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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 107 Records
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1966 (9) TMI 128
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... ... ..... venue. It appears that it was conceded in that case that no notice of assessment had been served on the assessee. Whether that admission is correct or not, is not relevant for our present purpose. Suffice it to say that this Court decided that case on the basis of an admission. Therein this Court further observed In this case it is unnecessary to decide what exactly is meant by notice of assessment . That question can be decided in an appropriate case if and when necessary. It has now become necessary to decide as to what is meant by the expression notice of assessment . For the reasons already mentioned by us, we are of the opinion that service of a notice in Form No. 6 is a service of a notice of assessment and the assessee having been served with that notice nearly 5 years prior to his filing the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, his appeal was clearly barred by time. In the result, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 127
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... ... ..... ate of Orissa v. Tulloch and Co. Ltd. 1964 15 S.T.C. 641.). And it is submitted that from the invoices and the bills issued by McDowell and Co., Ltd., to the petitioner it would be clear that tax has been paid in respect of the transactions by McDowell and Co., Ltd., Shertallai, and that if the point had been taken by the respondent at the time of hearing before him, the petitioner would have adduced unimpeachable evidence to show that the tax has been paid by McDowell and Co., on the basis that sales effected by it to the petitioner are the first sales. I therefore overrule this contention. I quash exhibits P-3 and P-4 the orders of assessment so far as they relate to the turnover of the sales of beer for the years in question as specified in the writ petition. The petition is allowed to this extent only. In other respects, it is dismissed. The respondent will compute the tax on this basis and issue fresh demands. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 126
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... ... ..... to be struck down. Those assessments are for 1962-63 in W.P. No. 1160 of 1965 with penalty thereon (W.P. No. 1161 of 1965), for 1963-64 in W.P. No. 1122 of 1965 and a provisional assessment for 1964-65 in W.P. No. 1159 of 1965. All these are linked in a chain as consequential assessments on the basic assessment, and everyone of them will have to be investigated in the light of the detailed explanations sought to be furnished by the assessee. We, therefore, direct that the writs would issue striking down the assessments and that the detailed explanations of the assessee now supplemented by further detailed statements, should be taken up and considered, and the assessment carried through again in due compliance with the requirements of law, and the principles of natural justice. The concerned assessee is directed to withdraw the appeals pending before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, in view of the allowance of the writs. Parties will bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 125
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... ... ..... hinks fit are three independent powers and all those powers should be exercised within the time fixed in section 21(3). They are all facets of one single power, namely, the power to revise and that power is exercisable within the time mentioned in section 21(3). We are also unable to agree with Mr. Srinivasan that the power to call for records under section 21(2) is not a part of the quasijudicial power of the Commissioner to revise the orders of his subordinates. The power to call for records is a part of the revisional power of the Commissioner. The expression shall be exercisable found in section 21(3) refers to the commencement of the exercise of the power referred to, and not the completion of the exercise of that power. Like all periods of limitation, section 21(3) also refers to initiation of the proceedings and not its completion. For the reasons mentioned above, these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 124
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... ... ..... g properties or even disposal of properties with a view to make such properties unavailable for realisation of arrears of tax may amount to fraudulent evasion of tax. Fraudulent evasion has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. A person who may have the intention to pay tax may not be able to pay it due to loss in business or similar other circumstances. It cannot be said that non-payment of tax under those circumstances is fraudulent evasion. In this case though the petitioner had not paid the tax in spite of notice for a long time, there is no evidence to infer that he evaded payment fraudulently. On the other hand, there is evidence to show that he disputed the validity of the assessment. The prosecution has not made out the offence under section 45(2)(b) of the Act against the petitioner in all these cases. These revisions are allowed. The convictions and sentences in each case are set aside. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 123
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... ... ..... rmises. The conjectures in this case are that, though the goods were carried only on two days in the year, i.e., on 12th September, 1964, and 9th February, 1965, similar goods have been carried during every week of the year. There is no material whatever for thinking that similar goods have been carried on any other day during the year of assessment. Notwithstanding the non-availability of material the assessing authority has assumed that every week of the year similar quantities have been carried by him through the check post. This assumption is without any basis. I therefore think that I should interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution and I quash exhibit P-1 order and allow this writ application. This of course will not preclude the assessing authority from requantifying the turnover and making any fresh assessment on the petitioner in the light of what is stated above and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in this petition. Petition allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 122
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... ... ..... act, sub-section (3) of the amended section 46 is to the effect that where the prescribed authority passes an order refusing to allow composition, it should record in writing the reasons therefor. I am, therefore, of the opinion that even under the old section 46, a dealer will have right of revision, as composition can only be held to be a proceeding recorded under the Act. It therefore follows that a revision will lie to the Deputy Commissioner under section 33 and to the Board of Revenue under section 35 of the Act. My view is strengthened on account of the fact that, under rule 53 of the Rules, the prescribed authority exercises the powers specified in section 46 of the Act subject to the control and direction of the Deputy Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. Such control and direction can effectively be done only in revisions to them. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. Rule nisi will be made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 121
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... ... ..... ncome-tax Act, 1922, giving the assessee also a right to move the Commissioner to exercise revisional powers. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer 1965 57 I.T.R. 349. is on section 33-A and could therefore afford little assistance. The unreported decision of the Supreme Court, to which we have referred, as well as the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council, though no doubt on provisions in different Acts which are pari materia, sets at rest even a lurking doubt as to the ambit of the powers conferred under section 20 of the Act. It is unnecessary in this view to decide the other questions namely whether the assessee has a right to have personal hearing. In the view we have taken, the revisions before the Board are not maintainable and the appeals are also not maintainable and are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 25 in each case except Special Appeal 1 of 1963 in which no costs are allowed. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 120
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... ... ..... ey . The words deferred payment or other valuable consideration used in section 2(h) of the Act, merely enlarge the ambit of the consideration beyond cash , but they do not, in my opinion, carry it outside the scope of the term money . The words other valuable consideration are general as compared with the two preceding more specific terms cash and deferred payment . Cash and deferred payment are also considerations. Hence, all the conditions for the applicability of the ejusdem generis rule are satisfied and the expression other valuable consideration can and must be interpreted restrictively here. It seems intended to cover cheques and promissory notes or negotiable instruments which serve the purpose of money in modern commercial practice and usage and which can be included in the concept of money . For the reasons given above, I concur with the interpretation of the definition of sale in section 2(h) of the Act given by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (9) TMI 119
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... ... ..... admittedly the petitioner did not produce before the Sales Tax Officer the declarations which it should have produced for claiming the benefit of the rate of tax laid down in section 8(1) of the Act. The production of the declarations before the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax was of no avail and the Additional Commissioner was right in not taking any notice of the C Form declarations produced before him. If he had given effect to those declarations, he would have acted contrary to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8 requiring that the declarations must be furnished before the taxing authority and before the assessment. 8.. For these reasons, the assessment order made against the petitioner-firm must be upheld. The result is that this application is dismissed with costs of the respondents. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Application dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 118
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... ... ..... , we have applied what is called the golden rule of interpretation thus stated by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson(1) In construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. The literal rule of interpretation is enough to meet cases of interpretation where no complexities are present. But, in a case where the situation is complicated by features which make it impossible to apply the literal rule reasonably, other rules of interpretation which may be applicable have to be used. What is known as the golden rule generally involves an application of several rules of interpretation in order to get the final result. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (9) TMI 117
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... ... ..... hing to do with the question of the liability having been incurred. We are of the view that the case falls within the first part of the proviso and the fact that the assessment was completed in 1961, that is, after the Madhya Bharat Act was repealed and the penalty was actually imposed thereafter, is of no consequence. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Sales Tax Authorities were right in not only assessing the petitioner under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act but also in imposing the penalty under that Act. The fact that there is no provision in the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act corresponding to section 14(1)(e) of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act is of no consequence so far as this petition is concerned. 7.. No other ground was urged before us. 8.. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 150. The outstanding amount of the security deposit, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 116
The State Legislature has no power to legislate for recovering tax improperly collected from a person who under the State legislation relating to sales tax is not liable to pay tax - Appeal allowed. The order passed by the High Court must, therefore, be set aside and the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal must be restored
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1966 (9) TMI 108
Whether for purposes of section 5(2) of the Act read with rule 4-A(iv)(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939 the respondents were the dealers who bought the cotton in the State and were the last dealers not exempt from taxation under section 3(3) of the Act on the amount for which the cotton was bought by them?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The liability to be taxed attaches if the purchase itself by the dealer is within the State. In the case of the sales in question, therefore, the buyers who purchased the cotton bales from the respondents were the last dealers who bought those cotton bales in the State and the single point tax under section 5(2) of the Act had to be levied from them and not from the respondents.
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1966 (9) TMI 102
Whether under section 52(1)(e) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 any tax was payable in respect of the sales of "patasa", "sakar ", "bura sugar", "harda" and "alchidana"?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. To be groundnut oil two conditions had to be satisfied-it must be from groundnut and it must be "oil". The hydrogenated oil was from groundnut and in its essential nature it remained an oil. It continued to be used for the same purpose as groundnut oil which had not undergone the process. It was further stated the mere fact that hydrogenated oil was semi-solid did not alter its character as an oil. For the reasons already expressed we hold that the decision of the Gujarat High Court dated December 11, 1962, is correct
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1966 (9) TMI 97
Whether Parliament can enact a law imposing tax on the supply of materials used in building contracts?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. We consider that the orders of assessment of sales tax made by the respondent for the two assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 are illegal in so far as the hire-purchase transactions are included in the computation of the taxable turnover of the appellant. We accordingly hold that these appeals should be allowed and a writ in the nature of certiorari should be granted for quashing the orders of assessment made by the respondent for the two assessment years in question and that a writ in the nature of mandamus should be issued ordering the respondent to make fresh assessments in accordance with law
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1966 (9) TMI 90
SALE OR WORKS CONTRACT — CONSTRUCTION OF COACH BODIES ON UNDERFRAMES SUPPLIED BY RAILWAY — LIABILITY TO SALES TAX
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1966 (9) TMI 82
Whether the turnover from the goods sold by the Company was taxable?
Held that:- As already set out in dealing with "kolsi", we are of the view that waste caustic liquor may be regarded as a by-product or a subsidiary product in the course of manufacture and the sale thereof is incidental to the business of the Company and the turnover in respect of both "kolsi" and "waste caustic liquor" would be liable to sales tax.
The answer recorded by the High Court on the first question will be modified as follows: "In the negative, except as to 'kolsi' and waste caustic liquor."
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1966 (9) TMI 70
Appointment of sole selling agent ... ... ... ... ..... he applicants are selling agents of the company. The provision in clause 2 of the agreement that the applicants guaranteed the fulfilment of the contracts by merchants and the provision in clause 5 that the applicants shall be responsible to a limited extent for non-payment of any amount by the merchants are the usual provisions in a sole selling agency agreement and negative the relationship of master and servant. The agreement, read as a whole, leads to one and only one conclusion, namely, that this is an agreement between a principal and agent and not an agreement between a master and servant. I am, therefore, of the view that the legal relationship between the company and the applicants under the Agreement was not that of master and servant and the applicants were not employees of the company within the meaning of clause 6 of the scheme. The claim made by the applicants in the summons must, therefore, be rejected. The summons, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 69
Loans to directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... tor to the company is extinguished on his death. On the other hand, they pointed out It is the language of section 235 of the Act that decides the issue. It was a limited right. It ended when Gopalacbariar died. We are not concerned with the question whether the liquidators have any other remedies against the estate of the deceased Gopalachariar. All we are concerned with is to answer the question we have set out above Can the proceedings under section 235 of the Act be continued against the deceased Gopal achariar? That was the limited scope of the decision of the learned judges and that decision does not support the argument that the suit to recover money from the defendants based on the liability created by section 86D of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, would abate on the death of the concerned director. It follows that these revision petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in C. R. P. No. 872 of 1966. There will be no order as to costs in the other revision petitions.
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