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Showing 1 to 20 of 89 Records
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1969 (9) TMI 132 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce is itself vanishing in b world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations Organisation. Its resolutions and covenants mirror the conscience of mankind and inseminate, within the member States, progressive legislation; but till this last step of actual enactment of law takes place, the citizen in a world of sovereign States, has only inchoate rights in the domestic Courts under these international covenants. 10. I have dealt with what otherwise might appear to be unnecessary for the decision of this case only because counsel for the appellant was insistent on my dealing with what he considered was the correct orientation of law in the light of the civil and political rights covenants. I set aside the order of the Courts below and remand the case to the Court of first instance for disposal in the manner and for the limited purpose indicated earlier in this judgment.
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1969 (9) TMI 131 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is entered by the Petitioner with the Government. If any authority is necessary it may be sufficient to refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court, in AIR 1966 SC 334, Lekhraj Sathrarndas Lal-vani v. N.M. Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, Bombay, wherein the following passage appears at para 5 of the report In our opinion any duty or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a contract entered into by him as such public servant cannot be enforced by the machinery of a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Then Lordships further held that the decisions in AIR 1936 PC 269, Commr. of Income Tax, Bombay Presidency and Aden v. Bombay Trust Corporation Ltd. and AIR 1947 Cal 307, P.K. Banerjee v. L.J. Simonds lay down the correct law on the point regarding the writ of mandamus. 5. The petition is therefore, without merit and is dismissed. Rule nisi discharged and the stay orders vacated. The parties will bear their own costs. S.K. Dutta, C.J. 6. I agree.
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1969 (9) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus he has fixed the case under Section 30 of the Act for evidence on 21-5-69. It seems that at the stage of preliminary hearing the attention of the High Court was not drawn to this fact and that Court proceeded to make an order virtually and in effect reversing the judicial order made by the learned Additional District Judge in favour of the appellant. This could more appropriately be done only on appeal or revision from the order dated April 19, 1969 after notice to the party affected and not on an application under Sections 151/141 Civil P.C. Such an application in the circumstances was misconceived. The ex parte order is thus unsustainable and must be set aside. 10. This appeal accordingly succeeds and the impugned orders are set aside with costs. 11. We would like to make it clear that it will be open to the parties, if so advised, to approach the High Court by appropriate proceedings for the speedy disposal of the appeal.
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1969 (9) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y. The order of the Collector does not affect the rights of the parties in any way; it is conclusive to this extent only that the petition for summary redemption has been dismissed and no other petition under the Act would lie. No suit under Section 12 being necessary or competent, there was no bar to the mortgagor suing for redemption in the civil courts within the period allowed by law in ordinary course. The same view was expressed in a judgment of the Punjab High Court Dewan Chand v. Raghbir Singh, I.L.R. 1966 1 Pun 193 The Court, in that case pointed out, in our judgment rightly, that Article 14 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit which does not seek to set aside the order of an officer of the Government. When the Collector decides nothing against the mortgagor and directs that the matter be settled in a civil court, the Collector's decision does not stand in the way of the suit for redemption. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (9) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... principle being that if the owner of an immovable property loses possession of it he is entitled to claim interest in place of the right to retain possession. It may be mentioned that even under the Interest Act, 1839 the power to award interest on equitable grounds was expressly saved by the proviso to Section 1. In our opinion, and this position has not been seriously controverted on behalf of the respondents, the appellants should have been held entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 12. In the result the appeal is allowed only to the extent that it is declared that the appellants should have been paid interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of rents collected by the manager on behalf of the Government and the final figure of compensation should have been determined after taking into account the amount of interest which accrued due to such of the appellants as were entitled to it. In view of the entire circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (9) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vation and improvements of the temple premises but subject to these demands, the Maharaj has a right to utilise the temple income in maintaining himself and his family in a reasonably comfortable manner. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs conceded this position. This suit has been brought by the plaintiffs with the sole purpose of preserving the temples assets and maintaining its dignity. They do not want to undermine the position or prestige of their Maha Prabhu. 38. In the circumstances of the case we see no useful purpose in directing the appellant to pay the costs of the plaintiffs in this appeal. She can only pay the same from temple funds. The alienees have not appealed against the judgment of the High Court. When we mentioned this aspect to Mr. S. T. Desai, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs he indicated that the parties may be left to bear their own costs in this appeal. 39. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.
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1969 (9) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... te and autho- rised the mortgagee to find any other tenant, the intention was to allow expressly a tenancy beyond the term of the mortgage. In this view of the matter the decision of the High Court and the court below cannot be said to be erroneous. There remains to consider the question of mesne profits. The High Court reduced the mesne profits to ₹ 250/- p.m. which was the actual rent paid for the building and the passage. There is some doubt as to whether this sum included ₹ 100/- for the use of the passage. However, we think that the matter is between the purchaser and the head lessee. The rent of ₹ 250/-, although on a low side, was the actual rent on which the premises were held. The High Court was, therefore, not wrong in limiting mesne profits to that figure. The result is that both the appeals fail and will be dismissed with costs. There will be a right to set off the costs and the resulting difference alone will be payable. Y.P. Appeals dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ispute that, in this case, the authority who can pass an order of dismissal has passed the same. Under those circumstances a violation of Regulation 16(3), as alleged and established in this case, can only result in the order if dismissal being held to be wrongful and, in consequence, making the appellant liable for damages. But the said order cannot be held to be one which has not terminated the service, albeit wrongfully, or which entitles the respondent to ignore it and ask for being treated as still in service. We are not concerned with the question of damages, because no such claim has been made by the respondent in these proceedings. 34. In this view, the judgment and the decree of the High Court, in so far as they declare that the order dated March 10, 1964 is null and void and that the respondent continues to be in the service of the appellant, are set aside and this appeal allowed, to that extent. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (9) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... anded to the Rehabilitation Grants Officer on account of certain procedural irregularities. It was pointed out that the Rehabilitation Grants Officer did not follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code by treating; the application under Section 79 as a plaint and the objection of the State Government as a written statement. It was said that the Rehabilitation Grants Officer was bound to frame proper issues and to take evidence of the parties on those issues as in the civil suit. But no case has been made out for remand because the appellant has not denied in the written statement that there was the customary right of maintenance of the junior members of the family of Raja Anand Brahma Shah. No disputed question of fact was raised on behalf of the appellant before the Rehabilitation Grants Officer, the award of the Rehabilitation Grants Officer was challenged only on a question of law. 8. For these reasons we hold that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
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1969 (9) TMI 123 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... delivered for a very long time. Now that we have re-assembled and have delivered this judgment sending the matter back for completion of the winding up proceedings with appropriate formalities, we feel it is desirable that these applications should be dealt with the utmost possible expedition. 95. There will be a stay of operation of this order until three weeks after the long vacation and in the meantime all interim orders passed by this court in connection with these appeals will remain subsisting. Any application that the parties want to make in connection with the winding up petition or with the application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator will be made before the appropriate court having jurisdiction in company matters. 96. Mr. S.C. Sen, appearing for the respondents, gives an undertaking to the court on behalf of the company and the other respondents in Appeal No. 174 of 1967 that the company will not, in the meantime, increase its existing share capital.
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1969 (9) TMI 122 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment out of court could be made. We are not inclined to believe Kamal Babu on this point. 26. We, accordingly, hold that initiative was taken by the brother and sister's husband of the wife to bring about reconciliation between the husband and wife, but that they got no response either from the husband or his relations. 27. From the above discussion it is clear that it cannot be said that the wife has failed to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed by a Division Bench of this Court on December 14, 1961 in F.A. No. 236 of 1961 (Cal.). The appeal is, accordingly allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is hereby set aside and the petition for divorce filed by the husband is dismissed. The wife will get her costs from the husband throughout. 28. Any amount paid by the husband to the wife towards the litigation expenses shall be taken into consideration in assessing the costs to be paid by the husband to the wife. Bagchi, J. 29. I agree.
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1969 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sider the representation as expeditiously as possible. The Constitution of an Advisory Board under Section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is received by it. 6. This earlier decision was affirmed by another Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 1st May, 1969 in Writ Petition No. 277 of 1968 Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal 1969 S.C.D. 944. 7. Clearly, the facts mentioned above show that this requirement laid down by the Constitution has not been satisfied in the case of any of these three petitioners before us. They were entitled to receive a consideration of their representations by the State Government as expeditiously as possible which the Government failed to do, and consequently their continuance in detention thereafter is illegal. As a result, the three petitions are allowed All the three petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith.
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1969 (9) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve list of the other permits held by it in the State under item 14 or in any other State, under item 15. The Transports. Authorities. in our opinion, would be acting within their jurisdiction when they take into account the matter governed by cl. (e) of s. 47(1) in calling upon a party to give more complete details, and give an opportunity to the other parties before it to state their objections. That is exactly what had been directed to be done by the Appellate Committee when it sent back the proceedings to the Regional Transport Authority. In this view, it follows that the order of the High Court treating the appellant's applications as invalid and excluding them from the consideration of the Transport Authority, is not warranted by the provisions of the Act. The result is that the order of the High Court, dated October 5, 1967 is set aside and that of the Appellate Committee, dated June 9, 1966 is restored. Respondents 1 to 3 and 5 will pay the costs of the appellant.
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1969 (9) TMI 119 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der of Shri Behl passed on 6-11-1962 is a fully discussed and reasoned order. It was not shown to be wrong in any respect. Further, the merits of the questions decided therein are for the officer acting under the Act to decide. It is not for this Court to go into the merits as this Court is not sitting in appeal over those orders. 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the view expressed by Tatachari, J., in C.W. No. 367 of 1967, D/- 29-10-1968 (Delhi) (Smt. Bishan Devi v. Union of India), that the applicant under Section 33 of the Act was entitled to a 'hearing'. The impugned order in that case, however, suffered from other defects, which are not present in the case before me. On facts, therefore, the case before Tatachari, J., is distinguishable from the one before me. This would explain the different conclusions at which we have arrived. 18. For the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. No order is made as to costs. 19. Petition dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Stevedores Association and its members who ’are parties to the Reference has to be considered and adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal, I.D. No. 10 of 1967 has to be remanded to the Industrial Tribunal concerned for disposal according to law. The Tribunal will be at liberty to call upon the parties concerned to file supplementary statements and permit them to adduce further evidence, oral and documentary, which may be considered necessary; but it is made clear that the Dock Labour Board, the appellant, will be completely out of the picture in the rein’and proceedings. o p /o p In the result, the order of the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated May 24, 1968 is set aside, and this appeal allowed. I.D. No. 10 is remanded to the said Tribunal to be dealt with ’and disposed of, according to law and the directions contained in this judgment. o p /o p Parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.. o p /o p Y.P. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1969 (9) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he way in which the management of the trustees of religious and charitable endowment was conducted. The High Court further found, which finding being of fact, must be considered as final that 60' of the amount of licence fees which were being realized was actually spent on services rendered to the factory owners. It can, therefore, hardly be contended that the levy of the licence fee was wholly unrelated to the expenditure incurred out of the total realisation. Before the High Court the appellant company never made out any case that the collections on .account of the licence fee were merged in the general public revenue and were not appropriated in the manner laid down for the appropriation of expenses for the department concerned. There can be no manner of doubt that the amount which the appellant company has to pay as licence fee is not in the nature of a tax but is a fee which could be properly levied. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h had been pointed out by a court of law. This objection was repelled in Udai Ram Sharma's case (supra) with a quotation from the decision of Das, J. (as he then was) in A. K. Gopalan v. State (6) reading -- "Our Constitution, unlike the English Constitution, recognises the Court's supremacy over the legislative authority, but such supremacy is a very limited one for it is confined to the field where the legislative power is circumscribed by the limitations put upon it by the Constitution itself. Within this restricted field the court may, on a scrutiny of the law made by the legislature, declare it void if it is found to have transgressed the Constitutional limitations." It necessarily follows that if a law does not suffer from any Constitutional limitation it must be given full play although its effect may be to override the decision of a court of law and cure the defect which was pointed out by that Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uting the court shall not ordinarily be disclosed to the parties nor shall the parties be entitled to such in,formation as of right. A similar rule is to be found in bye-law 8 of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Rule V(5) of Arbitration Rules of Madras Chamber of Commerce. It appears that the aforesaid Rule which has been framed by all these bodies of long standing and experience in the field of business is based on the elimination of all possibility or chance of a party trying to influence the members of the Arbitration Court before they enter upon or proceed with the reference. It is axiomatic that as soon as a party appears before them or the arbitration proceedings commence the names of the arbitrators can no longer remain a secret and it is always open to a party to initiate proceedings on the ground of bias or prejudicial interest even at that stage or after the award is made. The appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s also will have to be increased. Further the impugned notification does not authorise under S. 11(2) the payment of any portion of wages in kind. It merely says that if the employer supplies free meals to any employee, he may deduct the sum mentioned in the notification. It is only an option given and not a duty imposed. Therefore the procedure prescribed in rule 21 of the rules framed under the Act is inapplicable to the facts of the case before us. The relevant rule is rule 22 (2) (v) i.e. the valuation of an amenity. We fail to see why the supplying of food is not an amenity. In the result the appeal and the writ petition fail. They are dismissed with costs. Hearing fee one set. The owners of residential hotels and eating houses are permitted to pay the arrears of minimum wages accrued up till now within six months from this date subject to the condition they pay interest on those arrears from the due dates till payment at 6% per annum. Appeal and petition dismissed.
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1969 (9) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the premises under sub-s. (2) of s. 14 does not require serious consideration. Chawla obtained an order of disposal of the proceeding by depositing the amount ordered to be deposited by him under s. 15. That was clearly a benefit which he obtained under s. 14(2). The plea that "no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub- section" is only directory is without substance. In any event the High Court was of the view that having regard to the conduct of Chawla he having committed default previously and having obtained the benefit of sub-s. (2) in respect of the premises he was not entitled to the same benefit in this proceeding. Assuming that the proviso to sub-s. (2) of s. 14 is not mandatory on that question we express no opinion--we are clearly of the view that the High Court having declined to grant the benefit of sub-s. (2) of s. 14 to Chawla, no case is made out for our interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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