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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 65 Records
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1969 (11) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent order and that against this subsequent assessment order the petitioner was entitled to file an appeal. We see no merit in this contention. Section 43(3) makes it clear that the provisions of the Act and the rules, which include the right of appeal also, would apply only to rectification orders which have the effect of enhancing an assessment or penalty. The clear intendment of the provision is that rectifications which have the effect of reducing an assessment or penalty would not come within the category of appealable orders. Section 34 which deals with the appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner does not take within its ambit a rectification order which reduces the assessment or penalty. The result is that merely for the reason that a rectification order has been passed, the petitioner-assessee does not get a right of appeal. The decision of the Tribunal is correct and merits no interference at our hands. The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 73 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions the output will necessarily be much lower than the normal rate. The efficiency of the crushing machine as also the moisture content in the copra would also be relevant factors to be taken into account in arriving at the output. It is, therefore, unsafe to uphold the rejection of the accounts purely on the ground that there has been divergence in the consumption of electricity. In this case, there is also the additional circumstance that the department itself has admitted variations ranging from 10 to 12 units per quintal and the petitioner s consumption of electricity is 12 units per quintal, which cannot be said to be wide of the accepted consumption. We are of the opinion that in these circumstances the rejection of the accounts is not legally justified. 6.. We accordingly set aside the order of the Tribunal and direct that the assessment be modified accepting the assessee s accounts. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1969 (11) TMI 72 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed the goods to the head office, Bombay, which exported it to countries outside India. Since the branch office did not export the cotton to countries outside India, the deduction was not allowable. This reasoning was not accepted by the learned Single judge and we think rightly. The cotton had been purchased at Bhatinda by the firm and after purchase it was transferred to Bombay. In so doing no sale had taken place within the territory of the State of Punjab. From Bombay the cotton was exported to countries outside India. The sale was thus in the course of export and was not liable to any sales tax at Bhatinda. The order of the assessing authority had been rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge and we find no merit in this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent filed by the State of Punjab against the firm. The same is dismissed but without any order as to costs as no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent-firm. MEHAR SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of items like small tools and spare parts of machinery (iii) that hardware trade by itself refers ordinarily to small items of base metals particularly building materials like nuts, bolts, hinges, rivets, laches, curtain railings, window grills etc. (iv) that steel trunks are not one of the items of hardware or of mill-stores and (v) that there is a separate classification of trade known as iron and steel trade. Steel trunks would probably fall in that classification. We are, therefore, satisfied that steel trunks cannot be regarded as an item of hardware. We accordingly reframe the question to read Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the turnover of steel trunks was taxable as the turnover of hardware under Notification No. ST-1367/X-1045(19)-1960, dated 5th April, 1961? and answer the same in the negative. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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1969 (11) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... G.S.T. Act, cotton yarn is declared goods under section 4 read with serial No. 3 of Schedule II therein. The rate of tax on cotton yarn is I per cent. as on the material date. In the view expressed by us that cord is cotton yarn, the turnover of Rs. 4,68,399.54 as now claimed by the assessee before us, is in any event assessable only at that rate in the instant proceedings. The revenue of course can verify whether the figure is correct or not. It may be that a portion of the above turnover may overlap with the disputed turnover of Rs. 1,13,026.12, which concerns itself with the nonproduction of C Forms in time. But this is again a matter for the revenue to split and grant the necessary relief to the assessee. As the Tribunal failed to give the necessary relief to the assessee, to which it is legitimately entitled, the tax case is allowed and the appeal is remitted to the Tribunal for being disposed of in accordance with law. There will no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1969 (11) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner of Taxation v. Riley53 C.L.R. 69. where the learned judges observed, noticing a transaction similar to that in the instant case That the transaction is a sale is not, and doubtless could not be, disputed. In fact, the learned Government Pleader brought to our notice two other decisions of two different High Courts, one of the Bombay High Court and the other of the Patna High Court reported respectively in Chelaram Hasomal v. State of Gujarat 1965 16 S.T.C. 1021. and M. Ghosh v. State of Bihar 1961 12 S.T.C. 154. which also take a view similar to that taken by this court in B.V. Bhatta v. State of Madras 1965 16 S.T.C. 441. In the light of the discussion as above and the prevailing precedents we are of the view that the contention of the petitioner that its dealings should be characterised as dealings resulting from work and labour is not acceptable to us. The writ petitions therefore fail and they are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of work. In Nenuram v. State of Rajasthan 1967 20 S.T.C. 551., the contract was for fabrication and affixture of wooden doors and windows. There also the court held that the contract was an indivisible works contract and the amount received by the petitioner under the contract could not be assessed to sales tax. The Tribunal, in fact, found in this case that the transaction in question was a works contract. They also agreed that the decision of this court in Appeal No. 38 of 1945 would not apply to the facts of this case. What ultimately prompted them to negative the relief to the assessees, we are not able to comprehend. As already stated, the contract in question being indivisible and composite should be characterised as a contract for work and labour and not a contract for sale of materials. The disputed turnover included in the assessable turnover of the assessees has, therefore, to be excluded. The tax case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1969 (11) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h return was filed. Ultimately the assessee failed to establish from the material available with him and on the records disclosed, that the purchases made were not the last purchases in this State. We are of the view, therefore, that the observations in T.P.S.R. Factory P. Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer 1967 20 S.T.C. 419. may not strictly apply to the facts of this case. Further, the Appellate Tribunal reduced the penalty from Rs. 12,766 and Rs. 26,184 in each of the assessment years in question to Rs. 1,000 in each year. In fact they characterised it as a token penalty, but Mr. Chandrasekhara Sastry says that token penalty involves token stigma. But a party who felt complacent about a situation and who was unable to substantiate from record his factual basis cannot complain about a token stigma. The penalties which, in our opinion, are justified, are therefore sustained and the tax cases are dismissed with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly dealt with rule 16(2) as amended in 1955. Even so, in substance and in essence rule 16(2) as amended in 1955 was substantially the same as its predecessor and that being the case, the principle of Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 355. could well have been invoked for application which would not necessarily oblige this court to go into the question of vires in the tax case. On the face of Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 355. this court in the tax case could well have given relief the appellant wanted for the licence period if the point had been taken on the basis of that decision. This had not been done by the assessee. In our view, this is again a ground why the appellant is not entitled to the exercise of the discretion of this court under article 226 of the Constitution in the writ petition. The writ appeal is therefore dismissed with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred). Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nless such material or evidence is available, it would be difficult to decide whether an auctioneer as such is a dealer or not. Here, the assessee never took the precaution, in spite of having been warned by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, to place such material and evidence before the assessing authorities or even before the revenue or at least before us, to satisfy that the dealings of this kind cannot straightaway be included into the net of taxable turnover without a further probe and scrutiny. A person, who does not help himself, cannot seek help from others. This applies to the facts of this case. In these circumstances and in the absence of material, we are unable to appreciate and weigh the contention of Sri V.K. Thiruvenkatachari, that in the turnover characterised as assessable turnover, is included an amount which ought not to have been included in the eye of law. The tax cases are therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the definition of a dealer. A dealer, as defined, includes also a commission agent who, unlike an agent, has the property in the goods sold by him and effects sales in his own right, on behalf of disclosed or undisclosed principals. Turnover as defined by section 2(r) is relatable to the sales effected by a dealer and the proviso should naturally be taken to be concerned with the turnover in his hands, and this is also clear from the language of the proviso itself. The word himself in the proviso does refer to the dealer in the first part of the definition of the turnover. This is the reasoning in State of Madras v. T.C.M. Society Ltd. 1965 16 S.T.C. 760. also which commends itself to us. We also agree with the learned judges in State of Madras v. T.C.M. Society Ltd. 1965 16 S.T.C. 760. that the analogy of section 14A will not be of any assistance in interpreting the proviso to section 2(r). The tax revision case is accordingly allowed with costs, Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1969 (11) TMI 63 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... do. While expressing this opinion, the Supreme Court approved of the view taken by this court in State of U.P. v. Kashi Prasad A.I.R. 1950 All. 486. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act in respect of the certified copies filed by him along with his appeals, and the circumstance that he had earlier received copies of the assessment orders directly from the Sales Tax Officer must be held to be of no consequence for the purposes of computing the limitation for filing the appeals. The second question is answered in the affirmative. In the view that we have taken, learned counsel for the assessee does not press for a decision on the first and third questions. We accordingly return no answers to those questions. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 100 as one set of costs in the two cases. Counsel s fee is also assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (11) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up and Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1969 (11) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Meetings and Proceedings – Quorum for meeting, Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served, Proxies, Director – Disclosure of interest by, Director – Interested, not to participate or vote in Board’s proceedings, Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit
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1969 (11) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Power to pay certain commissions and prohibition of payment of all other commissions, discounts, etc.
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1969 (11) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHBAD
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases, Oppression and Mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... ed despite sufficient grounds shown for it, or, when the court finds that a proceeding before it, under either section 397 or section 398 of the Act, cannot satisfactorily terminate without such an investigation. The petitioners may, if so advised, themselves either apply under section 236 of the Act to the Central Government or take any other proceeding, which may be available to them under the law, for the protection of any right or enforcement of any liability. It is clarified that the dismissal of this petition will not stand in the way of their doing so as no issue, except the preliminary one, whether this is a fit case for an order under section 397 or section 398 of the Act upon the material brought to the notice of this court, is being decided here. The result is that I decide the preliminary issue against the petitioners and hold that no order can be made in this case under either section 397 or section 398 of the Act. Accordingly, I dismiss this petition with costs.
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1969 (11) TMI 44 - HOUSE OF LORDS
Principles for interpretation of statutes ... ... ... ... ..... acting section, but it is as much a part of the Bill as a cross-heading and I can conceive of cases where very rarely it might throw some light on the intentions of Parliament just as a punctuation mark. My Lords, the point of law submitted to this House by the Court of Appeal was in these terms ...what, if any, words of limitation must be imported in subsection (3) of section 332 of the Companies Act, 1918. But for the reasons I have given this question does not, in my opinion, disclose the real point of law upon which your Lordships decision is sought under section 1 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. The real point is whether before a prosecution can be initiated in respect of alleged fraudulent trading while the company was a going concern the company must be in liquidation. I would answer that question in the affirmative because subsection (3) is by reason of its context in the statute so limited in its application. For these reasons I would dismiss this appeal.
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1969 (11) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Fluorescent powder or luminophores ... ... ... ... ..... commonly understands by paint is only the substance used for either protection or decoration. In any case this does not satisfy the test of common usage. The term not being a word of art, I think that these substances should be brought under item 28 rather than item 30. 5.Another contention on behalf of the respondents is that when an item might reasonably fall under two heads and the Revenue decides that it falls under one of those heads, the Courts will not interfere with such a decision. But I do not think that it can be said that this can fall under two classifications. Chemicals is a term of such wide import that almost all substances can be said to be chemicals. Therefore unless a substance will not fall under any special classification that substance cannot be brought under the general heading of chemicals. I do not therefore think that this principle applies to the facts in this case. These two writ petitions are therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (11) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Tie rods - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... cle 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, this appears to be a case where the Customs Authorities when faced with every probability and every justification for classifying this item under Item 72(3) of the Schedule, decided to classify it under Item 48(c) under circumstances which are opposed to common experience and also ordinary knowledge of the limitation in the use to which a textile fabric altered into a particular form and shape can be put into. From this point of view, the classification made by the Department of the article in question appears to be one which could not be made by any reasonable interpretation of the provision in Item 48(c) relied upon by the Department. 14.Such is not the case in the present Writ Petitions for the reasons I have already indicated. Under the circumstances, the decision of Ramakrishnan, J. does not lend any support to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Hence, these Writ Petitions fail and they are dismissed.
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1969 (11) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Confiscation and penalty (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... b) of the Act the Assistant Collector in the impugned order, did not at all address himself, to the question, much the less did he find, that the petitioner either knew or has reasons to believe that the goods in question are liable to confiscation under section 111. For these reasons, the order in question (Ext. P7) appears unsustainable and is liable to be quashed. 3.Counsel appearing for the Respondent raised an objection that this writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal. This may well be so. But the writ petition having been entertained and having remained on the file of this Court for over six months, and there being a clear error of law disclosed on the fact of the record, which appears to warrant for interference. I am not prepared to uphold the preliminary objection and to dismiss this writ petition as this stage, on that ground. 4. I allow this writ petition and quash Ext. P7 order. No order as to costs.
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