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Showing 41 to 60 of 81 Records
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1972 (3) TMI 72 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In Ashoka Marketing v. State of Bihar 1970 26 S.T.C. 254 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 946. , it is observed The State Legislature may, under entry 54, List II, be competent to enact a law in respect of matters necessarily incidental to tax on the sale and purchase of goods . 10.. There is no substance in the contention that sub-section (2) of section 8 imposes a penalty on utilising the goods and is outside the said entry. 11.. Thus viewed, section 8(2) of the Act must be upheld as intra vires and valid. The petitioner, who transferred bidi leaves worth Rs. 12,46,824.62 to its branches outside the State, although the leaves had been purchased by it at the concessional rate of 1 per cent. from the Forest Department on production of a declaration in Form XII-A, incurred liability under sub-section (2) of section 8. 12.. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 71 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... il, 1963, to 30th September, 1963, as possible omissions were made with reference to any evidence or material on the contrary they show that having found the evidence of clandestine dealing, the sales tax authorities thought that they were now entitled to make any guess howsoever wild it may be. Having already determined and added the suppressed sales on the basis of the materials available, further addition towards suppressed sales as possible omission was anything but based on or having reference to any material on the record. In my opinion, therefore, the answer to the questions must be in the negative, namely, that the additions of Rs. 5,76,887.41 for the assessment year 1961-62 and Rs. 2,85,471.37 for the period 1st April, 1963, to 30th September, 1963, on account of possible omissions were not legal and valid. The references (are answered accordingly. The department is to pay costs. Hearing fee Rs. 150. SHAMBHU PRASAD SINGH, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1972 (3) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to make a final assessment under section 7(3) of the Act after the assessment year is over, even though he may not have made a provisional assessment or initiated proceedings for assessment within the course of the assessment year. In the result, we answer the questions in S.T.R. No. 138 of 1970 and S.T.R. No. 612 of 1965 in the affirmative and that in S.T.R. No. 550 of 1969 in the negative. The writ petition is not maintainable as there is still no operative order affecting the rights of the petitioner. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs in each case. By the Court We answer the questions referred as follows Sales Tax Reference No. 612 of 1965 In the affirmative. Sales Tax Reference No. 550 of 1969 In the negative. Sales Tax Reference No. 138 of 1970 In the affirmative. The writ petition is dismissed. In each case the parties will bear their own costs. References answered accordingly. Writ petition dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 the opportunity of being heard which was to be given to the assessees, would include within its sweep the right of cross-examination of a third party whose accounts were the basis of the best judgment assessments made by the Sales Tax Officer and the examination of which later on showed that the returns filed by the assessees were incorrect and incomplete?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. On a true interpretation of section 17(3), the proviso thereto and rule 15, the inescapable conclusion would be that the assessee has been given a statutory right to prove the correctness of his return by showing that the materials on the basis of which his return is found to be incorrect or incomplete are wrong and if for this purpose the assessee makes an express prayer for cross-examining the wholesale dealers whose accounts formed the sheet-anchor of the notice issued to the assessee, he is undoubtedly entitled to cross-examine such wholesale dealers. In view of the language in which the Rules are couched it seems to us that a determinative issue arises in this case-the department taking the stand that the returns filed by the assessees are incorrect and incomplete, whereas the assessees contend that their returns are correct and that the accounts of the wholesale dealers which formed the basis of the information of the sales tax authorities were wrong and incorrect.
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1972 (3) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... of Johnston and Chevis JJ. held that under section 169 only one appeal was competent and if that appeal had been made to the Division Court no further appeal lay to the Chief Court. Section 169 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, read Appeals from any order or decision made or given in the matter of winding up of a company by the court may be had in the same manner and subject to the same conditions in, and subject to which, appeals may be had from any order or decision of the same court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction, subject to this restriction, that no such appeal shall be heard, unless notice of the same is given within three weeks, alter which any order complained of has been made, These provisions are more or less akin to the provisions in section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. We, therefore, accept the preliminary objection and hold that no second appeal lay to this court under section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956, or under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
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1972 (3) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Balance sheet - Default in filing copies of ... ... ... ... ..... d them each to pay a fine of Rs. 200. The petitioners in this revision contended that they have been wrongly convicted. One who is charged with an offence could not rely on his own default as an answer to the charge and if a person charged was responsible for not calling the general meeting, he cannot be heard to say, in defence to the charge, that the general meeting had not been called. In other words, it the person charged with the failure to carry out the requirements of the section could have called the meeting, he cannot defeat the provisions of the section simply by not calling the meeting wilfully (vide State of Bombay v. Bandhan Ram Bhandani 1961 31 Comp. Cas. 1 1961 1 SCR 1961 SC 186). The petitioners have been correctly convicted and the convictions are confirmed. The sentences of fine imposed on the petitioners are reduced to Rs. 100 each. Excess fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioners herein. With this reduction in sentence, the revision is dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 49 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Shares capital – Reduction of ... ... ... ... ..... be that payment of preference shares would be valid only in the case of winding-up of the company in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But it does not follow from it that there is a prohibition anywhere in the provisions of the Act from a scheme, as we have before us, providing for payment of preference shares in the course of amalgamation, resulting in the transfer of all the rights and liabilities of the amalgamating companies and the new company undertaking liability to all their creditors. As Palaniswamy J. has rightly observed, the amalgamating companies are proposed to be dissolved without winding-up and, therefore, the provisions relating to winding-up are not attracted. In rejecting this objection as not tenable, we entirely agree with what Palaniswamy J. has stated. The appeal is dismissed. As the other appeals stand on no different footing, they too are dismissed. Costs in none of them. In view of the dismissal of the appeals, the stay will stand dissolved.
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1972 (3) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Samples - Testing - Yarn count testing ... ... ... ... ..... he Excise authorities that the yarn manufactured by the petitioners during the relevant period was above 51 NF counts cannot be accepted as conclusive. If really the yarn manufactured by the petitioner during the relevant period was above 51 NF counts, they could have sold the yarn for a considerably higher price and also collected the excise duty at the rate of Rs. 1.25 per kilo. There is no reason as to why the petitioners should collect a lesser price for the yarn and also collect the excise duty at a lesser rate if in fact the yarn produced by them was above 51 NF counts. The fact that they have collected only a lesser price and the lesser rate of excise duty shows that the test conducted by them in the factory should have shown the counts to be less than 51 NF counts. We, therefore, find that the petitioners are entitled to the refund claimed by them. The Writ Petition is, therefore, allowed and the order of the respondent is quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Remand - Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... reports etc., are not here, it does not follow that there were no such Documents and the matter should be conveniently redecided by the Department. It is very unfortunate that this case should come before me nearly 20 years after the goods were actually imported. This is due to the fact that the case was first in the Calcutta High Court and then came to this Court after having gone to the Supreme Court. It would, therefore, in my view the entirely wrong to have the case re-opened in this way. The absence of the test reports and the failure to make them over to the petitioners or to take samples in their presence has led in my view to a breach of the rules of natural justice and, therefore, entitles the petitioners to a writ. In this view of the matter, I accept the Writ petition and quash the orders dated 20th September, 1950 and 8th April, 1952. In case the penalty has been paid, the same will now be refunded to the petitioners. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Sugar - Duty liability, rebate ... ... ... ... ..... uch dirty sugar . It is only by reprocessing dirty sugar that ultimately marketable sugar is recovered. In the process some dirty sugar is lost. It is thus clear that the expression sugar produced does not take in within its fold every kind of sugar in the process of transformation. The expression sugar has a distinct meaning and it is only such sugar that is fit for consumption alone that can be called sugar produced . In view of what the Supreme Court has expressed, it must be held that the interpretation put on the expression sugar produced by the learned single Judge is not correct. There is also the further fact that no duty was levied on dirty sugar before it became a finished product and when it was not subject to levy of any excise duty we fail to understand how any rebate could be claimed on goods which were not excisable goods. We therefore reverse the order of our learned brother, allow the appeal and dismiss the writ petition with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100/-.
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1972 (3) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... hich she impugnes in this proceedings, she asked for a fresh test being conducted. But that could not obviously be done because there was no other sample available, and the only sample taken had been sent up to the Chemical Examiner. In our view the Authorities have chosen to act on a material without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to effectively challenge the correctness of the same and this amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. We are, therefore, of the view that the demands in this case cannot be sustained. 6.In view of the fact that the demands by the Authorities on the petitioner are quashed even on the first of the contentions urged by the petitioner, the other contentions are not dealt with as being unnecessary. It is, however, open to the Authorities to proceed to take such proceedings as they consider necessary in respect of the paint oil manufactured by the petitioner in accordance with law. 7.The Writ Petition is allowed. No costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Demand raised under Rule 9(2) was invalid if goods were cleared without payment of duty and were within the knowledge of the excise authorities
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1972 (3) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the shipment and export of iron ore by the appellant became liable to the said duty introduced on 2 August, 1966?
Held that:- Section 16 of the 1962 Act speaks of the fictional date only in relation to the order the date of entry outwards of the vessel. In the present case, the order of entry outwards of the vessel was made prior to 2 August, 1966. Therefore, the Customs Authorities in the impugned order acted without jurisdiction in imposing duty on the export by holding that the date of entry outwards of the vessel was the date "when the vessel arrived".
For the foregoing reasons the appellant is entitled to an order cancelling the notice dated 28 January, 1967 by which the Customs Authorities demanded duty from the appellant. The order of the Judicial Commissioner is set aside. There will be a writ setting aside the notice dated 28 January, 1967 and an order forbearing the respondents from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 28 January, 1967. There will also be an order quashing the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs dated 19 April, 1967 which gave effect to the notice and held the appellant liable to pay the export duty.
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1972 (3) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Excise duty-Excisable goods manufactured for own consumption - Dutiablity ... ... ... ... ..... factured for one s own consumption and those for sale. It is well established that in the matter of levy of excise duty the notion of commerce or trade cannot be imported. The will be clear from the following passage in M/s. Chhotabhai v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1006 at page 1018. In our view, a duty of excise is a tax levy on home-produced goods of a specified class or description, the duty being calculated according to the quantity or value of the goods and which is levied because of the mere fact of the goods having been produced or manufactured and unrelated to and not dependent on any commercial transaction in them. The duty in the present case satisfied this test and therefore it is unnecessary to this test and therefore it is unnecessary to seek other grounds for sustaining the validity of the tax. 5. In the foregoing circumstances, the petitioner s contention has to be rejected. The writ petition is therefore dismissed, but under the circumstances, without costs.
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1972 (3) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the facts established in this case support the plea of estoppel put forward by Hungerford?
Whether there was any waiver or abandonment as pleaded by Hungerford?
Held that:- Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be viewed in one of the two ways, i.e., that that provision does not apply to incorporated companies at all or alternatively that the incorporated companies must be held to reside in places where they carry on their activities and thus being present in all those places. Hungerford is an investment company. It had invested large sums of monies in Turner Morrison. Its board of directors used to meet in India now and then. It was (through its representatives) attending the general meeting of the shareholders of Turner Morrison. Under these circumstances, it must be held to have been residing in this country and consequently was not absent from this country. Hence, section 15(5) cannot afford any assistance to Turner Morrison to save the bar of limitation.
For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and it is dismissed
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1972 (3) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Income Tax, Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ive remedy available to him by way of a further appeal to the Tribunal would not have been adequate or sufficient for his purpose. The only other matter to which I would like to refer is the provision in section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. That section deals with repeals and savings and provides for different circumstances where the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the Income-tax Act, 1961, are to be applied in assessment and also in penalty proceedings. Admittedly, in, this case, no penalty has yet been imposed upon the appellant. If and when such penalty is imposed upon the appellant for omission on his part to pay the assessment already made, the question as to under which Act, viz., the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the Income-tax Act, 1961, penalty would be recovered, would have to be considered. It seems to us that a discussion on this question at this stage is premature. For these reasons, I agree with the order made by my Lord. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1972 (3) TMI 25 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, 1953 - This is an application filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ to declare the provisions of section 34(1)(b) and (1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It is also prayed that the respondents should be restrained from enforcing these provisions in respect of the estate of the petitioner's father - It is true that the constitutional validity could not have been questioned before the authorities under the Act, but, nothing could have been lost if the petitioner had waited till he exhausted all the remedies and then come to this court. In any case, since we have held that the provisions of the Act are not unconstitutional, we would reject the writ petition - Petition dismissed
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1972 (3) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that renewal of registration under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was wrongly refused to the firm for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 ? " Questions answered in the affirmative
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1972 (3) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessee was compensated by payment for the loss of income or profit suffered by the wrongful act of the customers - amount received by the assessee as compromise decree consequent to the filing of suit for compensation for causing loss of part of assessee's business - true character of the money received by the asseesee on the basis of the consent decree, therefore, represents compensation for loss to the assessee in its trade and not for any loss of any capital asset and the said amount must, therefore, be considered to be a trading receipt of the assessee
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1972 (3) TMI 22 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Official liquidator was appointed as the provisional liquidator of the company on December 5, 1967, and an order was made for the winding up of the company on May 10, 1968, when the official liquidator became the liquidator - Whether leave of company court for issuing the note is necessary – validity of notice
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