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1972 (3) TMI 113
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... ... ..... e decree shall be executable at once by the petitioners. Provided further that for purposes of execution of the decree as modified herein, the petitioners shall address notices making the offer referred to above to the address of the respondents 1 to 4 given in Special Civil Application No. 2185 of 1969 and post them by registered post, acknowledgment due. On such posting in any post office in Bombay the period of one month referred to above shall commence to run from 8 days after such posting; and the said respondents shall be deemed to be served with the notices. The trustees shall thereafter be entitled to execute the decree on the expiry of the said period of one month even if some or all of the said respondents claim that they were not served with the notice or even if any or all of them were not in fact served with the notices. 25. The respondents 1 to 4 to pay the costs of the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 2185 of 1969 throughout. 26. Rule made absolute.
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1972 (3) TMI 112
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... ... ..... e. In this case after the explanation was obtained it was open to the disciplinary authority to go through the documents and come to its decision. If the petitioner would have availed of the opportunity of personal hearing she could have made comments on the proposed action and the materials that were used against her. After having failed to respond she cannot make a grievance that she was not fairly listened to. Mr. L. Rath further contends that the petitioner had no notice of the report of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee. She would have known of the report provided she would have availed of the opportunity of personal hearing. 19. Thus in the quasi-judicial enquiry held against the petitioner in respect of the malpractice committed by her every reasonable opportunity was given to her for defending herself. The writ application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed; but in the circumstances without costs. Ranganath Misra, J. 20. I agree. Bijay Kishore Ray, J. 21. I agree.
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1972 (3) TMI 111
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... ... ..... t. In the case before us we find that the High Court had not noticed a number of facts duly considered by the trial Court so that the exercise of power of enhancement of the sentence under Section 366 I.P.C. could not be reasonably justified here. 12. Consequently, we allow this appeal by setting aside the order of enhancement of sentence by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and restore the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment passed upon the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence under Section 366 I.P.C. of which the appellant was convicted. The concurrent sentence of four months rigorous imprisonment under Section 354 I.P.C., which was not interfered with by the High Court, is maintained. We understand that the appellant has already undergone more than one year's imprisonment awarded to him and that he is in jail as his application for bail was rejected. If this is so, the appellant will be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.
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1972 (3) TMI 110
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... ... ..... d by two of the three members on the 4th April 1970 was legal because sufficient notice was given to all the three members. If for one reason or the other one of them could not attend, that does not make the meeting of others illegal. In such circumstances, where there is no rule or regulation or any other provision for fixing the quorum, the presence of the majority of the member would constitute it a valid meeting and matters considered there at cannot be held to be invalid. 6. This proposition is well recognised and is also so stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition (Vol. IX, page 48, para 95). It is, therefore, unnecessary to refer to any decisions on the subject. In the view we have taken, the appeal is allowed with costs against respondent 3, the Order of the Chancellor revoking the appointment of the appellant is set aside and the appellant is declared to have been validly appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the Saugar University as from the 22nd June 1970.
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1972 (3) TMI 109
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... ... ..... pay-sheets the whole prosecution case was actually demolished. Moreover, as the High Court had rightly pointed out, the complainant's actual evidence had fully supported and not contradicted any part of the complaint. No such absurdity was revealed by the complainant's evidence as to merit a forthright dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 Criminal Procedure Code. What the Magistrate had to determine at the stage of issue of process was not the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case on tie assumption that what was stated could be true unless the prosecution allegations were so fantastic that they could not reasonably be held to be true. 9. As we, in agreement with the High Court, think that the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate in dismissing the complaint was pre-mature and was also based on obvious misconceptions, we dismiss this appeal.
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1972 (3) TMI 108
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... ... ..... husband had admitted his fault and apologised for the same. In any case, this letter, admittedly, was written during the period when the compromise talks were going on. The inference drawn by the learned Judge from all these circumstances was that the letter was written at a time when the parties had agreed that no evidence would be given regarding it. That being so, the case will be covered by the second condition laid down in section 23, quoted above, and as such, the husband could claim privilege regarding the same. It has been ruled in a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Shibcharan Das v. (Form) Gulabchand Chhotey Lal . A.I.R 1936 All 157., that where negotiations were being conducted with a view to a settlement, it should be held that those negotiations were so conducted without prejudice. 7. In view of what I have said above, I would dismiss this petition. As the respondent is not represented before me, there will be no order as costs. 8. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 107
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... ... ..... espondents. It has not been shown that the allotment Order created any such rights on the basis of which the appellant could found his defence on the Rule of estoppel. The Additional Civil Judge had found on issue No. 4 that Harbans Lal never gave express consent for the constructions to be raised but he knew about their existence. We concur in the view of the High Court that mere inaction on the part of the lessor did not entitle the lessee to resist the suit on the ground of estoppel. The lessee had the right under Section 108(h) of the Transfer of Property Act to remove the constructions while he was in possession. There was no pro vision in that Act which debarred the lessor from determining the lease under Section 111 merely because constructions had been made by the lessee even to the knowledge of the lessor, and from instituting the suit for ejectment. 8. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. The appellant will have six months time for vacating the premises.
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1972 (3) TMI 106
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... ... ..... , the appeal should be adjourned till such time at this Act is enforced. In support of this contention, an order passed by Hon'ble Asthana, J., in Second Appeal No. 3041 of 1968 (All) was shown to me. This order is about the adjournment of the case. The reasons given in an order for adjournment of the case cannot be equated with the reasons and principles laid down in decided cases. The new Act only awaits certain legal formalities to be fulfilled. I don't think this appeal should await decision till the above Act comes into force. This court has to decide cases in accordance with the existing law and in this view of the matter, I don't think that the decision of this appeal can be adjourned only under a hope that the decision of this appeal would be affected by the new Act which might be in conformity with the social conscience underlying the new law to be enforced. 29. For the reasons given above, the appeal had no force in it. It is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 105
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... ... ..... is feature of the case is decisive not only on the right to be heard on the fresh ground but also on the right to advance any argument in support of the appeal of the deceased. 15. We may mention that it was also urged that the matter was so old that any reversal of the grant of the mining lease to Venkatagiri, as long ago as 1960, would involve considerable dislocation and injury to respondent Venkatagiri without any fault on his part. The respondent Venkatagiri must have invested considerable amount of money in mining operations. The acceptance of the claim of Venkatagiri by the Government on the strength of which Venkatagiri made his investment clothes Venkatagiri's claim with an equity which could not be defeated without clear proof of some over-riding legal right or interest of another claimant. We are unable to see any such right in the heirs of the deceased Buchivenkata Rao. 16. Consequently this appeal is dismissed but we make no orders as to costs in this Court.
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1972 (3) TMI 104
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... ... ..... urt while deciding the above case had not taken into account the provisions of Chapter IX of the State Act, and, therefore, the matter should be referred to a Full Bench, if necessary, for reconsidering the opinion expressed therein. We find it unnecessary to do so in this case as the petitioners are to succeed on the basis of our decision on the first point raised by them. 18. In the result, these two writ petitions succeed and the impugned notification issued by respondent 1 to the extent it levies tax on mining of manganese and iron ore carried on by the petitioners is quashed. The respondents are directed not to enforce the said levy appearing at S. L. Nos. 62 and 63 in the impugned notification against the petitioners. Any amount already paid by the petitioners, within three years upto the date of these writ petitions, pursuant to the said levy is directed to be refunded to them. 19. Petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250/- one set.
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1972 (3) TMI 103
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... ... ..... r the relevant date, that is 13th June 1962, mentioned in the second proviso to the notification. It is not in dispute that the petitioners applied for licence only on 16th October, 1963, long after the crucial date, namely, 13th June, 1962, referred to in that proviso. The petitioner's case that they have only applied for a renewal of the earlier licence held by their transferors cannot be accepted, for the rules make it clear that the licence issued is personal to the grantee and that it is not transferable. In view of the provisions making the licence personal to the grantee, the transferee, cannot be said to be a licensee before 13th June, 1962. In our view the petitioners will not be entitled to the exemption under the said notification in view of the second proviso. 5. In view of the fact that the Department itself does not seek to sustain the demand under rule 10-A, and that the demand could not be sustained under rule 9(2), the writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 102
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... ... ..... ncy Act of 1926 was in force. Under Section 25 (1) thereof a brother was a preferential heir to a brother's son. See Dular Pandey v. Nanda Budhai AIR1938All396 . Hence Chhiddu would inherit the one-third share till then held by Smt. Kaushalya. In this view, Chhiddu was entitled to a two-third share while the plaintiff had a one-third share in the holding. In regard to the house, the rules of Hindu Law would continue to apply. In accordance with the rule of survivorship, the interest of Chhangey would pass to both the other surviving members of the family, namely Chhiddu and the plaintiff Jhandey Lal. On this basis, they both had a half share in the house. o p /o p 18. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The decree is modified. The plaintiff's suit for partition is decreed for a half share in the house and for a one-third share in the tenancy holding. Under the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. o p /o p
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1972 (3) TMI 101
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... ... ..... ch the impugned decision has also been challenged. 26. In the result, I feel, that the impugned decision of the Central Government to impound the petitioner's passport taken on June 11, 1971 and which was communicated to the petitioner by respondent No. 2 in his letter dated November 25, 1971 should be quashed. 27. I further direct respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to forbear from taking any further steps or action in furtherance or in implementation of the impugned decision which has been quashed. 28. Rule is, therefore, made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. 29. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner. Costs to be taxed on a Long Cause scale with one counsel allowed on either side. 30. Taxing Master to be at liberty to allow as instructions for brief any sum exceeding ₹ 2,000 as he may in his discretion think proper. 31. Respondent No. 3 to bear its own costs. 32. Operation of the order stayed till Friday, March 24, 1972.
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1972 (3) TMI 99
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... ... ..... t an appeal under Section 10(1) of the Act against the order of a single judge in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction to a Division Court lies only in those cases where an order is a judgment as defined in the Code. In other words apart from the orders which have the force of a decree, appeals will, therefore, lie only against those orders passed by the single judge which are mentioned in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule I of the Code and no appeal will lie against other orders which are outside these two provisions. As the impugned order of the learned single judge is not one of those orders specified in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code the same cannot be held to be a judgment within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act and hence no appeal is competent under this Section. 44. The result is that the appeal is held to be incompetent and is dismissed but in view of the important question of law raised, there will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 98
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... ... ..... cessary to point out that the view taken by the trial Court that the plaint does not show as to how 12 installments were saved from the bar of limitation, is not correct. In fact, in para 2 of the plaint the plaintiff has referred to the reply dated 11-12-1967 as containing an acknowledgment of debt. It is sufficient for the purposes of Order 7, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code that the facts on which exemptions are claimed are set out in the plaint. 11. In the result, the revision petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute, the decree passed by the trial Court is modified by substituting the figure "684/-" in place of the figure "342/-" in the second para of the operative order and "Rs. 600/-" in place of ₹ 300/-" in the same paragraph. Defendant No.1 to pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner. Since the heirs of respondent No.2 have not appeared to contest this petition, no order as to their costs. 12. Petition allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 97
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... ... ..... February, 1967 and returned on 28 February, 1967. This was to make it possible for him to be present at Diken on 15 February, 1967. 55. Ram Bilas P.W. 11 narrated the speech, of Swamiji of Bhanpura. He however said that he had no talk with the respondent. It becomes difficult to follow as to how the respondent would know about the presence of the witness at Diken and then cite him as a witness. 56. The respondent gave an undertaking to this Court to produce the witness for cross-examination. The witnesses however were not produced. That is another reason to hold that the respondent's case was not true. 57. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The election petition is dismissed. 58. The trial in the High Court lasted over 180 days. Both parties should have conducted the case with precision and clarity. The parties could have shortened the matter. Both parties are to pay and bear their own costs in the High Court as well as in this Court.
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1972 (3) TMI 96
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... ... ..... ucation of the people is reasonable and correct and the learned single Judge was not justified in rejecting this contention. The museum cannot be taken to organise and provide entertainment to the visitors and consequently, the fees levied by the museum for the purposes of meeting the maintenance charges etc- cannot be liable to tax under the Act. The Commercial Taxes Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings against the appellant. 20. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 13-9-69 and a grant writ of certiorari quashing the order of she Commercial Taxes Officer, "B" Circle, Jaipur, dated 3-10-68 imposing penalty upon the appellant. We also quash the notice dated 15-10-68 of the said authority and further grant a writ of prohibition restraining the respondent No. 2 from taking any action against the appellant. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to (sic) their own costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 95
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... ... ..... 71 Examination, whereas in the case of the petitioner not only his 1971 examination has been cancelled but he has also been debarred from appearing in the Board's examination for 1972. It has been pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the case of Jai Ram Pandey was different, inasmuch as Jai Ram Pandey was charged with bringing unauthorised material in the examination hall which material he did not use. The petitioner, on the other hand, was charged and found guilty of having actually used unfair means in the two papers. In the circumstances, there is no parity between the cases of the petitioner and Jai Ram Pandey. It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondents practised any discrimination in dealing with the cases of these two candidates. 28. In the result, we find no substance in any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. The petition fails and is dismissed. Stay order dated 11th of February 1971 is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 94
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... ... ..... ances, was rightly convicted for offence under section 201 Indian Penal code for causing the disappearance of the dead body with a view to screen the murderer from legal punishments. As both Dasrath and Kasim are being acquitted, the charge under section 120B Indian Penal Code against Mahabir for conspiracy with Dasrath to murder Indira and against Mahadeo for conspiracy with Kasim for causing disappearance of dead body of Indira must fail. The result is that appeal of Dasrath and Kasim is allowed. Their conviction is set aside and they are acquitted. The conviction of Mahabir and Mahadeo for offences under section 120B Indian Penal Code is set aside. The conviction of Mahabir for offences under sections 302 and 201 Indian Penal Code as well as the sentence on that scare is maintained. Likewise, the conviction and sentence of Mahadeo for offence under section 201 Indian Penal Code is maintained. The appeal of Mahabir and Mahadeo to this extent is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 93
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... ... ..... them have not been printed. In these circumstances, we are unable to accede to the request that we should do novo examine the evidence on record. 2. Mr. OP. Verma, the learned Counsel for the appellant, contended hat the trial court as well as the appellate court had wrongly placed the burden on the appellant to prove that she had good grounds to leave the husband's house and because of that erroneous approach these courts have come to a wrong conclusion. The question of burden of proof has no importance at this stage, Both parties have adduced evidence and the trial court and the appellate court have appreciated that evidence. 3. For the reasons mentioned above we see mo reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. Hence the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. But we do not disturb the orders earlier made by this Court directing the husband to pay to the wife a sum of ₹ 2,000/- (in aggregate) for meeting the expenses of this litigation.
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