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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 95 Records
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1963 (4) TMI 69
Constitutional validity of certain notifications and directions issued under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and the Export Control Order, 1958 - whether the restrictions and control for which provision might be made by s. 3 would not include a provision for canalising the trade in any particular commodity?
Held that:- It would be a matter of policy for the Government to determine, having regard to the nature of the commodity and the circumstances, attending the export trade in it, to lay down the basis for the classification between groups and fix their relative priorities etc. When el. 6(h) permits "canalising" or the "channelling" of exports through selected agencies it does not no more than make provision for the classification into groups etc. which but one of the modes which the "control" under a. 3 of the Act might assume.
In the case of a commodity like manganese ore for which there is not much of an internal market the denial of a right to any group or we shall add, to any individual to export would in effect affect him adversely forcing him to sell to others who have been given such a facility. Persons like the app- ellant were being fed on hopes of some relief to them and it was a case not merely of hope deferrer making the heart sick, but of dashed hopes that led the appellant to approach. the Court for relief. Though we consider that the appellant has no legal right to the relief that he sought, his grievance is genuine and it would be for the Government to consider how beat the interest of this class should be protected and it is made worth their while to win the ore so as to expand, foster and augment the export trade in this valuable commodity.
Reverting to the legal points raised in the appeal, it appears cleat to us that on the premises (1) that s. 3 of the Import & Export Control Act, 1947 is a valid piece of legislation, (2) that cl. 6 (h) of the Export Control Order is within the rulemaking power of the Central Government and is constitutional, there is no escape from the conclusion that no legally enforceable right of the appellant has been violated for which he could seek redress; under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether the appellant having prayed primarily for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the licensing authorities to consider his application for an export licence for the half year current at the date of the petition ',without reference to the terms of the impugned notifications and policy statement" and that half year having long ago gone by, he could be granted any relief by the High Court on his petition or by this Court on his appeal. It is possible that in such circumstances a person situated like the appellant might be entitled to a declaration as regards the validity of the restrictions imposed which continue to be in force even beyond the half year or year to which the licence relates. It is however unnecessary to pronounce upon this question which does not really arise for consideration in view of the conclusion that we have reached that the restrictions and control to which the trade has been subjected are legal and justified by the Act and the Rules framed there under. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 68
Whether a confession made by the appellant and recorded by the Excise Inspector who was investigating the case is inadmissible by reason of the provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
Held that:- The learned judge apparently overlooked the fact that in the popular sense Excise Officers are also regarded as Police Officers, being referred to as "the Excise Police." Thus a consideration of the decisions of the High Courts in India shows that the preponderance of judicial opinion is in consonance with the view which we have already expressed. There is one more reason also why the confession made to an Excise Sub-Inspector must be excluded, that is, it is a statement made during the course of investigation to a person who exercises the powers of an officer in charge of a police station. Such statement is excluded from evidence by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the purpose of contradiction. Therefore, both by s. 25 of the Evidence Act as well as by s. 162, Cr.p.c. the confession of the appellant is inadmissible in evidence. If the confession goes, then obviously the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. Accordingly we allow the appeal' and set aside the conviction and sentences passed on the appellant.
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1963 (4) TMI 67
Whether the adoption of Venkayya was true and valid?
Whether Pitchayya and Chimpirayya were divided as alleged by the plaintiff?
Held that:- We cannot therefore hold that there is any such clear and unambiguous declaration of intention made by Chimpirayya to divide himself from Venkayya.
In our view, it is implicit in the expression "declaration'.' that it should be to the knowledge of the person affected thereby. An uncommunicated declaration is no better than a mere formation or harbouring of an intention to separate. It becomes effective as a declaration only after its communication to the person or persons who would be affected thereby. In this appeal there are only two members in the joint family and it is not suggested that Subba Rao did not have the knowledge of the terms of the will after the death of Chimpirayya.
In present case, it will have to be held that on the death of Chimpirayya his interest devolved on Subbarao and, therefore, his will, even if it could be relied upon for ascertaining his intention to separate from the family, could not convey his interest in the family property, as it has not been established that Subbarao or his guardian had knowledge of the contents of the said will before Chimpirayya died. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 66
To what relief the suspended workmen whose names are mentioned in list ’A’ are entitled ?
Whether the termination of employment of the workmen whose names are mentioned in list ’B’ was justified ?
Are they entitled to reinstatement and/or compensation ?
Held that:- Coming to the case of the four workmen whose services have been allowed to be terminated. Nothing was urged before us with respect to the order permitting termination of service. Nor do we think that the order of the tribunal in this behalf is wrong. In their case the tribunal has said that if the inquiry proceedings had not been defective, these four persons would be liable to dismissal as ordered by the appellant. It is only because there was defect in the inquiry proceedings as stated above that it was held that the dismissal was unjustified. The tribunal therefore went on to permit the termination of service of these four workmen under one of the standing orders and finally ordered payment of wages for, a period of one month alongwith compensation at the rate of 15 days average wages for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
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1963 (4) TMI 65
Whether the villages held by the appellant constitute an estate within the meaning of s. 2 (b) of the Bombay Act 47 of 1951?
If the villages constitute an estate, whether the exemption from payment of land revenue granted under the indenture is saved by sub-s. (3) of s. 3?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. By express provision the estate-holder is excluded from the benefit of sub-s. (3). The intention of the Legislature is clear: it is to withdraw the exemption in favour of the estate-holder from payment of land revenue if such right was granted under a cowl, That withdrawal is not to affect the rights of per-sons holding land in an estate under a special contract, or grant which was made or recognized by the terms of the cowl even if the right was to hold the land exempt from the payment of land revenue. The futility of the argument that the expression ",person" when it first occurs in sub-s. (3) includes the estate-holder, becomes obvious if the clause is read after substituting the expression "estate-holder" for "Person".
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1963 (4) TMI 64
Whether the partition by the deed dated March 14, 1947, between Nagappa and his sons, the plaintiffs, was a sham transaction?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The deed of partition was undoubtedly executed and was registered, but the mere execution of the deed is not decisive of the question whether it was intended to be effective. The circumstances disclosed by the evidence clearly shows that there was no reason for arriving at a partition. Counsel for the plaintiffs practically conceded that fact, and submitted that Nagappa's desire to defeat his creditors, and to save the property for his sons, was the real cause for bringing the deed of partition into existence. Counsel claimed however that Nagappa had adopted the expedient of effecting a partition with the object of putting the property out of the reach of his creditors, and the genuineness of that partition should not be permitted to be blurred by the unmeritorious object of Nagappa.
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1963 (4) TMI 63
Whether the expenditure of Rs. 3,19,766 incurred by the assessee in dismantling and shifting the factory from Sitalpur and erecting the factory and fitting the machinery at Garaul was expenditure of a capital nature and not revenue expenditure within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act ?
Whether the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the said expenditure of Rs. 3,19,766 ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The expenses for shifting and re-erection were incurred on capital account & the appellant cannot claim depreciation on the amount spent for acquiring an advantage. The questions referred was clearly correctly answered by the High Court in negative.
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1963 (4) TMI 62
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the common manager should be assessed under section 13 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act in respect of the agricultural income-tax payable by the persons jointly liable?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. We come to the conclusion that the answer which the High Court gave to the question was not correct.
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1963 (4) TMI 61
Whether the interim maintenance allowances received by the assessee under the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, are income and therefore liable to tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Question was answered correctly by the High Court by saying that the interim maintenance allowances received by the assessee which do not form part of the commutation amount are income and are liable to be taxed and that the payments made subsequent to April 1, 1950, towards commutation amount are not income and not liable to be taxed.
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1963 (4) TMI 60
In the event of the surplus being held to be income assessable to income-tax, whether the income should be ascertained by taking the market value of the shares as at the opening day of the year as the cost?
Whether there is any evidence on record to justify the Tribunal's finding that the assessee company was a dealer in shares not only in the year under consideration but in the years past ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It was open to the taxing authorities to consider the position of the assessee in 1943 for the purpose of determining how the gains made in 1944 should be computed, even though the subject of the assessment proceedings was the computation of the profits made in 1944. The circumstance that in an earlier assessment relating to 1943, the assessee was treated as an investor would not in our opinion estop the assessing authorities from considering, for the purpose of computation of the profits of 1944, as to when the trading activity of the assessee in shares began. The assessing authorities found that it began in 1943. On that finding the profits were correctly computed and the answer given by the High Court to the question of the computation of the profits was correctly given.
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1963 (4) TMI 59
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... ... ..... not be capable of moving. In our opinion, therefore, in the present case before us the transaction of the respondent with its customer of the nature evidenced by bill No. 12 is not a purely works contract but a combination of two distinct and separate contractsone for the supply or the sale of goods for consideration and the other for supply of work and labour, and so far as that part of the contract which consists of supply of goods for consideration is concerned, it is a sale as held by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. In the view that we are taking, the answer to the question which has been referred to us by the Tribunal on the present reference is that the transaction represented by bill No. 12 dated 3rd May, 1960, produced by the opponents amounts to sale and is taxable under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1959, in so far as it relates to the supply of goods mentioned therein. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petition. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 58
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... ... ..... an article which forms an identifiable constituent of the finished product and which along with others goes to make up the finished product. This explanation was brought into force only with effect from 10th January, 1962, and it is not contended that this has got retrospective effect. These petitions relate to applications by the petitioners for the blank forms for the period prior to 10th January, 1962. I am, therefore, not called upon to decide in these proceedings the scope and effect of the newly added explanation. The construction I have placed upon the provisions of section 3(3) of the Act is, therefore, without reference to the explanation. In the view I have taken of the scope of section 3(3) of the Act, it follows that the petitioners were entitled to the supply of the forms which they asked for under rule 22 of the rules in respect of transactions for the periods anterior to 10th January, 1962. The petitions are allowed in those terms. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 57
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... ... ..... erable volume which have been effected by the respondent-company during the years 1953-54 to 1956-57, the sale could not be said to have been done in the course of its business activity and, therefore, the respondent-company would not be a dealer as regards the said transaction. The business of the respondent-company was the manufacture of cloth. For the said business the company had from time to time replaced its old and unserviceable machinery by new machinery although such replacements of the old machinery by new machinery may have been necessitated for the purposes of the business of the company. The disposal of the old machinery for the purposes of replacing it by new machinery cannot be said to be a part of business of the respondent-company. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the question referred to us in the present case must be in the negative. We answer it accordingly. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the respondent. Reference answered in the negative.
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1963 (4) TMI 56
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... ... ..... It may be seen, therefore, that the question that has been raised in the instant case was not before the Court and was not decided in that case. In my opinion, the suo motu power of revision under section 32 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to revise an earlier order of assessment cannot be exercised before and until that order was communicated to the assessee, irrespective of whether such order resulted in tax or nil tax. I come to that conclusion both from the scheme of section 32 and also for the reason that no one can be asked to show cause against something of which he had never had notice or knowledge. The petition is allowed with costs and the rule nisi is made absolute. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. W.P. Nos. 933 and 935 of 1961.-The principle of the decision in W.P. No. 855 of 1961 will equally apply to the facts of these two petitions. The petitions are allowed and the rules nisi are made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 55
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... ... ..... M/s. Parasaram Parumal. These being the facts found, there cannot be any doubt that the applicant s course of business was to submit tenders for purchase of sugar, purchase the sugar and then hand it over to somebody else. There cannot be any doubt that this is a course of business, and the purchases made by the applicant have been in the course of the business. Our answer to the second question also is in the affirmative. As regards the third question, Mr. Joshi frankly conceded that answering the question would merely be academic, inasmuch as the Tribunal has already dealt with the questions of fact raised by the applicant and has recorded a finding against the applicant. Mr. Joshi, therefore, did not press this question. It is therefore not necessary to answer this question. In the result, we answer questions Nos. (1) and (2) in the affirmative, and record no answer to the third question. The applicant shall pay the costs of the respondent. Reference answered accordingly.
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1963 (4) TMI 54
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... ... ..... y that the State shall not discriminate. Mr. Thyagarajan has not been able to satisfy me by what act of the State or by what provision of the Act any discrimination in taxation resulted. Further, the requirements of equal protection is only that like should be treated alike. It is not the case of the petitioner that, among licensed dealers, some have been picked out for a differential treatment. What is more, so far as the assessment order for the year 1953-54 is concerned, the petitioner has no cause to complain on the ground of discrimination. It is only if and when he is called upon to pay tax on further transactions in the same goods after tanning that the question may arise at all. In my opinion, there is hardly any room, having regard to the Scheme of the Act, for the contention based on discrimination. That was the view I took in H. H. Naeems and Co. v. State of Madras 1964 15 S.T.C. 269. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 53
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... ... ..... eral principle, the concession of single point was made available by the Act but subject to certain restrictions and conditions. It is not the case of the petitioner that even though he complied with those conditions and restrictions, he was denied the benefit of the single point tax while those similarly situated were given that benefit. If a concession was given in those terms and the dealer did not comply with the requisites for getting that concession, hardly could there be any complaint of discrimination. There is also another way of looking at it. If a licensed dealer got the benefit of single point tax and the unlicensed dealer was taxed on the multi-point tax basis, it was not because the provisions of the Act themselves made any discrimination but because of the failure on the part of the dealer himself. I consider, therefore, that the impugned order cannot be held to be discriminatory. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 52
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... ... ..... lar adequate causes. It is settled rule of law that tribunals created by special statutes do not have larger powers than what the statute chooses to confer upon them. It is very difficult to conceive of any inherent jurisdiction in a Tribunal analogous to that of an inherent power of a Civil Court. Whatever that may be, where the special enactment confers a power of review to the Tribunal of its creation in restricted terms, it is implicit that the power cannot be enlarged or extended beyond the statutory restrictions, in the guise of an inherent power. The case in Natarajan Chettiar and Others v. State of MadrasI.L.R. 1960 Mad. 449. was a case in which there was no specific or special power by way of review under the particular statute. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the petitioner cannot obtain any relief once it is found that neither section 36(6)(a) nor section 55 would be applicable. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 51
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... ... ..... own Improvements Act of 1919 against an award of a Tribunal constituted under the said enactment. The Kerala High Court held in Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co. v. President, Cashew Industries A.I.R. 1962 Ker. 1 (F.B.)., that a civil proceeding that is contemplated under Article 133 is a proceeding in which rights to property or other civil rights are involved and that it is of no consequence whether such a proceeding arose out of a suit or out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Each case proceeded on its own facts and we do not think that any useful purpose would be served by referring to the numerous decisions on the subject. In our opinion, the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 cannot be sustained. In this view, it is not necessary to consider whether on the merits of the case, a certificate of fitness for leave should or should not be granted. The application fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100.
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1963 (4) TMI 50
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... ... ..... 1st April, 1958, the ordi- nary rule of construction would be that, those restrictions would apply irrespective of whether section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act was actually brought into force on 1st April, 1958, or not. 4.. The Tribunal s view was therefore right and the point of law raised by the department was so untenable that it should not have been taken up before the Tribunal or here. 5.. The answers to the questions are therefore as follows (i) The Tribunal was right in reducing the rate of sales tax to 2 per cent. for the quarter ending on 30th June, 1958. (ii) The Tribunal was right in its view regarding the applicability of the restrictions and conditions imposed in section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, in respect of declared goods, for the quarter ending 30th June, 1958. The reference is answered accordingly. The petitioner must pay costs to the opposite party. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 50 (fifty) only. MISRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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