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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 102 Records
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1971 (3) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inding character on the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is concerned. Merely because a tax case has been filed by the department, it does not mean it acts as a kind of stay of operation of the order of the Tribunal. So long as that order of the Tribunal is not set aside, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is bound to give effect to it, and if he fails to do it and by-passes it on the ground that the department has filed an appeal, it will be really a contempt of the Tribunal s order. In the circumstances, therefore, we should think that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will, as he is bound to, follow the Tribunal s view. It is, of course, open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take his own view on the facts, but, so far as the law propounded by the Tribunal is concerned, it is binding and it should be applied by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the facts before him. Subject to these observations, the petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 93 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t a formal one in the land that would enable a person to claim the benefit thereunder. The reason is not so difficult to state. If he has an interest in such land, then if agricultural produce is produced thereon, it would be reasonable to attribute such an activity to the person having an interest therein, and such nexus being established, the proceeds of the sale of such produce will automatically be excluded from the assessable turnover because they would relate to sale of agricultural produce. As I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner on the question that the turnover in question is excludable under section 2(r) of the Act, the orders of assessment in all the years in question are proper and there are no errors apparent or otherwise in them. The penalty imposed is only consequential. There is no error of jurisdiction either in the order impugned. The writ petitions are therefore dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 92 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hen the return in the prescribed form is before him for purposes of processing through the assessment. Surprisingly enough he threatens penalty for submitting an untrue return when a return is already there in his files, and which contains material on which he should act and decide as an assessing authority. If the materials before him and the return filed by the assessee are not acceptable for any other reason, he can act in any manner known to law including the levy of penalty as provided under the Act. But the respondent has no jurisdiction to say that he would provisionally assess in the circumstances of the case and threaten the assessee with penalty for having wilfully submitted an untrue return. It is in this view of the matter, the rule nisi is made absolute and the writ petition is allowed. The assessing authority is at liberty to proceed with the assessment on the basis of the return filed by the petitioner and deal with it in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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1971 (3) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... open to them and they cannot be permitted to by-pass the statutory remedy and seek their remedies directly under article 226 of the Constitution. These points include also the contention of one of the petitioners that the assessing authority has used a kind of formula not justified by the provisions of the local Act to estimate the turnover of raw hides, which have been used in the tanned hides and skins sold either locally or exported. Although the assessee has maintained accounts as required by rule 26, still, it is for the assessee to establish the particular raw hides which have gone into the manufacture of tanned hides and skins. But if he fails to do so, and has mixed up on the ground that it is impossible to keep separate accounts, the assessing authority is left with no alternative but to use its best judgment and estimate the relative turnover to be brought to charge. The petitions are dismissed with costs in each. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll-stores and hardware . What is comprehended within the expression mill-stores and hardware are all those articles which whether described as mill-stores or hardware have something common with each other. That common factor and the limits within which its range is circumscribed have been broadly indicated in the cases already referred to above. Upon that test, weights and measures have nothing in common with mill-stores and, therefore, do not fall within the expression mill-stores and hardware mentioned in the notification of 5th April, 1961. They can be described as wares made of metal liable to tax up to 31st May, 1963, at the rate of two paise per rupee, and subsequently by virtue of Notification No. ST-2104/X-902(16)-52 dated 21st May, 1963, at the rate of three paise per rupee. The questions referred are answered accordingly. As no one appears on behalf of the assessee, there is no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants in that case were purchasers for value without notice?
Whether the purchaser in not doing so he acted with wilful abstention or gross negligence?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Question of constructive notice is a question of fact and it is not find that the material on the present record justifies that the plaintiff should be fixed, with any constructive notice of the arrears of municipal taxes.
As the question of constructive notice has to be approached from equitable considerations we feel that the municipal corporation in the present case was far more negligent and blameworthy than the plaintiff. Therefore, no hesitation in holding that the High Court took the correct view of the legal position with the result that this appeal must fail and is dismissed. As there is no representation on behalf of the respondent there will be no order as to costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State Government was competent to levy and collect sales tax on the turnover of works contracts for the period covered by the assessment orders impugned in these proceedings?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Sales tax on works contracts was not leviable by the State of Kerala after the 26th January, 1960, under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (XI of 1125).
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1971 (3) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and proceedings - Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice ... ... ... ... ..... ice which Ghose J. had to consider. For more reasons than one, I am unable to uphold the contention raised by Mr. Sen. In the view I have taken, the application succeeds. There will be an order for an injunction restraining the respondents and each of them from giving effect to the resolution set out in the notice dated September 14, 1970. The order is made without prejudice to the rights of the respondents and the members of the respondent-company to pass a fresh resolution according to law in terms of or similar to the resolution No. 1 which is the subject-matter of this application. There will be no order for costs. Upon the respondents giving an undertaking to the court through their counsel, Mr. Nag, that they will not invest in the shares of Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. for a period of three weeks, there will be a stay of operation of the order made herein for the same period. The previous undertaking given by the respondents on the 12th of October, 1970, is hereby discharged.
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1971 (3) TMI 73 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Meetings and Proceedings – Ordinary and special resolutions ... ... ... ... ..... s said in evidence that the points were produced by Mr. Kinslow deliberately and in a manner which enabled them to be recorded. Indeed it is very noticeable from the rough notes made by Mr. Bruce how the nature of his notes changed when he comes to the five points. The five points are recorded carefully and fairly fully with no attempt at the sort of verbal shorthand which appears earlier in these notes. I do not believe that Mr. Bruce would have failed to record the express challenge to the status of the liquidator had it, in fact, been made. Nor is there any trace of that challenge among the contemporaneous writings which refer to this meeting. Without in any way casting imputations on the honesty and truthfulness of Mr. Kinslow, Mr. Bailey and Mr. McGonigal, I prefer the evidence on this point of Mr. Bruce to the evidence of those speaking to the contrary effect because it seems to me more likely. In the result, I shall declare that the company is in voluntary liquidation.
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1971 (3) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the memorandum of appeals from an order of acquittal were barred by article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
Held that:- Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963, requires appeal under subsection (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be filed within 30 days from the date of the grant of special leave. No application for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal was made within 60 days from that order of acquittal. The orders of acquittal were passed on April 4, 1968. The petitions of appeal were presented on July 1, 1968. The appeals were rightly not entertained by the High Court because first there was no application for grant of special leave under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; secondly, the appeals were incompetent without grant of special leave, and, thirdly, these were barred by limitation. An appeal under section 417(3) against acquittal is competent only when there is special leave granted by the High Court. On obtaining special leave the appeal is thereafter filed within 30 days of the grant of leave to escape the mischief of the period of limitation under article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Section 624B is not such a section which can be said to be conferring a right of appeal. Section 624B only mentions as to the person through whom the appeal is presented. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (3) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Statement made before a customs officer — Explaining the provisions of Indian Penal Code does not amount to threat
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1971 (3) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt so far as their binding character on the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is concerned. Merely because a tax case has been filed by the department, it does not mean it acts as a kind of stay of operation of the order of the Tribunal. So long as that order of the Tribunal is not set aside, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is bound to give effect to it, and if he fails to do it and by-passes it on the ground that the department has filed an appeal, it will be really a contempt of the Tribunal s order. In the circumstances, therefore, we should think that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will, as he is bound to, follow the Tribunal s view. It is, of course, open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take his own view on the facts, but, so far as the law propounded by the Tribunal is concerned, it is binding and it should be applied by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the facts before him. Subject to these observations, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1971 (3) TMI 50 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Accident Insurance ... ... ... ... ..... 55-56 the Income-tax Officer discovered that the assessee, which had come into existence in January, 1952, had not submitted an estimate of the tax payable by it under section 18A(3), Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and had not paid the advance tax before 15th March, 1955. He made an order charging interest under section 18A(6) of the Act. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the view that no appeal was maintainable in respect of the levy of interest under section 18A(6). His view was confirmed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It has been held in Keshardeo Shrinivas Morarka v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 48 ITR 404 (Bom) that no appeal lies against an order levying interest under section 18A(6) of the Act. Nothing has been shown to us to persuade us to take a different view. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative. There is no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1971 (3) TMI 49 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Partner allowed profits to be accumulated in capital account. On the dissolution of the firm the legal representatives agreed to receive lesser amount in settlement of the credit balance in his capital account, whether the difference is allowable as bad and irrecoverable debt - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee is entitled to claim the sum of Rs. 38,394 as allowable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act ? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee is entitled to claim Rs. 6,589 from April 1, 1959, to July 14, 1959, pertaining to the accrued profit allocatable to the deceased partner till his death is allowable as a deduction ? " - our answer to both the questions is in the negative and against the assessee
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1971 (3) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Relief under sections 84 and 88 – allowability in the hands of a firm - fact that the Income-tax Officer had granted these exemptions in other hands (allowed in the partners' assessment) was no reason to deny the benefit to the firm
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1971 (3) TMI 47 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 41,219 which represents 25 per cent. of the net profit of the Jeypore Sugar Company and received by the assessee-company is an item of revenue receipt liable to income-tax ? "
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1971 (3) TMI 46 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessee was running an old sugar factory operated by steam. It erected a new factory run by electricity - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee-company is entitled to exemption from tax on the profits or gains derived from the plant and machinery installed by it at a cost of Rs. 1,10,00,000 under section 15C of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ? "
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1971 (3) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
This application under article 226 of the Constitution challenges the assessment order under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the firm, Dhaniram Gupta & Co., for the assessment year 1965-66. The main ground urged in this application was that documents have been seized by the income-tax department under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, as such, it was not possible to comply with the notice under sections 142(1) and 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - When the assessee has resorted to the alternative remedy, the High Court should not entertain application under article 226 of the Constitution
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1971 (3) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
In this application under article 226 of the Constitution, Shri Dhaniram Gupta, the petitioner herein, challenges the assessment order passed under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1965-66, and the notice of demand in respect of the same.
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1971 (3) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether it was legal for the Tribunal to work out unaccounted-for stocks pledged with the bank as on 8th April, 1957, with the assessee's stocks as obtaining on 8th April, 1957 - discrepancy between the stock book and goods pledged with bank - whether only the stock on last day of the accounting year should be considered in determination of suppressed income - fact that assessee itself had tabulated its stock as on next day (8th April, 1957) after the accounting year was immaterial for determining the suppressed profit for the relevant accounting period - question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee
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