. It is also true that there is no clear evidence as to how the property was dealt with, nor, as to the appropriation of the income thereof, But there is no evidence on the record to show that by any conscious art or exercise of volition Butchi Tirupati surrendered his interest in the property devised in his favour under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy so as to blend it with the joint family property. In the absence of any such evidence, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in holding that Lakshmama was entitled to a fourth share in the property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy. The. appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 53
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... ... ..... alue of the land and not on the value of his leasehold only. If the tax was on the capital value of assets, such a person could not have been so taxed. Again, under the same section a proportionate part of the tax which is primarily payable by the owner under the Act, may be recovered from a tenant in -possession of the land and this would of course not be possible if the Bombay Act, was an Act imposing a tax on the capital value of assets of individuals for the assets, that is, land did not belong to the tenant at all. I think, therefore, that the contention of the appellants that the Act really authorises the imposition of a tax on the capital value of assets of individuals and is thus an Act which the Central legislature could pass under the Government of India Act and the Provincial legislature could not, must be rejected. I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal with costs. By COURT In accordance with the majority opinion the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
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1963 (3) TMI 52
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... ... ..... happenings. But it cannot be said that in order to determine the question whether the assessee could have believed that the debt was made on a particular date his subsequent conduct, treating the debtor as solvent and sound, would be irrelevant or inadmissible. In our opinion, the principle of the decision in Anderton and Halstead Ltd. v. Birrell ( 1931 16 Tax Cas. 200) and the observations of Rowlatt J. in that case should be confirmed to a case where the department attempts to cancel a deduction once granted by levying an additional assessment either by taking action under section 34 or under some other provision of law. In our opinion, the said principle cannot have an application to the facts and circumstances of this case. We hold that the department and the Tribunal reached the correct conclusion in holding that the assessee was not entitled to write off the debt. These petitions are dismissed with costs in T. C. P. No. 26 of 1962 only. Counsel's fee ₹ 150.
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1963 (3) TMI 51
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... ... ..... vail as against the right of the income-tax department as under section 64, Civil Procedure Code, the charge created by Mohamed Ismail Sahib cannot affect the rights which have accrued to the income-tax department by reason of the attachment. Learned counsel for the appellant while accepting this position contended that there is no proof of any attachment having been effected by the income-tax department or that such an attachment was actually subsisting. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Tahsildar of Gudiyattam on April 7, 1953, and the supplemental counter-affidavit on behalf of the Tahsildar of Gudiyattam on April 22, 1959, clearly prove that an attachment had been validly effected in 1959, and that it was subsisting in 1954. In view of this we are of opinion that the right of priority of the Government would attach to the sale proceeds and the applicant is not entitled to any portion of the sale proceeds. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (3) TMI 50
Whether the terms of the arbitration agreement include a dispute relating to a refusal to meet the obligations arising under the contract even though the refusal was not founded on any right arising under the terms of the contract?
Held that:- The Union is not seeking to go to arbitration on a dispute between the parties about a breach committed by one side or the other or whether circumstances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties from further performance. It is a case in which in substance there is no dispute between the parties "under", "in connection with", or even "with regard to" the contract. The plea raised by the Union for stay of the suit was frivolous. It is some- what surprising that the plea should have been raised and persisted in, and even after going to arbitration in the other case have been brought up to this Court involving large costs to the public exchequer. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (3) TMI 49
Whether Rule 8-A is framed in exercise of the power reserved under S. 26 of the Abolition Act to effectuate the provisions of cl. (d) of S. 6, and adjustment under the Rule can only be made in respect of agricultural income-tax payable for any period prior to the date of vesting?
Held that:- Rule 8-A requires the Collector to adjust the liability to pay agricultural income-tax due by the intermediary against compensation payable to him. This order, the High Court has directed the Collector to make in favour of the respondent, but in making the order the High Court has proceeded on the assumption that compensation bonds remain to be delivered to the respondent.
For reasons already set out, there are no materials on which the truth of the assumption may be ascertained. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the case to the High Court for deciding whether there are any compensation bonds remaining to be delivered, and if not, whether by any appropriate order or direction, adjustment of tax liability against compensation due to the respondent, which has been directed by the High Court, under Rule 8-A can be made effective. The High Court will dispose of the petition on the evidence already on record, or such other evidence as may be brought on the record by the parties.
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