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1972 (3) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e taken into account in considering whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause. 4. From the facts found above it is clear that the appeal came to be filed two days after the period of limitation solely because of the wrong calculation made by Mr. Atma Ram. 5. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the Punjab Government cannot take advantage of the mistake committed by Mr. Atma Ram. It has not given any explanation of its own for not filing the appeal within time. This contention does not appeal to us. As mentioned earlier, Punjab Government had evidently left the matters in the hands of the Punjabi University which was the party really intersted. It depended entirely on the Punjabi University. We see no reason why that cause should be found to be improper. 6. For the reasons mentioned above these appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. The High Court is directed to admit the appeals and dispose of the same in accordance with law. No costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... are modified and the appellants allowed in part. THEre will be no order as to costs in the appeals. If the amounts have been deposited by the appellant as per orders of this Court dated September 13, 1968 in C. M. Ps. Nos. 849-851 of 1968, the appellant will be given credit for the same. Similarly, if the employees, referred to in the said order have withdrawn moneys on furnishing security, that security will be treated as sufficient for the purposes of our order also. But it is made clear that the directions given by us regarding the deposit of the amounts and furnishing of security will apply to all the employees who have filed the applications under S. 33A before the Tribunal. As the complaints, filed under S. 33A, have been pending for a fairly long period, it is highly desirable that the Tribunal takes up these applications and disposes them of within a period not exceeding three months from today. The records will be sent immediately to the Tribunal. Order accordingly.
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1972 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re this Court and give custody of the same to the Registrar of this Court. The Registrar will hand them over to the appellant. The Receiver has informed this Court that the remuneration the shares in this Court in pursuance of this judgment. We allow the appeal with costs. ORDER In modification of our earlier order dated March 9, 1972 we now direct the Receiver to deliver the shares to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court on the original side within 10 days from this date. The Registrar will hand-over the shares to Mr. B. M. Bagaria, a Solicitor of the Calcutta High Court, on behalf of Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (The Receiver has informed this Court that the remuneration (due to him has not yet been paid. The Receiver may move the (Calcutta High Court for necessary orders in this connection. In modification of our earlier order dated March 9, 1972 regarding costs' we direct that in Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1971 the costs will be paid by the contesting defendants
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1972 (3) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... act between a letting by the respondent No. 1 and the business of the society when the society was not itself the landlord of the flat. Reference was made at the Bar to Deccan Merchants Co-opera- tive Bank Ltd. v. M/s Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others 1969 1 S.C.R. 887. 5-LI208 Sup C I/72. The facts there were very different from those of the instant case. But the Court had to consider the question of competing jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act and the Act and it is pertinent to note the observations at p.902"that the two acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply." In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgement and order of the High Court And of the Bench of the Court of Small Causes. The matter is now to go back to the Court of Small Causes for disposal according to law. The appellants will have the costs incurred in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to have expressed any opinion on the construction of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two single Judges have taken divergent views and tile Kerala High Court agreed with the view that the employees under the Minimum Wages Act need not be, in the employment at the time of their applications under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act whereas the Punjab High Court on the other hand agreed with the contrary view of the Madras High Court. The language of s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act is not completely identical with that of s. 33C(2)of the Act and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in the two statutes are also somewhat differently worded. Without any further discussion on this aspect we are content to observe that this judgment should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. As a result of the foregoing discussion, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 87 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trust without joining the other trustees. 11. We are, therefore, of the view that unless the instrument of trust otherwise provides, all co-trustees must join infiling a suit to recover possession of the property from the tenant after determination of the lease. No one single co-trustee, even he be a managing trustee unanimously chosen by the co-trustees, can maintain such a suit against the tenant without joining the other co-trustees. All co-trustees must be joined in the suit and if any one or more of them are unwilling to be joined in the suit as plaintiffs or for some reason or the other it is not possible to join them as plaintiffs, they must be impleaded as defendants so that all co-trustees are before the Court. 12. We, therefore, answer the questions accordingly and send the Special Civil Application for hearing and final disposal by a single Judge of the High Court in the light of the answers given and the observations made in this judgment. 13. Order accordingly.
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1972 (3) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ment in publishing the notification under section 3., It is clear to our minds, as it was to the High Court that under clause(b) the filing-of the suit within the period of exemption is the- only- condition that is necessary to satisfy one of the requirements of the. exemption, the other requirement being the passing of the decree in respect of which no time has been prescribed. If the decree, as contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant, has to be obtained within the period of 5 years, there was no need to specify that the suit had to be filed within that period because the-,exemption from the requirements of section 13 is only. in respect of the decree and not the suit, There was, therefore, no need to mention about the time of, the filing of the suit. In the view we have taken, the construction placed by the High Court is the only construction that is possible on the language of the notification. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ace for payment of the excise duty as contemplated in Rule 9(1) for clearance of the goods, and that will not apply to a case where the levy is sought to be made for the first time and that Rule 9(2) can be applied only for a clandestine removal of the excisable goods in contravention of Rule 9(1) In view of that decision we have to hold that the demands in these cases purport to have been issued under Rule 10A cannot also be sustained under Rule 9(2). It is not the case of the department that the demands could be sustained under any other statutory provision. Obviously Rule 9(2) cannot be applied as there is no levy before. Therefore the demands in question have to be quashed on that short ground. In that view it is not necessary to go into the other contentions raised by the petitioners relating to the scope of the two notifications referred to above. The Writ Petitions are, therefore, allowed and the demands in question quashed. There will however be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 84 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... actory, the petitioners cannot be held to have contravened Rule 9(1) so as to enable the Excise authorities to invoke Rule 9(2). 13. In view of the finding that Rule 9(2) cannot be invoked to sustain the demands made in these cases, the further contention raised by the petitioners that Rule 9(2) suffers from the same infirmities as Rule 10A and had, therefore, to be held ultra vires, need not be gone into. We are not, therefore, expressing any opinion in relation to that contention. Similarly, the other contentions raised by the petitioners that Rule 9(2) is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution need not be considered at this stage. 14. Since the demands are quashed, it is unnecessary to go into the question as to the exact scope of the Notifications Nos. 137/60-C.E., dated 1-10-1960 and 109/63 dated 5-7-1963 referred to above. The writ petitions are, therefore, allowed and the demands in question quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the highest bid should be confirmed or not?
Held that:- The High Court erroneously thought that the Government was bound to satisfy the Court that there was collusion between the bidders. The High Court was not sitting on appeal against the order made by the Government. The inference of the Government that there was a collusion among the bidders may be right or wrong. But that was not open to judicial review so long as it is not proved that it was a make- believe one. The real opinion formed by the Government was that the price fetched was not adequate. That conclusion is taken on the basis of Government expectations. We are unable to agree with the High Court in its conclusion. Neither the provisions of the Act nor the order issued by the Government lend any support to such a conclusion.
In the cases of public auctions or in the case of calling for tenders, orders from the Government directing its subordinates to notify or hold the auctions or call for tenders is understandable. Public auctions as well as calling for tenders are done by subordinate officials. Further due publicity is necessary in adopting those methods. TOP require the Government to make an order that it is going to sell one or more of the privileges in question by negotiating with some one is to make a mockery of the law. If the Government can enter into negotiation with any person, as we think it can, it makes no sense to require it to first make an order that it is going to negotiate with that person. We must understand a provision of law reasonably. Section 29 (2) (a) does not speak of any order. It says that "the State Government may by general or special order direct". The direction contemplated by that provision is a direction to subordinate officials. It is meaningless to say that the Government should direct itself. In the result these appeals are allowed
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1972 (3) TMI 82 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erty from a dealer bona fide for valuable consideration without notice of the proceedings, the transfer in his favour shall be saved under the proviso even though it is hit by the main part of the section. The view taken by the revenue authorities that the expression without notice of the proceedings in the proviso refers to the dealer and not to the transferee is not correct. Thus, there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 10.. We, therefore, hereby allow the petition and quash the order of the Additional Tahsildar, Gwalior, dated 28th August, 1970 (vide annexure 4) and of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Gwalior, dated 26th November, 1970 (annexure 5). It would be open to the authorities to consider the objection of the petitioner afresh in proper perspective as indicated above. We make no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 81 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the meaning of the explanation to section 2(c) of the Act. Sri S.L. Gupta is said to be the dealer by application of the fiction in the explanation under section 2(c) of the Act. It becomes difficult for us, under the circumstances, to accept the stand of the opposite parties that the notice under section 13-A(1) was a valid one and was in terms of the statutory requirements. 7.. We would, accordingly, allow the writ petition, quash the notices in question dated 16th October, 1971, and 21st December, 1971, issued by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Balasore-I Circle, to the Commandant, Proof and Experiment Establishment at Chandipur in the district of Balasore as per annexures 7 and 12 of the writ petition. We, however, make it clear that it is open to the taxing department to take again appropriate action under section 13-A(1) of the Act in accordance with law. The writ petition succeeds in part. There shall be no order as to costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Petition partly allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecessary. Even on a cursory perusal of section 17(3) of the Amending Act in that case, it becomes manifest that the language used in that Amending Act is wholly different from the language used by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in section 8(1) of the Amending Act, which has already been reproduced in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. The words notwithstanding anything in the judgment, decree or order of any court found in section 8(1) of the Amending Act are not found in section 17(3) of the Amending Act in the Madras case. Hence the decision so strongly relied upon by the learned counsel, Sri S. Dasaratharama Reddy, for the petitioner is distinguishable on facts. In the instant case, the Commercial Tax Officer had revised not the order of the High court, but his own order made earlier. We, therefore, reject this contention. No other contention was raised. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 79 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n be taxed only to the extent of price of ballast supplied after making a proper enquiry in that behalf or even that portion of the turnover which really represents the labour charges can also be taxed. It is also to be considered whether the assessing authority could make enquiry in that behalf even though the agreements are composite ones. These points have not been fully argued before us. Moreover they do not seem to have been canvassed before the appropriate authorities. We find it therefore difficult to decide that question. In the circumstances, it is open to the petitioners to adopt such remedies as are available to them if they think that they are entitled to the refund of the portion of tax which they have paid on the ground that no sales tax could have been levied on that part of the turnover which represents the labour charges. We would, therefore, dismiss the writ petitions with costs, one set in W.P. No. 3645 of 1971. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 78 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , I would answer the second question also in the affirmative. In the result, the appeal and the writ petition are allowed, the impugned notice dated 17th September, 1966, and further proceedings on its basis are quashed. It will, however, be open to the assessing authority to issue a fresh notice to the assessee requiring the latter to prove that the materials purchased by it on the basis of its certificate of registration were actually used by it in sizing, bleaching and dyeing of goods of other dealers and that those goods were for sale or were actually sold in the course of inter-State trade. It is only on the company s failure to prove that fact, that the question of its having contravened the conditions of its certificate or the provisions of clause (b) of section 8(3) of the Act would arise. In view of the complicated question of law involved, the parties are left to bear their own costs in both the courts. HARBANS SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Appeal and writ petition allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o 12th March, 1968, for the delay, the respondent was responsible. In that view, therefore, the petitioner s firm cannot be made liable for the delay of the respondent in the disposal of the application, and the notice under section 9 in respect of the period commencing from 10th November, 1966, to 30th September, 1967, is bad and it cannot be said that the petitioner has failed to get himself registered as the application was pending before the Commercial Tax Officer. The same cannot be said, however, in respect of the period between 8th July, 1966, and 9th November, 1966. In the circumstances, therefore, this rule succeeds in part. The notice under section 11(2) for the period between 10th November, 1966, and 30th September, 1967, must stand quashed but the notice for the period from 8th July, 1966, to 9th November, 1966, must, however, be effective notice. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1972 (3) TMI 76 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... osit into the Government treasury the amount of Rs. 61,011 said to have been collected by it as sales tax on account of sale of mica during the year 1950-51? 2.. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the dealer that section 20-A(3) of the Act is ultra vires and, therefore, the order of the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes for depositing the aforesaid amount is bad and the reference must be answered in the negative. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. The State of Bihar 1970 26 S.T.C. 254 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 946., the Supreme Court has held that section 20-A(3), (4) and (5) are ultra vires of the State Legislature. It is obvious, therefore, that the Superintendent of Commercial Taxes had no authority to direct the dealer to deposit the aforesaid amount and he could not direct it to do so. In the circumstances, the question referred to the court is answered in the negative. There will be no order as to costs. S.P. SINHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1972 (3) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oral submission. In the case before us, we find that the Sales Tax Officer had fixed 2nd July, 1963, as the specific date on which the assessee was required to show cause. The assessee could appear and have his say in the matter on that date. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the dealer, therefore, is clearly distinguishable on facts, but the observations made in that case support the view which we are taking in this case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of section 15-A(3) had been fully complied with in this case and the assessee was given sufficient opportunity of being heard. Our answer to the question as reframed by us is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the dealer was given an opportunity of being heard before imposing penalty as provided in section 15-A(3) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (3) TMI 74 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no goods had been sold, there was no question of adding them to the taxable turnover of the assessee, but if the goods had been sold then the mere fact that M/s. Gurdial Singh Sohan Singh, a registered firm, had stopped its business would be no ground to penalise the assessee when the sales had been made in accordance with the rules. The assessee had complied with the provisions of law while selling the goods to that firm after receiving from it form S.T. XXII and, therefore, the liability, if any, had to fall on the purchasing dealer. If the dealer had closed its business, it was for the department to cancel its registration certificate or not to issue form S.T. XXII. For the reasons recorded above, the only answer to the question referred to us has to be in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. SANDHAWALIA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1972 (3) TMI 73 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... k petitioner No. 1 to submit monthly returns and to make an assessment for a broken period, there was no question of imposing any penalty for not filing monthly returns within time or for the late payment of tax on the basis of monthly returns and on that ground also the imposition of penalty on petitioner No. 1 by respondent No. 1 must be held to be illegal. 20.. For the reasons stated above, I accept both the contentions which have been raised by Mr. Sen and hold that the order of assessment passed by respondent No. 1 (annexure 1) is illegal and without jurisdiction. 21.. In the result, this application is allowed and the order of assessment (annexure 1) is quashed by a writ of certiorari. There will be no order as to costs. 22.. It will be open to the sales tax authorities to pass a fresh order of assessment against petitioner No. 1 for the entire period, 1st of April, 1968, to the 31st of March, 1969, in accordance with law. AKBAR HUSAIN, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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