|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 55 Records
-
1968 (4) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that the applicant is the appellant and the bank is merely acting as his agent. In other words, the bank did not purport to execute the decree in its own name or in exercise of its own right. When the execution application was filed, there was no dispute between the appellant and the bank. Hence the bank levied execution of the decree in the name of the appellant as provided in the power of attorney. The controversy between the parties arose during the pendency of the execution. It is only thereafter that it became necessary for the bank to assert its own right. It serves no useful purpose to direct the present application to be closed merely because it was made in the name of the appellant. In view of our earlier conclusions it will be still open to the bank to levy fresh execution of the decree. It will be in the interest of the appellant as well as the bank to allow the present application to go on. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
-
1968 (4) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ut can also issue further direction in the matter. 17. In the result, in modification of the High Court's decision in respect of solatium of 15 per centum on the market value, we direct that in all these cases the taluqdars be awarded solatium in accordance with this judgment. We set aside the High Court's decision with regard to river and river beds. Instead, we direct that the Special Deputy Collector will inquire into the claim for compensation for Bhathas, if any, formed in the river and other portions of the river beds, if any, where crops could be raised during some parts of the year, particularly during the summer. The Special Deputy Collector will make awards under these two heads after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence Subject to these modifications, the appeals are dismissed and the decision of the High Court in order respects is confirmed. As success is divided, there will be no order as to costs. 18. Appeals dismissed with modifications.
-
1968 (4) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
... ...
... ... ..... ed by following the procedure laid down for summons-cases, and as such there cannot be any question of the irregularity being cured under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I may add that in such a case prejudice to the accused is writ large as he had to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses immediately after their examination-in-chief, and he was thereby deprived of the opportunity of cross-examining them at a later date after deliberation as to the lines on which he will take up his defence. In the circumstances, as the present trial is vitiated by the above defect, the order as passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. 9. In the result, this application is allowed and the order as passed by the trial Court convicting and sentencing the petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and forfeiting the seized foodgrains is hereby set aside and it is directed that a fresh trial shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of law.
-
1968 (4) TMI 92 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
... ...
... ... ..... o so accordingly. 29. In the Original Petitions the petitioners therein who are the same filed Land Tribunal Appeals 33 and 34 of 1966 on the file of the Sub-Court, Parur, against the orders of the Land Tribunal sought to be quashed in the writ petitions. Subsequent to the filing of the original petitions the appeals before the Sub-Court, Parur, wore dismissed because of the memo filed by the petitioners withdrawing them in view of the filing of the writ petitions. Since we have held that the application for fixation of fair rent by a varamdar is maintainable, in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution we set aside the orders dismissing Land Tribunal Appeals 33 and 34 of 1966 and direct the Subordinate Judge of Parur to take back the appeals to his file and dispose of the same on the merits and in accordance with law. The Original Petitions are dismissed subject to these observations. 30. We do not make any order as to costs in any of the cases.
-
1968 (4) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... es the security held by him. Upon the evidence adduced by the parties in this case we are satisfied that there was shortage of goods of the value of ₹ 35,690 brought about by the negligence of the Bank or for some other reason and to that extent there must be deemed to be a loss by the Bank of the securities which the Bank had at the time when the contract of surety was entered into. It follows therefore that the principle of s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act applies to this case and the surety is discharged of the liability to the Bank to the extent of ₹ 35,690. We accordingly hold that the respondent Bank is entitled to a decree against respondent 6, the appellant only to the extent of ₹ 5,243.58 and not to the sum of ₹ 40,933.58 and to proportionate costs. For these reasons we allow the appeal to the extent indicated above and modify the decree of the High Court accordingly. The parties will bear their respective costs in-this Court. Appeal allowed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... urt, there must be involved some "act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority" or something "calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts" see Reg. v. Gray 1900 2 Q.B. 36., Arthur Reginald Perara v. The King 1951 A.C. 482. The respondents in this case have done noting to obstruct or interfere with the lawful powers of the Court by acting bona fide and discharging statutory functions under the Commission of Inquiry Act. We therefore, see no justification for holding that the issue of the notification under s. 3 of the Act or the conduct of the Inquiry by respondents amount to contempt of Court. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Asoke Sen on this aspect of the case. 18. It is for these reasons that we have dismissed these Civil Appeals by out order, dated April 16, 1968. One set of hearing fee. 19. Appeals dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 89 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Requisition Order if at all can only be violative of Section 3 (3B) of the Act. In this view, no question of declaring the latter part of Clause 7 of the Levy Order contravening Article 31 (2) of the Constitution arises. Therefore the striking down of the latter part of Clause 7 of the Levy Order as violative of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution cannot stand. Balakrishna Eradi, J. 55. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by my learned brothers Madhavan Nair and Krishnamoor-thy Iyer, JJ., and I fully concur with the views expressed by them. I agree that the appeal -- W. A. 30 of 1968 filed by the State should be allowed upholding the validity of the impugned orders, viz., the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 1966, the Kerala Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966, the Kerala Paddy (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 and the Kerala Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1965 and that the other appeals should be dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... also not said under what circumstances different kind of cultivation can be imposed upon the land. The law does not provide for an opportunity to the cultivator to change his cultivation from one kind to another. It does not even re-; quire that the management should be; efficient. After taking over the lands the Manager can lease them to others but it is not stated what conditions they have to observe. Merely on the opinion of an' officer, land may be taken away because the officer thinks that wheat is to be preferred to fruits and fruits to grass and so on and so forth. The management is taken over without any clear limit of time. In these circumstances it is difficult to uphold the declarations made in these cases or to give them the protection of Article 31-A(1)(b). 18. The appeals will, therefore, be allowed with costs and the orders of the Deputy Collector quashed. There shall be one set of hearing fee in each group, where same counsel appeared for all the appeals.
-
1968 (4) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... alice or mistaken identity, or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the notice and the like. The allegations made in the notices, issued under s. 59, as against the respective respondents, in our opinion, contain the general nature of the material allegations made against each of them, in respect of which the respondents had been given a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation, regarding them. Therefore, it follows that the view of the Gujarat High Court that the notices, under s. 59, and the orders of externment, passed under s. 56, are invalid,' cannot be sustained. The orders of the Gujarat High Court are, accordingly, set aside, and these criminal appeals, allowed. But, we may make it again clear, that in spite of our decision, in favour of the appellants, no action can be taken against the respondents, in these appeals, on the basis of the orders, which are now held to be valid. Appeals allowed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ertainment of the base for assessment. The ascertainment of market value of urban land as provided under Section 6 without further guidance is wholly unsuited to heavily built up areas as in the City of Madras and could result in unjustly discriminatory levy. It follows that Section 6 of the Act has to be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. As all the levies and demands under the Act are wholly dependent on the application of Section 6 of the Act, all such levies and demands are illegal and void and have to be stuck down. 136. The writ petitions have therefore to be allowed. ORDER 137. By virtue of the opinions of the majority of the full Bench, Section 6 of Madras Act XII of 1966 must be struck down, as violative of Articles 19(1) and 14 of the Constitution of India. It follows that all the proceedings before us under Article 226 of the Constitution will have to be allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. 138. Petitions allowed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... estion is whether in a case where an- exporter has not done so, is he disentitled from claiming the refund ? The real difficulty in the way of the appellant Committee is that though the rules lay down a procedure which such an applicant has to follow, they do not provide at the same time that an applicant for refund who has failed to follow the procedure laid down in rr. 35 to 39 would be disentitled to claim the refund. In the. absence of such a provision coupled with the categorical language of r. 27 giving a right to an exporter of dutiable goods to claim 7/8th of the duty paid on such goods on their import, it becomes difficult to uphold the denial by the appellant Committee of the right of respondents 1 and 2 to such a refund. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the present state of the rules, the appeal must fail though for reasons different from those given by the Board of Revenue and the High Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... arly shows that the counsel felt that he had not been able to cross-examine at least the sole eye-witness Khan Bahadur properly. That is why he presented an application for recall of that witness. It is obvious that, in rejecting that application, the Sessions Judge failed to notice that the counsel had been appointed on the very day when that witness was examined and sufficient time had not been granted to him to prepare the defence. In fact, we feel that, in such cases, if sufficient time is not granted to the counsel to prepare defence, prejudice must necessarily be inferred and the trial will be vitiated. 11. As a consequence, we set aside the conviction and sentence of the Appellant. Since we are holding that the conviction is void because of an error in the procedure adopted at the trial, we direct that the Appellant shall be tried afresh for this charge after complying with the requirements of law, so that the case is remanded to the Court of Session for this purpose.
-
1968 (4) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e ground that they do not hold essentially a judicial office because they primarily perform other functions. For it cannot be denied that the expression "holding a judicial office" signifies more than discharge of judicial functions while holding some other office. The phrase postulates that there is an office and that that office is primarily judicial. Office means a fixed position for performance of duties. In this case the distinction was unsubstantial because the Magistrate was holding a fixed position for nineteen years and performing functions primarily of a judicial character. The case was not fit for interference by a writ in view of the provisions of s. 9 of the Act. 17. In the result we are of opinion that the judgment under appeal is right although the reasons justifying the conclusion are different from those accepted by the Divisional Bench from the earlier case of the same Court. The appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd-holder who dies after having become a "displaced person" within the meaning of the relevant statutory enactments referred to above. The paragraph does not apply to a case of a person who was not a displaced land-holder at the time of his death. In the present case it is admitted that Nanak Chand never become a displaced land-holder. On the other hand, Nanak Chand died before he became a displaced land-holder and therefore para 17 of Tarlok Singh's Manual has no application to the facts of the present case. 12. For these reasons we hold that this appeal has no merit and it must be dismissed with costs. 13. Civil Appeals Nos. 938 of 1965 & 1195 of 1967 14. The question arising in these two appeals is identical with the question of law in Civil Appeal No. 937 of 1965. For the reasons given in that judgment we hold that the decision of the High Court challenged in these appeals is correct and these appeals must be dismissed with costs. 15. Appeals dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t with by the authorities specified in that behalf. Power to decide whether the transfer or acquisition is invalid under s. 84C and to dispose of the land as provided in that section is undoubtedly conferred upon the Mamlatdar, and the civil court has no jurisdiction in that behalf. But there is nothing in cl. (mb) of s. 70 which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land. An inquiry under s. 84C to determine whether the transfer or acquisition is invalid may be made only after the acquisition of title pursuant to a decree for specific performance or otherwise. The civil court has no juris- diction to determine whether the acquisition is invalid, but there is nothing in s. 70 or in other provisions of the Act which excludes the civil court's jurisdiction to decree-specific performance of a contract to transfer land. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed..
-
1968 (4) TMI 79 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... l now rank as a creditor of the company and will be entitled to prove his debt as such and take his rank in the list of creditors in accordance with law. 95. There then remains the question of costs. 96. In Appeal No. 100 of 1967 and Appeal No. 86 of 1967 the costs of the company shall come out of the assets of the company. 97. In Appeals Nos. 96, 97 and 98 of 1967 the costs of the appellants in each of the appeals shall be payable by the respondent Messrs. J.K. (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. 98. At this stage Mr. Bhatt applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Since this is a reversing decision and the valuation is undoubtedly of the requisite amount, he is entitled to leave as of right. Leave granted. Certificate to issue. 99. Mr. Bhatt prays that the operation of the order for winding up of the company should be stayed to enable him to lodge the appeal to the Supreme Court. We are unable to grant any stay in this matter. Stay is refused. 100. Liquidator to act on the minutes.
-
1968 (4) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... trial court had committed an error of. law and so had acted with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction within the meaning of S. 1 15 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code. It was therefore competent to the High Court to interfere, in revision, with the order of the trial court on this point. To put it differently, the decision of the trial court on this question was not a decision on a mere question of law but it was a decision on a question of law upon which the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the particular relief depended. The question was therefore one which involved the jurisdiction of the trial court; the trial court could not, by an erroneous finding upon that question, confer upon itself a jurisdiction which it did not possess and its order was therefore liable to be set aside by the High Court in revision. For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ibility to submit a correct return or to suffer the consequences of an incorrect return may be a strict liability of the Master of the vessel. Notwithstanding all these, the statute provides one safeguard for the Master, namely, if he is an innocent victim of an error in a case where goods have been clandestinely imported in his vessel without his knowledge, he may be permitted, on discovery of such importation. to amend the Manifest and thereby escape the penalty. If, however, he refuses to amend then of course the consequences of filing an Incorrect Manifest must visit him. 22. In the result, I quash the Impugned order to this extent that the imposition of a personal penalty of ₹ 1,00,000/-(Rs. one lakh) upon the Master, petitioner No. 1, shall stand set aside and quashed. The rest of the order is not interfered with in any way. 23. This Rule succeeds to the extent Indicated above. I, however, make no order as to costs. 24. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly issue.
-
1968 (4) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as a policy not of reservation of some appointments or posts it was a scheme of distribution of all the posts communitywise. Distribution of appointments, post,; or promotions made in implementation of that State policy is contrary to the constitutional guarantee under Art. 16(1) and (2)and is not saved by cl.(4). The promotions granted to respondents 3 to 83 are accordingly declared contrary to the provisions of Arts. 16(1) and (4) of the Constitution and therefore void. This will not however prevent the State from devising a scheme, consistent with the constitutional guarantees, for reservation of appointments, posts or promotions in favour of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the petition including the costs of the hearing which culminated in the interlocutory order, and the costs incurred before the High Court. Petition allowed.
-
1968 (4) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... alleged to have frustrated the contract arises from the act or election of a party. But for the reasons already given, we hold that this principle cannot be applied to the present case for there was no choice or election left to the appellant to supply chicory other than under the terms of the contract. On the other hand, there was a positive prohibition imposed by the licence upon the appellant not to sell the imported chicory to any other party but he was permitted to utilise it only for consumption as raw material in his own factory. We, are accordingly of the opinion that Counsel for the respondent has been unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the decree of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 367 of 1958 should be set aside and the suit brought by the respondent should be dismissed in its entirety. We do not propose to make any order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed.
|
