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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 58 Records
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1972 (11) TMI 89
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... ... ..... ed so as to be retrospectively active. The State Legislature did possess the competence to so enact the law. There is no ambiguity in it. In those circumstances, the petitioners cannot, relying solely upon section 4 of Madras Act 3 of 1969, contend that the retroactivity is purposeless. Even if section 4 has to be understood in that fashion, it does not affect the validity of the other sections of Madras Act 3 of 1969. Thus the other contentions of the counsel also fail. In the result, the final order of the Appellate Tribunal challenged here is well within its jurisdiction and there being no other apparent error or error of law in it, the rule nisi is discharged and the writ petitions are dismissed. Even so, the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, which is the subject-matter of W.P. No. 873 of 1970, does not suffer from any apparent error. The rule therein also is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 88
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... ... ..... provision corresponding to explanation II of the Andhra Pradesh Act which is now in question. I do not, therefore, agree that this decision at all supports the petitioners contention. The learned counsel for the petitioners also invited my attention to certain cases arising under the Income-tax Act as to what is meant by agricultural income. No useful purpose will be served by referring to these decisions, as the Income-tax Act deals with taxation on income while the taxable event under the Sales Tax Act is a sale and not income. For all the above reasons, I hold that explanation II to section 2(1)(e) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, is valid. The further contention that even if the explanation is valid it is still necessary to establish in every case whether the person has been carrying on business, cannot be accepted. It follows, therefore, that all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Government Pleader s fees Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 87
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... ... ..... third objection urged by the petitioner s counsel relates to disallowance of rebates given to the customers in determining the turnover. This claim has to be considered by the first respondent in the light of Explanation II to section 2(27) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, wherein the term turnover is defined, and rule 9(a) of the Rules made under the Act. 7.. The petitioner has also raised a contention that the levy of surcharge is illegal, for the reason that the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act, 1957, is unconstitutional. This contention has to be rejected in view of the decision of this court in Kilikar v. Sales Tax Officer 1968 21 S.T.C. 252. 8.. For the reasons stated above, I quash the order exhibit P-3, in so far as it relates to the matters dealt with above, and direct the first respondent to assess afresh the petitioner s turnover according to law and in the light of the observations herein contained. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (11) TMI 86
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... ... ..... is the correct view. 8.. Counsel for the revenue then referred to the amendment introduced by the Madras State to the rule corresponding to rule 9(f)(ii) of the Rules clarifying that charges for packing will include the cost of packing materials and urged that but for the amendment the cost of packing materials will not fall within the rule. We think that the amendment is only by way of clarification and not by alteration by addition. The words used in rule 9(f)(ii) are wide enough to take in the cost of packing materials. 9.. In the light of the above, the imposition of sales tax amounting to Rs. 6,415.75 for the year 1968-69 and Rs. 33,139.08 for the year 1969-70 relating to the turnover pertaining to charges for packing is not justified. We, therefore, set aside the assessment orders to the extent of deleting the above amounts from the total tax determined for the two years. This petition is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 85
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... ... ..... nce than a necessity. Use of the goods in the present case cannot be considered for luxurious purposes. The aforesaid goods may be glasswares but are not luxury goods. Therefore, the respondent cannot charge on their sale a tax at a higher rate. I am also supported in the aforesaid observations by an unreported judgment of this court of M.R. Sharma, J., in Civil Writ No. 703 of 1972 (M/s. Amir Chand Om Parkash v. The Assessing Authority, Amritsar, decided on 25th September, 1972) . In that case, respondent No. 1 made an assessment on the sale of doop and agarbatti at a higher rate treating the same as perfumery as given in entry No. 16 of Schedule A. The same was challenged in this court. The learned judge came to the conclusion that the aforesaid goods do not fall within the description of luxury goods. For the reasons recorded above, I accept this petition with costs and quash the notices of respondent, annexures B, B-1, and B-2, all dated 5th June, 1972. Petition allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 84
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... ... ..... ecision in Delta Engineering Company s case 1963 14 S.T.C. 515 and has held that the pumping sets are not agricultural implements. For the reasons already indicated, this case also, in our opinion, does not lay down the law correctly. We are thus clearly of the opinion that pumping sets in question are connected intimately with agriculture and are commonly used and understood as agricultural implements. As the petition succeeds on merits, it is not necessary to deal with the constitutional question as to whether section 3-AB of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is ultra vires. We, accordingly, allow this petition and quash the assessment order for the year 1966-67. The connected writ petition relates to the assessment year 1968-69, where no assessment has yet been made. We direct that the Sales Tax Officer shall pass the assessment order keeping in view the law as clarified by us in this judgment. The assessee is entitled to costs. There will be one set of costs only. Petition allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 83
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... ... ..... inues. The above provision shows that the Central Act has not provided that when an assessee commits default, he commits an offence for which he can be prosecuted. Therefore, it is clear to our mind that committing default in payment of tax levied under the Central Act does not constitute an offence for which the defaulter can be prosecuted. When the Central Act itself does not make committing a default in payment of tax an offence, aid of section 29(1) of the Mysore Act cannot be invoked to prosecute a person who has committed default in payment of tax assessed under the Central Act. In view of both the reasons, viz., section 9(2) of the Central Act not providing that a prosecution under section 29(1) of the Mysore Act could be made, and the Central Act not making commission of a default in payment of tax levied under the Central Act an offence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution in these cases is incompetent. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 82
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... ... ..... r within the meaning of the term dealer as defined in section 2(d) of the Rajasthan Act. We might observe at this stage that the learned Members of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan have rightly directed the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer to determine the liability of the assessee by excluding from his turnover goods which he had purchased and on which sales tax had already been paid before. This is the correct view to take in view of the language of section 5A. We have already indicated the cases cited by the learned counsel for the assessee and it would be enough to say that our case is governed by the direct authority of the Supreme Court and the cases referred to by the learned counsel for the assessee are distinguishable and no useful purpose would be served by analysing them. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that we answer the question in the affirmative. We make no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (11) TMI 81
It was held that a person could be said to be in the course of his employment only if he was under an obligation, expressed or implied to his employer to do something reasonably incidental thereto. The test in all such cases is whether the employee was exposed to the particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took the same risks as those incurred by any member of the public using the road. In view of the clear finding of the court that the insured employee was assaulted by the coolie and the cause of the assault was due to an earlier incident of reprimanding him, it was held that the assault that had resulted in an injury to the insured employee arose out of his employment. It was also further held that the injury was sustained by the insured employee during the course of his employment not only when the injury was caused to him while doing something which an employee was under an obligation express or implied to do but also when he was doing something reasonably incidental thereto
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1972 (11) TMI 80
Whether Tribunal was justified in excluding from the assessable income of the assessee the sums which were the amounts of dividend received by the assessee's wife and two sons from shares acquired out of the profits of the assessee - dividends from those shares were to be included in assessee's income
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1972 (11) TMI 79
Charitable Trust - term "individual" in s. 3 of Wealth-tax Act, includes individuals and therefore the trustees of a trust constitute an assessable unit - trust for the benefit of the members of the settlors family was not a trust for any public purpose
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1972 (11) TMI 78
Whether article 226 can be used for challenging the validity of the orders passed prior to January 26, 1950?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As agreeing with the High Court that the petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy by way of going up in appeal against the impugned orders. He having failed to do so, cannot be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection, we may also note that if the petitioner had instituted a suit for refund of the tax, the same would have been barred by limitation.
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1972 (11) TMI 76
Whether chillies and lemons were "vegetables" within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Unable to accept this assertion that in Orissa chillies and lemons are not used as articles of food. Even if a section of Oriyas have a dislike for chillies and lemons, they do not cease to be vegetables for that reason. In common parlance chillies and lemons are known as vegetables. We have no doubt that chillies and lemons have always been considered as vegetables. In that view it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether at any rate they are fruits, sales or purchases of which are exempt from sales tax.
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1972 (11) TMI 70
Whether the provisions of the 1959 Act empowered the assessing authority to reopen the assessments?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The question for decision is as to who had the jurisdiction to reopen the concerned assessments. Such a question cannot be considered as a question of procedure. Under the old Rules the assessee had a right to have his assessments reopened only by the appellate authority. This was undoubtedly a right conferred on the assessee. It is a valuable right. That being so, the same is protected by the proviso.
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1972 (11) TMI 68
Whether the producers who supplied the cement to the State Trading Corporation or its agents in gunny bags in pursuance of the directions given by the Government are liable to pay sales tax on the turnover relating to the price of the gunny bags?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 66
Whether the food colour and essence are under the circumstances items to be taxed under section 3-A within the Notification No. ST-905/X dated March 31, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.The appellant's learned counsel had at one stage suggested that the goods intended to be taxed under section 3-A of the Act are all luxury goods and therefore food colours and syrup essences which are normally used by comparatively richer class of society should be presumed to have been intended to be included in items Nos. 10 and 37 of the List. On closer scrutiny of the List, however, this point was rightly not developed.
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1972 (11) TMI 40
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... s mentioned under section 244B. As already said, I, however, deem it unnecessary to advert to this aspect of the case because the respondent succeeds on two of his preliminary issues. Before parting with this judgment it deserves notice that the common case of the parties before me is that not a penny has been misappropriated or converted to his own use by the respondent. Admittedly, the whole of the amount of issue was tendered over in court and was thereafter disbursed amongst the creditors under the authority of the orders passed by the hon ble the company judge. The issue was merely a technical one mdash whether the amount should have been deposited in the companies liquidation account or should have been tendered over into the court for distribution to the other creditors as done by respondent No. 1. In view of the success of the respondent on both the preliminary issues Nos. 1 and 3, this application must fail and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (11) TMI 31
Memorandum of association - Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1972 (11) TMI 21
Agricultural Income Tax, High Court, Rubber Trees ... ... ... ... ..... he question that the assessee had performed agricultural operations. There is no finding in the sense that the Tribunal has not stated, we find . But, reading the relevant part of the order, we have no doubt in our mind that they have found that the assessee had not performed agricultural operations and there is of course the definite finding which we have extracted that the assessee was holding the property. The principle of the decision in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. George Varghese and Co. is not, therefore, attracted. We answer the question referred to us on the basis of the findings entered by the Tribunal, in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (11) TMI 20
Account Books, Previous Year, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... e have detailed above, this passage is helpful to him. In Baladin s case the books of account did not contain the undisclosed income and the dates of their acquisition could not be located and, therefore, resort had to be taken to the financial year. That precisely is the principle enunciated in section 69 of the Act. We need not examine Jethmal Lakhani s case because it has been mentioned with approval by their Lordships in the above case, which we have already noticed earlier. No other point was pressed. In our opinion, the answer to the question referred is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, clearly applies and the Tribunal was right in law in deleting the cash credit of Rs. 20,000 in the books of account of the assessee on April 7, 1961, from the total income of the assessment year 1962-63. The reference is answered against the department but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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