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Showing 21 to 40 of 67 Records
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1970 (10) TMI 65
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... ... ..... is enhanced and each of them is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. In default of payment of fine, each of them shall suffer simple imprisonment for a term of seven days. Criminal Revision Application No. 300 of 1970 is allowed. The sentence imposed on opponent No. 1 as also on opponent No. 2 is enhanced and each of them is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. In default of payment of fine each of them shall suffer simple imprisonment for a term of seven days. The substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for one month passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 300 of 1970 arising out of Criminal Case No. 628 of 1970 shall run concurrently with that of one month s sentence of simple imprisonment passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 301 of 1970 arising out of Criminal Case No. 629 of 1970. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent in both matters. Applications allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 64
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... ... ..... liability under the statute. According to him proof of dissolution is necessary prior to the department recognising the dissolution. No rule has been brought to my notice and there is no provision in the statute which justifies this stand. As already observed by me earlier, the Act and the Rules constitute a fiscal statute and it is not for the courts to supply the deficiencies in the statute. The language of the statute or the rules cannot be strained to hold that unless the competent authority is satisfied about the dissolution, the former partners of the dissolved firm will continue to be liable for payment of sales tax under the Act. The result is that this petition must succeed and I hereby issue a writ quashing the demands made against the petitioners and restraining the respondents from realising from the petitioners the amounts due under the assessments made on October 25, 1959. The petitioners will also be entitled to their costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 63
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... ... ..... e decision in Yaddalam s case(2) has been superseded and that the sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are taxable although such sales may not be taxable if treated as intra-State sales under the appropriate sales tax law of the State, it requires no elaborate argument to hold that the order of the first respondent suffers from a mistake apparent from the record. The first respondent while allowing the appeal of the petitioner exempted the petitioner s turnover following the decision in Yaddalam s case 1965 16 S.T.C. 231 (S.C.). When the decision on which the order of the first respondent rested has been superseded, as held in Joseph s case(1), it is clear that the order of the first respondent made in the appeal suffers from a mistake apparent from the record. All the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner having failed, this writ petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without an order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 62
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... ... ..... this respect. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the word chokar is included in item No. 15 and that the assessing authority should have allowed the claim of the petitioners in respect of the sales of chokar . No other point was urged on either side. For the reasons recorded above, L.P.A. Nos. 37, 59, 61, 62, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84 and 145 of 1970, Civil Writs Nos. 2478, 2772, 2816 and 3085 of 1969 and Civil Writs Nos. 293, 313, 356, 622, 1196 and 1267 of 1970 are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Civil Writ No. 1362 of 1970 is allowed to the extent that the order of the assessing authority dated 16th March, 1970 (copy annexure A to the petition), disallowing the claim of Rs. 14,307.72 P. in respect of the sales of chokar out of the tax-free claim, is quashed while in all other respects the writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs. HARBANS SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1970 (10) TMI 61
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... ... ..... the sum of Rs. 74,765.44 outstanding against you as an additional demand created on 2nd July, 1969, for the year 1968-69 by 18th instant and produce treasury receipt on that date failing which besides penalty under section 11(8) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, the amount will be recovered under the Punjab Land Revenue Act without any further reference to you. From this letter, it is clear that the recovery proceedings were started on the ground that the period of stay, according to Government instructions, extends only up to 60 days, and not on the ground that the appellate authority had no power to stay the proceedings. Thus viewed from any angle, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single judge is unexceptionable and there is no warrant for holding that the appellate authority is not vested with the power of stay. No other point was urged. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 60
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... ... ..... the assessee may not care to listen. In section 22 of the Act a similar expression has been used, that is, within 60 days from the passing of an order . If the view stated in the above case has to be taken into consideration, then the period of limitation would start from the date the petitioner obtained the copy of the order as admittedly the copy of the order was never sent to the counsel for the petitioner. Only an intimation was sent that the revision had been dismissed. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the applications of the petitioner-firm under section 22(1) of the Act were wrongly rejected as barred by time without proper consideration of the various authorities and the view-points as have been set out above. We, accordingly, set aside the orders dated 21st February, 1968, rejecting the applications as barred by time and direct the learned Tribunal to decide the applications afresh after hearing the parties. There is no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1970 (10) TMI 59
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... ... ..... Tax Act confers no jurisdiction on the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to adjust the sales tax due from an assessee towards the amount refundable to another person by the Government. The learned Government Pleader has not shown us any statutory provision which empowers the respondent to make the impugned order. It was submitted by him that the order was made in exercise of his administrative powers. The powers of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes are derived under the Mysore Sales Tax Act and as his action cannot be supported by any of its provisions, the impugned order, clearly, is illegal and without jurisdiction. Therefore, we allow this writ petition in part and quash the impugned order made by the respondent on 20th October, 1967. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed for the other reliefs regarding mandamus for a direction to pay the amount withheld since they cannot claim the said reliefs against the respondent. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 58
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... ... ..... ii) of the Act is invoked. It is also true that as pointed out by the learned Government Advocate, the petitioner should specify the particular documents, registers or account books which he would like to be summoned for the purpose of helping the assessing authority to arrive at a fair conclusion. The petitioner shall, therefore, specify those documents etc. before the assessing authority and the assessing authority shall summon them or such of them as may be relevant and thereafter he shall pass a fresh order of assessment. 7.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of assessment (petitioner s annexure C ) is quashed with a direction that the assessing authority shall pass a fresh order in accordance with the provisions of law. As the case is being remanded, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs. The amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Petition allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 57
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... ... ..... ned Advocate means the new Act. What is, however, overlooked is that section 41 requires the several proceedings to be carried out as if the new Act was in force at the time the return was to be filed. To this case also therefore because of section 41, section 14(3) would apply and not section 14(4). In this view of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the two consequential contentions which were advanced on the assumption that section 14(4) would apply to the present case. We must in fairness to the learned Advocate for the petitioner say that after the close of the argument, he brought to our notice that the question in regard to limitation was in fact not raised before the Tribunal and therefore he was not entitled to raise it. We appreciate this frankness. Since the arguments were advanced before us, we thought that we should deal with them. Since no other contention was raised, the result is that the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1970 (10) TMI 56
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... ... ..... re, according to his calculations, no amount of tax is due, no deposit shall be necessary, and the assessing authority cannot act under sub-rule (3) simply because no tax was paid or deposited while submitting the return during the prescribed period. Similarly, where according to the dealer, tax is payable on lower scale, the tax due shall be the amount calculated at this rate and once this amount has been deposited or paid by cheque, there shall be compliance of subrule (2) and the assessing authority shall not have the power to act under sub-rule (3). Our reply to the question referred to this Bench is as below In view of the various sub-rules of rule 41 of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules, a dealer is entitled to deposit the tax admitted by him to be due and the assessing authority does not have the power to make an enquiry, while making the provisional assessment, whether the position assumed by the dealer as to his liability was justified in law. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (10) TMI 55
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... ... ..... 1957) in so far as it empowers the appellate authority to dismiss an appeal for default was held to be repugnant to section 21(4) of the Act and ultra vires of the power of the Tribunal under section 3(4) read with section 21(4) of the Act. Thus, we are of the considered view that an appellate authority has no power under the Act to dismiss an appeal in default that it must dispose of the appeal on merits irrespective of the fact whether the appellant or his counsel appeared on the date of hearing or not and that rule 59(2) so far as it authorises dismissal of appeals for default is inconsistent and repugnant to section 20(6) of the Act. Accordingly we allow this writ petition with costs and quash the impugned orders of the Presiding Officer, Sales Tax Tribunal, Punjab, dated 8th April, 1968, and 6th August, 1968, and send back the case to the Tribunal, respondent No. 2, to decide the appeal of the petitioners in accordance with law. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 54
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... ... ..... served on the daughters and the widow of the deceased assessee. The recovery proceedings under section 13(3)(b) of the Act also have been taken only against some of the legal representatives and not against all who can represent the estate. The principles laid down in the above decision under the Income-tax Act, in our opinion, are equally applicable to recovery proceedings under the Mysore Sales Tax Act. Therefore, the applications made by the respondent against the petitioners have to be rejected. The legal representatives of a deceased assessee, as stated earlier, are liable only to the extent of the estate that has come into their hands. There is no determination by the learned Magistrate that the movables ordered to be attached form part of the estate of the deceased assessee. For the above reasons, these sales tax revision petitions are allowed and the orders of attachment made by the First Class Magistrate, Sindhanoor, are hereby quashed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (10) TMI 53
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... ... ..... on the rest of the evidence. In the light of these observations, it is evident that there was enough material on the record before the Excise and Taxation Commissioner to come to the conclusion that the omission to file the returns within time and to pay the sales tax in accordance therewith was deliberate and showed utter disregard of statutory obligations and on that finding it was open to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner to impose such penalty as he considered fit. The petitioner-firm availed of the further remedy of revision to the Financial Commissioner who also considered the penalty imposed by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner not to be excessive. That is a question of fact and, therefore, no question of law can be said to arise out of the orders of the Financial Commissioner dismissing the revision petitions. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that there is no merit in these petitions which are dismissed but without any order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 52
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... ... ..... both the orders. It is difficult to understand as to how the Supreme Court case can have any relation to the facts of the present case. The other decision relied upon by the learned counsel is the State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. 1967 19 S.T.C. 144 (S.C.). There also the question was entirely different. There the question was as to whether the Board of Revenue could revise an order after four years. In the relevant section relating to the revisional power of the Board the limitation of four years is provided. In the case before us the question of limitation is not involved and therefore the case cited by the learned counsel, in our opinion, is of no assistance whatsoever. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs.100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1970 (10) TMI 51
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Parties to petition, Savings of orders, rules, etc., in force at commencement of the Act
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1970 (10) TMI 49
Whether the High Court ought, in exercise of the power under Order 41, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have vacated the writ of mandamus issued requiring them to grant permission for quotation of the company's shares?
Held that:- An appellate court may, in appropriate cases, pass any decree and make any order appropriate to the ends of justice, even if a party has not appealed against an adverse decision. That power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the parties, even though they may not have filed any appeal or objection. But the jurisdiction is discretionary and the High Court has not exercised it apparently for good reasons. The orders passed against the Union and the two exchanges were in substance distinct. Against the Union the order was made quashing its order in appeal against the orders of the exchanges; and against the exchanges the order was made directing inclusion of the shares in the list of quoted shares. The exchanges acquiesced in the direction.
We need, however, not express any final opinion on this question. We are informed at the Bar that the Calcutta Stock Exchange has applied for certificate to the High Court of Delhi and that application is pending. We need not pre-judge the result of that application or the appeal, if any, which may be filed in this court. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (10) TMI 46
Winding up – Power of company to appoint and fix remuneration of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... o have its corporate existence. During the course of the winding-up, the company is represented by the liquidator who functions as its agent for the purpose of winding up. One of the duties of the court, as observed by the learned company judge, is to see that the liabilities of the company are properly met in accordance with the provisions of the law. The liability to income-tax is one of such liabilities. The official liquidator is the officer employed under the Companies Act for discharge of the said liability also. He can be rightly termed as the agent of the company. Therefore, the liquidator, on an order for winding up being made, becomes the principal officer of the company within the meaning of section 2(35)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In that view, the learned company judge was right in requiring the liquidator to file returns before the Income-tax Officer. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without an order as to costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 30
Demand (Customs) - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... arly mistakes arising from the fact of adverting to the dates of the seals and not to the dates of the Bills of Entry. At no time was also this question raised before the Customs Authorities though it is stated in ground (3) of the grounds raised in the petition that the enforcement of the surety bond is barred by section 28 of the Act. I am not satisfied that section 28 of the Act is attracted in this case at all. 14.The proviso to section 147(3) of the Act will be attracted only in cases where section 28 is attracted. The proviso to section 147(3) is in these terms Provided that where any duty is not levied or is short-levied or erroneously refunded on account of any reason other than any wilful act, negligence or default of the agent, such duty shall not be recovered from the agent unless in the opinion of Assistant Collector of Customs the same cannot be recovered from the owner, importer or exporter. This cannot apply to the cases. 15.I dismiss this petition with costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 29
Confiscation of seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... . I, therefore, reject the contention that the extension of time allowed by the Collector in the instant case is bad, as it was done without notice to the petitioner. 4.Counsel for the petitioner also contended that there has been no proper extension of time in this case, as there was nothing to show that the Collector of Customs was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the extension of time. It is clear from the facts of this case that the time was extended due to some omission or negligence in the office of the Collector or Customs in despatching the notice which was signed by him on 12-1-1970. When it was brought to his notice it was only just and proper that he extended the time, so that the proceedings may not be defeated and he has done so before the expiry of the period. Therefore the objection that the extension has been done without sufficient cause cannot be sustained. 5.In the result, this Original Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (10) TMI 28
Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 - Levy - Interpretation of taxing statute
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