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Showing 41 to 60 of 106 Records
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1967 (4) TMI 177
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... ... ..... ed to get refunded is the tax relating to the turnover ending with 25th January, 1960. The total amount of sales tax and surcharge that the petitioner will be entitled to get by way of refund in respect of the years 1950-51 to 1958-59 is Rs. 31,216.76. I direct the respondents to refund this amount to the petitioner. The amount of sales tax for the year 1959-60 is Rs. 2,709.80 and the surcharge Is Rs. 67.74. The amount collected by the 1st respondent on account of the turnover from 1st April, 1959 to 25th January, 1960, has to be ascertained. The petitioner is directed to move the 1st respondent for determination of the turnover in respect of the aforesaid period, and the sales tax and surcharge collected on account of the said turnover. The respondents will refund to the petitioner the amount of sales tax and surcharge recovered in respect of the said turnover. The original petition Is disposed of in the manner stated above. I make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1967 (4) TMI 176
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... ... ..... Bill subsequently became an Act of the Legislature. Whatever may be the purpose of this amending Act, we have certainly no doubt in our minds that the total turnover of an agent in respect of several principals cannot be computed for assessing him when in fact the transaction of each one of the principals is below the non-taxable limit, i.e., Rs. 10,000 each. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the further contention of Mr. Anantha Babu that the provisions of section 11, if the interpretation given to it by the department and suggested by the learned Government Pleader is accepted, are discriminatory and, therefore, contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. The result is that the Commercial Tax Officer is prohibited from acting otherwise than in accordance with what has been observed above. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. The T.R.C. is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 75 in each. Writ petitions allowed and tax revision case dismissed.
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1967 (4) TMI 175
Whether section 18(4) takes away the right of election of the assessment year conferred on every dealer by the first proviso to section 7 read with rule 39(1)?
Whether tax is to be imposed on a new dealer on his turnover computed in accordance with section 18(4) in spite of his election of the assessment year by filing quarterly returns?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Rule 41(5) cannot be read so as to modify an express provision of the Act. The statutory obligation imposed upon the authority to tax the dealer under sub-section (4) of section 18 remains absolute for the year following immediately the year in which the business was commenced by the dealer, and the method prescribed for determination of the turnover must be applied.
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1967 (4) TMI 174
Whether on the facts proved in this case the turnover in dispute can be held to be the turnover of confectionery sold in sealed containers?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The judgment of the High Court set aside and the question answered in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P.. As observed by the High Court, that the idea underlying the notification was to benefit small dealers, but with respect, small dealers may also sell confectionery in sealed containers. It may be that the idea underlying the exemption was, at least, partly administrative. It is difficult to check small sales made loose or in unsealed small packets. Be that as it may, in the context it is difficult to give to the expression "sealed container" a meaning different from the ordinary dictionary meaning
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1967 (4) TMI 173
Whether the purchaser of business carried on by a dealer as defined in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 can be made liable for arrears of sales tax due from the dealer in respect of transactions of sale which took place before the transfer of the business under rule 21-A of the Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government by section 19 of the Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Even on the assumption that the respondent undertook to pay the arrears of sales tax due by the transferor, it does not follow that there is a liability created inter se between the State Government on the one hand and the transferee on the other hand. To put it differently, it is not open to the State Government to rely on the instrument inter vivos between the transferor and the transferee and to contend that there is any contractual obligation between the transferee and the State Government who is not a party to the instrument
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1967 (4) TMI 169
Whether, on a proper interpretation of section 11, sub-sections (4) and (5), of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, the period of limitation is three years for making the assessment from the last date on which the return is to be filed, as held by the Punjab High Court, or whether the connotation and effect of the language of section 11(4) and (5) is that the order of assessment is valid even if it is made after a period of three years provided the necessary notice is issued within a period of three years from the last date on which the return is to be filed?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. In the present case that the proceedings for assessment of sales tax taken against the respondent by the Assessing Authority are legally valid, because the assessment in question being for the year 1957-58, the notice with regard thereto in Form S. T. XIV had been issued and served upon the respondent on January 2, 1960, and the proceedings for assessment were initiated in time within the period prescribed under section 11(5) of the Act. It follows therefore that the respondent has made out no case for the grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the proceedings for assessment of sales tax for the year 1957-58 taken against him by the appellants.
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1967 (4) TMI 167
Jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner - Held that:- Appeal allowed. High Court was in error in holding that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner was barred, because the order of "nil assessment" was not communicated and on that account the period for filing the appeal had not expired, and therefore the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner could not be exercised.
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1967 (4) TMI 166
Principle of res judicata - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. To make a person a privy he must have acquired an interest in the subject-matter of action by inheritance, succession or purchase subsequent to the action or he must hold the property subordinately, i.e., as a sub-lessee. In the present case, Gendalal does not claim his interest in the partnership through Lalji and it follows therefore that the principle of res judicata cannot be invoked in this case.
Thus counsel for the appellants is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.
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1967 (4) TMI 137
Whether the penalty should have been imposed on the entire turnover assessed to tax under section 21 or should have been imposed only on the basis of the turnover which had been concealed or incorrectly disclosed during the proceedings under section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act?
Whether the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer on 31st March, 1957, was one imposing a penalty both under clauses (b) and (c) of section 15-A or only under section 15-A(b)?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The penalty under section 15-A(1)(b) of the Act should have been imposed on the entire turnover assessed to tax under section 21, that is to say, on the turnover concealed from or incorrectly disclosed in the return submitted under section 7 and not in any statement submitted by the assessee under the proceeding under section 21 of the Act. It follows therefore that the High Court has correctly answered the first question against the assessee.
The power to impose penalty is conferred upon the assessing authority, and he is not required to impose any fixed penalty. Only the maximum amount of penalty is indicated in the appropriate sections. The Judge (Revisions) has pointed out that the assessing authority has not imposed any penalty under section 15-A(1)(c). That order was made within his competence, and unless that order is set aside by appropriate proceedings under the Act, there can be no additional penalty imposed upon the assessee. It is also possible to take the view that the penalty imposed was a composite penalty both under clauses (b) and (c) of section 15-A(1). In our opinion, the second question does not require to be answered in the present reference because it has become academic.
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1967 (4) TMI 136
Sales tax liability - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is true that sections 3 and 4 speak of "a year", i.e., the financial year, and it is only the turn- over during that year that is liable to taxation in the hands of the assessee, but section 4 has to be read with the Second Schedule, and reading section 4 with the Second Schedule, it seems to us clear that a dealer is not liable to pay a tax on the purchases until the purchases acquire the quality of being the last purchases inside the State.
we agree with the Madras High Court that the assessee is right in contending that he was entitled to claim deduction in respect of the value of the stock of ₹ 2,27,250 as being the purchases other than last purchases of cotton.
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1967 (4) TMI 134
Whether Travancore Rubber and Tea Co., hereinafter referred to as the assessee, was not a "dealer" within section 2(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The petitioner in the Instant case owns considerable lands which he cultivates and gets agricultural produce from them. He has also a business. The accounts of the two are separately maintained (which fact the Assistant Commissioner admits in his order in Appeal No. 5060/I.A. 6 of 1954) and the income from agriculture can. be clearly separated from the income of his other business. There is nothing to show that the petitioner acquired these lands with a view to doing 'the business of selling or supplying' agricultural produce.
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1967 (4) TMI 131
Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Punjab Act 46 of 1948) as amended by Punjab Act of 1958, relating to three categories of goods, namely, oil-seeds, iron and cotton
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.Pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act before it was amended, Act 7 of 1958 added clause (ff) to section 2 of the principal Act fixing the same stage indicated by section 15 of the Central Act, i.e., the stage when the purchase is made by a dealer for use in the manufacture of goods. This section was amended by Act 13 of 1959, and Act 24 of 1959. Under the later amendment in clause (ff) of section 2 for the words "goods for use in the manufacture of goods for sale" the words "goods specified in Schedule 'C' for use in the manufacture of goods for sale" were substituted, that is to say, the stage for taxation prescribed in the earlier definition was amended. It may be recalled that under the Central Sales Tax Act, as amended, the description of the stage was omitted, but that does not affect the question, for that description is maintained even under the amended clause (ff). It follows from the said discussion that the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, during the crucial period which is the subject-matter of these appeals, in terms fixed a stage for taxation, i.e., the stage of purchase by a dealer for use in the manufacture of goods. There are, therefore, no merits in this contention either.
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1967 (4) TMI 124
Whether Section 2(c) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, defines a "dealer" as meaning "any person who carries on the business of selling goods in West Bengal and as including the Government"?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The material facts of this case are closely parallel to those in the present case and it must be held that the appellant was not carrying on the business of selling goods and was not a "dealer" within the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act 6 of For these reasons we hold that the appellant did not carry on the business of selling goods in West Bengal and therefore was not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act and the question referred to the High Court under section 21(3) of the Act must be answered in the negative and in favour of the appellant. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court dated November 26, 1964, and allow this appeal with costs.
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1967 (4) TMI 114
Time limit of furnish the declarations in Form 'C' - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The third proviso to rule 6(1) is ultra vires of section 8(4) read with section 13(3) and (4) of Central Sales Tax Act. It follows therefore that the assessee was not bound to furnish declarations in Form 'C' before February 16, 1961, in the present case. In the absence of any such time-limit it was the duty of the assessee to furnish the declarations in Form 'C' within a reason- able time, and in the present case it is the admitted position that the assessee did furnish the declarations on March 8, 1961, before the order of assessment was made by the Sales Tax Officer. Thus the assessee has furnished the declarations in Form 'C' in the present case within a reasonable time and there has been a compliance with the requirements of section 8(4)(a) of the Act. It follows that the High Court was right in quashing the order of assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer and directing him to make a fresh order of assessment after taking Into consideration the declaration forms furnished by the assessee on March 8, 1961.
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1967 (4) TMI 110
Whether the stage of levy is definite and ascertainable and there is no possibility of the tax being levied at more than one stage?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The High Court has sustained the levy of tax under the original notification of 1958, on the basis of section 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, which, in our opinion, does not assist the State. It is not open to the State to urge that it is entitled, in the matter of levying tax on transactions by way of purchase, to tax only the category of purchases for use in the manufacture of goods for sale. Further, the State has not been able to satisfy us that there is any reasonable classification made, which will enable this Court to sustain the notification. Inasmuch as no fresh notification had been issued, under section 5(1), till September 26, 1961, the assessment for the years 1960-61 and 1961-62, on the basis of the notification issued in 1958, cannot be sustained, on this additional ground also.
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1967 (4) TMI 102
Order of "nil assessment" under section 11 of Act 9 of 1939 - Held that:- Appeal allowed. There was, however, no assessment of tax against the respondents. There could be no appeal against the order of "nil assessment" under section 11 of Act 9 of 1939 and no bar to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Act could arise. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in holding that because "the order of nil assessment" was not communicated, the respondent could not appeal against that order, and the time for appealing against that order had not expired within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 32 of Act 1 of 1959. We are unable also to agree with the High Court that in an appeal under section 11 of Act 9 of 1939 an assessee may object to a mere statement setting out the sales and purchases during the course of his business, or even his turnover.
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1967 (4) TMI 84
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... ntention that the court has no jurisdiction to direct re-payment. Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules is an additional reason why I am inclined to accept the contention that the company court has jurisdiction to direct refund under section 536(2) of the Companies Act. No other points are raised before me. In the result, therefore, in C.A. No. 85 of 1965 there will be an order against the creditor-bank directing refund of Rs. ,000 with interest at 6 per annum from the date of application (of the official liquidator), February 25, 1965, to date of payment and proportionate costs. C. A. No. 85 of 1965 is therefore decreed in part with proportionate costs. C. A. No. 134 of 1965 is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the respondent bank submits that, inasmuch as C. A. No. 85 of 1965 is decreed in part, the creditor bank should be permitted to prove its debt before the official liquidator. It is permitted to do so within six weeks from today.
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1967 (4) TMI 83
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... higher offer Soundararajan v. Mahomed Ismail AIR 1940 Mad. 42. The Travancore High Court had occasion to consider the question in Kochappi Vasudevan v. Habeeb Asanaru Pillai 1944 TLR 665. There, the liquidator of a company sold a property in public auction with the previous sanction of the court. There was no irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale. On the application of two strangers, at a later stage offering to pay a higher price, the court cancelled the sale and directed a resale. It was held that the court acted without jurisdiction in setting aside the sale and directing the resale of the property, and the condition that the sale is subject to confirmation of the court is only a safeguard against irregularity or fraud in connection with the sale and against property being sold at an inadequate price. We think that the court below did not err in not enquiring into the petition filed by the appellant, and dismissing it in limine. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1967 (4) TMI 77
Winding up – Final meeting and dissolution ... ... ... ... ..... knowledge that he had not fully dealt with the affairs of the company in a material respect, nonetheless called a final meeting. It may be that in the absence of fraud the registration would still be effective, but I am not concerned to decide that point. Mr. Heyman very naturally drew attention to the irregularities in the winding up of the affairs of the old company, and in particular pointed out that the liquidator did not in his return make any note as to the pound 8,701 which it appeared was owing to the new company. He did not, however, seek to set up any case of fraud, and I do not think I am concerned to take that point any further. So far as the present application is concerned, the position is that the registration was effective under section 290(4). Accordingly, the old company was dissolved upwards of two years before the date of the present notice of motion. The notice of motion is out of time, and I have no jurisdiction to exercise any discretion in the matter.
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1967 (4) TMI 76
Winding up - Power of court to declare dissolution of company void ... ... ... ... ..... etter produced by the department has been perused by me and it bears the endorsement thereon that it was directed to the concerned office. The reply of the petitioner is that it reached the concerned officer on January 23, 1961. In the face of these facts, it is difficult to accept the petitioner s allegation that the department was deliberately kept in the dark about the liquidation proceedings. Point 7. mdash One of the accepted grounds for setting aside the dissolution is fraud. But the fraud alleged has to be strictly proved. That is the accepted position, though the section itself does not state so vide In re Pinto Silver Mining Company 1878 8 Ch. D. 273, In re London and Caledonian marine Insurance Co. 1879 11 Ch. D. 140 and Coxon v. Gorst 1891 2 Ch. 73 Inasmuch as the fraud alleged has not been proved as found by me under point 3, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for. In the result, the petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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