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1971 (8) TMI 212
... ... ... ... ..... ied by the Government of India and the tax so levied shall be collected by the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) in the State from which the movement of goods commenced, and the respondents have already been assessed by the Sales Tax Officer, Bareilly, and they have already deposited the tax so assessed and as such they cannot be made to pay the said tax over again more so when the Sales Tax Officer, Delhi, had no jurisdiction to assess the respondents to tax without giving a positive finding as to the place where the sale was effected. In the circumstances, it cannot be urged that the petitions are not maintainable. In the special circumstances of the case, the learned single Judge was justified in holding that he was not inclined to dismiss the petitions on the ground of existence of an alternate remedy. For the reasons stated above, the appeals, which are devoid of merit, are dismissed but with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 211
... ... ... ... ..... to Delhi. Our decision will, therefore, have no bearing on any such local sales at Delhi. It is to be noted that the sales falling under section 4(2)(b) are subject to section 3 and are, therefore, inter-State sales as distinguished from local sales at Delhi which are intra-State sales. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed with the declaration that the inter-State sales of the petitioner falling under section 3(a) of the Act causing the movement of goods from Faridabad to Delhi are liable to be assessed to inter-State sales tax by the sales tax authorities at Faridabad. The amounts of tax which the petitioner has wrongly paid to the sales tax authorities at Delhi on such inter-State sales during the period from 1st April, 1961, to 30th September, 1965, shall be transferred by the sales tax authorities at Delhi to the sales tax authorities at Faridabad. In the circumstances, the costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred. HARDAYAL HARDY, J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 210
... ... ... ... ..... n principal and agent may be implied in a case where a reasonable man, examining the conduct and situation of both the parties, would conclude that one party had authorised the other to act as agent, and that the other had agreed so to act (Ibid, page 22). These two passages show that in order to prove agency there should ordinarily be evidence also of the conduct of the alleged principal. The conduct of the alleged agent alone will not establish agency between two persons. Ram Swarup and P.D. Singhal are apparently strangers. There is no finding that Ram Swarup was dealing as an agent in the normal course of his business or that he was looking after the business of P.D. Singhal or was his employee. So there is no evidence in support of the finding. In our opinion, the assessment order and the notice of demand were not duly served on the assessee. We answer the reference accordingly. The assessee shall get his costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (8) TMI 209
... ... ... ... ..... egistration is conceded, it reasonably follows that the petitioner would also be entitled to the inclusion of news-print in the certificate of registration, for it is the manufacture of newspaper that produces waste paper. Whilst making the rule nisi in W.P. No. 1360 of 1968 absolute, I issue a rule in the nature of mandamus in W.P. No. 1361 of 1968 directing the respondents or the appropriate authority to include news-print in the certificate of registration and all other ancillary material required for the manufacture and sale of newspaper, which is the commercial activity of the petitioner as a registered dealer and such a certificate shall be issued forthwith, as claimed by the company and has to be specified in its certificate of registration. It may not be out of place to mention in conclusion that such a certificate has been issued by the Mysore State under similar circumstances. The writ petitions are allowed and there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 208
... ... ... ... ..... Deputy Commissioner, and as against the order of the Deputy Commissioner there is a further revision to the Board of Revenue. These are the two authorities that are expressly mentioned in rule 53 of the Rules and if the prescribed authority acting under section 46 deliberately violates any administrative direction issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and the Board of Revenue, as the case may be, then whilst reviewing such orders in revision, either the Deputy Commissioner or the Board would naturally correct the prescribed authority. This result also flows from the prescribed procedure dealing with the subject under consideration. This being the position, the argument that a compounding fee can be levied only if the prescribed authority has been so directed by the Deputy Commissioner or the Board of Revenue is without substance. The rule nisi is, therefore, discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 207
... ... ... ... ..... uld be some reason to reopen. Such reason should not be drawn barely from the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but should also satisfy the test of objectivity. As already stated, the records do not disclose as to what at all was the reason for the reopening of a closed assessment. In the peculiar circumstances of this case when the transactions were scrutinised and rescrutinised by the appellate authority for the earlier year and in the absence of any material on record to show that there was some reason to reopen the assessments and thereby justify the exercise of jurisdiction under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, I am unable to sustain the impugned notices, as they are not authorised. The respondent lacks jurisdiction ab initio to invoke section 16 of the Act to issue the challenged notices. In this view of the matter, the rules are made absolute and the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 206
... ... ... ... ..... intended to give effect to sub-section (2) of that section, it is competent for the Legislature to enact that provision with reference to entry 64 of the State List. Our observations in respect of section 2 apply to section 3 as well. One or two of the petitioners contended that the additional tax under section 2(1) amounts to a tax on tax. We have already held that the tax, in its true character, is sales tax. Another contention is that rule 4 of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Rules, 1970, which provides for levy and collection of advance tax is ultra vires. But the contention overlooks the concluding part of sub-section (1) of section 2, which attracts to the impugned Act the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which include the power to levy and collect such advance tax. The petitions are dismissed with costs in Writ Petition No. 3551 of 1970. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. In the other petitions there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 205
... ... ... ... ..... arrying on business in some commodity and he disposed of for a price, articles discarded, surplus or unserviceable. Unless they are frequent, voluminous, continuous and regular, an inference that they were all undertaken in the course of trade, whether real or casual, cannot be properly drawn. I am therefore of the view that the petitioner cannot come within the definition of section 2(g) as a dealer and it is only the dealings of a dealer which can be brought to tax, if they are assessable at all, under the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. In any view of the matter the amount brought to tax by the respondent cannot be included or treated as assessable turnover which has escaped assessment. Therefore both the order of assessment and the imposition of penalty in consequence thereto were passed without proper exercise of jurisdiction. In this view, the rule nisi is made absolute. The writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 204
... ... ... ... ..... part of the business of manufacturers of machine screws. The scrap has to be disposed of and the disposal of it does not necessarily indicate that it was in the course of business. The business, as we said, of the assessee is really manufacture of machine screws and not sale of scrap. On that view the tax cases are dismissed there will be no costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 203
... ... ... ... ..... etitioner as disclosed in A-2 returns, the annual tax liability would come to about Rs. 18,000 or Rs. 19,000. Half of the said tax liability would be very near Rs. 9,000 or Rs. 10,000. Here, in the instant case, the demand for security for a sum of Rs. 25,000 was made by the respondent under the challenged order. This appears to be contrary to the prescription in section 25(5)(ii) of the Act. There is, therefore, an error apparent in the face of the record and is thus the main limb of challenge to the order which is sought to be enforced by the authorities. I am constrained to find that there is an error apparent in the order impugned which ought to be removed by making the rule nisi absolute. Hence this writ petition is allowed and there will be no order as to costs. The revenue is at liberty to take appropriate steps under the prescribed circumstances to call for or demand the security in accordance with law from the petitioner herein if they so deem fit. Petition allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 202
... ... ... ... ..... once the original order becomes merged with the appellate order, then there is a substitution of the original order in all aspects of law and, indeed, factully as well, and that any attempt to rectify the original order, which should be deemed to be non est is a futile one. In this view of the matter also the petitioner cannot succeed. For the reason that the appropriate authorities, for want of material, did not discover any error apparent on the record, which only would entitle the petitioner to reopen the assessment to cause a rectification of the assessment order under section 55 of the Act, and also for the reason that the application for rectification was directed against the original order of assessment which has become non est, I am unable to issue the rule of mandamus, for there is no public duty on the part of the second respondent to act in the manner sought by the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 201
... ... ... ... ..... s expressly included in the dictionary meaning of coals. According to Webster, cinder is a piece of partly burnt coal, capable of further burning without flame. Another meaning given by Webster is that it is a partly burnt combustible, which no longer gives flame. That is the meaning generally found in all other dictionaries. It is also, like coal, used as fuel, though of a low grade. That being so, as understood in the ordinary and commercial sense, the entry would include coal ash. We may also add that if coal, charcoal and firewood, all used as fuel, are taxable at 2 per cent., it does not appear reasonable and could not have been intended by the Legislature that coal ash or cinder, which is also used as fuel of a low grade, should be taxed at a higher rate. 5.. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is that the word coal in entry I of Part III of Schedule II includes coal ash. Since no one appeared to oppose this reference, we make no order about costs.
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1971 (8) TMI 200
... ... ... ... ..... is expressly included in the dictionary meaning of coal. According to Webster, cinder is a piece of partly burnt coal, capable of further burning without flame. Another meaning given by Webster is that it is a partly burnt combustible, which no longer gives flame. That is the meaning generally found in all other dictionaries. It is also, like coal, used as fuel, though of a low grade. That being so, as understood in the ordinary and commercial sense, the entry would include coal ash. We may also add that if coal, charcoal and firewood, all used as fuel, are taxable at 2 per cent., it does not appear reasonable and could not have been intended by the Legislature that coal ash or cinder, which is also used as fuel of a low grade, should be taxed at a higher rate. 5.. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is that the word coal in entry 1 of Part III of Schedule II includes coal ash. Since no one appeared to oppose this reference, we make no order about costs.
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1971 (8) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... s sought to be rectified were passed, there was no error in it and, therefore, the authority acting under section 55 rightly said that there was no error in the order, for it to rectify. In these circumstances, the authority has rightly exercised its jurisdiction and the writs of certiorari, therefore, cannot lie. Writ Petitions Nos. 4788 of 1968 and 3329 of 1969 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. In the view that I hold that this jurisdiction cannot be availed of for getting refund of moneys, may be tax, paid by an assessee to implement the lawful order of assessment, I am unable to issue writs of mandamus compelling the respondent to refund the taxes paid by the petitioners in the manner stated above. There is no public duty on the part of the respondent to act in the matter and refund the amounts claimed. Therefore, the other two writ petitions, W. P. Nos. 4789 of 1968 and 3330 of 1969 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 198
... ... ... ... ..... o decide whether any part of the turnover related to sales in the course of import nor was it called upon to do so by any argument of counsel before it at that time. In this state of affairs, I fail to see how any error at all has crept into the record and if no such error has crept into the record, there can be no apparent error either. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was right in having dismissed the application to rectify an error which did not exist in its order. There was no public duty on the part of the Tribunal to correct an error which was not there in the order. In fact, that is the only thing they are expected to do under section 55. The application for rectification has been rightly rejected. On the only ground that the petitioner secured certain rights as a result of the decision in the KhosIa s case(1), he cannot compel a Tribunal to do a duty which is not enjoined on it by law. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 197
... ... ... ... ..... do not think that the ratio in the cases cited above, which would clearly apply in a circumstance when the original order has merged with the appellate order, can be invoked in the instant case so as to avoid the payment of the lawful liability of the original dealer and which is now payable by his successor, viz., the petitioner in this writ petition. As a matter of fact, the petitioner is estopped from contending that the amount is not recoverable, for she canvassed the correctness of the order of rectification, but failed to establish that it was wrong. In this view also, she having elected one mode of relief, cannot be allowed to reprobate and take up the position that the revenue is not authorised legally to collect the amount due and claimed under the challenged order. In these circumstances, I am unable to issue, in my discretion, a writ of prohibition. The rule nisi is discharged. The writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (8) TMI 196
... ... ... ... ..... the Government for payment in instalments. So the assessee did not consider at that stage the notice of demand was vague as to the time for payment of tax. The plea is an afterthought invented with a view to escape from penalty. Counsel for the assessee submitted that as the proceeding under section 15-A is penal in nature, the burden of proof lies on the department. The construction of notice is a question of law, and not a question of fact. So the submission is not relevant. In the result we will answer the question referred to us in this manner The notice of demand sent along with the assessment order is a valid notice of demand the letter dated 14/15th July, 1961, sent after the dismissal of the writ petition is a mere reminder and not a notice of demand as contemplated by the Sales Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same account. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (8) TMI 195
... ... ... ... ..... r was passed, whether metal polishing bars or metal polishing compositions could come within the purview of item 37. As there can be no tax by an intendment and in the absence of an express item including metal polishing bars prior to 1st of July, 1967, the attempted revision of the original order as undertaken by the respondent in exercise of its power under section 16 of the Act is not legal and is not one which could normally be said to flow from the power contemplated in section 16 of the Act. In the above view, there was no jurisdiction for the respondent to revise the order under section 16 of the Act and even otherwise it would be perverse to hold that the metal polishing composition or bar used in polishing and metal finishing activities is equatable to soaps which are primarily intended to wash and clean. In this view of the matter, the rule nisi has to be made absolute. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1971 (8) TMI 194
... ... ... ... ..... ppeal was filed. Hence he held that the appeal was in order and should not have been rejected as incompetent. Against this order the Commissioner of Sales Tax has come up in reference. Now, when the judge (Revisions) had accepted the contention of the assessee that the cheque in question was deposited towards the admitted tax for the year 1962-63, there is no reason why that sum should not be deemed to have been deposited towards the admitted tax for the year 1962-63. It was open to the judge (Revisions) to have accepted the explanation of the assessee and to have permitted him to rectify the mistake. Learned counsel for the Commissioner has not been able to show us as to why the amount in question could not be deemed to have been deposited towards the year 1962-63. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1971 (8) TMI 193
... ... ... ... ..... d been validated by Act No. 14 of 1964. Coming now to question No. (2), it appears that the reference to the entire assessment year 1958-59 is incorrect. The dispute only relates to the turnover of the period 1st August, 1958, to 31st March, 1959. We are not concerned with the rate applicable for the period of assessment year 1958-59 from 1st April, 1958, to 31st July, 1958. We would, therefore, reframe question No. (2) as below In either case what would be the rate of tax on yarn for the period 1st August, 1958, to 31st March, 1959, falling in the assessment year 1958-59. The notification of 1st August, 1958, had fixed the rate of tax at. 2 per cent. That notification having been validated, the rate of tax for that period would be 2 per cent. We accordingly answer question No. (2) as reframed by us by saying that the proper rate of tax on yarn would be 2 per cent. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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