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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 67 Records
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1965 (10) TMI 88 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court I think the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Hiralal Nawalram's case ILR 32 Bom 505(FB) should be preferred to the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Moreover the facts of the present case are also more akin to the facts in Hiralal Nawalram's case ILR 32 Bom 505(FB) than to those in (FB). (58)I think the answer in the question referred to us should be as follows -- "The deed in question may be regarded as a conveyance under Article 19 of the Schedule to the Mysore Stamp Act 1957 hence it is unnecessary to consider whether the deed may also he regarded as a release under Article 44 of the said Schedule as under Section 6 of the Act the deed is chargeable to the higher Stamp duty as a conveyance under Article 19 of the said Schedule. (59) The papers will now be returned for being placed before the Division Bench for disposal of the Writ Petition. Hegde, J. (60) 'I agree' Tukol, J. (61) I agree' (62) Reference answered.
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1965 (10) TMI 87 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iff, for it has and can have no bearing on the question of limitation applicable to the plaintiff's suit. It is correct that the contract between the parties in this case did become void, or let us say was discovered to be void later, but the question still remains when it was discovered to be void the plaint is wholly silent on the point. As we are inclined to think, the contract became void on the coming into force of the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950, and must have also been discovered to be void at that very time, for the Constitution on this point spoke with no uncertain voice and it was hardly a matter of such legal complexity that the plaintiff or his legal advisers should not have been in a position to ascertain the correct state of law. In this view also the plaintiff cannot escape the bar of limitation. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, we make no order as to costs of this appeal.
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1965 (10) TMI 86 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re would be a negative burden on the assessee to disclose non-relevant facts. That cannot be the correct interpretation of clause (a) of section 34(1). A reason to believe that there was escarpment of assessment founded on a fact which is not a primary fact, which did not actually exist and in consequence of which there was actually no escapement cannot confer jurisdiction for invoking the provisions of clause (a). In such a case there is no ground or material which can give raise to reason to believe on the part of the Income Tax Officer that there was non-assessment as a result of non-disclosure 20. In the view we take of clause (a) of section 34(1) we must come to the conclusion that the action of the Income Tax Officer in initiating the proceedings under clause (a) was without jurisdiction and was, therefore, bad in law. Accordingly, out answer is in the negative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference. 21. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (10) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alt with the goods after the smuggling was over and was not in any way concerned with actual smuggling. He would therefore be guilty under s. 167(81) of the Act. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order the acquittal made by the High Court, restore the order of the Presidency Magistrate and confirm the sentence passed on Sitaram Agarwala by the Magistrate. 34. It also follows on facts found that Wang Chit Khaw is guilty under s. 167(81) inasmuch as he was dealing with prohibited or restricted goods and had the necessary knowledge and intent as required under that section. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, restore that of the Presidency Magistrate and confirm the sentence passed on him by the Magistrate. ORDER 35. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are allowed, the orders of the High Court are set aside, the orders of the Presidency Magistrate are restored and the sentences on the respondents are confirmed.
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1965 (10) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o relies on the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act No. 16 of 1955, in this Court. It is true that the appellant stated in its writ petition that it was holding a licence under the 1955-Act; but there was no clear averment in the petition that chloral hydrate was being manufactured as a medicinal preparation under the 1955-Act. The licence which has been produced shows that chloral hydrate is being manufactured under the Drugs Act and the rules framed thereunder. Further the judgment of the High Court shows that no argument was raised before it to the effect that chloral hydrate was a medicinal preparation under the 1955-Act. In the circumstances we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise this point for the first time before us, even though there was some kind of denial on this point by the State Government in its affidavit to which we have already referred. 14. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 83 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the sureties must be such persons as can in all cases be imprisoned in case of default. It must, therefore, be held that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was right in excluding artificial persons from the purview of the relevant provisions. 7. The learned counsel for the State has also taken an objection that by reason of section 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code only the sureties could apply to the Magistrate to discharge the bond executed by them. The accused persons were, according to the learned counsel, not competent to make the said application. In view of my decision on the merits I need not decide this question. 8. A further objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that the present revision is barred by time. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with the objection as to limitation, particularly because it appears to be a fit case for condonation of delay even if any. 9. In the result, the revision petitions fail and are dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... citor-General who appeared on behalf of the Assam Oil CO. In the present Case, the respondent did not give up any previous job in order to take service under the appellant. She had worked for a period of about 5 months with the appellant. Her appointment with the appellant was somewhat unusual because it was made on the recommendation of Sri B. Patnaik, the.. then Chief Minister of Orissa. There are no special circumstances for 'awarding compensation to two years' salary. Having regard to these considerations we are of opinion that the amount of compensation awarded by the. Labour Court to the respondent should be reduced and. the respondent should be granted a sum of ₹ 4,800 as compensation. She should also be paid 6% interest from the date of order of the Labour Court till the date of payment. We -accordingly modify the award of the Labour Court dated May 24, 1963 and allow the appeal to this extent. There will be no order as- to costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (10) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; In our view, this decision of the Supreme Court furnishes a complete answer to the question referred to us. It makes if deal that there is power of "review" both in cases where judgment has been delivered but not signed and cases in which judgment has been delivered, signed and scaled in the former case the power to alter or amend or even to change completely is unlimited provided notice is given to the parties and they are heard be before the proposed change is made, while in the latter case the power is limited and review is permitted only on very narrow grounds. We are therefore, of the view that (AIR 1961 All 326 1961 All LJ 244), ('supra) was rightly decided and our answer to the question referred to us is as follows "A judgment which has been orally dictated in open Court can be completely changed before it is signed and sealed provided notice is given to all parties concerned and they are heard before the change is made." Question answered.
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1965 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ey-lending and money-lenders) has to be mentioned and rejected. As the subject of the annuity deposit provisions is capable of being comprehended in the entry relating to taxes on income I do not feel called upon to invoke the aid of entry No. 97 by assuming that no entry covers such provisions. This will be a fundamental error in approach to such problems. The provisions are neither colourable nor discriminatory. The apply to upper income groups and this does not lead to discrimination. They are not colourable because, though called annuity deposits, they only defer payment of tax on part of the assessable income and the name does not matter at all. Instead of charging income-tax on the amount forthwith the amounts is ordered to be kept in deposit with Government, one-tenth being returned with interest every year. The returned amount then bears the tax. An election once made is final. 20. I agree, therefore, that the petition be dismissed with costs. 21. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason of any rule of res judicata or on analogy that the parity owner firm is entitled to invoke Art. 32 of the Constitution when it possesses no right of property in the leaves. It has only a contract in its favour and that is to a right of property. No doubt the Adhiniyam indirectly overreaches the decision of this Court but that, in any open to he State Legislature provided it passes a valid law to that effect. The law is not challenged as invalid and it must therefore apply to the petitioner firm, as to any other person. The petitioner firm cannot take shelter of Explanation I till it buys leaves from Government under the Adhiniyam and the Niyamavali. 21. In our judgment the rights of the petitioner firm such as they were, must be held to be no available to it. The petitioner firm must buy its leaves like any person. The petition must, therefore, fail. It will be dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to cost. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r a transaction which falls within the Explanation to article 286(1)(a) before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. It is merely a question of interpretation of the contract in the light of the statute and the sales-tax authorities are entitled to entertain the objection, if it be raised before them, that the transaction was not taxable because the State had no power to legislate in respect of an Explanation sale. But in this case, that stage was never reached. The taxpayers in the belief that they were liable to pay tax paid advance tax before any orders of assessment were made. Thereafter realising that they had committed a mistake filed suits for refund. Thereby they were seeking to obtain orders of refund of payments made under a mistake of law they were not seeking to set aside any order of assessment. 18. We agree thereof that the appeals should be dismissed with costs. 19. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... form of application for the registration there is column in which the salary or commission of the partners has to be a reason for refusing to grant registration for it is incumbent on the officer to grant the certificate if he is satisfied that there was a firm in existence constituted as shown in the instrument of partnership and that the application was properly made. The finding of the Tribunal is not there was on partnership or that the application was not properly made but that the profits were not correctly calculated as two of salary. This, in our opinion, will not be a ground for refusing registration. The finding that the net profits of the firm are reduced can not also be accepted, for the employees. The fact that two of the partners were discharging certain duties of employees will not make any difference. In the circumstances, our answer to the question is in favour of the assessee with costs. Counsels ₹ 250. 5. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (10) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... immediately while an order of detention takes effect from the date it is communicated. What we have to see is whether the detention under the fresh order passed on March 4, 1965 was legal when the petition for habeas corpus was made. As to that we have no doubt that it is legal. We therefore dismiss the petitions. Before we leave these cases we would like to refer to the inordinate delay that took place between the making of the petitions to the jail authorities and their reaching this Court. The petitions were made on March 15, 1965 but they reached this Court on April 12, 1965, exactly four weeks later. We consider that ordinarily one week is enough for any such petition to reach this Court, from any part of India. We also consider that it is the duty of the jail authorities to send such petitions directly and at once to this Court and indeed to the High Courts where they are addressed to them. We trust that there will be no such lapse again in future. Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 75 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... spondent having been brought on the record. As the present suit was brought by Parwati Devi for the benefit of herself and her two sons Shyam Sunder and Madanlal and her daughter Lali and her father-in-law Chatur Bhuj and her mother in-law Pyari Bai, we consider it safer to order that all those for whose benefit the deceased brought the present suit be allowed to be substituted in her place though, as we have made it abundantly clear, no question of abatement can possibly arise in a case like the present. We order accordingly. In the view of the matter the alternative contention raised by the state does not arise of all. ( 3. ) For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the objection raised by the legal representatives of the deceased Mst. Parwati Devi is without any force and we hereby overrule it. The case will be set down for hearing on the merits after due service has been effected on such of the persons whom Parwati Devi represented and have not so far been served. .
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1965 (10) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... besides some special class of persons allotments to whom would clearly come within public purpose. Merely because there is a possibility of the evicted person getting allotted the premises he had been evicted from, does not appear to us to be good reason for holding that the provisions of s. 6 of the Act do not apply to the requisitioning of premises when the premises became vacant on the eviction of a tenant by a Civil Court on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his own use. K. A. Nambiar is no. party to these proceedings and this should also prove fatal to the writ petition by the appellants when the appellants seek the quashing of the order of requisition and the order of allotment to K. A. Nambiar. We therefore agree with the High Court that the requisition order cannot be said to be mala fide. The result will be that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (10) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntage for himself to which he may not be lawfully entitled. This appears to be the scheme underlying s. 7(d) which disqualifies a person from being chosen, as a member of the Legislature if there subsists a contract entered into the course of his trade or business by him with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods or for execution of any works. If, on the evidence, subsistence of the contract which disqualifies a candidate is established, the Court would not be justified in refusing to give effect to its conclusion especially when the question vitally concerns the public in keeping out of the Legislature persons who have claims arising out of subsisting contracts against the Government. In our view the appeal ought therefore be allowed, and the order passed by the High Court set aside and the order of the Election Tribunal restored with costs in this Court and the High Court. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (10) TMI 72 - KERALA, HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tarwad are assessable under section 3 of the Act, the contention that the imposition of tax on "Hindu undivided family" is violative of article 14 of the Constitution on account of the exclusion of Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad from the scope of section 3 of the Act cannot stand. On the merits of O.P. No. 684 of 1959, I concur with Mr. Justice Velu Pillai that the plea raised under section 20(1) requires reconsideration by the Wealth-tax Officer. I am, therefore, of the view that O.P. No. 684 of 1959 has to be allowed. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 89. In view of the unanimous decision that O.P. No. 684 of 1959 should succeed on the merits, that petition is allowed, with directions to the Wealth-tax Officer to comply with section 20 of the Act before making a fresh assessment; and, in view of the decision of the majority in O.P. No. 674 of 1958, that petition also is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs in either of the petitions.
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1965 (10) TMI 71 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d been effected upto the 26th June 1954, and in the normal course, the price ought to have been paid by the defendant within a reasonable time of the deliveries, but the payment had been delayed for nearly three years and plaintiff was obliged to institute the present suit for recovery of the price. In such circumstances, it was within the discretion of the Court to award interest to the plaintiff at a reasonable rate on the amount of the price under Section 61 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act. The price was undoubtedly payable when the notice of demand (Ex. 2) was served by the plaintiff upon the defendant, and there can be no doubt that the rate of 6 per cent per annum which the Court awarded was a reasonable rate. Thus, no interference is called for against this part of the decree. 11. No other point was raised on behalf of the appellant. The decree of the trial Court must, therefore, be upheld. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Mahapatra, J. 13. I agree.
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1965 (10) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ants that he had admitted copies of those documents on the record. Nor did he give to the appellants an opportunity to meet the case which the State of Uttar Pradesh sought to make out. In our view the pro- ceedings of the Custodian-General were so wholly inconsistent with the procedure which may be followed in a judicial trial, that his order must be set aside and the proceedings remanded to the Custodian-General with a direction that he do call upon the State of Uttar Pradesh to formally tender in evidence such of the documents on which they rely, and that he do give an opportunity to the appellants in this appeal to tender such evidence as they desire to tender in support of their case. Thereafter the Custodian-General -shall hear both the parties on the evidence properly brought on the record. The appeal is allowed and the case is remanded to the Custodian-General for disposal according to law. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (10) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt by its order dated November 13, 1964. We, therefore, confirm- the order of the High Court, but for different reasons. We, however, desire to make it clear that our order does not affect the validity of the permit granted to the appellant by the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur in so far as it relates to the route within the limits of Bilaspur region. That is the ratio of the decision of this Court in M/s. Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company, Nowgaon v. Behari Lal Chaurasia and anr.( 1966 1 S.C.R. 485) in which it was pointed out that inter-regional permit when granted is valid for the region over which the authority granting the permit has jurisdiction even though it is not countersigned by the proper Regional Transport Authority with regard to the portion of the route outside that region. We accordingly dismiss this appeal. There will be no order as to costs. We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Iyengar who acted as amicus curiae in this case. Appeal dismissed.
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