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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 31 Records
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1966 (5) TMI 71
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... ... ..... affect the appellant's case. Secondly, he has argued that the notification is wholly inapplicable to the case in hand. In either case, in my opinion, the appellant cannot succeed because of our conclusion that no payments are proved to have been made as a result of the alleged, settlement. Reference to a Single Bench decision of this Court in Thakar Das Bagai v. Dr. C.N. Bhargava 1963 P.L.R. 1054, by Shri Bishamber Dayal is, therefore, hardly relevant. The decision in Abdulla Ahmed v. Animendra Kissen Mitter (1950) 1 S.C.R. 30, in which the rule of law laid down by Viscount Simon. Lord Chancellor in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper 1941 A.C. 108, that contracts with commission agents do not follow a single pattern and in each case one has to ascertain the express terms of a given contract, is also of little assistance to the appellant. 14. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. R.P. Khosla, J. 15. I agree.
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1966 (5) TMI 70
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... ... ..... e value of the seized assets. 8. That the impugned order dated 4th March, 1966 was not bad on the ground that all the necessary materials on which it was founded were not brought to the notice of the petitioner. 9. The seizure by the Superintendent of Central Excise Jaipur is referable to a proper authorisation by a competent authority and is therefore, not illegal. 10. It cannot be said that the Collector of Central Excise will not be having jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 11. The petitioner is not entitled to tender the gold under the Gold Bonds Scheme in view of the fact that it has been seized by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Jaipur and as the seizure by him was not in contravention of any law. 49. In view of what we have discussed above, we do not find any force in either of the two writ petitions which we accordingly dismiss with costs to the respondents. The hearing fee of counsel appearing for the respondents will be assessed at ₹ 500 in each case.
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1966 (5) TMI 69
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... ... ..... he notification from the mischief of Sub-clause (d) of Clause (1) of Article 19. 9. I may also in this connection refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court (majority) in (1963)1 SCR 491 (AIR 1962 SC 1406) to the effect that compensatory taxes were reasonable restrictions in the public interest for the purpose of Clause (b) of Article 304 of the Constitution. Though Article 304 may have no application for the reasons already stated, nevertheless the view taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as regards the reasonableness of the restrictions and such taxes being in public interest would equally apply in construing the same expression occurring in Clause (5) of Article 19. The other points urged by Mr. Ghosh are pure questions of fact which cannot be taken up in a writ petition in view of the vehement denial of the same by the other side. 10. For these reasons the petition is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee ₹ 100. Anwar Ahmad, J. 11. I agree.
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1966 (5) TMI 68
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... ... ..... ed by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not attracted and do not assist the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner admitted, and I think rightly, that the verification was defective and the Court could not make an order for winding up on this petition, and it was for that reason that he asked for leave to re-verify the petition. That being the position, in my opinion, re- verification of a winding up petition cannot be allowed, particularly because in this case the verification appears to have been done before a notary public, who under the rules is not an officer before whom a petition could be verified under the rules of this Court as also under the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. For the reasons mentioned above, the Court cannot proceed to make an order on the present petition nor can the Court give leave to the petitioner to re- verify the petition in conformity with the rules. In the circumstances, this application is dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel.
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1966 (5) TMI 67
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... ... ..... p as consisting of those Sunris who bore the surname Saha. All the courts in West 'Bengal, therefore, came to the conclusion that it had not been proved in this case that the appellant belonged to the smaller caste group of Sahas. We have no reason to take a different view of the evidence. The result then is, that the appellant is a Sunri by caste and has not been proved to belong to the smaller caste group of Sahas. He must be held to belong to the Scheduled Caste specified in item 40. That being so, the election petition must fail. Accordingly, we allow Appeal No. 931 of 1965 and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Election Tribunal dismissing the petition. The appellant will get the costs throughout. In the view that we have taken in Appeal No. 931 of 1965, the other appeal must necessarily be dismissed and we, therefore, dismiss it with costs. One set of hearing fees only. Appeal No. 931 of 1965 allowed. Appeal No. 1149 of 1965 dismissed.
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1966 (5) TMI 66
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... ... ..... g so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil proceeding alone. In a recent case Kochadai Naidu v. Nagavasami Naidu(I.L.R. 1961 Mad. 413.) Ramachandra lyer J., (as he then was) was called upon to consider the very question which arises before us. The learned Judge held that a proceeding before a civil court arising out of a reference to it under S. 146(1), Cr. P.C. can be transferred by the High Court or District Court under S. 24, C.P.C. because it is in any case a proceedings. He has also considered this question from the angle of the nature of the proceeding and expressed the view that the proceeding was a civil proceeding to which the procedure for suits could, with the aid of s. 141, C.P.C. be applied. If indeed the term "proceeding" in s. 24 is not confined to a civil proceeding there is no need whatsoever of taking the aid of S. 141, C.P.C. Upon this view we dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (5) TMI 65
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... ... ..... f the deponents of the affidavits and also of others; see ff. 6, 7 and 8. Rule 10 reproduces the restricted right of cross-examination given by s. 10. Rule 11 says that in all matters not provided by the rules, the Commission may decide its own procedure. One of the matters covered by the rules is cross-examination of witnesses. So the rules contemplate cross-examination as a matter of procedure and the Commission is free to decide what cross-examination it will allow provided that in doing so it cannot go behind the rules relating to cross-examination. Section 9 of the Act has to be read in the light of these rules. All this. we think, supports the interpretation we have put on s. 4(c). We also feel that the procedure before a body like the Commission has necessarily to be flexible. We, therefore, reject the last contention. In our view, for these reasons, the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported. We accordingly set it aside. The appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (5) TMI 64
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... ... ..... s for the production of the account books to satisfy himself that there is no taxable turnover of that person. In this case the learned Judge issued a writ in the nature of prohibition by relying on a decision of this Court in Panna Lal Babu Lal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. 1956 7 S.T.C. 722. That case would hardly govern these cases after the commencement of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act. That there is no patent want of jurisdiction was not present in the mind of the learned Judge. We have little doubt that if this aspect had been brought to the notice of the learned Judge, he would have declined to issue a writ in the nature of prohibition at the very threshold of the enquiry. In view of the foregoing discussion we are satisfied that these appeals should be allowed. We allow the appeals and set aside the order of the learned Judge and dismiss the writ petitions. Each of the respondents shall pay costs to the appellant, which we assess at Rs. 300. Appeals allowed.
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1966 (5) TMI 63
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... ... ..... ants were registered dealers and they made their returns under that section. Section 15 deals with production and inspection of accounts and section 24 enumerates the offences under the Act. The alleged offence committed by the appellants fell under section 24(1)(b) and (g). Their Lordships held as follows When the appellants submitted their returns they did so under section 10 of the Act and when they produced their accounts, they did so under section 15 of the Act. Therefore, both the making of the returns and the production of the accounts were done under the Act and cannot be said to be outside the provisions of the Act. The principle of that ruling must be applied here. 9.. In this view of the matter, section 26(2) of the Act applies to the omission on the part of a dealer to get himself registered. In the present case, the prosecution having been instituted after three months it has rightly been held to be barred by time. 10.. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (5) TMI 62
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... ... ..... ors were not liable to sales tax. The Supreme Court having reversed that position, I think there were legitimate grounds to review the said order. In this view the second contention of the petitioner-firm must be repelled. There remains then the third contention of the petitioner-firm. The four years period provided in section 11(2a) is from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the assessment is made. Even if the taxable period be a quarter yet the period of limitation provided under section 11(2a) has to be calculated from the end of the relevant year. That being so, the assessment order could, in any case, have been made at any time before 31st March, 1960, that is, four years from the end of the year 1955-56. The impugned order having been made on 17th November, 1959, the bar of limitation provided in section 11(2a) of the Act would not be applicable. In the result, this petition must fail and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (5) TMI 61
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... ... ..... Legislature intended that the power of review can be exercised without any bar of limitation and even after a 100 years. It follows that it was not open to the Assessing Authority to review the order dated 21st December, 1956, after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the year 1954-55. The hearing of notice for review was fixed for 8th April, 1959, that is, a date beyond the expiry of 4 years from the end of March, 1955. The bar of limitation being fully applicable it was legally not possible for the Commissioner to review his order dated 21st December, 1956, on 8th April, 1959. That being so, the petition must be allowed and a writ of prohibition issued to the Commissioner of Sales Tax restraining him from proceeding further in pursuance of the notice for review dated 18th March, 1959. In view of this it is not necessary to decide the other questions. The petition is, therefore, allowed as indicated above. The parties will, however, bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1966 (5) TMI 60
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... the result, in my opinion, the application shall be adjourned till the disposal of the pending Suit No. 2011 of 1963 filed by the respondent company, where if any amendment is sought to be made, an application must be made within 3 weeks from date. In case the suit is not proceeded with or it is decided in favour of the petitioning creditor, then the petitioning creditor will have liberty to mention and bring it on the list. The costs of this application are reserved. I have not considered the claims of the supporting creditors and I do not express any view about their claims or their rights. I do not, however, propose to give them any costs. The interim order dated 10th July, 1963, made by the Hon ble Mr. Justice B. C. Mitra will continue. Interim order restraining the respondent company from applying for an injunction against the petitioning creditors restraining him from proceeding with the winding-up application will stand modified to the extent of the order made herein.
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1966 (5) TMI 51
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... ... ..... From the fact that special provision had to be made in the Code of Civil Procedure authorising the secretary to sign the pleadings indicates that otherwise he would not have been so authorised and such an authority given under the special law cannot lead to the conclusion that the secretary has also an authority either to borrow loans or to bind the corporation by acknowledging liabilities We are, therefore, fully satisfied that in this case the letter (exhibit 1) dated of the 16th April, 1946, did not amount to acknowledgment and was not sufficient to extend the limitation. Both the suits must, therefore, be dismissed on this ground. We need not consider any other aspect of the matter as it is sufficient to dispose of all the three appeals. The result, therefore, is that Appeals Nos. 441 and 442 of 1950 filed by the corporation are allowed while Appeal No. 198 of 1952 filed by the company is dismissed. The corporation will get costs in both the suits and in both the courts.
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1966 (5) TMI 50
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... s Act, 1948. I have arrived at my conclusion on the construction of section 95 and I do not think it is necessary to rely on section 96. That conclusion disposes of the action, but I will mention shortly one further issue which arose. It was contended by the defendants that on its true construction the letter of authority represented, not an assignment by way of charge, but an absolute assignment, and that section 95 did not apply to it on that ground. Having decided that the charge is not a charge on book-debts, it is not necessary for me to give a decision on this second issue, but as I have heard argument upon it, I will say simply this that the letter of authority beyond question represented an assignment by way of charge. I propose, therefore, to dismiss this action. Action dismissed. The first defendant to pay the plaintiff s costs, the liquidator s costs being costs in the liquidation. Solicitors Sole Sawbridge and Co., Denton Hall and Burgin Solicitor, Board of Trade.
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1966 (5) TMI 38
Winding up – Fraudulent preference, Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.
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1966 (5) TMI 37
Whether the power under article 11 to refuse registration of the transfer is a discretionary power?
Held that:- Cannot accept the contention that the petition was liable to be dismissed because the State of Orissa had asked for registration in the name of the Secretary, Finance Department. No such objection was taken by the company, although it had taken numerous other objections. Moreover, by letter dated December I, 1953, Shri S.K. Mandal, the attorney for the State of Orissa, had definitely called upon the company to record the name of the State as the owner of the shares in the share register. In spite of this letter, the company refused to make the necessary registration.
The Maharaja of Mayurbhanj has ceased to be the owner of the shares. The State of Orissa is now their owner, and has the legal right to be a member of the company and is entitled to say that the company should recognise its membership and make an entry on the register of the fact of its becoming a member and its predecessor-in-title having ceased to be a member. The name of the State of Orissa has, without sufficient reason, been omitted from the register and there is default in not entering on the register the fact of the Maharaja having ceased to be a member. The court's jurisdiction under section 38 is, therefore, attracted. The High Court rightly ordered the rectification in the exercise of its summary powers , under section 38. The jurisdiction created by section 38 is very beneficial and should be liberally exercised. We see no reason why the court should deny the applicant relief under section 38. The directors of the appellant company on the most frivolous of objections have prevented the State of Orissa from becoming a member for the last 16 years. It is a matter of regret that justice has been obstructed so long. There is no merit in this appeal.
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1966 (5) TMI 36
Company Law Board – Appeal against orders of, Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases, Power of inspectors to carry investigation into affairs of related companies
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1966 (5) TMI 14
Whether the shares in question held by the trustees under the Second Trust are held for the benefit of the three minor children mentioned in the Second Trust deed?
Held that:- The word " benefit " in the context means for the immediate benefit of the individual or his wife or minor child. If a property is transferred to trustees to hold in trust for the life of A and then for B, we cannot hold that the property is held for the benefit of B during the lifetime of A. As will appear later, under the Second Trust, the trustees hold the trust property for the benefit of the charitable trust for a number of years before they start holding it for the benefit of the minor children. It is difficult to say that while the property is being held for the benefit of the charitable trust, it is also being held for the benefit of the minor children.
Thus considering the document as a whole the shares were not held for the benefit of the three minor children as on March 31, 1958, and March 31, 1959. Accordingly the answer to the question referred by the Appellate Tribunal and set out above must be against the revenue
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1966 (5) TMI 13
Whether an advocate of the High Court of Bombay is liable to pay income-tax on his receipts?
Held that:- The receipts were not chargeable to tax either under the head of professional income or under the residuary head. It was not said that the receipts might be brought to tax under any other head. In our opinion, therefore, the receipts were not chargeable to tax at all. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (5) TMI 12
Seizure of account books ... ... ... ... ..... Government to apply the provisions not of the Customs Act 1962 but, the Sea Customs Act, 1878 but we find that by virtue of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act references to the Sea Customs Act may here be construed as references to the Customs Act Section 178 of the Sea Customs Act made provision for seizure of property and this provision has been re-enacted with modification in Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962. Accordingly we see no merit in this petition which is therefore dismissed.
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