Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1963 1963 (8) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 3 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 41 to 51 of 51 Records

• 1963 (8) TMI 35
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... pals had dealt with the goods in question they would not have been liable to pay licence fee on the turnover in question but because they had put through the transactions in question through an agent, their agent is liable to pay tax which in effect means that they are liable to pay tax. We do not think that this view of section 6 is correct. Both under the law of agency as well as under the Act, exceptions apart, the liability of the agent is co-extensive with that of his principals. Under section 11, an agent is taxed qua agent and not as a dealer. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the licence fee imposed on the petitioner and impugned in this writ petition is without the authority of law and therefore the same has to be quashed. Hence we issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of assessment impugned in this petition and detailed earlier. The respondents shall pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Assessment order quashed.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 34
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... essence of an offence, the person committing the act is not criminally responsible if he had no mens rea and the act was ordered or procured by another person but the person who ordered or procured the act is criminally responsible. It is a general principle of criminal law that there must be some blame-worthy condition of mind or mens rea. Therefore, on the reasoning in Govindarajulu v. State(4), unless it is shown that accused 1, 4 and 5 knew about the exclusion of certain items from the return or of its falsity, there can be no question of wilfulness much less mens rea so far as they are concerned. They cannot, therefore, be held criminally liable. In this view of the matter, the other petitioners, namely petitioners 1, 3 and 4 are entitled to an acquittal in this case. They are accordingly acquitted. The conviction and sentence of A-3 (petitioner 2) are confirmed. The fine, if recovered from the petitioners A-1, A-4 and A-5, will be refunded to them. Ordered accordingly.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 33
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... It is true that the Board did become the owner of the goods the moment they were delivered. But, it would be nothing incongruous or strange to hold that the property passed directly from the petitioners to the State Electricity Board. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the question whether the case of selling agency as put forward by the petitioners is well-founded or not. The onus is upon the department to show that there was a sale by the petitioners in favour of the Electric Company and that that was the first sale in the State of Madras. This they have failed to discharge and the assessment cannot therefore be supported. In the result, the petition is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. From what we have observed above it would follow that this turnover of Rs. 30,537 would not be taxable turnover and should not therefore be taxed. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs from the department. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 32
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ed day would still govern the rights of parties in the Telangana area. The law of court fees obtaining before that date in the State of Hyderabad is the Hyderabad Court Fees Act and, therefore, the Hyderabad Court Fees Act governs the proceedings arising out of that area. 7.. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the petitioner is not liable to sales tax on the sales effected by him in Fort Cochin prior to 1st October, 1957, under the General Sales Tax Act, 1125 and that he will be liable under that Act only for the sales effected by him on and from the said date. We decide accordingly. 8.. The same may perhaps be the position as regards the assessee s sales of tea stored on Willingdon Island and sold in Calicut. This must be investigated. 9.. The department will recalculate the assessee s liability in respect of the assessee s sales on the above basis and pass appropriate orders in the matter. 10.. The T.R.C. is allowed as above. No costs. Petition allowed.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 31
  

  Depreciation – Allowance of – Assessment year 1957-58 - Held,– Whether where loss was calculated on revaluation of stock-in-trade due to change in method of accounting, deduction of said loss was to be allowed as changed method of accounting had been followed even in subsequent year

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 30
  

  Whether there can be a valid agreement under Article 278 of the Constitution in respect of taxes leviable by the State and not leviable by the Government of India till an appropriate law is made by Parliament?

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. The Constitution gives a separate treatment to the subject of finance, and Article 277 saves the existing taxes etc. levied by States, if the conditions mentioned therein are complied with. While Article 372 saves all pre-Constitution valid laws, Article 277 is confined only to taxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before the Constitution. Therefore, Article 372 cannot be construed in such a way as to enlarge the scope of the saving of taxes, duties, cesses or fees. To state it differently, Article 372 must be read subject to Article 277. We have already held that an agreement can be entered into between the Union and the States in terms of Article 278 abrogating or modifying the power preserved to the States under Article 277.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 21
  

  Powers of Court to rectify register of members

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... e their names had found place in the list of contributories. Furthermore, the present petition is also considerably belated. The letter of allotment of shares to them was issued as far back as nth February, 1952, and the petition was lodged three years after, and no explanation has been given for this inordinate delay. In Jagan Nath v. Gopi Chand AIR 1915 Lah. 100(1) it was laid down A person who claims to have been misled by fraud or false representation into taking shares in a company should raise the objection without delay. The learned counsel for the respondents was not able to cite any authority to the contrary. The learned district judge should have dismissed the petition on the two short grounds elucidated above. For the above reasons the appeal is accepted and the order of the learned district judge directing rectification of the register of members of the company as prayed for by the petitioners is set aside. Their application stands dismissed with costs throughout.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 20
  

  Dividend manner and time of payment of

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... of opinion that the company should pay and bear the costs of the Jaipuria defendants who came to defend the suit on the questions of law and it is because of the declaration of the dividend by the company that they have defended the suit. It is true that they were added as defendants at their risk and expense. The added defendants who contested the suit assisted the court and, therefore, I am of opinion that the company should pay and bear their costs. One set of costs is to be divided amongst all persons who are contesting. There will be declaration in terms of prayers (c), (d), (e ), (ee) and (f), and an injunction in terms of prayers (g), (h ) and (hh). The plaintiff will also get costs paid by the company, because the plaintiff instituted the suit bona fide and in legitimate protection of the interest of shareholders. The remuneration of Mr. Khaitan, the receiver, is assessed at Rs. 1,000. The company will pay such remuneration. Certified for two counsel for all parties.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 6
  

  Penalty - Authorised representative - Adjudication - Hearing - Import Trade Control

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... icence the petitioner company was not permitted to import anything else but the permitted number and type of machine and its accessories under the licence. Since the petitioner company imported more machines than the licence permitted, the fact that it kept within the monetary limits of the licence did not absolve itself. 27. emsp It was lastly argued by Mr. Deb that the goods passed out of the Customs barrier and thereafter the Customs authorities could not pursue the goods and impose penalty upon the petitioner. This point has already been dealt with by Sinha, J in matter No. 169 of 1959 Lakshminarayan Ramnivas v. Collector of Customs and in His Lordship s opinion the Customs authorities are entitled to impose penalty even after the goods pass out of the customs barrier. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by His Lordship and for that reason I repel this branch of the argument. 28. emsp All the arguments advanced by Mr. Deb therefore, fail. This rule is discharged.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 2
  

  True interpretation of the meaning of the expression " escaped assessment " in section 11-A of the Central Provinces & Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (XXI of 1947) questioned

  Held that:- In this case the Commissioner assessed the appellant in respect of the turnover of the entire year without showing separately the assessment of tax payable in respect of each quarter. We cannot, tberefore, confine the relief to be given to the appellant in these appeals to the period barred under section 11A of the Act. We would, therefore, set aside the assessments in both the appeals giving liberty to the respondent to make the assessment separately for the periods not barred under section 11A of the Act either because return was filed, as in the first case, or because the last quarter was within the period of three years, as in the second case. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 1963 (8) TMI 1
  

  Whether the seizure as alleged by the prosecution has been proved?

  Held that:- We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the construction put by the High Court on the notification is right, and Lal Singh, being an officer in the District of Barmer which is mentioned in the Schedule, was an officer for the entire area which formed the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs. Delhi, including the place where the seizure was made, and was therefore competent to make the seizure.

  Here, however, there is an additional circumstance that a pointsman of the Railway, not expected to have so much gold in his possession, was carrying the gold which was, as already mentioned in six blocks and 22 bars apart from some small pieces and one pair of murkees. The total quantity was as much as 286 tolas and 11 annas, that is, about three kilograms. When all these circumstances are taken together, it is not possible to accept learned counsel's suggestion that he might be carrying the gold innocently having purchased it from somebody. In our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that all the ingredients of the offence under s. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act have been established. It may be mentioned that it has not been disputed before us that if we believe the story of the recovery of the gold from the appellant, the circumstances are sufficient to establish that Lal Singh seized the gold in the reasonable belief that these were smuggled goods. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

123